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Abstract 
The political transition in May 1998 set the stage for the passing of Indonesia's 
framework decentralisation laws (numbers 22 and 25 of 1999). These laws include 
both political and technocratic efforts to devolve authority from the centre (Jakarta) to 
the peripheries. Contrary to expectations, enhanced public participation often takes 
the form of indigenous (adat) revivalism, a highly contested and contingent process 
linked to intensified political struggles and conflicts throughout the archipelago. 
This thesis considers the ways in which decentralisation and adat revivalism 
intersect by foregrounding specific, localised struggles for rights and recognition in 
Sulawesi,, eastern Indonesia. Year-long research for this thesis was conducted at 
national, provincial, and local levels, with an emphasis on case studies from the 
districts of Bulukumba, East Luwu, Gowa, Majene, North Luwu, Palopo, and Tana 
Toraja. 
The core chapters of this thesis suggest that the innate, primordial givens of 
indigenous communities are being selectively drawn upon, finely-tuned, and 
exemplified in the search for political rights and recognition. It is argued, therefore, 
that village communities are increasingly engaged in a process of "becoming 
indigenous, " a process largely driven, instrumentalised, and distorted by external 
actors such as NGO activists and legal advocates. Local disputes increasingly derive 
from the primary, exigent right of recognition, and then extend to remedial rights 
including customary tenure, resource entitlement, and the right to return to antedated 
systems of governance. 
In the era of decentralisation there is no unified, grand procedural strategy for 
dealing with the political challenges posed by adat revivalism. In response to the 
devolution of authority from Jakarta to the peripheries, however, the political 
contours of conflict mediation and dispute resolution are being reconfigured, and the 
roles of all protagonists are evolving (or regressing) accordingly. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
This thesis engages with the politics of decentralisation and indigenous (adat) 
revivalism in Sulawesi, eastern Indonesia, by foregrounding specific local struggles 
for rights and recognition. Since Indonesia's "big bang" political transition in May 
1998, a highly visible process of adat revivalism has been gaining momentum. Adat is 
a fluid, contingent concept encompassing a wide range of customs and traditions 
unique to each of Sulawesi's ethnic groups. Depending on the local context, adat may 
represent antedated systems of governance based on oral traditions and customary 
law, provide ceremonial protocol for marriages and funerals, or determine patterns of 
land usage and entitlement, among other things. 
Beyond simply "being indigenous" (Alfred and Corntassel 2005: 597), this 
thesis argues that adat revivalism is a matter of "becoming indigenous" based on 
selective representations, articulations, and deployments of the past. Critics such as 
Kaldor (2004: 164) argue that appeals to indigenism are counterproductive and 
paternalistic, a form of "blocking pastism" that "obscures the everyday experiences 
and concerns of present generations". By contrast, Smith (2004: 204) contends that the 
aim is not to "recreate the past in the present, " but rather to use the past as an 
"inspiration and means for renewing decayed or fragmented societies, so as to make 
them viable and confident in the face of the pressures of modernity". This contention 
is echoed by Morrell (2001: 440), who found that representations of indigenous 
culture in South Sulawesi are based on "selective appropriations of the past" which 
are relevant to the needs of modem society. 
Consistent with Azarya's (2003: 2) path-breaking findings in Africa, there 
seems to be no contradiction in Indonesia between primordial and instrumental 
aspects of indigenism. Indeed, they often reinforce each other. Primordial attachments 
have been defined as the "assumed givens" of a community's innate social existence, 
including kinship, birthrights, shared histories and languages, territorial attachments, 
and social connections (Geertz 1973: 259; Geertz 1994: 3 1). Instrumentalism refers to 
the mechanisms and processes through which social "givens" are appropriated and 
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propagated by actors with the capacity to shape political outcomes. This involves 
social transformation, influencing perceptions, inflecting meanings, claiming 
66 guardianship" over the past, and ensuring acceptance by the wider community 
through subtle or coercive means (Coakley 2004: 531-534). ' 
By framing the debate around the socially constructed process of "becoming 
indigenous, " this thesis highlights the instrumental roles played by all parties actively 
intervening in localised settings "in the name of adat" (Henley and Davidson 2007: 1). 
In response to the devolution of authority from Jakarta to the peripheries, the contours 
of conflict mediation and dispute resolution have been reconfigured, and the roles of 
all protagonists have evolved (or regressed) accordingly. 
Van Klinken (2001: 324) underscores the broad distinctions in nationalist 
discourses: there are inclusive, democratising forms of nationalism known as "civic,, )9 
as well as exclusionary, essentialist forms known as "ethnic" that tend to "highlight 
myths of origin". The nation-building project in Indonesia has made use of both of 
these forms (van Klinken 2001: 324). Since 1998, notions of ethnicity and adat have 
become increasingly instrumentalised, tied to specific political projects and interests. 
The primordial traits of the archetypal Indonesian village are subject to constant 
reconfiguration as actors compete over finite resources and lucrative lands. Power 
brokers continue to devise new and innovative ways to capture and shape the politics 
of tradition in particular local settings. 
In the context of decentralisation, disputes over land rights, political 
recognition, and resource entitlements have proliferated and intensified throughout 
Indonesia. Contemporary scholarship is both conceptually rich and empirically sound, 
though it has yet to keep pace with these rapid changes. This thesis therefore 
examines both the constructed perceptions and real consequences of adat revivalism 
by foregrounding complex, contingent, politicised struggles in specific local settings. 
The core research questions are: 
1 On the debate between primordialism and instrumentalism, see McKay (19 82) and Eller and 
Coughlan (1993). 
3 
1. Looking at both processes and outcomes of decentralisation, to what extent 
have district regulations in recognition of adat become tools of emancipation 
for local communities? 
2. To what degree have third-parties, external supporters, government officials, 
and corporate strategists driven (or captured) the process of adat revivalism, 
inflecting meanings, shaping perceptions, and articulating local strategies? 
3. In terms of consequences, has third-party intervention fostered a growing 
dependency on outside representation, marginalising ordinary villagers in 
dispute resolution processes? 
4. In the enabling context of decentralisation, to what extent has adat revivalism 
created opportunities for peaceful collaboration between all protagonists? 
5. Conversely, to what extent has it exacerbated local land conflicts, fomenting 
divisions within and between communities, corporations, and government? 
Conceptualising Adat Communities 
In his analysis of nationalism and ethnic conflict in Indonesia, Bertrand (2004: 5) 
argues that the democratic transition in 1998 triggered widespread actions and 
struggles which revolved around questions of political representation. Regional and 
local conflicts often coalesce around forms of ethnic representation, which are 
constantly being renegotiated, along with resource allocations and entitlements, and 
efforts to preserve (or reinvent) cultural identities. 
While this thesis may appear to present 'adat' as a received and tangible 
reality, this form of presentation is essentially a heuristic device. I am fully aware that 
adat is a contested and constructed term,, framed by a set of quasi-ideological 
understandings. But to place adat literally within quotation marks throughout what 
follows would place a heavy burden on both the author and the reader, requiring 
constant refocusing and reframing. I have therefore elected to omit those quotation 
marks in the rest of the thesis,, while providing here a constructivist lens through 
which to view the notion of adat. 
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Discourses of adat are being deployed with great frequency in Sulawesi, 
eastern Indonesia. Power brokers are attempting to exploit Indonesia's volatile 
decentralisation process in order to capture and shape the politics of tradition in 
particular local settings. In many cases, adat revivalism becomes the basis for local 
land claims (ownership, resource entitlements, compensation), sets the terms for 
exigent struggles (recognition), and provides the model for autonomous village 
governance. When speaking of adat communities, it must be acknowledged that 
identities and boundaries are constructed in the course of long-range social and 
political processes. As observed in Africa, selective representations of local 
indigenous communities are subject to constant negotiation and reconfiguration 
(Azarya 2003: 1). 
Representing local communities through the accentuation of adat serves 
specific purposes, goals, and interests. Communities may work with local leaders, 
activists, organisers, entrepreneurs, and opportunists in order to improve their relative 
positions over perceived opponents. They may attempt to enlarge adat boundaries 
(building a broad, inclusive basis of support), or contract them (stressing exclusivity, 
distinction, and superiority). The dangers of clientelism-the reciprocal, dependency 
relationship causing the weak to sell their autonomy to powerful and wealthy patrons 
for protection-are always present (Lemarchand and Legg 1972; Szeftel 2000). 
In decentralised settings, the local has become a focal point for struggles over 
rights, recognition, autonomy, resource entitlements, land ownership, power, and 
legitimacy. Notions of adat are redeployed and reforinulated as conflicts unfold and 
political conditions change. Land title and tenure conflicts are of central importance 
in the era of decentralisation. A local community may determine (internally) or be 
convinced (externally) that "becoming indigenous" or reviving adat is in their best 
interests. Thus new representations emerge based on shifting attributes such as 
religious beliefs, collective names, languages, geographical territories, shared 
histories, myths of origin, shared grievances, customs, traditions, land tenure, and 
cultivation patterns. 
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There are, of course, primordial aspects of adat communities that are more 
than simply colonial creations, post-colonial constructions, or invented traditions. 
Throughout Indonesia there are local adat communities with recognisable ascriptive 
features, including blood, kin, and ancestral ties, which inform their beliefs and 
behaviours. This thesis,, however, is more concerned with the constructivist impact of 
colonial and post-colonial periods, along with selective representations of adat in 
highly contested and politicised locations. 
At different stages in history the reification of adat occurred, particularly 
when it suited the interests of colonial authorities or embattled indigenous rulers 
(Gibson 2000: 54; Pelras 1993: 142). There were many instances during which Dutch 
authorities recreated adat tribunals, codified adat laws, celebrated indigenous culture,, 
and empowered loyal chiefs in the hopes of restoring order (undermining religious 
extremism and political radicalism), and achieving stability (investment, trade, 
resource extraction). 
It is clear that colonial imperatives such as administration and resource 
extraction led to the reification of ethnic identities and the selective empowerment of 
native rulers. Anthropologists, linguists, educators, missionaries, Leiden law experts, 
romanticists, Orientalists,, and colonial officials also contributed to this reification. In 
the authoritarian post-colonial era this resulted in the domestication of adat through 
territorial delineation and ethnic classification, along with the indexing, codifying, 
microfilming and archiving of customs and traditions. In the era of democratic 
decentralisation (post-1998), these "transmissions of indigenous knowledge" have 
been selectively adopted and constructed by local communities and their supporters, 
those eager to accentuate adat and reclaim control over customary lands (Azarya 
2003: 13). 
In terms of positive framing, the accentuation of adat serves specific political 
and technocratic goals that align with donor discourses and mainstream NGO 
agendas. Examples include sustainable ecological management, agrarian reform, 
indigenous rights, good governance, efficient administration, genuine autonomy, 
capacity building, poverty alleviation, community driven development, public 
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participation, and village emancipation. There are substantial financial resources and 
support facilities available from donors such as the World Bank, the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), 
the British Department for International Development (DfID), the Ford Foundation, 
and the Gennan Technical Assistance (GTZ) in support of such objectives. 
Framed negatively, the politics of adat revivalism is vulnerable to capture and 
containment, the misprepresentation of communities, the vices of clientelism, 
patronage and cooptation, and the often violent consequences of exclusionary, 
chauvinistic ethnicisation (Elmhirst 2001: 293; Li 2001: 662). This indicates that 
fundamental issues of political representation and ethnic accentuation have yet to be 
fully resolved. Hence the hanging questions about "who" is a member of an adat 
community, "how" the balance of power within these communities is determined, 
"where" they are to be found, and "under what circumstances" adat communities are 
to be recognised as legitimate bearers of rights and entitlements (Bourchier 
2007: 124). 
Subsequent chapters examine the extent to which conflicts and political 
struggles are represented as indigenous in nature, and the ways in which adat 
discourses are used in the management of such conflicts. References to local 
communities and adat communities are contained throughout this thesis. "The local" 
in Indonesia has long been a site of political struggle and contestation. Any local 
community claiming indigenous status will be able to draw upon a repertoire of 
cultural symbols and meanings. 
There are, of course, indigenous characteristics (reverence for land, elaborate 
ceremonies and rituals) unique to adat communities in South Sulawesi, allowing 
observers to distinguish between Sa'dan highlanders in Tana Toraja and coastal spirit 
cults in Kajang Dalam, Bulukurnba. That said, indigenous identities and boundaries 
are constructed in the course of long-term social processes, political transitions, and 
conflict management. Selective representations of local adat communities therefore 
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result from constant negotiation and reconfiguration, the processes and implications 
of which shall be examined throughout the substantive chapters of this thesis. 
Briefing: Decentralisation and Adat 
Chapter two provides detailed analysis of each critical phase in Indonesia's history as 
it pertains to the creation of the modem state, the administration of land, and the 
cumulative forging of the "constitutive political conditions" that stand in the way of 
emancipation for rural indigenous communities (Lipschutz 2005: 242). Meanwhile, 
the following is a brief account of the features of the Indonesian state which are 
pertinent to customary land tenure and indigenous revivalism. 
By May of 1998 economic crisis and mounting pressures for democratic 
reforms culminated in the resignation of President Suharto, the "father" of Indonesian 
development. Prior to this much lauded transition, an era known as the New Order 
(1966-1998) was characterised by developmental authoritarianism and premised on a 
highly centralised military and bureaucratic system. During this period, local 
differentiation was suppressed and overt attempts to standardise village and regional 
affairs hastened the decline of traditional sources of authority throughout Indonesia. 
Indeed, policy during this era was believed to have "seriously eroded the varied local 
governance regimes across Indonesia that had their roots in local customary 
institutions and sensibilities" (Warren 2005: 50). 
Since 1998 Indonesia has joined the ranks of Southeast Asia's emerging 
democracies. One of the most far reaching policies tabled during the interregnum 
period was that of decentralisation. Considering the geopolitical features of the 
Indonesian archipelago 2, decentralisation seems a logical way to usher in reforms in 
order to meet demands for greater participation, representation, legal recognition and 
accountability-the so-called pillars of local democracy. These pillars were markedly 
2 Indonesia is the fourth most populous country in the world with a population of some 220 million, 
and is the world's largest Muslim nation. There are approximately 17,000 islands that constitute the 
archipelago, although some 4,000 are uninhabited. The decentralisation legislation is said to impact 
upon at least 62,500 villages throughout Indonesia (Antl6v 2003 a: 194), representing a highly complex 
political and administrative experiment. 
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absent from the first decentralisation experiment in Indonesia in 1903, where the 
Dutch established local councils for natives with limited powers and strict central 
oversight (Legge 1980: 136). Contemporary devolution serves to bring politics "closer 
to the people, " encouraging local fonns of autonomy and democracy, cultural 
diversity and tolerance, popular participation, civic and ethnic empowernient, and 
government accountability (Crawford 2008: 235). 3 
Adat revivalism is one of the most visible manifestations of the public 
participation project in Indonesia. Li (2007: 365) refers to this as a "contradictory 
conundrum, " whereby harmonious indigenous communities possess innate political 
rights and authentic lifestyles, yet are in need of protection and renewal in order to be 
"brought into line with new standards". These new standards are set out in 
Indonesia's framework decentralisation laws (numbers 22/1999 and 25/1999). Since 
decentralisation,, adat "has acquired great symbolic and rhetorical importance, " as 
well as fuelling political activity, enhancing participation, and forging new activist 
alliances in support of formerly disenfranchised constituencies (von Benda- 
Beckmann et al. 2001: 33). 
As a cornerstone of decentralisation, public sphere or popular participation is 
a highly contested concept. Local groups, actors, and associations are increasingly 
agitating for change, though their methods and strategies differ dramatically. In 
instances where political participation is equated with "becoming indigenous, " it may 
spur popular mobilisation, divisiveness, exclusivity, resistance, emulation, 
withdrawal, rejection, or affirmation. There is no decisive way to predict with any 
reliability how these reinvigorated forms of participation will translate into 
substantive changes on the ground. This uncertainty stems from the fact that people 
are motivated in different ways, some acting for personal gain, some vying for 
exclusive control over and access to resources, and others committed to community 
development and the common good. 
There is an immensely complex ethno-history behind processes of indigenous 
revival, which are perfectly suited to Armstrong's (1982) and Smith's (1986) analysis 
3 See chapter two for a comprehensive discussion on decentralisation. 
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of la longue dur& (the long-term approach to exploring the layered nature of 
ethnicity and patterns of cultural identity). Such explorations are not of primary 
concern to this thesis; however, some historical background on adat is needed. 
Historically, there was never an exact word in any Indonesian language for the 
English "law" or the Dutch "recht". In the "modemised, Europeanised Malay" 
adapted by Republican leaders after independence, however, the Arabic terms 'adat 
(custom) and hukum (law) were officially adopted as "customary law" (Prins 
1951: 283-284). Adatrecht was first popularised by the Dutch in the early 1900s, 
though for centuries adat was said to comprise "all things Indonesian, " including 
societal rules, customs, politics, perceptions of justice, and even the "personal habits 
of an individual" (Prins 1951: 284). In other words, adat provided "the cosmological 
order, the primary, perhaps sometimes the only, explanation that rendered the world 
intelligible and informed one as to how to act in it" (Acciaioli 1985: 152). 
Broadly speaking, adat encompasses a wide range of customs and traditions 
unique to each region of Indonesia. 4 It is . moreover, a 
fluid concept, not fixed, and for 
much of history it existed as an oral tradition encompassing local law, authority, 
marriage, investitures, land use, traditional house-building, the holding of annual 
feasts,, rituals,, and the arts. By transposing the traditional concept of adat onto a 
contemporary political platform, a situation tends to emerge where it is selectively 
"defined in different ways in different places and among different groups" (Elmhirst 
2001: 292). 
Recent efforts by local communities and their supporters to link notions of 
adat with burgeoning political movements towards local democracy must be 
scrutinised further. While the recent convergence between decentralisation and 
atavistic struggle has given rise to new opportunities for redressing decades, even 
centuries of repression and maladministration, it also harbours unforeseen threats and 
uncertainties that must be investigated. Particular reference will be made to adat 
struggles over land, resource entitlement, and the revitalisation of antedated systems 
4 Geertz (1967: 24) distinguished over three hundred cultures and more than two hundred languages in 
Indonesia, without even accounting for the great complexities of Papua (Irian Jaya). 
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of governance by drawing on empirical findings from Sulawesi, an island in resource- 
rich eastern Indonesia. 
Briefing: Sulawesi 
Eastern Indonesia is host to 79 per cent of the country's ethnic and linguistic 
diversity, and throughout the four peninsulaS5 of Sulawesi there is an intriguing 
process underway to make use of traditional knowledge and to support its application 
in contemporary politics (SOfEI 2006: 15). Makassar, the capital of South Sulawesi 
province, is often referred to as the gateway to Eastern Indonesia. Therefore it follows 
that the city of Makassar is a suitable location from which to begin investigating 
ethno-historical reconstructions, indigenous articulations and the political revival of 
adat in Sulawesi. 
Since the implementation of decentralisation (January 2001), a process of 
administrative blossoming has occurred, meaning that new provinces have been 
formed and districts have fragmented. 6 For instance, the Greater Luwu district of 
South Sulawesi has been subdivided into four districts, and West Sulawesi became a 
separate province in 2004. There are currently 25 districts 7 in South Sulawesi, the 
average population of which is approximately 300,000 people. As a testament to the 
ethnic diversity of the province, there are 35 officially recognised ethnic groups 
interspersed throughout modem district administrative units, including the four major 
ethnicities: the Bugis (some four million people), the Makassarese (some two 
million), the Mandar (approximately half a million) and the Toraja (approximately 
half a million). 8 
5 The "orchid-shaped island" of Sulawesi contains four peninsulas, with Makassar located in the south- 
western peninsula, Kendari in the south-east, Luwuk and the straight of Maluku in the centre-east, and 
finally, Manado in the north-eastern peninsula (Errington 1989: 14). 
6 Prior to 1999 there were some 168 districts in Indonesia; by November 2004 that number had risen to 
440 districts (Duncan 2007: 726). 
7 For clarification there are two designations, kabupaten (district) and kota (city), both of which are 
basically administrative equivalents. In South Sulawesi there are 22 districts and three cities, though 
there are ongoing negotiations to sub-divide Tana Toraja into two districts, so these figures are 
constantly changing. 
8 The 35 recognised ethnic groups as listed by the Ministry of the Environment, Republic of Indonesia, 
in 200 1; the population figures for the four major ethnic groups are from Robinson (1998: 4). 
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In the 1980s the national Department of Education and Culture began to 
promote the architectural traditions of South Sulawesi, including Kajang, whose adat 
communities are often held to be exemplars of pre-modem Sulawesi; that is, an 
authentic representation of pre-Islamic and pre-colonial society (Robinson 1997: 81). 
Despite deliberate campaigns to depoliticise adat, the Kajang territories of the Amma 
Toa continue to be governed in accordance with customary law (see chapter seven). 
Scholars began a collaborative study in 1992 to highlight the distinctive 
cultural and historical traditions of South Sulawesi through an archival project 
involving the microfilming and cataloguing of indigenous manuscripts (Robinson 
1998: 1). By 1996 the archive contained approximately 4,000 such manuscripts, which 
are called lontara. based on the fact that they were originally written on the leaves of 
the lontar palm (Robinson 1998: 17). 9 
In 1996 a conference was held in order to disseminate the findings of the 
archival research to an audience in Makassar. During these proceedings, "new 
dimensions" to the analysis of the lontara arose (Robinson 1998: 9). Audience 
members explained how these manuscripts "affect the conduct of everyday life in 
contemporary Sulawesi" and how, in turn, they are "bound up with current social 
dynamics, including issues of cultural continuity and renaissance" (Robinson 1998: 9). 
On 13 October 1999 the historic name Makassar was revived as part of the 
capital city's autonomy project. 10 One local newspaper headlined with a sentimental 
story titled "Makassar, the prodigal child has returned" (Morrell 2001: 437). To many, 
this represented a reassertion of local identity and a celebration of Makassar's past 
fame as a cosmopolitan centre for trade. " South Sulawesi was also the focus of an 
international forum focusing on the "Origins of Complex Societies in South 
Sulawesi" held in Barru district from 18-19 August 2000 (Macknight 2000: 117). 
9 According to Caldwell and Bougas (2004: 457) writing was first developed in South Sulawesi in the 
fourteenth century. 
'0 In accordance with Government Regulation 51/197 1, the name Makassar was replaced by 
Ujungpandang. 
11 Morrell (2001: 448) adds that this "valorisation of history" was based on selective reconstructions. 
12 
Events such as these indicate that Sulawesi is an active region where the pace of 
political change invites further research into these increasingly atavistic trends. 
Moving from historical reconstructions to contemporary deployments, there 
are significant differences between the adat that was collected for the microfilm 
archive in Makassar and that which has come to form an oppositional basis for 
political struggle. 12 From 2001 onwards, the most visible manifestation of this 
oppositional struggle has been land reclaiming in forest zones designated as 
productive or protected, thus representing a new challenge to the legal norms and 
regulatory notations of the state. However,, in Sulawesi, as in other resource rich, 
heavily forested islands in the eastern archipelago, most land and resource conflicts 
involving adat communities remain unresolved, despite the influx of local NGOs,, 
provincial mediators, national trustees, 13 and international donors. 
In the new era of local autonomy and reform, it is necessary to examine the 
extent to which the recognition of customary land rights is permitted only insofar as it 
does not threaten to "dismantle the dominant logic of the state" (Kinsella 2005: 255). 
Starting from the colonial era, succinctly characterised by the volksverheffing 
principle, 14 it can be argued that manifestations of state power have come to 
"constitute not only what activists seek to change, but also the activists themselves" 
(Lipschutz 2005: 243). In other words, subtle reconfigurations of power prompted by 
the decentralisation process come to influence and shape the agendas of activists, 
including pemangku adat (customary leaders), village advocates, domestic NGOs, 
third-party mediators, or cadres of legally-trained, internationally-funded trustees. 
Determining the extent to which this legacy has been overcome requires the 
foregrounding of specific local struggles, coupled with an examination of the 
changing relations between all protagonists in the wider context of decentralisation. It 
is evident that the continuous relocation of authority, along with the enhanced 
12 See Acciaioli (2007) and Li (2007) for further analysis of "officialising" and "oppositional" 
strategies. 
13 Concept of "trustees" developed by Blair (2000), explained further in chapter two. 
14 Volksverheffing refers to the emancipation of the native population, along with elite participation in 
socio-economic development, without posing any genuine challenge to the durability of the colonial 
state (Weber et al. 2003: 407-409). See chapter two for more on this concept. 
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capacity o ocal actors to participate in politics, creates opportunities for peaceful 
collaborations in governance, expanded human rights protections, and rising 
standards of living. For the many thousands of adat communities in Indonesia, this 
translates as an opportunity for recognition of their rights (real or perceived) over 
lands,, resources, and autonomous governance. Conversely, such a process also 
threatens to exacerbate conflicts (ethnic, communal), undermine social cohesion, and 
lead to worsening environmental conditions. 
In the most recent collected works on adat, scholars sought to examine the 
various "manifestations of adat revivalism in the post-New Order era, " with particular 
emphasis on the decentralisation process (Henley and Davidson 2007: 1). The 
analytical focus was to be fixed upon the "particular forms of adat revivalism, " rather 
than adat itself (Henley and Davidson 2007: 2). Similarly, Li (2007: 337) sought to 
develop an "inventory or map" of contemporary deployments of adat, which requires 
an outline of the "contexts in which they have arisen and the projects they serve". 
At one end of the spectrum there are idealistic efforts to seek out exemplary 
cases of pristine tribal communities, returning to the authentic indigenism of the past, 
and recreating socially harmonious and environmentally sustainable non-native orders. 
This celebratory form of adat revivalism has been referred to as "museumisation and 
showcasing" (Erb 2007: 247-248). At the other end of the spectrum, there are the 
political forms of revivalism in pursuit of tangible goals such as tenure security, 
resource entitlement, and autonomous governance. 
Distinctions between festive showcasing and political resistance are largely 
the product of choices (consciously or unconsciously) made by local communities and 
their supporters. However, once adat has been deployed and claims have been 
articulated, a multitude of possible scenarios arise that are often beyond the control of 
the target constituencies. Such scenarios can be divided into two main categories. On 
the one hand, there are attempts to "institute orderly rule through adat" (Li 2007: 337). 
This has been referred to as an "officialising strategy" which can be deployed by a 
variety of actors for a variety of purposes (Acciaioli 2007: 302). The strategy would 
have district government officials seeking to integrate an optimal, formalised version 
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of adat into the service of the local administration. Similarly, intervening activists 
may unwittingly promote a sanitised version of adat that, while appearing democratic 
and environmentally friendly, ultimately fails to constitute a genuine challenge to 
dominant power structures or constitutive political conditions. 
On the other hand, there are attempts to "challenge state authority" (Li 
2007: 337). This has been referred to as an "oppositional strategy" which has multiple 
dimensions (Acciaioli 2007: 303). Support networks and sympathisers may seek 
recognition for adat claims (land, resources), not as part of official government 
structures, but rather as "parallel forms of sovereignty whose adherents' rights need to 
be guaranteed" (Acciaioli 2007: 303). In the search for recognition, such networks 
must work with local communities, promoting "popular rights and capacities for self- 
government and social justice" (Li 2007: 337). 
One interpretation of adat revivalism holds that its origins and subsequent 
political deployments lie in the "concrete struggles of marginalised communities" 
against the expropriation of customary lands by the state for developmental purposes 
(Bourchier 2007: 122). Building on this "grievance-based" interpretation (van Klinken 
2007b: 2), local villagers and their allies have frequently managed to align their 
political struggles for the recognition of adat with global movements for indigenous 
rights and sustainable forest management. In the enabling context of decentralisation, 
the realignment of authority has prompted some optimism, with suggestions that local 
politics has come to matter to local people, who are now "free to determine their own 
destinies,, express their own views and participate in the decisions that shape their 
lives" (Antl6v 2003b: 74). However, few foresaw the intensity with which atavistic 
trends such as "becoming indigenous" would come to constitute and even overtake 
Antl6v's (2003b: 74) civic-minded freedoms of expression, participation, and the 
shaping of destinies. 
The process of becoming indigenous has, for some groups, become the 
ultimate expression of local autonomy, pluralism, and participation, combining 
primordial notions of traditional wisdom and antedated governance with modem 
political prerogatives such as recognition, land tenure, agroecological management, 
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and resource entitlement. For this form of emancipatory positioning to achieve any 
substantive gains, however, it must come to challenge aspects of the dominant, 
constitutive political order. This involves courting external supporters as well as 
engaging with self-serving and cautious politicians, entrenched and emerging elites, 
nepotistic power brokers, predatory bosses, corrupt bureaucrats, a vitriolic security 
apparatus, cunning corporate managers, unscrupulous entrepreneurs, and elusive ad 
hoc criminal networks. 
The prospect of power has the obvious capacity to corrupt, challenging 
notions of communal harmony and indigenous unity, with the consequence that self- 
interested actors or groups frequently distort notions of adat in order to capitalise on 
compensation packages, land allocations, or corporate goodwill funds. A more 
penetrating view on the different manifestations of power is therefore needed to help 
discern the interests and motivations of the various actors influencing adat revivalism. 
Power and Resistance 
Since colonial times,, regionalism and ethnic diversity have been allowed to flourish 
insofar as no fundamental changes occurred in the relations of power. Power tends to 
be exercised by those who have control over patterns of resource use, systems of 
governance, land entitlement and bestowal, law enforcement, and surveillance; in 
short, all the elements of the constitutive political order. In their systematic analysis 
of global governance, Barnett and Duvall (2005) propose a "taxonomy of power" 
involving four types of power-compulsive, structural, institutional, and productive. 
' 5 
Applied to Indonesia, this taxonomy helps comprehend some of the dilemmas of adat 
revivalism, providing a critical analytical framework from which to examine the 
processes and consequences of becoming indigenous. 
Most frequently, power is wielded in the coercive fashion, whereby the state 
exercises direct influence over the public sphere, coordinating the actions of citizens' 
groups and NGOs so as to align their interests with those of the state (Barnett and 
Duvall 2005: 14). By contrast, power may take the institutional form whereby control 
15 Classic works on power (Weber 1947; Dahl 1957) use term coercive rather than compulsive power. 
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is achieved indirectly, extending the reach of the state into peripheral, socially distant 
domains (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 16). Degrees of "patterned regularity" (Biersteker 
1992: 104) and "routinised behaviour" (Rosenau 1992: 7) may be achieved through 
national laws, district regulations and local ordinances. Control in this sense is 
manifested through agenda setting, dictating the range of permissible actions, limiting 
the choices of dependent actors (those with fewer resources), imposing subtle 
behavioural constraints, perpetuating governing biases and privileges, and embedding 
power asymmetries and differentials. 
One may also encounter a form of structural power that shapes the capacity of 
actors in direct relation to one another, as well as the interests that underlie their 
actions (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 18). Early colonial legibility projects geared 
towards efficient administration, taxation, and resource extraction attempted to 
entrench a hierarchical system of order, with an essentialised view of highland or 
frontier populations as "objects of governance" (Muppidi 2005: 276). 
The colonial binary construction of governors and the governed, as well as 
subjects and objects of development, echoes in the present political constellation 
(Muppidi 2005: 280). However, it is not enough to imagine a colonial or authoritarian 
order; it must materialise. Thus the objects of governance must be "locked in to 
various forms of institutional and structural power, [and] must know their 
responsibilities, " otherwise the deployment of coercive power will be required 
(Muppidi 2005: 283). 
Finally, a form of productive power may serve to constitute the actors 
themselves, concerned mainly with the discourses, social processes, and systems of 
knowledge through which meanings are produced, fixed, lived, experienced, and 
transformed (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 20). This implies that power may influence the 
ordinary practices of life, define the social fields of action, produce social identities 
and capacities, and orient particular discourses of developmental action. 
Visible manifestations of power in the context of local adat struggles for land 
and resources assume each of these forms-coercive, institutional, structural, and 
productive. The most obvious (and frequently reported) form is coercive power, 
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involving the deployment of mobile police brigades or private security forces hired by 
corporations to suppress demonstrations and protests. In a typical scenario, local 
villagers and their NGO counterparts are treated as provocateurs in the field, subject 
to coercion, intimidation, imprisonment, and violence. Subsequent chapters shall 
examine whether the reform era in Indonesia (1998 onwards), heralded for freedoms 
of press, association, and protections of democratic rights has led to a reduction of 
coercive power. 
One would expect that a reprieve from the stifling, authoritarian tendencies of 
the New Order would prompt a shift away from compulsion and towards more subtle 
forms of power. As such, it is necessary to consider instances where institutional 
power has been deployed, tempering political movements through quaint, gradual, 
donor-friendly processes of deliberation and negotiation. When the status of 
customary rights is disputed, local communities must be dissuaded from adopting a 
radical stance (land reclaiming, direct action). Rather, the shackles of elegant policy 
must be reapplied, as witnessed through the promulgation of several redundant 
district regulations in recognition of adat in Sulawesi. 16 
While drawing on the "authentic" features of adat to legitimise claims, some 
of those involved in the current revival are striving to transcend the notion of customs 
and traditions by realigning them to fit more comfortably into legible platforms for 
political struggle. This is not the same as Scott's (1998) usage of the term legibility, 
which referred to neo-colonial "state simplification" programmes aimed at 
"standardising the subjects of development" in the interests of "legibility and control" 
(cited in Warren 2005: 50). Rather, standardisation focuses on the creation of ideal 
subjects capable of maximising the use of developmental assistance, rendering local 
struggles compatible with the discourses of international rights movements. In this 
sense, legibility may be pursued through activities such as participatory community 
mapping, multi-stakeholder initiatives, and village deliberation, with the aim to render 
disparate customary claims coherent or compatible with reformist programmes such 
as environmental sustainability, eco-friendly development, or the protection of 
16 See chapter three for examples of redundant district regulations on adat. 
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indigenous lifestyles. Such programmes may reduce the threat posed to the state or 
entrenched interests through a process of non-nalisation, one which is less costly than 
overt, coercive exertions of power. 
In cases involving reassertions of adat rights over land and resources, there are 
many variables that require attention, such as village heterogeneity, divergent 
interests, and the elusiveness of some ad hoc support networks that mobilise around 
specific land conflicts. Therefore the "confrontations and complicities" involved in 
localised struggles require a closer reading, one that "belies a simple dualism" 
between state power and local resistance (Elmhirst 2001: 285). 
A closer reading of these complex dilemmas suggests that there is also a 
"human inclination" to resist in the face of power, with local agents and actors 
throughout Indonesia seeking to influence or transcend the social forces that once 
"defined them and their parameters of action" (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 22). 
Taxonomies of power thus generate taxonomies of resistance. Specifically, resistance 
may include direct confrontation to counter coercive power, interpretive legal 
measures to institutionalise indigenous rights, strategies to transform the structures 
that perpetuate inequality, as well as actions to disrupt social processes and challenge 
dominant discourses. 
In the enabling context of decentralisation, the likelihood of a diffusion of 
power allowing for "ruptures in the web of governmentality" increases markedly 
(Lipschutz 2005: 245). 17 Such ruptures may represent zones of agency, autonomy, 
resistance, and contestation in the name of indigenous revival or environmental 
sustainability, which can serve to expose "inherent contradictions" in the governance 
system (Lipschutz 2005: 245). 
What is less clear, however,, is the extent to which such forces can transcend 
this dominant system, as opposed to simply exposing inherent contradictions. In other 
wordsl further research is needed in specific local contexts to decipher between mere 
political disruptions and the potential for genuine change. Political disruptions occur 
when activists do not resolve problems but merely define problems to be solved and 
" Lipschutz (2005) drawing on Foucault's (199 1) conception of "governmentality". 
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engage with inherent contradictions; genuine political changes occur when the 
dominant discourses and structural prerogatives of the state are altered (Lipschutz 
2005: 247-248). 
Based on evidence from Central Sulawesi, it has been suggested that 
contemporary efforts to restore customary rights and re-appropriate lands have been 
unsuccessful, despite "some individual exceptions" (Acciaioli 2007: 312-313). These 
exceptions include isolated cases such as the Katu and Lindu of Central Sulawesi, or 
the Kajang Dalam of South Sulawesi. However, many local communities and their 
allies are said to have come to the "sad realisation" that, although they have achieved 
many micro-level successes, the "systems and structures that determine power and 
resource allocations-locally, nationally, and globally-remain largely intact" (Mohan 
and Stokke 2000: 254). 
Despite their popular characterisation as forces of resistance and change, 
community allies and civil society actors in any given situation may "unwittingly 
support the logics of governance, " or indeed may be satisfied with the status quo, thus 
reducing their efficacy to single issue-areas without posing a broad challenge to 
existing structural relations of power (Lipschutz 2005: 238). In this sense, while the 
adat revival is couched in terms of resistance and opposition, it may be little more 
than a permissible form of alternative politics encapsulated within persistent, 
dominant structures of power. 
In the event that adat communities and their supporters are able to mount a 
sustained challenge to existing conditions (flawed land tenure systems, 
maladministration of the forestry sector), government officials may deploy a variety 
of counter strategies. For instance, threatening actions such as forcible land 
reclaiming or destruction of corporate property can be criminalised, representing an 
exercise of institutional power, or violently suppressed, representing coercive power 
(Lipschutz 2005: 240). By contrast, reforming actions such as struggles for the 
recognition of adat rights may be absorbed by government officials, redirected 
through official channels and converted into drawn-out regulatory processes or 
tenurial negotiations. 
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As a significant feature of decentralisation, adat revivalism highlights the fact 
that "polycentric societies have a variety of forms of order, some of which do not 
answer to the ideals of democracy" (Bohman 2005: 57). Informed by this dilemma, 
the practical knowledge needed to promote the democratisation of "uneven and 
hierarchical social relations" requires an "empirical analysis of current 
transfon-nations and [their] embedded possibilities" (Bohman 2005: 61-62). In 
Indonesia, analysis of the embedded possibilities resulting from the convergence of 
decentralisation and atavism remains incomplete, owing mainly to the continuous 
reconfiguration of adat and the constantly shifting parameters of power at the local 
level. 
Henley and Davidson (2007: 37), editors of a rich collected works on adat, 
make "no pretence to comprehensive coverage, either in regional or in thematic 
terms, of the politics of tradition in Indonesia". In order to contribute to the 
burgeoning literature on adat and decentralisation, therefore, this thesis examines the 
process of "becoming indigenous" in Sulawesi, foregrounding specific local struggles 
for recognition and land rights. Thus far the perceptions of adat emanating from local 
communities have been understated, as have the impacts of newly promulgated 
regional regulations (research question one-Ql). Similarly, the impact of third-parties 
and trustees have been overlooked at the local level (research Q2 and Q3), and the 
consequences of the selective redeployment of adat in conflict areas have yet to be 
fully gauged (research Q4 and Q5). 
Research Methodology 
The voluminous works on adat in recent years have brought together a multitude of 
scholarly disciplines and approaches. Historians and archaeologists continue to 
grapple with the mystique of the concept itself, while cultural anthropologists and 
political economists focus on contemporary manifestations of adat revivalism, 
querying the extent to which this elusive and contested concept may challenge the 
dominant structures of power in Indonesia. 
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It is argued that scholarly investigations into complex political phenomena 
cc must travel to a variety of different cultural locations" in search of the "voices of the 
silenced or subdued" (Pensky 2005: 12; Steinman 2005: 115). Such assertions resonate 
with McCargo's (2006: 118) call for the "subtle readings" of political texts and the 
"teasing out of layers of ambiguity" through firsthand fieldwork. Applying these 
criteria to adat revivalism in Indonesia requires one to undertake intensive, systematic 
field research with an orientation towards qualitative methodology. In the context of 
decentralisation, this involves primary document analysis, semi-structured interviews, 
and participant observation. 
Having undertaken research in South Sulawesi since 1967, Pelras (2000: 18) 
found that local informants are very fond of speaking about social hierarchy, 
genealogy, and the origins of kingdoms. Moreover, his (mainly Bugis) infon-nants 
believed strongly in the study of local history, and they "insisted very much on the 
force of traditional values" expressed through indigenous concepts such as siri 
(honour or shame) and pesse (compassion) (Pelras 2000: 18). 
One concern raised by Pelras (2000: 19) regarding fieldwork in South 
Sulawesi was that, upon arrival in Makassar, he was almost instantly "entangled in 
bonds of clientship" and unwittingly ended up being associated with one particular 
local faction. 18 The unintended consequence was to be excluded from interviewing 
rival adat groups. Thus the field researcher must try to be aware of the formidable 
divisions that can exist between local communities, and avoid becoming associated 
with one particular faction. 
Working closely with local infon-nants for sustained periods of time in the 
field reinforces perceptions about the gracious nature of Indonesian hosts, and the 
different conceptions of privacy. 19 It is not uncommon, for instance,, to receive 
invitations to dine with or stay in the homes of local activists and their extended 
families after only one meeting. As I observed in Soroako (East Luw-u), Madandan 
18 Esther Velthoven of the Royal Dutch Institute of War Documentation had similar experiences during 
her years of fieldwork in Sulawesi (personal communication, 15 April 2005). 
'9 One of the most endearing features of rural Indonesia is the generosity of local villagers, many of 
which face daily struggles on a subsistence level. 
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(Tana Toraja), and Palu (Central Sulawesi), several of the aspiring young researchers 
from Europe, Japan and North America accepted these offers and became in a sense 
embedded with their informants. 
Some of the one-sided, inaccurate reporting coming out of these highly 
contested and politicised locations hints at the potential drawbacks of embedded 
research, which may compromise one's objectivity. Therefore, as politely as possible, 
I declined numerous invitations and thus avoided becoming overly domesticated 
whilst in the field. Consequently, a number of local informants took umbrage, were 
reluctant to participate in interviews, and were not as forthcoming as might have been 
expected, making it harder to negotiate access to villagers in certain conflict areas. 
From his work on adat and decentralisation in Central Kalimantan, McCarthy 
(2004: 1199) found that one is "likely to come across a muddled and rather chaotic 
state of affairs that hardly seems to resemble the scenario described in [mainstream] 
decentralisation policy narratives". Indeed, culture can "seem an all too slippery, 
interpretive and potentially conservative concept for those concerned with nitty-gritty 
questions of institutional design and fiscal transfers" (Bebbington et al. 2004: 188). 
With these difficulties in mind, van Klinken suggested that a study of the "real 
people and real contestations where adat claims are being made" would be interesting 
and feasible,, leading the researcher to then "make a judgment about how democratic 
it all iS.,, 20 The focus, therefore, should be on the interests of those doing the actual 
reinterpreting of adat. In Sulawesi, this includes official sources such as district heads 
and parliamentarians, along with traditional elites and community representatives, as 
well as NGO activists and supporters in the field. 
The field research for this study was undertaken in stages from August 2005 
to August 2006. The initial phase was conducted in Bandung (West Java) and Jakarta 
from August 2005 to January 2006. This involved key informant interviewing and the 
gathering, translation, and analysis of primary Indonesian-language materials. This 
helped establish pertinent research locations and a list of key informants and 
accessible non-government organisations (NGOs) in the field. From discussions with 
20 Personal communication with Gerry van Klinken, 23 February 2005. 
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scholars and professionals, it was unanimously felt that research on adat should be 
conducted in eastern Indonesia rather than Java, and therefore Sulawesi was 
selected. 21 
The fonner director of the National Secretariat of the Indigenous Peoples 
Alliance of the Archipelago (Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantera or AMAN) in 
Jakarta. ) Emil Kleden, and 
his staff (particularly Yuyun Indradi) granted interviews as 
well as access to their databases. 22 These contained key reports on national 
congresses, along with bio-data and membership applications for all local 
communities in Sulawesi that had registered with AMAN (see Table 1.1 below). On 
file were 107 community profiles from South Sulawesi province, all of which had to 
be translated and analysed in order to determine which communities were engaged in 
politicised processes of adat revivalism. 
21 The list includes Ryaas Rashid (drafted the decentralisation laws), Philips J. Vermonte (CSIS 
Jakarta), and Jeffery Ong (Development Programme Officer-Canadian Embassy, Jakarta). 
22 Visitations to AMAN Jakarta took place between November 2005 and January 2006. 
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Table 1.1: Revised Membership ForM23 for New Members-AMAN 
A. Individual Data 
1. Name 
2. Place and date of birth 
3. Occupation and institution/organisation 
4. Ethnicity/adat community 
5. Home address 
6. Mailing address 
7. Position and designation/Title in your adat organisation 
B. Adat Community Data 
1. Name/Designation for adat community 
2. Name how many managers/leaders of adat communities or adat organisations 
3. Ethnicity/sub-ethnicity 
4. Location of adat territory 
5. Size of adat territory (estimate in hectares) 
6. Amount of members (population) in the adat community _ 
people or 
households 
7. Prominent problems facing the adat community 
C. Expectations from AMAN 
List the reasons why the adat community and adat organisation which you represent 
feels the need to become a member of AMAN. 
List the type of support or services that you expect to be given by AMAN to the adat 
communities or adat organisations that have already become members. 
D. Commitment to fulfil Rights and Obligations 
[Applicants must give their signature showing they acknowledge various stipulations] 
" Prior to filling out and returning this form to the Management/Board of AMAN or sending it through 
the post office or fax to the National Secretariat of AMAN, please confirm that you already understand 
what AMAN is, what aspirations it has and it's line of struggle, along with the rights and obligations 
for the adat community that will become a member. 
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In accordance with the decisions fTom the first Congress of Adat Communities 
of the Archipelago (KMAN) in 1999, communities eligible for AMAN membership 
are defined as follows: 
Communities that live in accordance with the origins of their 
ancestors and in a manner based on inheritance over a certain 
adat territory, possessing sovereignty over the land and its 
natural wealth, whose social and cultural lifestyles are 
arranged by adat law, and under adat organisations that 
directly manage community lifestyles. 24 
Examples of such adat communities listed by AMAN include the Nagan in 
Minangkabau (West Sumatra), the Kemukiman and Gampong in Aceh, the Binua in 
several regions of West Kalimantan, the Marga of South Sumatra, and the Negen in 
Central Maluku. All of these criteria for membership are contigent and contextual, 
subject to long histories of intrusions and constructed over long periods of time. 
A shortlist of research locations was drafted based on relevant district-level 
administrative units boasting adat communities with strong representation in AMAN, 
evidence of legislative activity regarding the recognition of adat, and involvement in 
protracted land disputes. 25 Based on these criteria, the most relevant of South 
Sulawesi's 25 districts appeared to be North Luwu, East Luwu, Palopo, Tana Toraja, 
and Majene. 26 
While these preparatory activities were taking place, I undertook a three- 
month intensive course at the Language Centre for Cross-Cultural Communication 
(IMLAQ in Bandung. This provided a sound basis for communications in Bahasa 
Indonesia (the national language), though some additional support was needed for the 
intensive period of field research in Sulawesi. Two graduates from the Faculty of 
24 Definition of the criteria for adat communities from the revised AMAN membership form obtained 
at AMAN Jakarta. 
2' Based on the data collated Erom section B (Q7) and section C of the AMAN membership forms, it 
became apparent that adat communities from some districts elicited a higher level of political 
awareness, clarity of expectations, and articulation of demands than others. 
26 Since 2004 Ma*ene has been part of West Sulawesi province. At the time that their membership 
applications were received by AMAN, however, they were still within the jurisdiction of South 
Sulawesi province. 
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Social and Political Studies (FISIP) at UNPAR in Bandung were therefore hired as 
research assistants. Conducting research with a small team was useful for building 
rapport with local informants as well as translating the large volume of documents 
obtained in the field. In the event that villagers did not speak the national language, 
such as in parts of Mandar speaking Majene and Konjo speaking Kajang, additional 
assistance was required. 
The second phase of research was conducted from February 2006 to July 2006 
in four provinces of Sulawesi. This was the integral phase as it involved intensive 
fieldwork for sustained periods in remote locales. Makassar, the capital of South 
Sulawesi and the "gateway to the east, " is host to the prominent Universitas 
Hasanuddin (UNHAS), from which the historian Dias Pradadimara agreed to sponsor 
my research visa application (KITAS). Makassar is host to many regional head 
offices of international organisations and multilateral donor agencies, including the 
Support Office for Eastern Indonesia (SOfEl) led by Richard Manning. 
Having prepared a shortlist of districts while still in Jakarta, it was necessary 
to visit AMAN's regional branch in Makassar to get local input into the selection of 
research locations. This branch has 116 registered adat communities from throughout 
the province. In addition to the shortlist already prepared, staff recommended visiting 
Bulukumba district, where local communities are embroiled in a controversial land 
dispute with a profitable rubber plantation (PT London Sumatra). AMAN staff 
provided invaluable contact information for all of their local partners, revealing a 
well-organised activist network operating throughout Sulawesi. 
However, one dilemma did arise on several occasions. Informants from some 
of the villages and local organisations clearly expected to benefit from their 
participation in the interview process. Some made direct enquires as to what they 
would gain if they took the time to contribute to research projects. In general there 
was an expectation that they would be assisted or facilitated in some way, and that 
their participation as interviewees should bolster their local campaign, their funding 
options, and the resources available to them and their support networks. Care was 
thus taken from the outset not to mislead anyone, and it was made clear that all data 
27 
gathered would be used for academic purposes only, rather than serving the specific 
agendas of NGOs or donors active in the region. No misleading promises were made 
to any informant, even if this resulted in the termination of interviews. 27 
The provincial governor's complex in South Sulawesi hosts all of the relevant 
government bureaus (see Table 3.1 'State Hierarchies' for clarification). For instance, 
the Bureau of Law and Institutions is responsible for administrative reorganisation in 
conjunction with the implementation of regional autonomy laws in 2001. The director 
of this Bureau consented to interviews about the challenges facing civil servants in 
the process of implementation, as well as the legal mechanisms for oversight of 
regulations promulgated by districts with newly devolved authority. The head of the 
provincial Bureau of Finance provided reports and data on district budgets, grants, 
and allocation funds. 
Staff from the newly minted Bureau of Regional Autonomy described their 
oversight functions, which include reviewing and verification of district elections. 
This requires constant liaising with the General Elections Commission (KPU), which 
reports on election proceedings and collates electoral statistics from all district 
elections in the province. Most of the provincial officials were forthcoming and 
accessible, although the information was of a highly procedural nature, more suited to 
a study of "optimising blueprints" of decentralisation rather than local political 
contestations. 
At district level, government officials are better suited to comment on local 
land disputes and processes of adat revivalism. All forinal enquires begin with the 
office of the mayor, which stands at the centre of the district government complex. 
Key district departments include the National Land Agency and the Forestry Agency, 
along with the District Parliament and Court, all of which play a role in dispute 
resolution processes. These agencies have asserted their autonomy from Makassar 
27 In some cases a promise was made to deliver a copy of my thesis once it was completed. Other 
researchers working in Central Sulawesi have done the same, including Claudia Francesca D'Andrea, 
who provided activists in Palu, Central Sulawesi, with a copy of her Ph. D. thesis 'Coffee, Customs and 
Capital' (2003). 
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and Jakarta, however most land disputes are not contained within carefully drawn 
administrative boundaries, and thus require intervention from multiple districts. 
Once a conflict bleeds into multiple districts, a degree of provincial 
intervention is required, as matters of jurisdiction become blurred. Most often the 
governor's office will issue decrees and appoint provincial mediation teams to assist 
in resolution processes. Moreover, when disputes reach the courts, nearly every 
district ruling will be brought to the provincial court of appeal in Makassar, which 
keeps records of all the trials. With persistence, provincial trial transcripts and 
mediation team records have been obtained, translated, and used for research 
purposes. 
Interviewees from particular districts and villages were selected purposively, 
on the basis of research questions and geographic base. In the district of Bulukumba 
(chapter seven), for instance, respondents came from all relevant quarters. At the 
community level villagers were interviewed from the Konjo-speaking customary 
domain of Kajang Dalam, as well as surrounding villages affected by the land dispute 
with rubber producer PT London Sumatra (Lonsum). 
Governinent officials from relevant departments were also approached, along 
with PT Lonsum's plantation estate managers and the relevant civil society 
organisations intervening in the conflict. Since this protracted dispute had been taken 
to trial, all the court transcripts were obtained and interviews with legal 
representatives sought. Further, given that provincial mediation teams were appointed 
and the National Commission for Human Rights was invited to oversee proceedings, 
more documentation was gathered for factual cross-checking and verification. 
Primary documents included Indonesian press releases, court rulings, election 
data, transcripts of official meetings and workshops, mediation team reports, local 
regulations and ordinances, field data collected and documented by NGOs eliciting 
community aspirations, chronologies of land disputes and legal proceedings, and 
other relevant documents. All documents were translated from Bahasa Indonesia into 
English, and most of these were translated between January 2006 and September 
2006. 
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Semi-structured interviews were the most appropriate form of interviews in 
order to cope with the extent of local variation encountered in the field. Prior to each 
scheduled interview,, the framework for questioning was catered to the particular 
informants and adjusted based on specific local settings. Since fieldwork is not 
entirely predictable, impromptu interviews were also conducted, during which the 
mode of questioning remained on topic although a degree of improvisation was 
required. 
Overall, the research was premised on the fact that a significant number of 
variables and factors are beyond the control of the researcher, and thus a degree of 
flexibility was built into the methods and timeframe from the outset. Subsidiary 
questions were thus left open-ended and were allowed to evolve accordingly. Any 
temptation to reduce the cultural-political dynamics of adat to models and formulas 
was resisted. Finally, contingency plans were established in order to cope with the 
multitude of dilemmas that arise, from outbreaks of communal violence and urban 
rioting (expulsion of Danish nationals, "sweepings" against westemers, kidnapping of 
Chinese-Indonesians), to natural disasters (mainly floods) and collapsing bridges, to 
the contraction of debilitating illnesses (dengue fever). 
Structure of Thesis 
This thesis sets out to disaggregate the concept of customary rights and examine what 
recognition consists of by foregrounding adat as an ongoing forum of struggle. Thus 
adat will be examined in all its local forms in order to draw conclusions as to its 
potential as an emancipatory force serving to "concretise complex and contradictory 
historical experiences" into atavistic campaigns or struggles (Steinman 2005: 118). 
Chapter two provides relevant historical background and theoretical positions 
in order to locate the broad political phenomena of decentralisation, land disputes, 
and indigenous revivalism in the Indonesian context. Chapter three addresses the first 
core research question (Ql) by establishing the legal framework under 
decentralisation for the recognition of adat, after which the cases of Gowa, Majene, 
and Palopo are examined in order to illustrate some of the political dilemmas 
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associated with district regulatory processes. Chapters four and five provide detailed 
empirical accounts of the politics of recognition in Seko and Tana Toraja, considering 
the extent to which regulatory initiatives have tempered oppositional political 
struggles, rendering them quaint and donor-friendly (research Ql, Q2 and Q3). 
Chapter six reaches the shores of Lake Matano in East Luwu district, where a 
plethora of actors are reclaiming land and challenging the legitimacy of International 
Nickel of Canada's subsidiary in Indonesia, PT Inco (research Q3, Q4 and Q5). 
Chapter seven engages with long-standing disputes in the district of Bulukumba, 
where local fan-ning communities have for decades been challenging the rubber 
estates of PT London Sumatra (research Q3, Q4 and Q5). Chapter eight concludes the 
thesis. It surnmarises and expands upon the conclusions of previous chapters, 
considering the political implications of "becoming indigenous" in terms of primary 
rights (recognition), and remedial rights (over land, resources, and autonomous 
governance). 
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Chapter Two: Critical Conjectures 
This chapter reviews centuries of intrusions that have shaped the cultural and political 
landscapes of Indonesia. Given the long-standing, unresolved tensions surrounding 
customary land tenure and indigenous rights, it is important to examine the historical 
context behind the current revival of adat. Each key historical phase carried different 
possibilities for promoting, co-opting, or tempering the political impulses of adat 
communities. 
Emphasis is then placed on the era of decentralisation, which according to 
mainstream accounts allows for the unleashing of community aspirations and the 
celebration of local diversity. A critical reading of decentralisation in Indonesia, 
however, reveals that adat revivalism has become a central manifestation of the public 
participation project, leading to unforeseen political dilemmas. The subtle ways in 
which discourses of adat are constructed shall be discussed,, along with political 
representations of adat communities and the use of institutional power to shape and 
contain local struggles. 
Pre-colonial Period 
Prior to the arrival of Europeans, conditions in the Indonesian archipelago were 
characterised by the rise and fall of kingdoms, which served as centres of custom and 
commerce. In social and political terms, the pre-colonial reality of the archipelago 
was characterised not by "autocratic kings from whom all power descended, but by a 
complex web of contractual mutualities at the local level" (Reid 1998: 32). 
There was a recurring tension throughout the pre-colonial era, signified by the 
49 ebb and flow of the great Hinduised dynastic kingdoms, Muslim sultanates, petty 
kingdoms and trading interests, all vying [ ... ] for political and economic supremacy" 
(McWilliam 2006: 45). South Sulawesi's principal kingdoms were Luwu, Gowa, and 
Bone, though there were several smaller kingdoms, all connected in some way 
through tributaries and vassals. 
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From a historical perspective, Caldwell (1998: 30) identifies fifty-odd small 
and large kingdoms that existed in South Sulawesi, the largest and most important of 
which was the Kingdom of Luwu. 28 Evidence from historical chronicles suggests that, 
"prior to the emergence of kingdoms after 1300 the largest political entities in South 
Sulawesi were simple chiefdoms" (Caldwell and Bougas 2004: 459). The Kingdom of 
Luwu has been characterised as the "cradle of Bugis civilisation" and is believed to 
be the oldest of South Sulawesi's kingdoms (Schrauwers 1997: 356). 
With regards to matters of governance, the Kingdom at one stage consisted of 
sixteen autonomous principalities, answerable to the ruler (datu) of Luwu only in 
matters of tribute or war (Schrauwers 1997: 360). There was differentiation within 
each principality, some domains being within the central orbit of power, and others 
occupying a more peripheral position. Peripheral domains retained autonomy over 
local political affairs, an arrangement typical of the "segmentary state" model found 
throughout Southeast Asia (Robinson 1986: 62-63). 
The incorporation of peripheral domains such as Matano (chapter six) into the 
larger Bugis Kingdom of Luwu was forinalised through intermarriage and the 
payment of tributes. One consequence was that local customs and traditions gradually 
became synonymous with Bugis customs. The Buginisation of peripheral domains 
throughout Luwu was just one of a series of intrusions upon the customs and 
traditions of local indigenous communities. Other major intrusions included the 
spread of Islam (1475 onwards)29; the expansion of mercantile trading networks 
(1800s); the establishment of direct colonial control after 1905; the Indonesian 
struggle for independence (1945-1949); the Darul Islam rebellions (1953-1965); and 
the New Order era (1966-1998). 
By the seventeenth century the power of Luwu had been eclipsed by the 
Makassarese Sultanate of Gowa (Andaya 1978: 277). Custom and tradition within 
peripheral domains such as Bulukumba (chapter seven) were shaped largely by 
relations with the larger Kingdom of Gowa, relations often described in familial or 
28 Based on historical Bugis texts there is information about the major kingdoms of South Sulawesi 
dating back to circa 1300 (Bulbeck and Caldwell 2000). 
29 See Cammack (1989) for more on the origins and spread of Islamic law in Indonesia. 
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organic terms (Cummings 2001: 433). With Gowa as the centre of power in South 
Sulawesi from 1608 onwards, all subordinate polities within its sphere of influence 
would orbit around this focal point. Subordinate polities would be characterised as 
46 siblings, " invoking a sense of kinship and shared blood, or as "gourds attached to a 
stem, " invoking a symbiotic, organic relationship (Cummings 2001: 433-434). 
It appears, however, that direct measures were also needed in order to ensure 
that subordinate polities remained subordinate. Between 1540 and 1623, for instance, 
Bulukumba was invaded and subdued four times by the rulers of Gowa, giving rise to 
forms of local resistance as well as emulation (Cummings 2001: 425). Therefore 
developments in Bulukumba were said to be driven by "contradictory impulses" such 
as rejection and mimicry (Cummings 2001: 435). 
The Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) set up its first trading post in South 
Sulawesi in 1609, opposed only by the forces of Gowa (Ricklefs 1993: 48). By 1660 
the Dutch and Bugis "decided to ally against their common Makassarese enemy, " 
precipitating the fall of Gowa (Ricklefs 1993: 49) . 
30 All subordinate polities within the 
orbit of major kingdoms came under the nominal rule of the Dutch East Indies 
Company (VOC) "by right of conquest in 1667, and passed into the jurisdiction of the 
Government of the Netherlands East Indies in 1800" (Gibson 2000: 44). However, the 
formal rounding out of the empire did not occur until 1905, when the Dutch forcibly 
pacified the Celebes and initiated an era of direct rule. 
Prior to their acceptance of Islam between 1605 and 1611, the peoples of 
South Sulawesi had been exposed to regular contact with Muslim traders, teachings, 
and pressures to convert for more than 125 years (Pelras 1993: 139). One explanation 
for this lengthy conversion period was that the "deep changes it implied provoked 
strong resistance among a people keenly attached to its custom and proud of its own 
culture" (Pelras 1993: 139). Furthermore it has been hypothesised that, from the 
30 Ricklefs (1993: 63 -64) identifies a common feature in all of the 
VOC's wars: the search for a 
significant party within a hostile state to ally with. In the 
defeat of Gowa, this "significant ally" was the 
Bugis prince Arung Palakka. On 18 November 1667 Sultan Hasanuddin of 
Gowa was "forced to sign 
the Treaty of Bungaya" which symbolised the cessation of hostilities (though 
fighting continued until 
June 1669). 
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perspective of the indigenous nobility in South Sulawesi, religious teachings "would 
jeopardise social order and threaten their power" (Pelras 1993: 142). 
It is likely that the projection of power from the indigenous nobility shaped 
the response of the ordinary villager to the spread of Islam. For instance, Gibson 
(2000: 44) argues that people have a firm sense of an autonomous history in South 
Sulawesi, resulting from strong atavistic sentiments. Based on readings of particular 
historical narratives and texts, Gibson (2000: 44-45) suggests that political morals tend 
to be attached to physical features of the natural environment such as rivers and 
mountains, providing a mnemonic device for villagers. 31 Through such atavistic 
appeals, it is possible that adat rulers were able to maintain control over their 
principalities, even though it was "clearly in their interest in terms of both foreign 
policy and trade to adhere to the same religion [Islam] as their main partners in the 
archipelago" (Pelras 1993: 142). 
Despite evidence of extensive interaction with external forces, historians 
remain "struck by the long-lived survival of pre-Islamic elements" in Sulawesi (Pelras 
1993: 133). At the extreme, pre-Islamic elements include clans led by transvestite 
pagan priests called bissu, communal offerings made to guardian spirits, or rituals and 
rites of passage performed during inaugurations of houses, harvests, or ancestral 
worship (Pelras 1993: 113). More relevant to the current adat revival, however, are the 
ancient Bugis-Makassarese scripts known as lontard. 
These scripts contain chronicles about the "people of the olden days, " 
including a range of historical facts, descriptions of auspicious events, notes on adat 
laws and customs, collections of treaties between kingdoms, social contracts, king 
lists, royal diaries, agricultural manuals, medical lore, myths, and legends (Abidin 
1971: 159-160). 32 Furthermore, focal Bugis and Makassarese cultural concepts such as 
31 In the Matano domain (chapter six), the identity of indigenous communities is closely linked with a 
sense of place, ties to their village of origin, often demarcated by physical landmarks, natural borders, 
and symbolic trees such as the Banyan. 
32 The most prominent Bugis chronicle is I La Galigo, which for many contemporary authorities in 
Luwu represents their golden age. It is held that this work "must rank among the longest pieces of 
literature in the world, " given that European scholars alone "assembled about 6,000 folio pages of it" 
(Abidin 1971: 160). 
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siri (honour or shame) and pesse (compassion) have been "widely elaborated in the 
lore" of lontara, manuscripts as well as "orally transmitted precepts and aphorisms" 
(Pelras 2000: 15). 
The principal ethnic groups of Sulawesi are known to have "produced a 
historiographical literature unique in Indonesia" (Abidin 1971: 166). In 1907, Dutch 
Assistant Resident of Bone, de Greeve, attributed this accomplishment to the 
character of the people of South Sulawesi, who "always paid great attention to their 
history, " chronicling important historical events, genealogies, and anthologies that 
were bequeathed to succeeding generations (cited in Abidin 1971: 166-167). It is 
worth noting that recorded events were not limited to local matters, with the 
consequence that any effort to write the history for a given area "requires comparison 
of numerous lontard from all over" (Abidin 1971: 167). 
While there is evidence of the survival of pre-Islamic elements in Sulawesi, 
social and cultural formations have long been shaped by "histories of migration, long- 
standing links to markets and state or chiefly regimes, and the influence of world 
religions" (Li 2007: 337). After the period of Islamisation, Dutch conquest in Sulawesi 
(1667 onwards) became the major intrusion upon the customary order. 
Colonial Legacy 
While customary laws, tenure and practices were said to have "flourished under the 
shifting geo-politics of Indonesia's dynastic history, " for the most part they remained 
"ill-defined and diffused as coherent systems of bounded customary practice and 
authority over defined jurisdictions" (MeWilliam 2006: 46). It is held that none of the 
present Southeast Asian states are "based on a homogeneous cultural tradition, " but 
rather consist of a variety of different ethnic groups, each possessing their "own 
languages and their own cultural heritage" (Schefold 1998: 25 9). 
33 Most of these 
states "emerged from colonialism and inherited boundaries that were imposed from 
the outside" (Schefold 1998: 259-260). 
33 See Henley (1996: 13-16) for an illuminating account of the "origins of nations, " succinctly divided 
into five models. 
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The story of Indonesia is said to have begun "when a discrete, compact 
territory was excised by sharp colonial boundaries from an indigenous political 
geography characterised by aterritoriality, fluidity and fragmentation" (Henley 
1996: 143). Despite disagreements among historians about the precise "birthdate" of 
the Indonesian state, its "birthplace" is quite clearly the "swampy coastal township of 
Batavia, which the VOC made the center of its islandempire at the beginning of the 
seventeenth century" (Anderson 1983: 478-479). With the outward appearance of a 
business, the VOC quickly manifested itself in the archipelago as a "state, " one 
capable of "raising armies, concluding treaties, imposing taxes, punishing 
lawbreakers" and so forth (Anderson 1983: 479). 
Broadly speaking, the Dutch model for the East Indies was characterised by 
policies of "nonassimilation" and a preference for indirect rule, including little or no 
attempts to westernise the Indonesian (Vandenbosch 1943: 498-499). The extent of 
this nonassimilation even drew reproaches from other European colonial officials 
(such as the French) for not having brought the Dutch culture to the East Indies. 
Studies of early Dutch attitudes towards indigenous communities and their adat law 
reveal a "considerable indifference" and "neglect, " the only exception being the 
34 British interregnum in Java between 1811 and 1816 (Gall 1996: 116-118) . 
In other ways, however, Dutch systems of governance did impact upon the 
cultural landscapes of native populations. For instance, Dutch officials after 1870 
sought to preserve, revive (where necessary), and strengthen "native institutions and 
cultures" (Vandenbosch 1943: 499). Moreover, Dutch administration was known to be 
intensive, with a comparatively large number of colonial officials (relative to British 
colonies), who were able to penetrate deeply into native society and wield extensive 
authority through "gentle compulsion" (Vandenbosch 1943: 499). 
Having previously served as a refuge for all forces hostile to the Dutch, the 
fall of Makassar after 1667 prompted the migration of Bugis people throughout 
Sulawesi,, signifying the "first indirect impacts of Dutch rule on the cultural 
34 Thomas Stamford Raffles was appointed Lieutenant-Governor of Java from 1811-1816, replacing 
Herman Daendels (Ricklefs 1993: 113). 
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landscape" of Sulawesi (Weber et al. 2003: 402). Direct rule was extended to the outer 
islands of Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi only after 1870, when "indigenous 
states were incorporated into the Dutch hierarchy as Zelfbesturen [autonomies]" 
(Weber et al. 2003: 406). The Dutch colonial impact is best understood by making 
distinctions between different eras (see Table 2.1 below). 
Table 2.1: Phases of Dutch Colonial Rule 
priod , 'M W. 
bescripti. I rW 
Fifth Century-1601 Pre-colonial period 
1602 -1800 Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) period 
1800 -1830 Consolidation period; closing of the VOC, rule 
transferred to the Dutch state/crown 
1830 -1870 Forced cultivation (cultuurstelsel) period 
1870 -1900 Liberal era 
1900 -1941 Era of Ethical Policy 
1942 -1945 Japanese Interregnurn 
1945 -1949 Proclamation of Independence; continued Dutch 
presence 
1949 Final admission of independence (merdeka) 
Adapted from Weber et al. (2003: 40 1) 
Following the Vienna Congress of 1815 and the lifting of restrictions on the 
spice trade, colonial interests shifted to the development of plantations (Weber et al. 
2003: 403). This precipitated the era of forced cultivation, where policy was to 
(. 6 extract agricultural commodities as expeditiously as possible" (Lev 1985: 58). From 
1830-1870 the Cultivation System introduced by the Dutch King William I forcibly 
restored the profitability of the Dutch possessions in the East Indies (Bosma. 
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2007: 275). In the Liberal Era of Dutch rule (1870-1900) that followed, the focus was 
on capitalist expansion; this was then superseded by the Ethical Era (1900-1941), 
during which moral and social progress was promoted (Gibson 2000: 54). 35 Colonial 
treatment of adat communities varied significantly between 1870 and 1942, serving 
different agendas in response to periods of rapid political change. 
One common feature,, however, seemed to be the Dutch exploitation of 
internal ethnic diversity. Rather than being viewed as a "cause for concern, " such 
diversity could "serve as a welcome instrument in the endeavour to play off 
indigenous anticolonial movements against each other [ ... ] to render them harmless" 
(Schefold 1998: 260). However, the extent of this harmless instrumentalism is 
questionable. In South Sulawesi, no serious attempt was made to impose direct 
administration until the 1860s, and even then it is held that local resistance hindered 
the creation of a colonial regency system meant to consolidate village affairs (Gibson 
2000: 44). 
The passing of a new Agrarian Law in 1870 sought to formalise land usage 
and entitlement, creating new legal categories and serving to guarantee the liberty and 
security of entrepreneurs. 36 Policy from the 1870s onwards ensured that the "gates 
were now open for the development of capitalism in the colony" (Weber et al. 
2003: 405). Java's first railway line was opened for business in 1870, primarily for the 
transport of sugar (Anderson 1996: 26). In 1880 the Coolie Ordinance was enacted, 
regulating and controlling labour (Brown 2003: 93-94). Between 1870 and 1930 the 
primary exports of the Indies reaching European markets were coffee, sugar and 
tobacco,, along with the "garden products" of the eastern islands such as mace, cloves, 
nutmeg and pepper (Legge 1980: 9 1). 
Though this was in essence unfettered capitalism, there was an emergent 
liberalism in colonial discourses, and by 1900 the Ethical Era was ushered in. This 
35 The major historical eras (Liberal, Ethical) are commonly agreed upon by scholars of the 
Netherlands East Indies. See, for instance, Ricklefs (1993) or Weber et al. (2003). In 1860 the novel 
Max Havelaar, published by Eduard Douwes Dekker, exposed the brutality of rule in colonial Java. 
36 The issue of land rights was dealt with directly through the Domeinverklaring (Domain Declaration) 
stipulations of the Agrarian Law. For more on this, see Peluso and Vandergeest (2001) or Fitzpatrick 
(2005). 
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paternalistic era was marked by direct administration and intensified intervention into 
native affairs, which would come to have a profound impact on the cultural 
landscapes of Sulawesi (Weber et al. 2003: 407). Indeed, the evolving colonial state 
came to be known as "the most centralised model of state power Southeast Asia had 
ever experienced" (Reid 1998: 35). 
Beyond trade, agriculture and commerce, it is held that one of the "most 
perplexing and ambiguous themes in Indonesia's colonial history" was the treatment 
of local customary law (Lev 1985: 63). Policy makers of a liberal persuasion argued 
that native subjects should be drawn "into the modem world and subject to the same 
law, [with] legal unification for all population groups, maybe improving the natives' 
commerce and civil relations" (Lev 1985: 65). 
By contrast, the influential Leiden School of legal jurists and Orientalists 37 
led first by Jacques Oppenheim and then Cornelis van Vollenhoven (1874-1932)38, 
succeeded in convincing colonial officials to maintain a dualistic system and redouble 
efforts to "understand local [adat] law and preserve its integrity" (Lev 1985: 65 ). 39 
Dutch scholars came to identify within Indonesian village practices a "model of 
Eastern democracy which represented an advance on the individualistic and 
mechanistic conceptions of politics" associated with Western liberal democracies 
(Bourchier 2007: 114-115). 
Despite the rising influence of van Vollenhoven, some Dutch colonial officials 
and members of the Utrecht School expressed doubts about the viability of customary 
adat institutions. For instance, Professor J. de Louter felt obliged to ask whether adat 
could really be a useful political or legal instrument for "responding to the needs of 
37 Preceding the Leiden School, British Orientalist scholars such as Sir William Jones and Henry 
Colebrooke gained fame by "discovering" in the 1780s a Hindu Aryan Sanskrit civilisation in North 
India, proclaimed as the "original civilisation of humanity" (Hutchinson 2004: 111). 
38 See Bums (2004) and Holleman (1981) for a comprehensive study of the Leiden legacy. See Benda 
(1958: 340) for an account of Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, one of the "great statesmen of the 
Netherlands". Even after departing from Indonesia in 1907 to accept a professorship at Leiden 
University, Hurgronje remained highly influential over Dutch Islamic policy and continued to exert a 
lasting influence as a consultant on native affairs. 
39 By the 1920s policymakers endorsed the revival of tradition in order to offset the growing influence 
of religious extremists, communists, and the Dutch-educated revolutionary nationalists (Gibson 
2000: 54). 
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the individual and society in a rapidly changing and modemising Indonesian world" 
(cited in Fasseur 2007: 60). The following dilemma was raised in the 1920s: 
Is it enough [ ... ] to judge the policy of a colonial government 
according to the degree to which it respects native institutions 
and adat law, or should the criterion be that such a 
government must give the law that best suits the needs of 
modem society, thus preventing Indonesia from turning into 
an open-air adat museum (de Louter cited in Fasseur 
2007: 60)? 
Paradoxically, despite the genuine respect held for diverse Indonesian cultures 
and customs, the Leiden School helped to "imprison [them] in a cage of elegant 
policy that rendered them even more vulnerable to outside manipulation" (Lev 
1985: 64). Specifically, the preservationist approach succeeded in divorcing adat law 
from its own economic and political environment. As such, it was relegated to a brand 
of folk law that, while still important as the "repository of kinship organisation and 
values, " held little capacity for "internal evolution and elaboration as conditions 
changed" (Lev 1985: 64). 
Further, it is held that Dutch legal dualism established the "genetic pattern of 
the Indonesian state, which was intended primarily to "make exploitation efficient" 
(Lev 1985: 57). Consistent with contemporary officialising strategies, colonial 
adatrecht (customary law) policy had "always helped to define Indonesian 
communities in ways that kept them manageable, even docile, and subject to 
authorities upon whom the administration could rely" (Lev 1985: 65 ). 
40 While there 
has always been a primordial flavour to the ways in which adat has been articulated, 
Dutch interventions from 1905 onwards in Sulawesi set in motion a direct, deliberate 
process of "constructing" adat in non-threatening terms (Elmhirst 2001: 292). 
For instance, Dutch efforts in "mapping adat communities and drawing up 
administrative frameworks" would have been couched in predictable terms such as 
"protection and preservation" of unique, vulnerable communities, or emancipation in 
'0 See Kingston (199 1) for more on the "manipulation of tradition". 
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modernising, rationalist terms (Elmhirst 2001: 292). More to the point, colonial 
mapping efforts and legibility campaigns would have served pragmatic ends such as 
improving the scope and reach of the colonial apparatus, including the ability to 
penetrate into remote regions, expand resource extraction, and limit or co-opt 
potential sources of resistance. Teams of legal experts were deployed in order to 
consult village chiefs and document oral traditions, establishing borders and mapping 
remote terrains,, and engaging in activities that "assumed as well as sought to 
engineer" native populations (Li 2000: 159). 
From 1906, Dutch occupation of the "previously self-governing areas" of 
South Sulawesi allowed for the extension of indirect rule, a form of rule that 
introduced many changes "in order to 'optimise' the efficiency of administration" 
(Pelras 2000: 28). Key changes included the redrawing of administrative boundaries, 
systematising the hierarchy of government titles, reallocating tasks, and the creation 
of the kampung, a new low-level administrative subdivision (Pelras 2000: 28). This 
precipitated the decline of traditional leadership in parts of South Sulawesi, as the 
Dutch deterinined final appointments of rulers or high officials, severing the links 
between these rulers and their followers, and nullifying their status as patrons and 
protectors (Pelras 2000: 28). 
Optimising colonial administration required control of the population and 
therefore resettlement was encouraged, typically from inaccessible highlands to 
coastal regions. Taxation and forced labour followed, and regulations were imposed 
in order to "sedentarise" dispersed forest dwellers and curtail their shifting, slash and 
bum swidden cultivation that characterised agrarian practice in many indigenous 
communities prior to rice paddy field cultivation (McWilliam 2006: 54). Such ill- 
regarded practices were replaced by the introduction of permanent cultivation, which 
also brought the concept of private land ownership into the region. 
By 1910 the colonial state, acting through its own military force, the Royal 
Netherlands Indies' Army (Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger or KNIL), had 
successfully imposed "tranquility and order" (rust en orde) throughout its vast 
possessions, a "system of control" not seriously disturbed until 1942 (Anderson 
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1983: 479). During the Ethical Era there was a "huge extension of the state apparatus 
deep into native society" (Anderson 1983: 479). Along with the intensification of 
administration and the construction of a unifying infrastructure, rapidly expanding 
officialdom established the constitutive conditions for the modem state, based on 
"education, religion, irrigation, agricultural improvements, hygiene, mineral 
exploitation, [and] political surveillance" (Anderson 1983: 479). 
There was even talk of the volksverheffing principle, which refers to "the 
emancipation of the native population" without threatening to undermine colonial 
power (Weber et al. 2003: 407-409). This was part of an officialising strategy meant to 
support the continued existence of the colonial state, based largely on the loyalty of a 
new class of educated native elite (Weber et al. 2003: 407). Even at the height of the 
Ethical Era no substantive targets were set concerning national income levels, rice 
yields or infanticide; rather, politicians promoted emancipation in vague terrns such 
as consciousness, aid, education, participation, and social uplifting (Weber et al. 
2003: 409). This was meant to ensure that no connection was drawn between 
emancipation and independence or anti-colonialism, thus not challenging the 
constitutive political conditions. 
By the 1930s the Dutch administration was seriously concerned about 
nationalist movements and calls for independence in Indonesia. Evoking fond 
memories of the old kingdoms and the indigenous nobility, which had been "loyal 
vassals, 59 colonial officials endorsed the preservation of native legal and political 
institutions as advocated by Cornelis van Vollenhoven (Gibson 2000: 54). 
In South Sulawesi this trend went beyond preservation, however, as colonial 
officials sought to actively reconstruct the customary order in accordance with their 
political objectives. This kind of conservative, politically motivated notion of customs 
and traditions (adat istiadat) was articulated as early as the sixteenth century by the 
indigenous nobility in South Sulawesi, in the effort to preserve their authority and 
resist change (Pelras 1993: 142). 41 Just as the indigenous nobility failed to prevent the 
41 For different reasons, nationalist leaders also set about reconstructing identity and tradition through a 
broad, elite-based process of "moral innovation" that presented populations with "new maps of identity 
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spread of Islam, however, the Dutch were unable to contain the rise of revolutionary 
nationalism four centuries later. 
Independence 
In 1850 George Windsor Earl determined that the "brown races" of the vaguely 
defined Indian Archipelago should be afforded their own designation, proposing, 
among others, "Indu-nesians" (cited in Elson 2005: 146). James Richardson Logan, a 
British geographer, is then said to have coined the name "Indonesia" by combining 
India with the Greek nýsos, meaning Indian islands (Brown 2003: 2). In 1908 
Indonesia's "national awakening" was led by the medical students of STOVIA in 
42 Batavia, what is now the capital Jakarta (Elson 2005: 146) . 
Javanese awakenings were also led by Raden Ajeng Kartini (the inspiration 
behind the women's education movement), Budi Utomo (the beautiful endeavour), 
the Taman Siswa (or Garden of Pupils) education movement, Sarekat Islam (Islamic 
Union), and Muhammadiyah (Elson 2005: 146-147; McVey 1967: 130-131; Ricklefs 
1993: 156-158). The struggle for independence began in Java with the Indies Party 
(Indische Partij), founded in 1912 and banned the following year, while the 
"indigenous concept of Indonesia" was first expressed in political terms in 1917 
(Schefold 1998: 264). 43 
These early nationalist awakenings were inspired primarily by a core 
constituency of education young. This constituency was often "alienated from their 
traditional values by their secular education and imbued with new expectations of 
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social and political mobility" (Hutchinson 2004: 116). While the objective was to 
and political prescriptions" at a time when established traditions were "shaken by modernisation" 
(Hutchinson 2004: 116). 
42 The medical students of STOVIA established the first native political organisation (called Budi 
Utomo) in 1908 (Elson 2005: 146). Other organisations that directly contributed to pre-war nationalist 
movement were Sarekat Islam, Muhammadiyah, Taman Siswa, as well as Islamic pesantren schools 
(Bunnell 1996: 18 1). For a rich literary account of the Indonesian national awakening, see Pramoedya 
Anata Toer's Buru Quartet. 
43 See Schefold (1998: 264) for a vignette on Soewardi Soerjaningrat, co-founder of the Indies Party. 
Malay was selected as the unifying language of nationalism and archipelagic independence. 
44 Hutchinson (2004: 116) was not writing in the context of Indonesia, though cites similar cases of 
"national awakenings" in Italy, Poland, Ireland, and Egypt. 
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"reconnect with their society by leading it from backwardness, " the youth movements 
often found themselves "blocked by the established holders of power and status" 
(Hutchinson 2004: 116). It was nationalism that offered them an "alternative moral 
vision" and a way to circumvent entrenched interests (Hutchinson 2004: 116). 45 In 
transitional periods such as Indonesia's national awakening, the most creative ideas 
were found to have come from the "confluence of traditional and modem thought, " 
and it is held to be "impossible to credit the one or the other exclusively" (McVey 
1967: 130). 
As the world descended into war, a Tripartite Pact in September 1940 sealed 
the Japanese-German-Italian alliance (Ricklefs 1993: 194). On 10 January 1942 the 
Japanese invasion of Indonesia began; by 8 March 1942 Java was surrendered by the 
Dutch. The next three and a half years of Japanese occupation was a period of 
"extraordinary changes" which made the Indonesian Revolution possible (Ricklefs 
1993: 199). Two days after the unconditional Japanese surrender, Indonesia's 
revolutionary nationalist leaders gathered in the front yard of Sukarno's private home 
in Jakarta, raised the red and white flag and sang Indonesia Raya, which marked the 
beginning of the proclamation of independence on 17 August 1945 (Anderson 
46 1983: 480). This was followed, however, by the arrest of Sukarno (the first 
president), five years of conflict with Dutch forces (1945-1949), and regional 
rebellions (1950-1965). Such volatility was said to have precipitated an "enonnous 
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upheaval in the social system" (Pelras 2000: 28) . 
During this period of upheaval a new class of nationalist leaders was thrust 
onto the political stage, some of whom were "endowed with a charismatic cultural 
authority" (Hutchinson 2004: 120). Following the protracted wars of independence, a 
new set of "national legends" arose with the ability to legitimise a post-colonial social 
45 To mitigate the tensions surrounding Java-centrism, Malay became the language of nationalism as 
it 
was not associated exclusively with any region of Indonesia (Schefold 1998: 265). 
46 Sukarno was "elected" by twenty-odd members of the Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian 
Independence, a body hastily set up by the defeated Japanese prior to their withdrawal (Anderson 
1983: 480). 
47 For an account of the "dark side" of the independence struggle (fi7om 1945 to 
1949), see Scagliola 
(2007). 
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48 and political order (Hutchinson 2004: 120) . However, the core challenges facing the 
new Indonesian state became highly visible as the euphoria of independence receded. 
These challenges derive from the multi-ethnic composition of the archipelago, the 
abolition of the external unifying power structure (colonial apparatus), and the power 
of local rather than national affiliations, all of which demanded a "new legitimation of 
the state" and the "activation of a national consciousness" (Schefold 1998: 262). 
Early movements to unify the diverse archipelago under one (mainly 
Javanese) central authority encountered resistance on several fronts. The Royal 
Netherlands Indies' Army (KNIL) sought to enforce a federal solution to the 
Indonesian question, and conducted several military operations (known as Police 
Actions) to ensure the integrity of the federal state (Kahin 1949: 227). 49 In 1947 KNIL 
forces received specific orders to pacify Sulawesi (known then as Celebes), during 
which time Captain Raymond 'Turk' Westerling executed a ruthless campaign to 
ensure that Makassar maintain its autonomous status, and resisted republican 
(Javanese) overtures. 50 What emerged was an amalgam of two adversarial states, the 
"united state" of eastern Indonesia, now deprived of its "inner Dutch spine, " and the 
"republican half, " struggling to recover from its "pulverisation" in the second Police 
Action of 1948-1949 (Anderson 1983: 482). 
Formal Dutch recognition of Indonesia's independence on 27 December 1949 
was followed by a series of violent "outbreaks of regionalism" (Errington 1989: 16). 
In 1953, forces from South Sulawesi led by Kahar Muzakkar adopted the mantle of 
Islamic struggle, and aligned their opposition to a centralised, unitary state with the 
wider Darul Islam (or House of Islam) movement. 51 It is widely reported, however, 
48 Hutchinson (2004) was writing about generals trends in nationalist revivalism, many of which were 
relevant to the Indonesian case. In Indonesia, national heroes included Sukarno, Hatta, Nasution, and 
Sudirman. 
49 The Linggadjati and Malino Agreements for federalism, both promulgated in Sulawesi, led to the 
declaration of the United States of Indonesia; as a result, Sulawesi was incorporated into in the State of 
Eastern Indonesia on 24 December 1946 (Kahin 1949: 227). 
50 See, for instance, the controversial account of Westerling (195 2), or van der Kroef (1954). 
51 Darul Islam began in 1948 as a rebellion in West Java. Kahar Muzakkar and his forces led a separate 
rebellion in South Sulawesi in 1950, officially proclaiming their alignment with Darul Islam only 
in 
1953. Kahar was killed in 1958, though fighting continued until 1965. For an extensive account of the 
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that the origins of the Sulawesi rebellion had more to do with issues of army 
personnel screening than with Islamic purity and the purging of syncretic practices 
(Errington 1989: 17). After years spent fighting the Dutch in Java, Kahar Muzakkar 
expected to command a battalion in South Sulawesi which included all of his men, 
but instead was excluded from the newly independent Indonesian an-ny. This 
provided the backdrop to more than a decade (1953-1965) of anarchic and 
devastating rebellion (Errington 1989: 17). 
Radical attempts to achieve the Islarnisation of South Sulawesi required, 
among other things, the suppression of all "feudal aspects of traditional society" and 
the "abolishment of the old forms of hierarchical politics" (Pelras 1993: 152; 
Errington 1989: 16). Feudalism was linked adat and condemned for its superstitions, 
rituals, myths of origin, ceremonies, and visitations to sacred sites, all of which were 
in contravention of Islamic law (Pelras 1993: 152). Many customary rulers had further 
discredited themselves by aligning with the transitional Netherlands Indies Civil 
Administration (NICA). With the departure of the Dutch in 1949 republican 
aspirations had risen to the ascendancy, and subsequent rulers took care not to 
foreground their noble origins. Two distinct movements, the religiously-inspired 
Darul Islam and the democracy-oriented Pemuda youth, wished to "wipe out all traces 
of the old order" in South Sulawesi, including the customary adat order (Pelras 
2000: 28). 
Early Dutch rationalisation projects (in administration, agriculture and law) 
were accelerated by the national revolution, disrupting and overlaying the customary 
order,, but not eradicating it. As Anderson (1983: 477) observed, the "lineaments of 
older states" remained highly visible despite these historic upheavals, lineaments such 
as organisational structures, distributions of functions, memoirs, lontard (chronicles), 
travelogues, and biographies. Similarly, "important historical antecedents" continued 
to inform the lifeways of local communities, representing focal points for ethnic 
Darul Islam rebellions, see Harvey (1974) and Harvey (1996); for the "Andi Aziz Affair" in South 
Sulawesi, see Feith (1962). 
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identities, cultural sentiments, living memories, and oral traditions (Gerber 
2004: 253 ). 52 
Analysis of indigenous discourses in the decolonisation era helps one 
understand the different representations of adat in current rights-based struggles 
throughout Indonesia, with particular emphasis on land, resources, and autonomous 
governance. Positive framing involves representations such as indigenous 
communities as "stewards" of nature, "repositories" of environmental knowledge, and 
"bearers" of unique and vulnerable cultural traditions (Henley and Davidson 
53 2007: 6). Negative framing links adat with exclusionary ethnic practices, divisive 
politics, violent resource conflicts, and the accentuation of chauvinistic indigenism. 
Just as the Leiden Orientalists may have inadvertently relegated adat to the 
status of folklore in the early twentieth century by divorcing it from its economic, 
political, and power base, post-colonial romantics and preservationists may have 
unwittingly contributed to the circumvention of adat's potential as an oppositional 
force for political change. For instance, the "ubiquitous political mantras" of 
musyawarah (deliberation) and mufakat (consensus), so often associated with modem 
adat campaigns, are evidence of the distillation of diverse customs and traditions into 
"simple formulas, " which were then used as "cultural-ideological instruments" by 
Sukarno's Guided Democracy and Suharto's New Order (Bourchier 1997: 158). 
Prior to the arrest of Indonesia's first president (Sukarno) in 1965, the 
Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunist Indonesia or PKI) was rapidly gaining 
popularity throughout the archipelago. Islamist movements were also growing 
increasingly restive, and the experiment in Guided Democracy 54 (involving the 
52 Gerber (2004: 253) provides a succinct overview of the major theoretical debates on nationalism 
between Benedict Anderson (2006), Ernest Gellner (1983), and Anthony Smith (1986). 
53 Bourchier (1997: 159-162) details the vision of highly influential customary law expert Supomo, 
whose promotion of adat during early constitutional debates was linked to "totalitarian" notions of the 
"integralist state". Indonesian integralism was conceived of as an organic whole without distinctions 
between rulers and ruled, which resonated with Europe's Weltanschauung, fascist and totalitarian 
philosophies. 
54 Beginning on 9 April 1957, the Indonesian government was led by an "extra-parliamentary cabinet 
of experts" personally appointed by Sukarno (van der Kroef 1957: 113). This era of "Guided 
Democracy" was prompted by economic decline, political crises, and regional rebellions. For further 
information see Feith (1963). 
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dissolution of parliament and the permanent rule of Sukarno) was faltering (Thorburn 
2004: 36-37). 
Polarisation between right and left, secular and Islamist, modem and 
traditional came to a head on the night of 30 September 1965, when six senior 
generals and a lieutenant were kidnapped and executed "as part of an attempt to 
establish a governing 'revolutionary council"' (Zurbuchen 2002: 565). The 30 th 
September Movement (usually referred with the acronym G-30-S) was quickly 
suppressed by Major General Suharto (McGregor 2002: 4 1). 55 What followed was a 
phase of communist purges that claimed as many as 500,000 lives across the 
archipelago between October 1965 and April 1966. (Collins 2002: 598). 56 In the wake 
of such terror and violence, a new era was bom. 
New Order Era 
The newly established Suharto 57 government was immediately confronted by a legacy 
of "hyper-inflation, debt and infrastructure collapse" (Hadiz and Robison 2005: 220). 
After "reigning in" rebellious regional military commanders and "brutally" restoring 
order in the countryside, there was a rapid shift towards "export-led economic growth 
and development" (Thorburn 2004: 37). Essential to this new orientation was the 
passing of a series of laws to attract investment, laws mainly concerned with natural 
resource management, the legacy of which is still visible in contemporary 
Indonesia. 58 Thus the "legal machinery" for exploitation and control was set in 
motion during this stage of the New Order (Lucas and Warren 2003: 100). 
"A commemorative ceremony (Hari Kesaktian Pancasila) was held at the elaborate memorial site 
(Monumen Pancasila Sakti) for the fallen generals for thirty consecutive years under the New Order 
regime. Critics argue that this commemoration was premised on "a very selective memory of both the 
coup attempt and the transition years from Sukarno to Suharto, " events still shrouded in mystery 
(McGregor 2002: 39). Pancasila, Indonesia's national philosophy, consists of five principles: belief in 
one God, humanitarianism, nationalism, democracy, and social justice. 
56 While these figures are disputed, many observers consider 500,000 casualties to be fairly accurate. 
" Suharto held de facto presidential power from March 1966, though formally supplanted Sukarno 
only in 1968 (Anderson 1983: 488). 
58 These laws included Forestry Law 5/1967, Mining Law 11/1967, Oil and Natural Gas Law 8/197 1, 
Resettlement and Transmigration Law 3/1972, Irrigation Law 11/1974, and Fisheries Law 9/1985 
(Thorburn 2004: 37). 
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Most notable was the betrayal of the principles of the Basic Agrarian Law (or 
BAL) Number 5/1960, which was intended to nullify the colonial Agrarian Act of 
1870 . 
59 The BAL contained provisions for the harmonisation of parallel legal systems 
established by the Dutch, as well as the promotion of adat as the basis for national 
land law (McWilliam 2006: 50). It also asserted the "social function" of land and 
resources,, which were to be managed and redistributed in the interests of "the people" 
(Lucas and Warren 2003: 94-95). Such assertions and provisions were conditional as 
the primacy of national interests was still upheld through the BAL. Land serving 
social and collective functions was also easily linked to communism, and thus 
vulnerable to misrepresentation. Incontrovertible notions of unity and development 
limited the prospects of collective tenure and hak ulayat (the customary right of 
avail). While customary rights and tenure were recognised in principle, in practice 
they were denied legitimacy, were poorly defined, and people remained "vulnerable 
to the dictates of state policy and development programmes" (McWilliam 2006: 5 1). 
Throughout the New Order traditional adat lands, practices and laws were 
largely ignored, and land was used by the central government to generate revenue 
through resource extraction. Emphasis was placed upon the mining sector, along with 
palm oil plantations, golf courses, and the dubious designation of "sleeping lands" to 
be bought by speculative investors (Lucas and Warren 2003: 88). The result was a 
"remarkable economic recovery" bolstered by Western creditors, concessionary 
loans, foreign investment in sectors such as petroleum, forestry and mining, "massive 
infusions" of foreign aid and finance, licensing agreements with transnational 
corporations, "windfall profits" from the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) price increases in the 1970s, and a surge in raw material exports 
(Thorburn 2004: 37-38; Elmhirst 2001: 286). 
Technocratic economic reform was coupled with administrative refinement, 
and the managerial vehicle for military-bureaucratic order became Golkar (Reid 
59 Gall (1996: 122) notes that the BAL eliminated Book 11 of the Dutch Civil Code along with the 
Agrarian Law of 1870. Then in 1963 the Civil Code was declared by a "supreme court circular" to be 
no longer in force. 
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1998: 27) . 
60 The New Order regime sought to extent its reach throughout the 
archipelago, imposing standardisation and uniformity at the village level through 
Regional Government Law 5/1974 and Village Government Law 5/1979 (Kato 
1989: 9 1). 6 1A "crippling uniformity" would come to exact a heavy price in some 
regions, leaving a legacy of "anti-politics" which fostered violence rather than 
deliberation, monopolisation of power, manipulation of interests, and patronage 
(Antl6v 2003b: 75). 
New Order policy is also said to have "neutered" adat institutions once 
capable of managing local conflicts (Erb 2007: 263). Village Government Law 5/1979 
in particular was seen as a reaction against local differentiation in political terms, 
which threatened to render the archipelago ungovernable. Efforts to standardise 
village administration were thus designed to strengthen the central state and weaken 
or eliminate traditional adat institutions (Antl6v 2003 a: 195). The regime sought to 
"reduce the capacity" for expressions of autonomy from the centre, and to "extend 
centralised authority in ways that appear to iron out difference and diversity" 
(Elmhirst 2001: 290). 
Power relations during the New Order era have therefore been characterised as 
ý (. pyramidal, " with Suharto at the apex of a dominant presidency, supported by 
politically active armed forces and centralised bureaucratic decision-making 
processes (Liddle 1985: 70). 62 Sustaining this pyramidal system involved surveillance 
and control, along with the strategic channelling of state funds to build a massive 
national bureaucracy, one stretching to the "farthest reaches of the archipelago" 
(Thorburn 2004: 38). 
It is held that Suharto was supported by a "phalanx" of authoritative figures, 
which "organised, ordered, constructed, [and] constituted society" in accordance with 
60 Golkar (or Golongan Karya) means "functional groups" based on organicist ideas of political 
representation, ideas such as duties before rights and the general interest, as opposed to individualism 
and political participation (Reid 1998: 27). 
61 Thorburn (2004: 39) calls Village Law 5/1979 the "cookie cutter" law because of its arbitrary nature, 
the tendency to blur ethnic boundaries, and the disruption of customary systems of land management. 
62 Kato (1989: 106-107) characterises the structural chain of command in New Order Indonesia as a 
"baseless" and "equilateral" triangle. 
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the comprehensive goals of the New Order (Leng 2003: 7 1). Maintaining power 
requires a balancing act, and Suharto established private sector monopolies (such as 
controlling the supply of cloves), state-owned enterprises gifted to members of rank 
from the armed forces, and a chain of "franchises" awarded to lower-level 
63 government officials, foundations and business cronies (McLeod 2000: 17-18) . 
Suharto's franchise model allowed for the controlled distribution of benefits 
from the centre to the periphery, and in return ensured a "flow of information to the 
top regarding individuals or organisations that might threaten the existence of the 
system" (McLeod 2000: 18). In addition, the "territorial command structure" based on 
a dual function security apparatus allowed for an extended military presence 
throughout Indonesia, increasing regional dependency upon the power centre in Java 
(Liong 2002). 64 A dual economy also emerged, with an "unofficial private military 
economy" operating under the faýade of an "illegal financial union of public and 
private funds" (Holtzappel 2002: 66). The "financial blurring" that resulted made 
accounting very difficult, and formed the basis of the "coalition between export trade, 
army and industry" which helped consolidate the rent-seeking Suharto regime 
(Holtzappel 2002: 66). 
Indonesia's progress, signified by development indicators, was positive, with 
gains in infi7astructure, education, health, and industry, ensuring its status as one of 
Asia's "emerging tigers". Economic growth reached the "spectacular rates" of eight 
per cent during the 1970s and five-point-three per cent during the 1980s (Colombijn 
1998: 305). Some of the Suharto regime's perfon-nance legitimacy derived from its 
capacity to "deliver development" based on a nepotistic model, without imposing too 
much of a tax burden on the people (Elmhirst 2001: 286). Another aspect was the 
apparent willingness of the regime to comply the international "human development" 
63 Restrictions on cloves (an essential ingredient in Indonesia's kretek cigarettes) enriched Suharto's 
family and business associates, including Indonesia's riches citizen Liem Sioe Liong (McLeod 
2000: 18). 
64 Malley (2003: 107) notes that, in Suharto's first decade in power, army generals "increased their 
share of provincial governorships" from 40 per cent to 78 per cent, and by the mid-1970s colonels and 
lieutenant-colonels "received nearly three-quarters" of all mayoral appointments at the district level. 
For more on the Indonesian military, see Crouch (1979), Mietzner (2003), or Rinakit (2005). 
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agenda by allocating a share of its 1970s OPEC "oil bonanza" towards public 
expenditures, including rural development (Bunnell 1996: 182). 
The view from below, however, casts a different light on this economic 
miracle, as the social and envirom-nental costs of such modernising progress were 
substantial. Vast tracts of diverse tropical rainforest were "reduced to smouldering 
moonscapes, " converted for productive purposes such as rubber, oil palm, and pulp 
plantations, or rendered inaccessible to thousands of forest-dependant communities 
through conservation programmes including national parks, reservations, and 
sanctuaries (Thorburn 2004: 38). 
Cumulative New Order policies "left a heritage of bitterness towards Jakarta 
and the Javanese dominated bureaucracy, " enriching politico-business elites from 
Jakarta while "local communities have been deprived of land and livelihood 
opportunities" (McCarthy 2004: 1202). What little wealth tricked down went to 
provincial capitals such as Makassar, leaving local people with little but "denuded 
hillsides and poisoned rivers" (Henley and Davidson 2007: 11). 
Further, transmigration schemes guided significant numbers of Javanese, 
Balinese and Buginese entrepreneurs along newly paved logging roads winding deep 
into the interiors of Kalimantan, Sumatra, and Sulawesi (Thorburn 2004: 38). This 
created a new wave of "pioneer slash-and-burn" agriculturalists whose practices 
rapidly depleted soil fertility (Thorburn 2004: 38). Local and national transmigration 
was an important mechanism used by the New Order regime in the attempt to "secure 
the conditions for capitalist accumulation" (Elmhirst 2001: 286). The majority of 
transmigrants were "land-poor Javanese, " relocated (often forcibly) as part of 
deliberate state policy to "manage divergent development paths, " as well as "forge 
national unity through population resettlement and administrative control" (Elmhirst 
2001: 286). 
Controversially, international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World 
Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) were major sponsors of transmigration 
in Indonesia during the 1970s. For example, the World Bank provided US$30 million 
for the resettlement of 4,500 families in the Batumarta transmigration project 
in South 
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Sumatra as well as the rehabilitation of transmigration settlements in North Lampung 
involving 12,000 families from 1975-1979 (Elmhirst 2001: 288). The government of 
Indonesia then went further by introducing a local transmigration policy (translok) 
which some believe was meant to secure the conditions for deeper capitalist 
penetration into remote areas of the archipelago as well as to improve administrative 
uniformity. 65 
Widespread displacement, disenfranchisement, and land alienation destroyed 
patterns of land use which had sustained local communities for generations. The 
sweeping changes of the 1970s divorced people from swidden fields, hunting and 
gleaning grounds, and the multitude of nuanced agrarian practices that are (often 
romantically) attributed to indigenous adat systems. Moreover, it has been argued that 
a "rabidly plundering" New Order regime was responsible for the organising and 
nurturing of powerful elites, the likes of which have recently been reconstituted in 
order to capture the fruits of an unstable decentralisation process (Hadiz 2004: 711). 
Rabid plundering would not have been possible over three decades without 
sophisticated methods of control. 
Within a "rigid state-corporatist system" all societal organisation was 
94 compartmentalised into state-backed corporatist institutions" for business, labour, 
youth groups, civic activists, media and the like (Hadiz and Robison 2005: 237). 
66 For 
the effective functioning of this corporatist model, control of land was paramount, 
though this was coupled with other imperatives, including control of ideas and control 
of the population (the floating mass concept). 
During the New Order era of accelerated development and modemisation,, 
"official state doctrine emphasised sanitised and authorised versions of cultural 
difference subservient to national goals, national unity" (Robinson 1997: 71). While 
sharing many of the characteristics of the colonial era, the penetrating, systematic 
interventions of the 1970s marked the most intensive alteration of the cultural 
landscapes of Indonesia. 
65 For more on resettlement and identity politics, see Hoshour 
(1997). 
66 The Village Deliberative Council (Lembaga Musyawarah Desa or LMD) was one such institution 
(Kato 1989: 94). 
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The hallmarks of this era inspired prominent works such as Rendra's (1979) 
play entitled the Naga Tribe and Robinson's (1986) book Step-Children of Progress. 
The New Order legacy was also essential to Erb's (2007) sympathetic analysis of the 
Manggarai of western Flores,, Elmhirst's (2001) study of the "politics of place" in 
north Lampung of Sumatra, Warren's (2005) examination of the resurgence of 
Balinese adat, and Avonius's (2003) assessment of adat revivalism in north Lombok. 
The common thread among all of these studies is the assumption that externalities 
caused the decline of the customary order and the unravelling of communal bonds, 
rather than the inverse, an unwillingness or inability within the community to respond 
to rapid social, economic and political changes. 
From 1971 onwards a "closing down of politics" occurred with the floating 
mass policy, and the "stultifying cultural homogenisation and political centralisation" 
of the New Order gradually "ruptured the social texture" of local politics and 
community institutions (Aspinall and Fealy 2003: 8; Antl6v 2003b: 74). Adat as art, 
festival and display was embraced insofar as it remained a vibrant, colourful, diverse, 
non-political representation of the various archipelagic ethnic groups, which the New 
Order deliberately sought to ensure through various programmes of "engineering 
identities" for the generic purposes of nation-building (Erb 2007: 269). 
Post-revolutionary Indonesian leaders sought to domesticate notions of 
indigenous tradition that were useful for the consolidation of power. Notions such as 
"the state as a family, organically united in love" and governed by an all-knowing 
father-head, were turned into "tools of control to shape and exploit people" (Erb et al. 
2005: 144; Reid 1998: 25). Essentially, the regime's power brokers were entrusted 
with "guardianship" over the past, using state agencies and media to "propagate" 
67 particularistic images throughout society (Coakley 2004: 534) . 
Starting from the late 1960s organisations such as the Legal Aid Institute 
(LBH) and Yogyakarta-based CD Bethesda (a developmental NGO founded by Dr. 
Paulus Santosa in 1974) began to devise strategies for political reform (Bunnell 
67 Coakley (2004) wrote on nationalist images of history in general, though his analysis relates to the 
Indonesian case. 
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1996: 184-185). Environmental NGOs in the 1970s were also becoming prominent, 
enjoying the protection of the progressive Minister of Environment and Population, 
Emil Salim (Bunnell 1996: 181). Advocates of political reform began to effectively 
operate under the coalition of the Indonesian Forum for the Environment (WALHI) 
and its "more militant offshoot, " the Indonesian Network on Tropical Forest 
Conservation or SKEPHI (Bunnell 1996: 18 1). 68 
As national movements progressively adopted the notations of international 
organisations (from "holistic" health, ecology and development to "human" security), 
activists and legal aid workers pushed the boundaries of permissible political 
activism. However, there were reversals and crackdowns as Suharto's rule became 
unpredictable in the 1990s. While the period between 1991 and 1994 was known for 
experiments in keterbukaan or "openness, " the fluctuations and unpredictability of the 
regime is clearly illustrated by the decision in spring 1992 to suspend all official 
governmental assistance from the Netherlands "for reasons of sovereignty" (Bertrand 
1996: 320; Bunnell 1996: 183-184). 69 Moving beyond the terms of the government's 
unreliable commitments to openness and its officialising partnership strategies, it was 
determined that Indonesian NGOs needed to "shed their fear of politics in favour of a 
new political activism" (Bunnell 1996: 196). 
Transition 
In the build-up to Suharto's fall from power, there were several ominous signs. For 
instance,, "in 1997 some of the "most extensive forest fires in the century" spread 
through Indonesia, consuming between seven and ten million hectares of forest and 
agricultural land (McCarthy 2000: 91). The New Order apparatus was then 
"unravelled by capital flight and panic" in the wake of the Asian economic crisis of 
1997-1998 (Hadiz and Robison 2005: 225). 
An increasingly desperate government turned to the IN4F on 8 October 1997 
and was offered a conditional US$43 billion bailout. Economic shock therapy in 
68 WALHI is funded by Oxfarn and CARE international, among other donors. 
69 It is reported that 80 per cent of the funding for the Legal Aid Institute (Lembaga Bantuan Hukum or 
LBH), Indonesia's "most vocal NGO, " came fi7om the Netherlands (Bunnell 1996: 183). 
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Indonesia required millions of rural citizens to ingest the "bitter pill" of structural 
adjustment, including trade liberalisation, fiscal austerity, and the lifting of subsidies 
(Tyson 2005: 146). Caught playing a "duplicitous" game with the IMF in order to stall 
reforms, failing to stabilise the currency and inflation, provoking dissent within the 
regime, exacerbating the swelling metropolitan student movements, and struggling to 
contain high-level desertions, Suharto was forced to resign his fractured office in May 
1998 (Hadiz and Robison 2005: 225 ). 70 
The transition in May of 1998 ushered in the era reformasi, giving rise to 
great expectations for political reforms as well as generating uncertainty in terms of 
territorial integrity and fragmentation. Eager to demonstrate its democratic credentials 
in the face of great domestic pressure, the interim government of B. J. Habibie 
included regional autonomy in its mandate for reform. There are many indications 
that the hastily drafted decentralisation laws of 1999 were "primarily designed by 
bureaucrats, with no feedback whatsoever from the regions" (Nordholt 2003: 564). 
External pressure was an important factor driving the interim administration to 
undertake a policy of decentralisation. The dominant neo-liberal agenda of the World 
Bank and IN4F prescribed decentralisation with the aim to reduce centralised 
corruption and bureaucratic stagnation, to promote a dynamic and open economy, to 
improve the investment climate, and to enhance democratic local governance and 
community-driven development. 71 
In the spirit of reform, the state appeared willing to tolerate and even 
encourage local diversity to an extent previously unheard of. This reduced the 
language of uniformity and standardisation typical of the New Order era, giving rise 
instead to local discourses and atavistic movements in which regional identities, 
70 In the crisis of 1997 the search for political scapegoats escalated; there are reports of the circulation 
of hundreds of documents entitled "The Conspiracy to Overthrow Suharto" in elite conservative 
Muslim circles in Jakarta, Bandung, Bogor and elsewhere (Hefner 2000: 44). This 50-page document 
contained "startling facts" about the economic crisis and the prodemocracy movement, deflecting 
attention away from the maladministration of the New Order and towards the "international conspiracy 
uniting Jews, the American CIA, the Vatican, and Chinese-Indonesians" against Suharto (a Muslim) 
and Indonesia (a majority Muslim country) (Hefner 2000: 44). 
71 Between 1997 and 2000 the Indonesian government was reportedly required by the IMF to sign as 
many as sixteen 'Letters of Intent' outlining its agreement to fulfil reform programmes 
(Hadiz and 
Robison 2005: 225). 
57 
customs and traditions are actively being reconstructed, reasserted and rearticulated. 
Therefore, decentralisation can be said to open up "a new and conscientious arena for 
political struggle" (Eaton 2001: 102). 
The passing of Law Number 22/1999 on 'Regional Governance' and Law 
Number 25/1999 on the 'Fiscal Balance between the Centre and the Regions' laid the 
foundations for penetrating reforms. These reforms would have substantial powers 
devolved not to the provinces but to the district (kabupaten) and village (desa) level. 
Specifically, Law 22/1999 "gives local government great autonomy over most of the 
functions that affect people most directly, including urban services, education, public 
health services, envirom-nental management, planning and local economic 
development" (Hadiz 2004: 707). 
B. J. Habibie's interim regime ceded power to Abduraham Wahid following 
national elections held on 7 June 1999, though this presidency was short lived. A 
special session held by the National People's Assembly (MPR) on 23 July 2001 
"formalised the removal of Wahid, 51 who had been plagued by impeachment charges 
and was reportedly in ill-health (Tyson and Tyson 2007: 261). This paved the way for 
Megawati Sukarnoputri, the daughter of Sukarno, to assume the presidency; she was 
far firom enthusiastic about decentralisation, though her stewardship proved cautious 
and no dramatic changes were ushered in. 
There are suggestions that the granting of residual powers to the districts was 
a reactionary manoeuvre, one premised on fears that the "provinces could be 
politically more difficult to control and may use their new powers to foster dreams of 
independence" (Bell 2003: 120). To support the newly devolved functions, the central 
government has restructured corporate contributions and made available a program of 
block grants called General Allocation Funds (Dana Alokasi Umum or DAU) and 
Special Allocation Funds (Dana Alokasi Khusus or DAK) to "help defray the costs of 
72 the regions' new responsibilities" (Fanany 2003: 177) . 
72 For a detailed account of regional income and centre-region financial balancing in Indonesia see 
Alm et al. (200 1), Erawan (1999), and Seymour and Turner (2002). 
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Within two years Indonesia underwent a transition from a highly centralised 
state with complete authority linked to Jakarta to one in which authority was devolved 
to more than 360 district-level governments and parliaments (Aspinall and Fealy 
2003: 3). In terms of deconcentration and delegation, some two million civil servants, 
239 provincial-level offices, 3,933 local-level offices, and 16,000 service facilities 
(schools, hospitals) were transferred from the centre to the regions (Duncan 
2007: 718). The speed and scope of change gave rise to claims that this "big bang" 
was one of the "most radical decentralisation programs attempted anywhere in the 
world" (Aspinall and Fealy 2003: 3; Guess 2005: 220). 
The logic of decentralisation suggests a transfer of responsibilities and power 
to the local sphere. A derivative of this responsibility and power is greater 
participation and representation. Participation, however, is a contested concept and 
once put into practice it may in fact run contrary to conventional theories. For 
example, the participation of local groups or actors may take the form of mobilisation, 
organisation, resistance, withdrawal, rejection, or affirmation. Firsthand fieldwork 
was therefore needed in order to better understand how participation translates into 
substantive changes at the local level, and how different representations of adat 
impact upon exigent struggles for rights and recognition. 
Uncertainty related to participation and representation stems from the fact that 
people are motivated in different ways, some acting for personal gain, some vying for 
exclusive control over and access to resources, and others committed to community 
development and the common good. Within this context, there are opportunities for 
positive interactions between the centre and the periphery, opening spaces for local 
innovation and expression while also nurturing a sense of national identity free from 
coercion. Conversely, there are also threats that the process will lead to greater 
fragmentation and expose the vulnerability of regions to exploitation, manipulation, 
and regressive aspects of tradition such as chauvinism and patrimonialism, possibly 
heightening ethnic tensions in remote regions. 
At this juncture it is necessary to revisit the research questions set out in the 
introductory chapter by tracing the convergence of adat revivalism and regional 
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autonomy in Indonesia. For Mohan and Stokke (2000: 247), this begins with an 
examination of the broad links between development theory and political action, and 
the specific ways in which "new political spaces are being imagined and constructed". 
Political discourses of participation and empowerment are now part of the established 
vocabulary of international financial institutions,, multilateral donor agencies, global 
civil society, recipient nations from the developing world, local activists, and even 
local client communities that are frequently subjected to good governance and 
sustainable development initiatives. 
To the extent that authority has been devolved in Indonesia, adat revivalists 
have been presented with an opportunity to "animate" political struggles from below, 
encouraging an upsurge of grassroots activism that could influence existing power 
holders and mount a serious structural challenge (Hutchinson 2004: 115). 73 This 
polycentric process has led to the emergence (or construction) of "the local" as the 
((site of empowennent and hence as a locus of knowledge generation and 
development intervention" (Mohan and Stokke 2000: 247-248). 
Within this potential site of empowerment, local cultural representations are 
64 contingent and embedded in a particular social and political context, " and the way 
they are articulated depends upon a particular positioning (Morrell 2001: 440). This is 
common throughout Indonesia, including Sulawesi, where "political culture has long 
drawn upon the past, selectively appropriating elements of tradition and history 
relevant to the needs of modem society" (Morrell 2001: 440). 
Antiquity is often employed "as a source of legitimacy" for political-cultural 
communities ranging from autochthonous villages to nations (Guibernau 2004: 136). 
Used selectively, historical antiquity may be deployed in order to forge collective 
identities, highlight continuities, provide a "distinguished pedigree" with regards to 
collective origins, exemplify ancestral deeds, feed subjective beliefs in kinship 
relations, and ultimately provide the intended community with a memory of 
"transcendental moments" which represent the "cradle" of their collective character 
73 Hutchinson (2004: 115) wrote in the context of "political communities of sacrifice" animating 
nationalist struggles to mount a revolutionary attempt on the state. 
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74 (Guibernau 2004: 137) 
. Engendering a sense of a shared past, therefore, is not 
simply an "ideological package that emanates from an 'objective' historical 
experience, " but rather is based on "selection and over- simplification" if not outright 
"misinterpretation and fabrication" (Coakley 2004: 533). 
In Indonesia, the selective appropriation and deployment of adat by groups 
positioned within a "local site of empowen-nent" signifies a deliberate process, 
something akin to what Giddens (1990: 37) called "conscious recontextualisation". 
This involves the selective application of "modem knowledge to the utilisation of 
tradition, ") which then forms the "basis of cultural intervention for the assertion of 
power and influence" (Morrell 2001: 440). 
When confronting entrenched political interests, the communities and activists 
behind adat revivalism tend to draw upon "historically sedimented practices, 
landscapes, and repertoires of meaning, " which emerge through "particular patterns 
of engagement and struggle" (Li 2000: 151). Assertions of power by the disaffected 
are often met with counter-resistance,, and those behind the struggles often succumb 
to manipulation or reorientation, thus provoking a cautious ambivalence amongst 
observers of adat revivalism. 
As these struggles unfold, cultural identities are "subject to the continuous 
6 play' of history, cultural and power" (Li 2000: 152). Far from being "eternally fixed 
in some essentialised past, " constantly equated with "fixity and tradition, " it is 
important to recognise the ways in which "the local" is "actively constructed, 
imagined and struggled over" (Li 2000: 152; Elmhirst 2001: 290). Social and political 
constructions occur as a result of external influences, exertions of power, 
representation, and active manipulation by actors and groups seeking to legitimise 
their claims to autonomous authority or control over territory (land and resources). 
Since 1998 there has been an "unprecedented ease of global communications, " 
allowing campaigners to "interact directly with their intended beneficiaries" (Henley 
74 Hutchinson (2004: 112) provides an illuminating account of historical reconstructions, instances 
where "romantic nationalists" overlay (but do not obliterate) existing ethnic traditions by "recreating 
the past as one of continuous creativity, " as well as "identifying a golden age that authenticated 
tradition". 
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and Davidson 2007: 6). Often the political ideals and struggles of such intended 
beneficiaries are shaped by their interactions with other actors, as they are drawn to 
the "economic resources and media attention which it provides" (Henley and 
Davidson 2007: 6). Interaction with the global indigenous movement has been 
characterised as "oxymoronic" in the sense that the adat communities of Indonesia are 
being embraced under the umbrella of "cosmopolitan nativism" (Henley and 
Davidson 2007: 6). Put another way, the practice of indigenous revival is "determined 
less by ancestry, culture, or marginality" than by "familiarity with international 
discourse and the politics of indigenous rights" (Henley and Davidson 2007: 6). As 
such, the authenticity of adat revivalism and all subsequent political claims have been 
rigorously challenged by proponents of the constructivist approach. 
Consistent with the critical conjectures developed throughout this chapter, it is 
necessary to examine the emergence of the local as a potential site for oppositional 
political struggles, set against the dominant tendencies of the state. Again, this section 
revisits earlier propositions that adat revivalism may not threaten the constitutive 
political order, this time drawing on the comprehensive body of literature dealing 
with Indonesia's recent transition towards democratic decentralisation. 
Decentralisation: Opportunities and Dilemmas 
Decentralisation as a modem development strategy was first introduced in the 1950s 
and 1960s throughout the developing world, from Latin America to Africa and Asia. 
Contrary to most expectations, this first wave of decentralisation did not achieve its 
stated objectives and was, in most cases, abandoned by the governments of the 
developing world. This failure was put down to the fact that decentralisation policies 
were "largely initiatives in public administration without any serious democratic 
component" (Blair 2000: 2 1). 
More specifically, early decentralisation initiatives had been vitiated by the 
1970s as a result of the growing distrust of central authorities. This distrust was based 
on the central authorities' tendency to interfere in the refonn process, as well as 
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internal problems such factional infighting, shortages of resources, and insufficient 
guidance for local elected councils and communities (Crook and Manor 1998: 2). 
It is held that the second international wave of decentralisation (late 1980s) 
departed from the experiments of the past-many of which were initiated by departing 
colonial authorities-by introducing the democratic element into the equation, and thus 
democratic decentralisation has been heralded as a new developmental paradigm with 
significant potential (Cheema and Rondinelli 2007: 2). Blair (2000) uses the term 
democratic local governance (DLG) to distinguish the new, third wave of 
decentralisation from the failed experiments of the past. The new DLG discourses 
seek to "build popular participation and accountability into local governance" by 
increasing the accessibility of authorities and making them more responsive to the 
local citizenry, who should begin to enjoy full political rights and recognition (Blair 
2000: 21). 
There are a variety of forms which decentralisation may assume, ranging from 
deconcentration to delegation to devolution. Deconcentration is often characterised as 
undemocratic, involving political manoeuvres by central authorities to reassert their 
power by relocating bureaucrats and officials from the centre to the periphery (Eaton 
2001: 103). This is intended to reinforce the centre's ability to penetrate into localities, 
increasing their sphere of control (Eaton 2001: 103). Delegation requires that central 
governments shift managerial authority for specific functions (regional planning, 
development) to lower administrative tiers (Cheema and Rondinelli 2007: 3). By 
contrast,, the process of devolution is held to be a form of genuine decentralisation as 
it allows for the transfer of meaningful authority over governance and finances to sub- 
national political units, giving local actors the autonomy to act outside the direct 
control of the central goverm-nent (Eaton 2001: 103). 
Of the three broad forms decentralisation may assume, it seems devolution 
alone would foster the democratic criteria sought after by pragmatists. Key among 
these criteria would be downward accountability, whereby local authorities represent 
the interests of their constituents who, in turn, have a greater platform to articulate 
their demands and participate in politics and decision-making at the local level. 
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Antl6v (2003a) suggests that, despite concerns over implementation, 
regulation and the extent of local contestation,, the process of devolution is occurring 
in many regions of Indonesia. In cases where central authorities challenge the 
devolution of authority or threaten to renege on their promises, there is always the 
possibility that local initiative and innovation will take on an impetus of their own. 
Unusual for a development policy, decentralisation has won support from 
those on both the left and right of the political spectrum (Goldfrank 2002: 51-52). 
Neo-liberals see decentralisation as a means of cutting back the bloated, inefficient 
and corrupt bureaucracies of highly centralised states that were generally thought to 
stifle creativity, prevent fair competition (in politics and commerce) and ultimately 
hinder development. Meanwhile, those on the left applauded the capacity of 
decentralisation to reduce state dominance by redistributing power to civil society, 
expanding political participation, increasing local representation in decision making, 
and drawing on the creativity of local communities (Arghiros 2001). 
Classical liberal theorists such as Rousseau, Tocqueville and Mill saw 
decentralisation as a way "of spreading political power to broad segments of citizens, 
thereby allowing them to exercise it on a limited scale" (Kulipossa 2004: 769). These 
theorists held similar views about the relevance of citizen participation and local 
institutions in sustaining democracy, thus perceiving 'the local' as the "cradle of 
democracy" (Kulipossa 2004: 769). Moreover, the classic liberal position was that 
"civic participation educates people to become full citizens, reduces conflict by 
helping people accept government decisions, and integrates the community" 
(Goldfrank 2002: 54). 
Colongon (2003) states optimistically that democracy is best observed at the 
local level, where the key actors engage in cooperative activities to improve local 
governance. These range from greater transparency, downward accountability, and 
responsiveness in governance, to economic probity, frugality, and efficiency in 
service delivery, as well as participation, empowerment and representation in local 
communities. Specifically, it is asserted that "devolving government decision-making 
authority" to allow civil society to flourish, as well as bringing "local government 
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closer to its client-citizens, " will make it "more vulnerable to citizens pressures" 
(McCarthy 2004: 1202). In the same way, the principle of downward accountability is 
intended to "increase the ability of local government to generate revenue and deliver 
services, " while strengthening the "capacity of local civil society to monitor and 
pressure local government" (McCarthy 2004: 1202). 
Mainstream neoliberal narratives are predominantly shaping and steering 
governance initiatives such as democratic decentralisation in the developing world. 
Examples of this trend abound. The International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and 
other international financial or developmental organisations have incorporated 
decentralisation into their wider policy prescriptions and aid conditionality 
programmes. The World Bank in particular has increasingly sought to "deliver 
development" through its fastest growing projects such as community driven 
development (Dasgupta and Beard 2007: 229). 
Principal indicators of such programmes are informed by the Washington 
Consensus,, including structural adjustment, restoration of markets, fiscal austerity, as 
well as good governance, basic needs and rural development (Cheema and Rondinelli 
2007: 4). Government downsizing should improve top-down responsiveness by 
rationalising the bureaucracy, making it internally accountable, reducing the 
discretionary powers of civil servants and officials, and reigning in corrupt 
authorities. 
Having filtered out the noxious elements of an oversized, inefficient 
government, it would be expected that top-down responsiveness would improve, 
particularly as "local representatives are best placed to know the exact nature of local 
needs and how they can be met in a cost-effective way" (Kulipossa 2004: 769). 
international financial institutions and development agencies tend to assess 
decentralisation and customary rights through the lens of a ledger, weighing costs and 
benefits. 
Proponents of this expansive, technocratic, neoliberal approach have been 
grouped into the "pragmatic school, " those constantly searching for, and fine tuning, 
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an " optimising blueprint" for decentralisation (Sch6nwdlder 1997: 758). 75 Such a 
blueprint calls for, among other things, analysis of the level of efficiency in service 
delivery, improvements to the technical and administrative capacity of local 
government, the design and implementation of local initiatives, and responsiveness to 
local needs (Malley 2003: 103). 
The pragmatists' optimising blueprint also involves technical design and 
sequencing, with emphasis on prerequisites for successful implementation (economic 
stability), the establishment of legal frameworks and local capacity, facilitation of 
support networks, effective monitoring mechanisms, stable financing for newly 
autonomous districts, restructuring and streamlining of local offices, and performance 
standards for local officials with newly devolved tasks (Guess 2005: 223-225). 
The pragmatic approach to decentralisation has generated a "wealth of 
empirical evidence about practical problems and obstacles" encountered in the 
implementation process (Schbnwdlder 1997: 758). There is little indication of a naive 
belief in decentralisation as a panacea for the social and political ills of the 
developing world. However, it is argued that the "liberalisation-decentralisation- 
good governance" discourse that dominates mainstream development policy employs 
technical solutions, institutional tinkering, and policy fixes as a "means of avoiding 
the complex and uncomfortable facts of power and conflict" (Hadiz and Robison 
2005: 222). Similarly, the dominant tendency has been to relegate politics from the 
equation, thereby failing to engage with existing power relations, as well as limiting 
popular participation to "passivity" and an "instrumental" role in the execution of 
standardised development programmes (Sch6nwdlder 1997: 758). 
Further,, Hadiz (2004: 698) critiques the "intellectual production lines" of 
development organisations (World Bank, USAID), those concerned with sequential 
planning, institutional fine tuning, and the "technocratic weighing of policy options". 
These concerns also extend to international civil society networks, whose seemingly 
75 Petras (2000) made similar observations with regards to colonial era administrative reforms, which 
were designated as 'optimising' endeavours. In eras old and new, optimisation concerns 'technical, 
spatial, and administrative' aspects of decentralisation (Sch6nwalder 1997: 758). 
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cosmopolitan ideas and actions appear "uncomfortably like those of the civilising 
mission behind colonialism" (Munck 2006: 328). 
On the heels of such criticism, there is an opposing "political school" of 
thought focusing on the empowerment of the "lower strata" by promoting a forin of 
decentralisation that "challenges existing power relations and the established 
distribution of economic and social resources" (Sch6nwdlder 1997: 761). Antl6v 
(2003b: 74) argues for a shift of emphasis away from the "high politics" of elections, 
constitutions and parliaments, and towards everyday forms of "low politics" where 
"society itself needs to be politicised". 
Slater (1989) proposed that, under the banner of decentralisation, activists 
could use the "mystique, ambivalence and allure" of the concept to mobilise support 
for something quite different. This could involve the nurturing of oppositional 
strategies with the potential to transcend the dominant, constitutive conditions of the 
local-national-global order that have thus far served to perpetuate power differentials, 
hindering the resolution of long-standing grievances in rural communities throughout 
Indonesia. 
This must be an enterprising, innovative endeavour, for any effort to confront 
existing power structures will be fraught with complications and obstacles. For 
instance, it is noted that many local initiatives have emerged as reactions to 
"immediate and particularistic concerns, and therefore lack continuity and 
organisational coherence" (Sch6nwdlder 1997: 762). Some see this as a weakness, 
implying the need for local communities to be "propped up by benevolent allies" 
(Schanwdlder 1997: 763). 
A variety of benevolent allies exist in Indonesia, better known as civil society 
associations, that work with and support local communities. Blair (2004: 8 1) describes 
one such association, known as "trustees, " that wield increasing influence over local 
communities. "Trustee organisations" claim to act on behalf of another constituency, 
for instance human rights groups, who represent the interests of disenfranchised 
citizens (Blair 2004: 81). In the case of adat revivalism, there are a number of 
internationally funded trustee organisations that deploy a "small cadre of highly 
67 
trained advocates, " usually human rights lawyers, economists, or ecologists, to 
support local adat communities in their struggles for recognition and rights (Blair 
2004: 82-83). This tends to involve "upper-level advocacy" rather than grassroots 
participation (Blair 2004: 83). 
Trustees attempt to defend their local clients through a host of formal 
measures, including appeals to the legal system, the publicising of subversive state 
actions, attempts to uphold democratic norms such as transparency, rights of 
assembly, and free speech, and engagement in a range of oppositional activities meant 
to enhance the level of contestation in the polity (Blair 2004: 83). Insofar as such 
actions force members of the state apparatus (officials from the forestry department, 
district police chiefs) to publicly address long-standing civic grievances, it could be 
argued that trustees play an indispensable role in local politics. 
One potential criticism, however, is that "upper-level advocacy" may enforce 
state accountability to civil society actors, but these same civil society actors may 
"remain unaccountable to the constituency they claim to benefit" (Blair 2004: 83). 
Others are wary of the dependency that upper-level advocacy fosters, with political 
action resigned to the "political will" of sympathetic state authorities or the 
"voluntarism" of benevolent allies from civil society (Sch6nwdlder 1997: 764). 
Ultimately, observers of contemporary adat revivalism suggest that it is "questionable 
whether the people most concerned are really being consulted" (Erb et al 2005: 144). 
In light of these potential deficits, it is argued that civil society organisations must 
undertake "self-critical reflection" with regards to their internal workings (Scholte 
2004: 230). 
Another obvious danger when working at the grassroots level is the tendency 
to "essentialise and romanticise the local, 15 a critique that is often levied against the 
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proponents of indigenous rights in Indonesia (Mohan and Stokke 2000: 249). There 
are also tendencies to highlight exemplars, honing in on "nature loving natives" and 
"ecologically noble savages" and advocating on their behalf (Li 2007: 344; Henley 
76 See Reid (1998: 28) for more on the dangers of "attempts to peel the onion of culture down to an 
original, indigenous core". 
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and Davidson 2007: 34). 77 In the conservation zones of Mozambique, where similar 
external interventions have taken place, "radical environmentalists" along with 
international project managers have been known to depict traditional communities as 
"harmonious" idealised groups, living in "natural territorial units" as opposed to 
("man-made administrative or political territories" (Virtanen 2005: 358). 
Disputes have been known to arise among the putative representatives of adat 
communities about "for whom they speak" (Bourchier 2007: 124). It is important to be 
wary of homogenising tendencies, as an "idealised local community" masks very real 
differences in terms of social,, economic and political power (Sch6nwdlder 1997: 761). 
Furthen-nore, it is imperative not to overlook the "conflictive relations" that often 
arise between the members of popular movements and their various allies 
78 (Sch6nwdlder 1997: 765) . Finally, Sch6nwdlder (1997: 765) wams that villagers and 
their activist supporters currently engaged in political struggles risk "wading into a 
minefield, "') in the sense that their participation risks "blockage, instrumentalisation, 
cooptation, or the loss of autonomy". 
Observers have consistently highlighted the potential for adat revivalism to 
empower "conservative elites, " those favourably positioned to use the new 
opportunities created by decentralisation to "enforce their power at the expense of 
less privileged groups" (Bourchier 2007: 124). By "adopting the mantle of adat, " for 
instance, powerful figures may seek to further their political and commercial interests 
by a variety of means, including "collaborating with foreign enterprises" (Bourchier 
2007: 125). 
Some of the actors and factions "nurtured" and "incubated" under the New 
Order regime have survived within the new decentralised framework, "albeit through 
new and more diffuse alliances and vehicles" (Hadiz and Robison 2005: 23 1). When 
speaking of "old and new" elites (Hadiz 2005; Antl6v 2003b), the distinction is that 
some are already entrenched (old) and must adapt to changing political conditions, 
while others are emerging (new) and therefore seize opportunities as they arise. 
77 See, for instance, Chambers (1983) for a critique of "rural developmental tourism". 
78 Chapter seven on the conflict in Bulukumba highlights these tensions and imperatives. 
69 
In Indonesia, this allegedly involves "many elements of the old rapacious, 
authoritarian regime, " elements capable of "reconstituting" themselves in rapidly 
changing conditions (Hadiz 2004: 699). Owing to the relative "weakness of newly 
created institutions" and "strength of old social forces, " the introduction of new 
political rules has not prevented embedded political elites from "reconsolidating" 
their power (Malley 2003: 103). These forces are drawn from the pool of political 
entrepreneurs and fixers, military commanders, business and bureaucratic interests, 
henchmen and enforcers that had been part of the "vast network of patronage that was 
the New Order" (Hadiz and Robison 2005: 233). 
With specific reference to adat, there are concerns that "unaccountable adat 
elites are being substituted for government-appointed resource gatekeepers" (Elmhirst 
2001: 293 ). 79 This often results in the re-branding of a movement with the slogans and 
rhetoric of indigenous rights and environmentalism while leaving the dominant power 
structures fundamentally unaltered. More extreme still, it is suggested that the adat 
movement may be reluctant to "consider whether the ethnic violence, discrimination, 
and profiteering that has already occurred might not be a direct consequence of their 
attempt to make indigeneity the issue in the struggle over resources" (Bourchier 
2007: 126). 
With these potential challenges in mind, Sch6nwalder (1997: 768) concluded 
that the best option for local communities would be "simultaneous coalition building" 
or the formation of "multiple alliances". Blair (2000: 26) echoes this call for broad 
coalition building, warning of the possible limitations of targeted political campaigns 
that appeal to particularistic rather than universalistic interests. While the articulation 
of land claims and rights on the basis of adat may arise out of a genuine concern for 
local livelihoods, a growing body of empirical work suggests that "forging alliances 
between disenfranchised groups" may be a "better route" to achieving justice where 
resource struggles persist (Elmhirst 2001: 304). 
79 Resource gatekeepers in the Philippines are known to capture decentralisation processes, turning 
them into "vehicles for protecting familial interests" through land ownership, commercial networks, 
plantation agriculture, or sub-contracting (Rood 1998: 112). For more on 
local 'bossism' and elite 
capture in the Philippines, see Sidel (1999). 
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Confronting power in this way may or may not empower people or 
communities. But even the perpetually disempowered may nevertheless reap the 
benefits and gains of such confrontation, be it through the granting of land 
entitlements, compensation, or legal recognition. Whether this is an acceptable 
compromise depends on the specific domain within which conflicts occur, as well as 
the specific actors involved. All the findings to date are unpredictable, demonstrating 
that "these factors combine in different ways, " are "context- specific, " and therefore 
need to be "assessed empirically" (Malley 2003: 105). 
Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrated that each key historical phase carried different possibilities 
for promoting, co-opting, or tempering the political impulses of adat communities in 
Indonesia. Leiden Orientalists played a key role in the conjuring of adat myths and 
symbols, which were later codified and rationalised under direct colonial 
administration. There are at the same time very real historical antecedents that 
continue to capture the public imagination, from the Bugis and Makassarese 
chronicles to the Torajan animist rituals to the spirit cults of Kajang. 
Socially constructed identities and perceptions have advanced well beyond the 
myths and legends recorded on lontard, regulated by Dutch controlleurs, captured by 
New Order bureaucrats, and microfilmed by teams of international scholars. The 
primordial traits of adat communities are subject to constant reconfiguration, at times 
contrived and manipulated in order to bolster claims over land and resources. There is 
also a degree of popular resonance as local communities respond to and mobilise 
around perceptions of authentic customs and traditions. Subsequent chapters reveal 
that degrees of popular resonance are evident in cases as diverse as Majene, Seko, 
Madandan, Kajang, and Soroako, where villagers are mobilised and choose to align 
their grievance-based struggles with discourses of adat. Therefore, as stated in the 
introduction,, the primordial and instrumental aspects of adat may prove to be 
compatible and reinforcing when deployed in disputes over compensation, resource 
entitlement, land control, or the freedom to govern according to customary 
law. 
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Adat revivalism in its present form, aligned with the processes of 
decentralisation, is still very new, and most of the disputes centred on concepts of 
indigenous rights, tenure, and recognition have yet to be resolved. As stated, the latest 
studies on adat make "no pretence to comprehensive coverage, either in regional or in 
thematic terms, of the politics of tradition in Indonesia" (Henley and Davidson 
2007: 37). Therefore, the substantive chapters of this thesis shall examine the process 
of adat revivalism in Sulawesi, foregrounding specific local struggles for recognition 
and land rights. Specifically, the perceptions of adat emanating from local 
communities will be examined, along with the impact of third-parties and trustees at 
the local level, and finally the consequences of the selective redeployment of adat in 
conflict areas. 
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Chapter Three: In Search of Recognition 
This chapter provides the background information and analytical framework needed 
to addresses the first core research question set out in the introduction, which reads as 
follows: looking at both process and outcome, to what extent have district regulations 
in recognition of adat become tools of emancipation for local communities? 
Conversely, to what extent do they represent an extension of the colonial-era shackles 
of elegant policy? With reference to case studies from Gowa, Majene, and Palopo, 
this chapter then begins to address the second core research question: to what degree 
have third-parties, patrons, and external supporters driven the process of adat 
revivalism,, inflecting meanings, shaping perceptions, and articulating local 
strategies? These questions are dealt with more thoroughly in chapters four and five. 
Along with land reclaiming, resource conflicts, and struggles for recognition, 
the passmg of Indonesia's framework decentralisation laws in 1999 prompted a return 
to antedated systems of customary governance throughout the archipelago. An early 
example was the "recreation of the nagari" in West Sumatra, skilfully assessed by von 
Benda-Beckmann et al. (2001). If one assumes these systems to be the innate units of 
political and social order, within which primordial attachments are to be found, one 
needs to consider how this can be reconciled with concepts of modernisation and 
national unity. 
In line with the critical conjectures set out in chapter one, coercive 
deployments of state power to eradicate the threat posed by autochthonous societies is 
less effective than diffuse methods of incorporation and domestication. Therefore, 
this chapter re-examines the constitutive political order and the ways in which adat 
revivalism is domesticated and contained through subtle institutional processes, 
regulatory procedures, and village deliberation. 
As stated in chapter two, during the New Order, notions of adat such as 
family, community and tradition were often turned into "tools of control to shape and 
exploit people" (Erb et al. 2005: 144). This corresponds to Hobsbawm's (1983: 1) 
notion of "invented traditions, " the norms and values of which are inculcated 
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repetitiously by rules, rituals, and systems of governance. When combined with the 
new emphasis on local autonomy, these notions may be deployed in order to further 
penetrate the village, enhancing bureaucratic capacity, stymieing local opposition, or 
fomenting divisions within the community. Of course, the very opposite may also 
occur. 
The dismantling of the repressive state apparatus in place during the New 
Order era has led to a proliferation of local contestations, conflicts, and rights-based 
struggles. It is generally accepted that the nature of customary claims over land varies 
significantly, and depending on the country, region or even village in question, there 
will be different criteria as to what constitutes customary land, and what form of 
recognition (if any) is being sought. Likewise, there are different criteria for 
establishing what constitutes a legitimate customary claim, as well as the extent to 
which local or national governments are willing to acknowledge these claims. 
Given the volatility of Indonesia's democratic transition, there remains a crisis 
of "procedural legitimacy" as newly empowered district authorities grapple with 
central bureaucrats for control of decision-making processes (Bohman 2005: 55). For 
example, the issuance of district-level forestry concessions often contradicts the 
rulings of the powerful Ministry of Forestry or the regulations of the National Land 
Agency. Similarly, the recognition of antedated systems of governance must comply 
with higher laws and regulations, from the constitution downwards, in order to uphold 
the democratic imperatives of the reform era. 
Given the "buzzing complexity and plasticity" of customary tenure and law 
(McWilliam 2006: 58), it is of little surprise that the treatment of adat in the 
Indonesian legal system remains ambiguous. Therefore, any strategy for the 
recognition of adat must take into account highly localised political circumstances, 
including the ethno-historical and socio-cultural features of the customary domain in 
question. 
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Seeds of Opposition 
Prior to the transition in 1998, local activists were working on oppositional strategies 
and appealing to global networks for support. In the early 1990s local activists from 
Tana Toraja district in South Sulawesi began setting up meetings with domestic 
partners such as the Indonesian Forum for the Enviroment (Wahana Lingkunan 
Hidup Indonesia or WALHI) and the Indonesian Network on Tropical Forest 
Conservation (SKEPHI). The aim was to initiate and develop new collaborative 
political strategies to address serious concerns about land tenure and resource 
entitlement. 
Having been banned in both Jakarta and Makassar, a series of "illegal" 
meetings were held in 1993 in Lembang Madandan, Tana Toraja district, drawing 
some 40 prominent activists fi7om throughout Indonesia. 80 The repressive New Order 
apparatus was still fully- functioning at the time, though it has been suggested that the 
((moral authority" and prominence of the village chief of Madandan, L. Sombolinggi, 
was enough to "keep local government and military authorities at bay" (Moniaga 
2007: 281). 
All these activities culminated in a workshop held Erom 25-29 May 1993 in 
Tana Toraja entitled "Workshop on the Development of Adat Community Legal 
Resources and Natural Resource Management in the Forestry Sector". 81 This 
workshop, led by WALDA and WALHI, culminated in the forination of the Network 
for the Defence of Indigenous Peoples (Jaringan Pembelaan Hak-Hak Maryarakat 
Adat or JAPHAMA). 82 
JAPHAMA was among the earliest rights-based movements in Indonesia to 
attempt to revitalise the concept of adat and redeploy it for specific political 
objectives. Significantly, 1993 was also declared by the United Nations as the Year of 
80 Anonymous source from Lembang Madandan, Tana Toraj a, interviewed in March 2006. 
81 According to an academic document produced by Yayasan Merah Putih (YMP) Palu in July 2005. 
82 According to Moniaga (2004: 2) several prominent adat leaders converged upon Tana Toraj a in 1993, 
including Nal Sinta from North Sumatra, Petinggi Aris from West Kalimantan, L. B. Dingit from East 
Kalimantan, Den Upa Rombelayuk and Lasso Sombolinggi from Tana Toraja, Oom Ely from Maluku, 
and finally Tom Beanal from West Papua. They were reportedly accompanied by many youth 
advocates from human rights and environmental NGOs. 
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Indigenous Peoples (Persoon 1998: 281). Many of the debates and initiatives that led 
to the formation of the Indigenous People's Alliance of the Archipelago (AMAN) in 
1999 began with the JAPHAMA network, and the first working definitions of the 
customary community (masyarakat adat) came out of the Madandan meetings in 1993 
(Moniaga 2007: 282). 83 
The conservative Toraja definition of masyarakat adat is translated as follows: 
social groups with ancestral origins in a specific geographical territory and possessing 
a particular system of values, ideology, economy, politics, culture, society, and 
territory of their own. 84 D'Andrea (2003: 100) criticises this definition for its idealised 
and "utopian" portrayal of the adat community, yet suggests that the wider intention 
was to align the adat revival with international policy narratives in support of 
indigenous peoples. Further, the Toraja definition has been criticised for its 
44 conceptual vagueness" and its detachment from "empirical realities" (Sangaji 
2007: 321). There are also concerns about campaigns to "elevate the status of adat on 
a national scale" without a clear sense of what adat is (Bourchier 2007: 123). 
Having initially promoted the distinctiveness of customary communities, 
which were in need of protection and preservation, rights campaigners working in 
Sulawesi have begun to move beyond this static, insulated view by referring to 
"progressive values such as justice and democracy, " as well as emphasising the 
"dynamics of development as empirically experienced by adat communities" (SangaJi 
2007: 321). 
From 15-22 March 1999 the first Congress of Indigenous Peoples of the 
Archipelago (Kongres Masyarakat Adat Nusantara I or KMAN 1) was held in Jakarta, 
during which 208 adat communities were represented. The proceedings helped 
establish a network of domestic activists, ultimately leading to the deployment of a 
83 The language used in this original definition was relatively conservative given the repressive 
tendencies of the entrenched New Order regime. 
84 The Indonesian version reads as follows: Kelompok masyarakat adat yang memiliki asal-usul leluhur 
secara turun-temurun di wilayah geografis tertentu serta memiliki system nilai, Ideology, ekonoml, 
politik, budaya, sosial, dan wilayah sendiri. Minor semantic differences are to 
be found in the 
translations of the Toraja definition of masyarakat adat from 1993 (see, for instance, D'Andrea 
2003; 
Moniaga 2007; Sangaji 2007). 
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revised concept of masyarakat adat, one which had evolved from orderly 
reinforcement to an oppositional, atavistic agenda. At the close of KMAN Ia 
manifesto was drafted for the protection and promotion of indigenous rights, local 
autonomy and customary law, and the slogan "if the state does not recognise us, we 
will not recognise the state" was popularised (Acciaioli 2001: 87-88). 85 
Perhaps the most visible manifestation of the adat revival has been the 
establishment of AMAN in 1999, an umbrella organisation led by a cadre of 
anthropologists and legal experts situated in the national secretariat in Jakarta. 
AMAN nominally represents thousands of local communities throughout the 
archipelago, and maintains some sixteen regional branches and affiliates. Indicative 
of Blair's (2004) conception of trusteeship, AMAN's (internationally funded) 
national, regional, and local directors possess a wealth of cumulative experience and 
knowledge about the nuances of indigenism throughout Indonesia. 
They have managed to pressure the Indonesian government to publicly 
acknowledge the grievances of adat communities, as well as engage in multi-party 
deliberations and negotiations. However, AMAN's leadership has yet to consolidate 
their efforts into a coherent, nationwide movement, one capable of challenging the 
constitutive conditions that continue to marginalise their constituents, the millions of 
disempowered rural citizens occupying Li's (2000) "tribal slot". 
By 2003 and the second Congress (KMAN 11), the masyarakat adat movement 
seemed to have progressed beyond the struggle for official state recognition. This 
progression was achieved by focusing on the "practical problems of implementing 
programmes that would actually ensure not only such recognition but also respect and 
legal protection for the rights of Indonesian 'indigenous societies"' (Acciaioli 
2007: 295). KMAN II participants sought to operationalise social and political 
articulation through the "explicit assertion of sovereignty (kedaulatan) over land and 
natural resources, " coupled with the "explicit allusion to the ordering of 
local social 
life by customary law (hukum adat)" (Acciaioli 2007: 299). 
85 While new proclamations were issued and strategies formulated, the agreed upon 
definition of 
masyarakat adat that emerged from KMAN I did not 
differ significantly from the original Toraja 
definition. 
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Among other things, AMAN's directors asserted that indigenous communities 
(masyarakat adat) existed prior to the Indonesian nation, possessing sovereign legal 
and political systems that are "co-equal" with national laws, not "subsumed within or 
subordinate to them" (Li 2001: 653). However, the paradox is in the frequent adoption 
of the "notations" of the state, replicating government ordinances, statutes, and 
classifications in pursuit of recognition, thus acknowledging the "legitimacy of the 
nation even as they challenge it" (Li 2001: 653). In other words, the strategies of 
AMAN and partners actually "concede to the power relations that frame and limit 
[their] most radical demands" (Li 2001: 653). For more clarity on the matter, the 
following section reviews the laws, regulations and ordinances concerning adat. 
Notations of the State 
On 17 August 1945 Indonesia's independence was declared. During this volatile 
period there was much debate surrounding the status of customary law and the rights 
of customary communities. While the original Constitution of 1945 did not explicitly 
mention adat, Chapter VI Article 18 on Regional Governance stated that "the division 
of the territory of Indonesia into large and small regions shall be prescribed by law in 
consideration of and with due regard to the principles of deliberation in the 
86 government system and the hereditary rights of special territories". 
In 1999 Article 18 was revised in accordance with the Second Amendment of 
the Constitution of 1945, declaring that "the State shall recognise and respect 
customary law communities [masyarakat hukum adat] with their traditional rights as 
long as they still exist and are in accordance with community development and the 
principle of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, as regulated by the 
laws". 87 
Building on these revisions, Law 39/1999 on Human Rights also dealt with 
adat. Specifically, the law states that "in the interests of upholding human rights, the 
differences and needs of indigenous peoples must be taken into consideration and 
86 Government of Indonesia, Ungang-Undang Dasar 1945. 
8' Government of Indonesia, Second Amendment to the Constitution 1945, Article 18[B][2]. 
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protected by the law, the public and the government, " and "the cultural identity of 
indigenous peoples, including indigenous land rights, must be upheld, in accordance 
with modem development imperatives". 88 
Further, the revised Forestry Law Number 41/1999 recognises the existence of 
a "customary forest, " though only in one of McCarthy's (2004) "shades of grey". 
According to the law, "a customary forest is a state forest that is located within the 
territory of the customary law community". 89 On rights, the law is ambiguous; while 
there is no explicit stipulation about customary rights (by default all lands without 
certificates are state lands), forestry authorities are instructed to "consider the rights 
of the customary law community, so long as these rights exist in reality, are 
recognised, and do not contradict the national interest". 90 
With regards to governance, the framework Decentralisation Law (number 
22/1999) stipulated that the village is a "single legal community that possesses the 
authority to govern and administer the local community based on local origins, 
customs and traditions [adat istiadat] that are recognised in the National Governance 
System and exist in the District". 91 In the elucidation to this article, it is stated that the 
village is a "unified legal community that possesses indigenous structures based on 
the special rights of origin as intended in the elucidation of Article 18 of the 
Constitution of 1945, " and further that the "conception of the regulation concerning 
Village Governance is based on diversity, participation, original autonomy, 
democratisation and community empowerrnent". 
92 
Districts and villages have been given the option under the new 
decentralisation framework to reassert their uniqueness and shed the restrictive 
uniformity of the past. This transition, therefore, gave rise to the notion that the 
88 Government of Indonesia, Undang-Undang Nomor 3911999 tentang Hak 
Manusia, Article 6[1-2]. 
'9 Government of Indonesia, Undang- Undang Nomor 4111999 tentang Kehutanan, 
Article 1 [6]. 
90 Undang- Undang Nomor 4111999, Article 4 [3 ]. 
9' Government of Indonesia, Undang-Undang Nomor 22 Tahun 1999 tentang 
Pemerintahan Daerah, 
Article I [o]. 
92 Undang-Undang Nomor 22 Tahun 1999, Elucidation of Chapter 1. 
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"resolution of issues of development is intrinsically interrelated with the need to 
fon-nulate altemative modes of democratic govemance" (Reid 2001: 779). 93 
Law 22/1999 on regional governance has been said to provide "a space for 
diversity and responsiveness to local aspirations" consistent with the loosening of 
restrictions on local diversity (Antl6v 2003a: 197). This supposedly constitutes an 
alternative to the uniformity of the past by allowing for a village to be called by any 
traditional name and to be based on local origins and customs. 94 Indirectly, it also 
allows various actors to attempt to secure their interests by reconstructing local 
customs and traditions in order to benefit from the new opportunities that arise. 
Revised Decentralisation Law Number 32/2004 on Regional Governance 
further clarifies the definition of a village. In strictly procedural terms, it allows for 
legal space and autonomy for adat communities at the village level: 
[The village is] a unified legal community that possesses 
territorial borders with the authorisation to regulate and 
manage local community affairs, based on local origins, 
customs and traditions [adat istiadat] that are recognised and 
respected in the Government System of the Unitary State of 
the Republic of Indonesia. 95 
Furthermore,, the law makes direct reference to village affairs, detailing the 
organisation of village administration and calling for direct elections for village 
heads. As one notable section reads: 
Elections of village heads within a unified customary law 
community where their traditional rights have long existed 
and are formally recognised shall comply with local 
customary law as stipulated in District Regulations, in 
compliance with [higher] Government Regulations. 
96 
93 Fauzi and Zakaria (2002: 13) argue that the stipulations contained in the Decentralisation Laws 
constitute an indirect admission of the detrimental impact of New Order policy, which undermined and 
disenfranchised adat communities. 
94 Government of Indonesia, Undang-Undang Nomor 22 Tahun 1999, Article 1. 
95 Government of Indonesia, Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 32 Tahun 2004 tentang 
Pemerintahan Daerah, Article 1[ 12]. 
96 Government of Indonesia, Undang- Undang Nomor 32 Tahun 2004, Article 203 [3]. 
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In theory, therefore, the law recognises the autonomy that each customary village 
possesses. In practice, the real test is whether autonomy translates into meaningful 
changes that have a positive impact on village affairs (Lucas and Warren 2003; 
McWilliam 2006). 
In the event that certain aspects of village authority remain ambiguous, district 
regulations are to be drafted in order to rectify this situation. Such regulations must 
comply with the "rights, origins, customs and traditions" of the village in question. 97 
While the existence of adat was reserved exclusively for the village level, the 
guidelines of the decentralisation laws determined that the recognition of adat must 
first be proposed through a district regulation (see Table 3.1 below for the legislative 
98 hierarchy) . It would 
be impractical for each customary community to undertake 
separate legislative processes because they tend to require many years of negotiation 
and can be quite costly, especially in districts where resources are stretched and 
capacity is limited. 
97 Undang- Undang Nomor 3212004, Article 216. 
98 Undang- Undang Nomor 2211999. 
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Table 3.1: State Hierarchies 
Administrative Institutional Hierarchy Legislative Hierarchy 
Hierarchy 
National Office of the President Constitution 1945 
Nasional 
People's Consultative People's Consultative 
Assembly Assembly Resolution 
People's Representative Law 
Council 
Government Regulation 
Presidential Decree 
Presidential Instruction 
Ministerial Decree 
Province Office of the Governor Provincial Regulation 
Propinsi 
Provincial People's Governor Decree 
Representative Council 
District Office of the Mayor District Regulation 
Kabupaten 
District People's Mayoral Decree 
Representative Council 
Sub-district Sub-district Head Not applicable 
Kecamatan 
Ward Ward Head Not applicable 
Kelurahan 
Village Office of the Village 
Desa or Kampung Head Village Regulation 
Village Council 
Neighbourhood Neighbourhood Head Not applicable 
Rukun Telangga 
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In the process of drafting, deliberating and promulgating regulations, the 
district government is obliged to "recognise and respect the rights, origins, and 
customs and traditions of the village". 99 Therefore each district has been provided 
with a broad legal framework within which to consider requests for the granting of 
formal recognition (of the existence and rights) of adat communities within their 
administrative jurisdiction. 
In an effort to clarify procedures, it was stated in Law 32/2004 that district 
regulations must be jointly approved of by the mayor (Bupati) and the district 
people's representative council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah or DPRD), and 
that the regulations must serve to further outline the laws and regulations that have 
higher legal status, taking into account the unique characteristics of each region. 100 
Without challenging the supremacy of the Unitary State, these regulations are 
intended to promote diversity, taking into account the extent of regional variation 
throughout the archipelago. ' 01 
One of the principles stipulated for the drafting of district regulations is 
transparency 102 ; therefore while the responsibility for initiating such regulations is 
deemed to be that of the district head and representative council, the public also 
reserves the right to provide oral and written inputs into the drafting process. 103 In the 
event that such input is provided, the process of drafting and promulgating district 
regulations tends to be lengthy and complex. In South Sulawesi, such regulations 
have taken up to three years to complete, and all of them have to be stringently 
reviewed to ensure they comply with higher laws and regulations. It is a matter of 
policy that all district regulations must be submitted to the central government no 
later than seven days after their enactment. 104 
This central oversight is designed to ensure that district regulations do not 
contradict the public interest or higher laws and regulations; the Ministry of Home 
99 Government of Indonesia, Undang- Undang Nomor 2211999, stipulated in Article 111[2]. 
100 Government of Indonesia, Undang- Undang Nomor 3212004, Article 13 6. 
10 1 Undang- Undang Nomor 3212004, Article 13 8. 
102 undang- Undang Nomor 3212004, Article 13 7. 
103 undang- Undang Nomor 3212004, Articles 13 8-13 9. 
104 Undang- Undang Nomor 3212004, Article 13 5. 
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Affairs therefore reserves the right to annul regulations within 60 days of receiving 
them if it is deemed that they are in violation of the stipulations mentioned above. An 
official Presidential Decree must be issued in order to nullify a district regulation; 
however the regions may contest this and bring their objections to the Supreme Court 
for further ruling, though this is a rare occurrence. 
Set against the lofty principles of community empowen-nent, popular 
participation and downward accountability often espoused in decentralisation policy 
narratives, the movement towards 'empowering, preserving and developing customs, 
traditions and customary organisations' seems rather vague and lacking in substance. 
However, a legal responsibility to protect customs and traditions at the village level 
implies that some form of external intervention is required. NGOs and activists 
fi7equently intervene in local politics to ensure that the rights of their client 
communities are upheld by government authorities. 
As such, the implementation of the regional autonomy laws may be 
synonymous with a rise in the creativity and innovation of local actors, taking the 
form of "place-based cultural reassertions" (Elmhirst 2001: 291). Therefore the 
following section must question the extent to which adat revivalism constitutes an 
oppositional, alternative, and locally-relevant way of organising lives and livelihoods 
(Eh-nhirst 200 1; Li 2007; Reid 200 1). 
The Politics of Recognition 
While recent developments in eastern Indonesia suggest that demands for recognition 
of adat rights will continue to increase, this poses a dilemma when set in the context 
of productive lands and concession zones. It may serve to strengthen the resolve of 
local elites determined to protect their own interests, or solidify resistance from the 
productive sector towards encroachments upon their concession zones. As a result of 
this highly contested political landscape, it has been suggested that "the fate of adat or 
customary law will continue to depend on the willingness of the state to accord legal 
space and autonomy to local customary communities" (McWilliam 2006: 57). 
84 
Having examined the legal ambiguities, political complexities and cultural 
dilemmas surrounding resource conflicts in central Kalimantan, McCarthy 
(2004: 1217) observed that, in the "absence of forinal recognition of adat rights and 
effective forms of accountability, local people are significantly disadvantaged". 
Indeed, in scenarios where villagers and adat authorities are "vulnerable to coercion 
and cooption, " the achievement of official recognition for their adat claims (or even 
their existence) would be considered a welcome (if preliminary) development 
(McCarthy 2004: 1217). Therefore decentralisation presents an opportunity to 
overcome some of the structural inequalities inherent in legal definitions of tenure 
and resource use which have long worked against villagers. 
In highly charged local settings, where villagers are beginning to overcome 
their fear of the repressive state, representations of adat increasingly serve to 
galvanise community members and activists around particular political struggles. 
However,, there is rarely consensus regarding strategy or objectives, even in the 
smallest of villages. 
According to Acciaioli (2001: 88) the decentralisation laws created a 
framework for district authorities throughout Indonesia to reassert the centrality of 
local customs, which was held to be "one of the most significant recognitions of the 
autonomy legislation in the current era of Reformasi". Such changes could possibly 
mark a genuine departure from the past by unleashing the "long- suppressed creativity 
and innovation in the regions" and celebrating genuine village initiative (Antl6v 
2003a: 208). Moreover, the revival of customary governance as stipulated in the 
decentralisation laws requires district governments to open political spaces for the 
replacement of uniformity with "regionally variable organisations and procedures of 
governance that encode community aspirations in terms of adherence to local 
custom" (Acciaioli 2001: 88). 
At the same time, such optimism has been tempered by sober analysis of both 
the opportunities and potential threats associated with the emergent "revival of what 
has been presented as customary (adat) institutions of governance" (Acciaioli 
2001: 87). Statements such as this are indicative of the ambivalence surrounding such 
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a revival, where systems of governance are presented as indigenous for politically 
complex reasons. For instance, it has been suggested that the term Toraja, so often 
used as a "badge of ethnic identity, " can be misleading without an awareness of 
historical usage and contemporary representations (Bigalke 2005: 7). 
Much has been written of the possibilities for elite capture, clientelism, 
predatory interests, and the hijacking of local politics that arise from ambiguities in 
the laws and ordinances of decentralisation. 105 However, less attention has been paid 
to the ways in which local customary communities and their supporters may use the 
new opportunities granted them to exploit legal ambiguities and turn them to their 
advantage. While the village is the principal setting for such activities, the campaign 
must be directed towards district authorities,, those occupying the office of the mayor 
and the district representative council. 
There have been cases in South Sulawesi where local communities 
participated in the regulatory process, from inception right through to completion, 
providing valuable input throughout. As a result, the volksverheffing tradition of 
replicating regulations to provide government with a symbolic cover for continued 
dispossession of rural communities has, in some instances, been challenged. One such 
case was found in the district of Tana Toraja. On 11 April 2001 District Regulation 
Number 2/2001 concerning Lembang Governance was promulgated. This was the 
first regulatory process to achieve official acknowledgment of customary governance, 
replacing the Javanese Desa system with the Torajan Lembang. 
The passing of Regulation 2/2001 prompted a convergence of NGOs and 
activists upon Tana Toraja district, engaging local communities in the process of adat 
revivalism and debating the merits of the new regulation. Similarly, the regulations 
passed in Seko, North Luwu district were the result of three years of community 
consultation and multi-party negotiations sponsored by international advocates and 
domestic trustees. Tana Toraja and Seko will be discussed further in chapters four and 
five. The following is a brief account of recognition in Gowa. 
105 See chapter seven on Bulukumba for specific examples of the ways in which political processes are 
captured and local communities manipulated. 
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Recognition of Adat: the Gowa Model 
As stated previously, it is expected that the drafting of district regulations will be 
conducted in a transparent manner; it is also expected that the public will be afforded 
the opportunity to participate in the process, and that their input will be 
acknowledged. However, there is a significant difference between the public right to 
provide input into legislation that is meant to affect their lives, and the actual 
exercising of this right, as well as the certainty that negotiations and legal drafting 
will be an inclusive, transparent process. 
As mentioned, from 2000 onwards district governments throughout South 
Sulawesi began introducing legislation concerning adat in their respective 
jurisdictions. There were three instances in which identical district regulations 
entitled 'empowerment, preservation and development of customs, traditions, and 
customary institutions' were enacted. On 5 September 2000 the district government 
of Jeneponto was the first to promulgate such a regulation, followed by Majene on 28 
February 2001, and Gowa on 31 December 2001. These were virtually identical 
regulations, and there is little evidence of any input or participation from adat leaders 
or community members. The following is a brief account of the process of 
recognition in the historic Gowa district. 
As stated in chapter two, the former Kingdom of Gowa was one of the major 
Makassarese kingdoms of Sulawesi, its influence penetrating much of the southern 
peninsula (Cummings 2001; Pelras 1993). By the first decade of the seventeenth 
century, the Makassarese kingdom of Gowa "succeeded in forcing its major rival 
Bugis kingdoms to acknowledge its overlordship" to become the most powerful state 
in South Sulawesi (Andaya 1978: 277). 106 While it is beyond the scope of this study, 
historians tend to analyse the Chronicles of Gowa and Talloq when discussing the 
106 See Carey (2003) for an account of the sacred role of poisons and blowpipes in Gowa, which helped 
ensure the kingdom's survival through military protection, judicial executions, and social control. 
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particulars of the old Makassarese kingdoms, including myths of origin, treaties, 
power structures, king lists, and chronologies. 107 
The coming of Islam occurred in the seventeenth century (Noorduyn 1987; 
Pelras 1993; Reid 2000). Prior to Dutch occupation in 1906, the kingdom of Gowa 
consisted of several kakaraengang or minor principalities (R6ssler 2000: 540). By the 
1960s the kingdom of Gowa was incorporated into the administrative structure of the 
newly unified Republic of Indonesia. The last karaeng (or king) of Gowa thus became 
the first mayor. 108 Despite a series of external intrusions that accelerated the erosion 
of adat, Gowa's historical legacy remains a matter of pride in the district. There are 
still annual meetings held in Gowa during which historical sites are visited and 
restored. 
According to the head of the district parliament, Gowa has been path-breaking 
in its legislative activities, being the first district to pass regulations concerning public 
participation and transparency in governance. 109 On 31 December 2001, District 
Regulation Number 44/2001 about 'Empowering, Preserving and Developing 
Customs, Traditions and Customary Institutions' was established. Far from path- 
breaking, however, Regulation 44/2001 seemed to follow the pattern of replication 
identified by Li (2007). 
In Gowa, official records are kept for the promulgation of all district 
regulations. In 2001 there were eighteen such regulations promulgated, and a thirteen- 
member district Oversight Committee for Regulations was appointed to oversee this 
process. Members of parliament claimed that all but two of the elderly committee 
members had passed away, indicating a pattern of gerontocracy in district politics. Of 
the two surviving committee members, only one was available for comment. This 
107 Formative studies of Makassarese kingdoms include Andaya (1978), Cummings (200 1), Noorduyn 
(1987), Pelras (1993), Reid (2000), and Rbssler (1990). 
108 H. Syafruddin Kaiyurn, District Secretary, believed this king to be the 37 th in the line of Gowa's 
kings. Further, he claimed that there were nine minor principalities in the former kingdom, which he 
called Ba'te Salapang (interview on 08 March 2006). 
'09 Interview with H. Mallingkai Maknun, head of Gowa's district parliament, on 08 March 2006. 
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informant, now retired, was in poor health and unfortunately could not recall the 
specifics of Regulation Number 44/2001 concerning adat. 110 
There was one official document, however, that provided some insight into 
the intentions behind Regulation 44/2001. The following excerpt is contained in a 
document published by the mayor of Gowa in 2001: 
Regulation 44/2001 was proposed and expected to support the 
realisation of an active role for customary organisations and 
customs and traditions in the implementation of village 
governance, such as in representing the opinions of the 
community, resolving conflicts related to the rights of 
customs, traditions, and habitual customary actions, and also 
in supporting the realisation of acts of democracy, justice and 
objectives at the community level as well as cultural openness 
to influence the values of other areas that are positive and 
constructive. III 
The language used is quite telling. Adat is envisioned as a support mechanism for the 
district government, rendered quaint and non-threatening, and even meant to ease the 
burdens of administration as communities are expected to resolve their own disputes 
in an optimal way. Even if there were progressive stipulations about land rights, 
resource entitlements, and the endorsement of antedated systems of village 
governance, there would be little chance of realising them, for there was no evidence 
of public consultation prior to the promulgation of Regulation 44/200 1. 
In the centre of Gowa, the former Palace (Istana) of Balla Lompoa has been 
converted into a museum, showcasing cultural artefacts and regalia from the golden 
age of the former kingdom. This would have been an appropriate venue for officials 
to visit in search of local perspectives on Regulation 44/2001. When I visited in 
March 2006, staff and curators from the museum expressed an interest in local 
customs, traditions and history, and were enthusiastic about research being conducted 
110 Interview with Abdul Khalik Mone, former member of the Oversight Committee for Regulations in 
Gowa District, on 09 March 2006. 
111 Attachment II Item 12 of the opening speech by the mayor, contained in the document titled 
'Meeting Summary about 18 Regional Regulations in Gowa District' obtained in Gowa on 08 March 
2006. 
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about the revival of adat in their district. ' 12 One of the curators was a well-known 
pemangku adat (or customary leader) from Gowa district, yet the copy of the 
regulation that I provided was the first anyone had seen. 
In accordance with principles of consultation and deliberation, it would have 
been logical for the district government to send a committee member to Balla 
Lompoa during the legislative process, or even after the promulgation of the 
regulation in order to "socialise" it. However, interviews revealed that none of the 
informants at the palace had heard of Regulation 44/200 1. In this sense, the politics of 
adat revivalism has been replaced by an officialising procedure couched in terms of 
recognition, one carried out by an insulated district legislative and promulgated by an 
indifferent executive. 
In order to expand on these observations, the following section visits the 
district of Majene in West Sulawesi province, the modem administrative domain that 
overlays the antiquated Mandar Kingdom. 
Adat Revivalism in Majene 
Majene is one of the four modem administrative districts of West Sulawesi province, 
which is host to the Mandar ethnic group, one of the largest in Sulawesi. The Mandar 
are a coastal people residing principally between Polewali and Mamuju, the 
provincial capital. They have developed a "reputation as Sulawesi's finest, and 
perhaps fiercest, sailors, " and are known for their devotion to the Muslim faith and 
aggressive defence of their dignity or "siri" (George 1991: 548). The fish-trade from 
the Makassar Strait is significant for the livelihoods of Mandar men, while the 
Mandar women are renowned for the weaving of "darkly checked silk sarongs" of 
"extraordinary beauty and refinement" (Volkman 1994: 564). 
All of the hallmarks of ferocity and refinement were seemingly lost when, on 
28 February 2001, the mayor of Majene saw fit to put his seal upon District 
Regulation Number 17/2001 in recognition of adat. The opening considerations of 
this document indicate that the district government was fulfilling its duties as 
112 Interview with Andi Kumala Idjo and staff from Balla Lompoa Museum, Gowa, on 09 March 2006. 
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stipulated in the Decentralisation Laws of 1999. Beyond this procedural stamp of 
approval, however, there is little information about the reasoning behind such a 
regulation. Judging from the response of local informants interviewed in May 2006, it 
was little more than an act of administrative posturing, one perhaps intended to 
appease critics or simply to bolster the reformist credentials of the district 
government. 
In Majene, as in cases from Central Sulawesi, "many more questions are 
opened up by the regulation than are answered by it" (Li 2007: 365). In its original 
top-down form, this regulatory process does not correspond to the emancipatory 
project of resistance and struggle set out in the introductory chapter of this thesis. 
Rather, it is indicative of Acciaioli's (2007) officialising strategy, where regulations 
are simply "copied directly from higher laws" in the hope that adat communities and 
their supporters will adopt the "notions of the state" (Li 2007: 364-365). 
McCarthy (2004) skilfully details the discretionary powers wielded by 
adaptive government officials since decentralisation. Discretionary powers create 
"opportunities for regional government innovation beyond those suggested by the 
reading of formal laws, " creating flow-on effects from legal ambiguities and 
conflicting regulations (McCarthy 2004: 1206). Hadiz (2004: 711) reinforces this 
argument, suggesting that "the design of decentralisation is obviously faulty, as 
reflected in numerous legal contradictions and ambiguities about the functions and 
role of different levels of government under the current legal framework". 
In order to investigate this situation further, firsthand field research was 
undertaken in Majene. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with protagonists 
from the activist community and NGO networks, from randomly sampled villages, 
and from relevant district government agencies. The district's first direct mayoral 
elections were also taking place during this period of research, providing a unique 
opportunity to observe polling stations and survey voters on Election Day (15 May 
2006). 
As in Gowa, activists and prominent figures from Majene had no knowledge 
of the existence of a regulation recognising adat. When presented with a copy of 
91 
Regulation 17/200 1, informants were partly intrigued and somewhat bemused over 
the fact that their district representatives had undertaken such a legislative process 
without public consultation. ' 13 Activists from an environmental NGO called 
Yanmarindo were the first to offer their perspectives on this regulation, and the 
response was generally positive. Members of Yanmarindo saw this as a clear 
opportunity to initiate a process of regulatory revision, and the existence of an older 
regulation provides them with a clear mandate for reform. 1 14 It is much easier to 
engage in a process of revision than to lobby for a new regulation. 
Official recognition and bureaucratic approval are still dominant themes 
amongst activists. Members of Yanmarindo were therefore asked what it was that 
they wanted recognition of, and whether they would pursue remedial rights, including 
land tenure, access to resources, environmental management, compensation for past 
injustices, or the autonomy to govern local affairs in accordance with adat principles. 
The response was that it was too early to tell. In order to establish the contours of 
their campaign, a comprehensive process of community consultation was needed. ' 15 
Only then could Yanmarindo press for specific stipulations in a revised regulation. 
However, community consultation is a lengthy process, and a strategy to recruit local 
partners was deemed necessary. 
Unlike the recent land conflicts pitting local Indonesian communities against 
multinationals such as Freeport, Rio Tinto and International Nickel of Canada, 
Majene remains a frontier case without a high-profile dispute behind which to unify 
local positions or rally external supporters. While this leaves local activists relatively 
isolated, it also limits the divisive impact of political opportunists, spoilers, and 
predatory entrepreneurs that tend to gravitate towards conflicts in resource-rich areas. 
Yanmarindo has relations with a village-based adat organisation in Tande, sub-district 
Banggae, members of which agreed to review Regulation 17/2001 and provide 
113 Local people are by no means surprised that legislation remains a top-down affair, or that elites still 
control political parties; however, the fact that a regulation specifically concerned with adat was 
established in this way struck people as unusual. 
114 Interview with Ikhsan Welly, director of Yanmarindo, in Majene on 10 May 2006. 
115 Interview with Ikhsan Welly from Yanmarindo, Majene, on 10 May 2006. 
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feedback. Whereas the preliminary response from Yanmarindo was to seek to revive 
and instrumentalise adat for political purposes, the response from Tande was a 
staunch rejection of the notion that adat can be subject to reconstructions and 
reinventions. 11 6 
Particular attention was paid to Article IU] of Regulation 17/2001, which 
reads: "the adat organisation is a community organisation that was established either 
intentionally or has developed in the history of the local community". In response, 
informants from Tande argued that "adat organisations are not something which can 
be intentionally established because they have already existed for a long time, " 
bequeathed by the ancestors before Indonesia was an independent, legally recognised 
state. 11 7 This clause encourages the construction of new, modem, rationalised adat 
organisations, something "which is not allowed, not correct, and will make various 
[incompatible] versions of adat in the community". 118 This critique relates to the 
primordial position that customary communities have existed since time immemorial. 
Despite these fundamental differences, it was agreed that a sequential strategy 
was needed to revise Regulation 17/2001. To begin, Yanmarindo and the community 
organisation from Tande resolved to produce an academic document detailing their 
intentions and strategy. Then they would establish a small working team, the purpose 
of which was to unify local perceptions on adat. If and when this was achieved, the 
team would conduct public consultations, the outcome of which would provide them 
with a popular mandate and a legitimate basis for demanding a meeting with district 
parliamentarians. By that stage, a comprehensive draft regulation would be available 
for the relevant communities to review. Final recommendations would be collated and 
delivered to the executive branch of the district government. 
At the time of researching this emergent process of adat revivalism, activists 
were only in the planning stages, and there had yet to be any public consultations. In 
lieu of any reliable sources detailing community aspirations, an opportunity did arise 
to gauge public opinion as a result of the mayoral elections held on 15 May 2006. On 
116 Interview with Anshary, adat expert from Tande village, Maj ene, on 10 May 2006. 
117 Interview with Anshary from Tande on 10 May 2006. 
118 Interview with Anshary from Tande on 10 May 2006. 
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Election Day, voting stations (Tempat Pemungutan Suara or TPS) were open from 
7: 00-13: 00, after which the open-air public ballot counting took place. 119 A total of 
53 voters 120 were interviewed after having cast their votes; respondents came from 
two villages in Banggae sub-district, one village in Pamboang sub-district, and three 
TPS in the city of Majene. 
The presence of foreign researchers in the frontier villages of Majene 
generated a significant amount of public interest. Each of the 53 respondents that 
agreed to be surveyed were surrounded by onlookers, including neighbours and 
family members. Many of the respondents consulted with these onlookers prior to 
making any final statements about the elections, indicating a degree of nervousness 
and indecisiveness (for many this was their first opportunity to participate in a direct, 
open mayoral election). 
Nevertheless,, it was possible to discern that people desired a peaceful 
electoral process, regardless of the quality of political debate. They hoped for "honest 
political leaders ... .. better roads, " and "public safety, " but there was no mention of 
empowering, preserving or developing the customs and traditions of their villages 
(the replicated notations of district regulations). Adat revivalism, it seems, was a non- 
issue among voters as well as mayoral candidates throughout the election campaign. 
The candidate pairing of Tashan (for mayor) and Mahmud (for deputy), for 
instance, made consistent reference to Majene's Human Development Index (HDI) in 
their vision and mission statements,, citing modem developmental imperatives, 
efficiency in resource management, and discourses of good governance. 121 with 
regards to socio-cultural issues, there was emphasis on gender equality, educational 
119 When polling stations close at 13: 00, General Election Commission officials open the ballot boxes 
at each of the 308 TPS in Majene and read aloud the results of each ballot, one by one, in front of a 
public gallery in an effort to maximise transparency and to guard against accusations of fraud and 
corruption. Based on personal observations and interviews with General Election Commission officials 
from I 1- 15 May 2006. 
120 There were 34 male and 19 female respondents, ranging from 17 to 71 years of age (though many 
villagers are not certain of their precise age). All 53 respondents were asked the same open-ended 
questions, which addressed the motivations for voting, opinions about the campaign period, problems 
encountered in the electoral process, and expectations over the next five years. 
12 1 Based on the document entitled "Vision, Mission and Development Programme, Candidate for 
District Head Year 2006-2011 " circulated by the candidate pairing of Dr. Ir. Hj. Hamdana A. Tashan 
and H. Syamsiar Muchtar Mahmud SH., MM. 
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achievement, and religion, without any explicit reference to adat. The long-term 
desire to elevate Majene to the status of "the Jakarta of West Sulawesi" is indicative 
of the general modernising thrust of the campaign. 122 
A second candidate pairing, Darwis (for mayor) and Mappangara (for deputy), 
stressed Majene's place in the new global era, focusing on a laundry list of political 
dilemmas including deforestation and ecosystems, and encouraging supporters to 
"think local, act global". 123 Good governance, tsunami early-warning systems, and 
telecommunications were emphasised, along with the virtues of religious and cultural 
dialogue. Finally, their vision and mission included "preserving and developing 
Mandar culture, " which requires the facilitation of historical documentation, 
publications, museums, and archaeological discovery. 
The politics of adat revivalism was, therefore, conspicuously absent from the 
election campaign in Majene. According to several local informants (names 
withheld), party politics continues to be dominated by the wealthy and powerful, 
excluding potential leaders with a surplus of integrity but a deficit of funds. Estimates 
of the money required for a successful campaign range from 250 million to two 
billion rupiah. 124 In many ways this level of fundraising, for which there is little 
accountability and oversight, determines the candidate's loyalties, priorities, and the 
trajectory of their term in office. 125 
In the event that activists and politicians are willing to collaborate in the 
revival of adat, it must be noted that notions of adat are tied to specific locations, 
122 Mrs. Tashan, the only female candidate in the mayoral race, was candid in an interview about the 
difficulties facing women in politics, particularly in regions with strong Islamist sentiments. She also 
commented on the lack of political debate during the campaign in Majene; public 
debates were 
discouraged because of the potential for violence between rival supporters. Instead, candidates limited 
their public appearances, offered only brief speeches, and preferred to introduce performing artists 
from Jakarta (usually sexy Dangdut singers). Based on personal observations of the campaign and an 
interview with Mrs Tashan in Majene on 12 May 2006. 
123 Based on the document entitled "United, People Working Together 
for a Prosperous Majene" 
circulated by the candidate pairing of Drs. H. Muhammad 
Darwis and Ir. H. A. Surianto B. 
Mappangara. 
124 The exchange rate as of August 2008 was approximately 18,000 rupiah to one 
British pound. 
12' Haj Hadidjah Katta, the head of the General Election Commission for Majene, defended the 
legitimacy of the electoral process by referring to Presidential Decree 
Number 6/2005 which regulates 
campaign fundraising, as well as the appointment of 
'auditing teams' from Majene and Makssar. 
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which for long periods of history determined patterns of land use and community 
relations. Each hamlet, village, and customary domain remains intricately linked, and 
each has been exposed to various external intrusions. Westerling's war of 
pacification, along with the Darul Islam rebellions, displaced many Mandar 
communities. 126 As such, one informant from Pallarangan sub-district was adamant 
that no authoritative proclamations based on adat in Majene were possible without 
widespread deliberations between peoples spread throughout the peninsulas of 
Sulawesi. 127 
Indeed, the Mandar peoples of West Sulawesi province have historic 
connections to the peoples of northwest Luwu, Toraja, and north Mamuju (some 100 
miles away), who are all bound by shared histories despite the difficult terrains that 
physically separate them. Therefore, it has been suggested that, for any consensus to 
be reached on adat (particularly one that is to be written and documented), there must 
be a coming together of a council of customary leaders committed to a sustained 
period of deliberation and dialogue. 128 It was felt that a failure to reach out to these 
other territories could provoke conflicts. 
Locally, the various actors claiming to speak authoritatively on matters of adat 
(descendants of nobility, local activists, or NGO directors) often disagree over 
specific representations. Broadly speaking, there is a distinction between local elites 
with some genealogical links to the nobility of the past, those considered natural 
conveyors of customs and traditions, and local activists aligned with external support 
networks, those pursuing specific political objectives. The former tend to caution 
against irresponsible deployments of adat based on tenuous links to the past, while the 
latter Erequently embrace any versions of adat (regardless of concerns over 
authenticity) that offer utility in their local campaigns. 
126 During an interview in Tande, Majene, on 12 May 2006 Pak Hasan, a prominent community figure, 
claimed to have been a member of the resistance movement Baruga 531 which opposed Westerling's 
army in 1947. 
127 Interview with Muhammad Abdu, an adat expert from Pallarangan, in Majene on II May 2006. 
128 Interview with Muhammad Abdu from Pallarangan, Majene, on II May 2006. 
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Between these opposing positions, there is an organisation in Majene that 
seems to represent the middle ground. This is KAPPMAM, led by Muis Mandra, a 
prolific writer on Mandar history, from Sendana sub-district in Majene. Bom out of 
the first Congress of Archipelagic Communities (KMAN 1), KAPPMAM is an 
alliance of adat communities from the traditional Mandar lands (what is now West 
Sulawesi province, part of the modem administrative grid). In conjunction with the 
proclamations of adat leaders during KMAN 1, the struggle for adat rights emanating 
out of KAPPMAM is based on the search for recognition as well as compensation for 
past injustices. 129 
On 25 May 2003 a meeting was held in Sendana to consolidate the AMAN 
membership applications for 21 adat communities, one foundation, and the 
KAPPMAM organisation itself. 130 In attendance were 65 adat representatives, all of 
which signed the membership applications, which contained details of their political 
struggles along with pronouncements of their loyalties to the unitary state, the 
constitution, and the dominant ideology of Pancasila. 131 
Beyond vague calls for recognition, there were allusions to land disputes, with 
particular reference to hak ulayat (the indigenous right of avail), the need to revisit 
negotiations over compensation, and the rejection of the designation "state lands, " 
which has disenfranchised local communities since colonial times. As proof of the 
timeless,, immemorial existence of tribal, indigenous, adat systems of land tenure, 
Muis Mandar cites the physical evidence of yellow bamboo, ceramics, sea shells, and 
banyan trees planted on customary lands. 132 The banyan trees in particular symbolised 
traditional places of worship and communal activities. 
To what extent do such symbols translate into concrete political claims to 
land? The head of the Forestry Bureau of Majene gave a measured but favourable 
appraisal of adat claims, citing the revised Forestry Law Number 4 1/1999.133 There 
129 Interview with Muis Mandra, head of KAPPMAM, in Sendana, Majene, on 13 May 2006. 
130 According to report number 23/KAPPMAM/V/2003 detailing the 'general consolidation meeting' 
held in Sendana; report obtained from AMAN Jakarta. 
131 Interview with Muis Mandra in Sendana on 13 May 2006. 
132 interview with Muis Mandra, in Sendana on 13 May 2006. 
133 Interview with the head of the Forestry Bureau in Majene on 12 May 2006. 
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are criteria for determining the status of adat forests, for instance, beginning with an 
investigation into the continued existence of adat, for which the local history has to be 
tracked. 134 
One such investigation was reportedly undertaken in the Sendana domain, 
headquarters of KAPPMAM. While the historiography tracked by the Forestry 
Bureau revealed traditional patterns of cultivation, there was little evidence of legible, 
antedated systems of governance, or coherent social organisation. Therefore, without 
a new, expansive district regulation, the Bureau could not endorse claims for the 
recognition of adat lands in Sendana. 
According to one seemingly well-informed family from Sendana, there is a 
legal exception in the Indonesian system of land ownership. 135 If land has been 
cultivated for more than twenty years, then the cultivator has a right to claim the land 
or propose that the land is his own. It is then the prerogative of the National Land 
Agency to issue a certificate of land ownership. The Basic Agrarian Law (BAL 
5/1960) contains the most detailed provisions regarding land entitlement, access, and 
ownership, as well as the criteria for hak adat (customary rights), although there is no 
specific mention of a twenty year period of cultivation as the final requirement for 
ownership. 
As a rejoinder, Fitzpatrick (2007: 141) skilfully argues that Indonesian land 
law is designed to ensure that underlying conditions of dispossession persist, even if 
there are exceptional cases and isolated victories. Therefore the recognition and 
bestowal of customary rights is dependent on discretionary administrative measures 
taken by authorities in the field, the results of which are revocable, rarely replicable, 
and would not stand up to legal scrutiny or judicial review. 
Neither Fitzpatrick (2007) nor the family from Sendana, however, are aware 
of the Supreme Court decision in 1991 granting customary land rights to 243 
households in sub-district Kajang (discussed in chapter seven). The legal ruling was 
134 Interview with the head of the Forestry Bureau in Majene on 12 May 2006. 
135 interview with one family (names withheld) from Sendana on 10 May 2006. 
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based on a derivative of squatter's law, where by virtue of persistent cultivation for 
28 years the claimants were entitled to remain on the land (measuring 200 hectares). 
Definitional and legalistic matters aside, some villagers from Sendana are 
acutely aware that district regulations in recognition of adat are not a panacea for their 
tenure insecurities and livelihood struggles. Indeed, it was held that "when the 
community attempts to claim land" they face many "complications and obstacles, " 
indicative of the political dilemmas reviewed in chapters one and two. 136 
Writing in the context of Central Sulawesi, Li (2007: 363) observed that the 
intention to strengthen the role of adat values and institutions provides a "window 
into the bureaucratic mind, " with mayors and bureau chiefs "imagining how easy it 
would be to rule over people who are already governed by their adat, whose leaders 
take responsibility for their conduct". 
Rather than succumb to these bureaucratic imaginings, members of 
Yanmarindo and activists from Tande have stated their commitment to 
comprehensive processes of community consultation, which would then form the 
basis for a new round of negotiations over a revised district regulation concerning 
adat. Judging from the campaign and electoral observations made on 15 May 2006, 
however, informed public opinion will not be forthcoming, and village consultations 
may end up being rather more selective than first envisioned. 
With few local alternatives, Yam-narindo hopes to align their struggles with 
new social movements that are high on the agendas of provincial, national or 
international organisations, including ecological sustainability, indigenous and 
minority rights, democratic local governance, and pro-poor development. As this 
process is still in its infancy, the protagonists behind the revival of adat will need to 
guard against the forces of cooptation and coercion, those factions within the district 
with an interest in continuity and orderly rule. 
136 Interview with one family (names withheld) from Sendana on 10 May 2006. 
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Adat and the Bureaucratic Mind in Palopo 
The final case study concerns the coastal township of Palopo, which was the former 
centre of the Luwu kingdom and played a vital role in the administration of peripheral 
domains, vassals and tributaries. Adat disputes that could not be resolved locally 
would be brought to the court of Palopo for adjudication. After independence Luwu 
became a district within the new administrative hierarchy of the Republic of 
Indonesia,, with Palopo as its capital. 
There is a keen (and sometimes cynical) interest in Palopo to revive notions of 
its "golden age" that antedate the modem era (VOC onwards). This is represented 
most obviously by the gTeat Bugis chronicle I La Galigo. 137 From a bureaucratic 
perspective, adat revivalism offers a variety of opportunities, particularly in terms of 
tourismI trade, and efficient governance. These are encapsulated in the mayor's broad 
vision for his city, set out in an offilcialising strategy called the "Seven 
Dimensions". ' 38 
The fourth dimension of the mayor's political programme involves "custom 
and culture, ')' the rediscovery and promotion of Luwu's history to ensure that 
successive generations do not lose their sense of identity, loyalty, and belonging. 139 
Budgetary allocations have thus been approved for the restoration of historical sites in 
Palopo, and regulations have been drafted (though not yet approved) for the 
revitalisation of adat institutions and governing structures at the village level. The 
draft regulation replicates those found in Gowa and Majene, claiming to "preserve, 
empower and develop customary institutions, customs and traditions" so long as they 
do not contradict any higher laws or the national interest. 140 
In relation to efficient governance, Li's (2007: 363) characterisation of the 
"bureaucratic mind" certainly applies in Palopo, where officials expected that 
recognition of adat would encourage people to take responsibility for their own affairs 
137 See Abidin (197 1) for more on the I La Galigo and other historical chronicles from Sulawesi. 
138 Interview with H. P. A. Tenriadjeng, mayor of Palopo, on 01 March 2006. 
139 Interview with H. P. A. Tenriadjeng, mayor of Palopo, on 01 March 2006. 
140 Government of Palopo draft regulation proposed by the mayor (H. P. A. Tenriadjeng) and the 
secretary (H. M. Jaya). 
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and resolve local issues autonomously. According to the mayor, adat institutions can 
only be permitted to handle social relations at village level, and do not constitute a 
functioning system of governance. 141 Autonomy is thus viewed in a narrow sense, as 
officials guard against the empowerment of local constituencies that may present a 
political challenge to their authority in the future. 
The notion that "full freedoms" could be afforded to these communities was 
dismissed by the mayor, who warned of isolationism, separatism, and incompatibility 
with the unitary state and Pancasila. 142 However, if adat communities wanted to be 
formally recognised, they were welcome to come to Palopo to be registered by the 
government, though the mayor doubts that Luwu's approximately 215 distinct adat 
communities would heed this call. Recognition was reserved for customs, culture and 
symbols, to be used as a support mechanism for the township of Palopo to monitor 
and collect data about its diverse constituencies. Any attempt to conflate notions of 
rights and recognition would cross into the realm of oppositional politics and thus has 
been rejected from the outset. 
Beyond the instrumentalisation of adat for myopic bureaucratic purposes, 
there is an emerging associational. network in Palopo dedicated to political struggle 
and oppositional campaigning. Foremost in this network is the Sawerigading Earth 
Foundation (Yayasan Burni Sawerigading or YBS). Though based in Palopo, this 
foundation's activities and networks extend throughout South and Central 
Sulawesi. 143 YBS features prominently in the struggles for recognition in Seko, North 
Luwu (see chapter four), as well as Tana Toraja district (see chapter five). 
Another noteworthy umbrella organisation based in Palopo is the To Tana 
Lalong Customary Deliberative Council (Dewan Musyawarah Adat To Tana Lalong) 
founded by Daud Pakondongan Tandigau. This council claims to represent the 
customary territories of Rongkong, Seko, Masapi, and Rampi. A variety of strategies 
are being deployed in the effort to secure official recognition for these territories, 
141 Interview with H. P. A. Tenriadjeng, mayor of Palopo, on 01 March 2006. 
142 Interview with H. P. A. Tenriadjeng, mayor of Palopo, on 01 March 2006. 
143 According to YBS's 'Organisational Profile' (Profil Lembaga) obtained at YBS Palopo on 27 
February 2006. 
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along with the protection, preservation and development of local adat communities. 
The first manoeuvre by Tandigau was to register 32 adat communities from these 
144 isolated territories with AMAN in May 2001 . 
Since its inception, Tandigau has been steering the To Tana Lalong Council 
towards environmentalism and the promotion of kearifan lokal (local wisdom), 
confronting plantation and extractive companies for human rights violations and 
ecological degradation. 145 One example of confrontation was the Seko Fajar tea 
plantation that was allegedly awarded concession rights over 70,000 hectares in Seko, 
North Luwu in 1992. With the death of Haj Musa, the owner of Seko Fajar, in 1998, 
tea production ceased, though there are many other prospective investors. 146 
While still committed to AMAN's defining slogan from 1999 ("if the state 
does not recognise us, we will not recognise the state"), Tandigau is markedly 
sceptical about the intentions behind district regulations as well as their efficacy. 
Rather than publicly endorsing the mayor of Palopo's proposed regulation on adat, 
which is little more than an officialising and instrumentalist bureaucratic procedure, 
Tandigau has been lobbying for specific development projects. 147 These are primarily 
infrastructure projects, such as the construction of bridges and service roads to 
improve access to remote adat territories,, as well as a proposed "miniature theme 
park" (taman mini) located in Rongkong, representing Luwu's diverse indigenous 
communities. 
If Tandigau and the To Tana Lalong Council are opposed to bureaucratic 
capture in principle, they have in practice emulated the notations of the state by 
forming a trustee organisation (Lembaga Adat Rongkong) with the capacity to enact 
regulations and make proclamations on behalf of local communities. The first order 
of business was to promulgate a decree setting out the organisational structure and 
144 Registration forms contained in AMAN's national secretariat database in Jakarta. Tandigau was 
also one of the founders of AMAN, playing a pivotal role in the first national congress (KMAN 1) in 
Jakarta in 1999. 
145 Interview with Daud Pakondongan Tandigau in Palopo on 27 February 2006. 
146 The family of Haj Musa accused Tandigau of "using magic" to kill him. 
147 Interview with Daud Pakondongan Tandigau in Palopo on 27 February 2006. 
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membership criteria of the Lembaga Adat Rongkong. 1 48 The next step was to 
mobilise support for a day of rituals called "Ma'bua Kalebu" held on 12 January 2006 
in order to celebrate the rich heritage and customs of Luwu. 
The mayor of Palopo, who admitted in an interview to being opposed to any 
notion or interpretation of adat rights that was linked to land claims and resource 
entitlements, was quick to endorse this cultural celebration by co-signing an "Official 
Report" of the event itinerary along with Tandigau. 149 This same pattern has been 
replicated in East Luwu where the district government has enthusiastically promoted 
Bugis cultural events, and PT Inco, the major nickel mining corporation, has 
commissioned reports on ancient oral traditions. In each case, it was hoped that adat 
revivalism could be reduced to a form of "museumisation and showcasing" without 
the political connotations, thus detracting from the pursuit of tangible (potentially 
threatening) objectives such as land reclaiming and resource entitlement (Erb 
2007: 247-248). 
Conclusion 
It has been acknowledged that, in some instances, local negotiations will result in the 
granting of serni-forinal land use rights from district officials; however, for many 
observers this does not constitute an adequate solution to the wider problems of 
community dispossession in eastern Indonesia, particularly the "right of control" 
principle that favours the state in national law and forestry department policy 
(Fitzpatrick 2007: 138). 
Further, it has been argued that the new adat regulations promulgated at 
district level signify symbolic reform at best; while appearing to recognise traditional 
communal rights, the reality is that the underlying conditions of dispossession remain 
in place (Fitzpatrick 2007: 141). In this view, encouraging local activists to pursue 
standard-form district regulations may serve as diversion, as a move away 
from 
148 Based on Decree Number 65/DAR-TM/XII/2005 issued by the Lembaga Adat 
Rongkong on II 
December 2005. 
149 Based on Official Report Number 66/DAR-TM/I/2006 co-signed 
by Tenriadjeng (the mayor) and 
Tandigau. 
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oppositional politics. In other words, it may undermine the emancipatory spirit of 
local movements, reducing the efforts of activists to singular, instrumental, issue-area 
challenges rather than structural or systemic challenges against constitutive political 
conditions. 
The fonnal recognition of adat communities as bearers of rights is thus 
rendered vague, as something akin to the Dutch colonial principle of 
volksverheffing. 150 It does not automatically confer land title, lead to the bestowal of 
land, or secure the payment of compensation. Stated simply, the preferred strategy in 
search of recognition of adat rights does not dismantle the dominant logic of the state, 
it merely reconfigures it (Kinsella 2005: 255). Some observers have therefore 
criticised organisations such as AMAN for their pursuit of "legislation empowering 
adat communities as if they existed as distinct, harmonious, self-regulating entities, " 
suggesting a failure on the part of activists to critically examine the complexities and 
political realities of local communities "on the ground" (Bourchier 2007: 123). 
Examples of these realities include the fact that adat communities may not be 
coherent or self-managing, that they have long histories of interaction with outsiders 
and thus cannot be "discreet entities, ')' and that cultural essentialism may potentially 
sharpen distinctions between communities, culminating in horizontal conflicts, or 
oppression within communities (Bourchier 2007: 124). There are also allegations that 
local governments may benefit from the promulgation of adat regulations as it allows 
them to exploit resources and enhance administrative legibility (McCarthy 
2004: 1216). Under the guise of local autonomy, dominant modes of clientelism are 
not only preserved, but they are often extended. While the integration of adat into 
local law "affords no real rights" to constituents, it does serve as "a cover for the 
government" to capture local processes, extract rents, and maintain networks of 
patronage and clientelism (Moniaga 2007: 289). 
Research in Central Sulawesi seems to confmn these suspicions, revealing the 
tendency for district governments to replicate regulations concerning adat, which are 
"copied directly from the national regulations on village and regional autonomy, " and 
150 Volksverheffing refers to "lifting the population from their situation" (Weber et al. 2003: 409). 
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thus "have not been drafted in the region with a view to addressing regional realities 
and concerns" (Li 2007: 364). 15 1 This was also the case in South Sulawesi, where 
identical regulations were passed in Majene, Jeneponto and Gowa about 
'Empowering, Preserving and Developing Customs, Traditions and Customary 
Institutions. ' 
Taking their cues from the decentralisation laws of 1999, mayors and district 
officials have sought to retain (or impose) institutional control by "creating categories 
of action,, fixed meanings, [and] shaping subjectivities" (Barnett and Finnemore 
2005: 179). In order for this forrn of control to materialise, the objects of governance 
must be "locked in to various forms of institutional and structural power" (Muppidi 
2005: 283). 
In Gowa, Majene, and Palopo districts, where adat revivalism has been 
domesticated by subtle and diffuse regulatory processes, manifestations of 
institutional power have been most visible. Consistent with the bureaucratic 
imperatives of the district, control has been achieved indirectly, with attempts to 
penetrate into peripheral (socially distant) domains without coercion or compulsion 
(Barnett and Duvall 2005: 16). 
Indeed, as the mayor of Palopo stated, adat communities are encouraged to 
voluntarily register with the government, which would appear to promote local 
autonomy while actually enhancing surveillance and the monitoring of peripheral 
constituencies. There was never any indication that the government would extend this 
formal recognition of adat to include notions of rights over land and resources, nor 
allow the revitalisation of antedated systems of governance beyond simple village 
affairs. 
Thus through the calculus of "agenda setting, " officials are able to dictate the 
range of permissible actions, limit the choices of dependent actors (those with fewer 
resources), impose subtle behavioural constraints, perpetuate governing biases and 
privileges, and embed power asymmetries and differentials. Regional activists and 
trustees are building local partnerships in Majene in order to overcome these forms of 
"' Such regulations have been promulgated in the districts of Poso and Donggala, Central Sulawesi. 
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institutional control. However, their first order of business has been to undertake 
community consultation in order to legitimate calls for the revision of a redundant 
district regulation. 
When mobilising traditional notions of adat for thoroughly modem political 
projects, therefore, one must consider what exactly is being represented. Writing on 
the phenomenon of the return of the sultans, van Klinken (2007a: 157) found that 
some revival efforts have been "complete symbolic reinventions, " the original entity 
having faded in the mists of time, meaning there is "no longer any question of a living 
connection". 
In the cases examined in this chapter, there are living connections to adat 
(albeit tenuous and broadly defined) which are being reinvented as optimal 
bureaucratic tools, objects of tourism, authentic platforms for rights-based struggles, 
and justifications for infrastructure projects with potentially disastrous environmental 
implications. By foregrounding indigenous issues, therefore, perceptions of customs 
and traditions have been largely inflected by external ideas, domesticated by 
institutional power, and captured by subtle, diffuse regulatory processes. 
Given that most activists and village representatives willingly engage in these 
domesticating processes, they are largely responsible for the outcomes. Their cases 
now at the foreground, the protagonists of adat revivalism from Gowa, Majene and 
Palopo appear to have a long process ahead before the visible manifestations of their 
struggles lead to substantive, emancipatory changes on the ground. 
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Chapter Four: Recognition of the Seko Domain 
In the cases of Gowa, Majene and Palopo (chapter three) it was found that the process 
of adat revivalism was largely captured by bureaucrats and channelled into the 
patterned regularity of the state. Many local activists were found to have willingly 
subscribed to this process. This chapter revisits the debate surrounding rights and 
recognition in the context of the Seko customary domain in North Luwu district. 
Unlike the previous cases examined, adat revivalism and public participation in Seko 
has become intermingled with international donor projects. 
In Majene, it was established that an increasingly associational and network- 
oriented public sphere was eager to court international donors, promising to undertake 
comprehensive village consultations. The ultimate objective was the revision of an 
older, redundant regulation concerning adat, replacing it with legislation that would 
provide activists with a legitimate basis for further political struggles. In Seko this 
process has already occurred, and therefore needs to be reviewed in detail, for most 
adat communities and their allies in Sulawesi are committed to similar procedural 
struggles in search of recognition. 
Along with primary document analysis, key informants responsible for 
negotiations on behalf of the Seko community were interviewed in Masamba (the 
capital of North Luwu district), Palopo (headquarters of Sawerigading Earth 
Foundation-YBS), Palu (capital of Central Sulawesi province), Makassar, and 
Kendari (capital of Southeast Sulawesi province). In the absence of firsthand field 
research in Seko, these sources have been rigorously cross-checked to determine their 
reliability. Furthermore, this chapter critically examines the available records and 
testimony concerning the multi-party negotiations and processes of community 
consultation that have taken place in Seko, drawing on detailed and voluminous 
reports from NGOs, government agencies, and international donors, as well as key 
semi-structured interviews. 
As Li (2007) observed, most regulations concerning adat promulgated in 
Sulawesi are copied directly from higher laws without local differentiation, and then 
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replicated by district governments with limited regard for local political realities. In 
the Seko territories as well as Tana Toraja district, this officialising regulatory trend 
has to some extent been broken. Specific stipulations regarding the return to 
customary governance, village autonomy, and control over land have for the first time 
been included in district regulations and mayoral decrees. 
While some scholars allude to these types of local ordinances (in recognition 
of adat), there are no comprehensive studies of the negotiation processes that precede 
the passing of such ordinances, no thorough analysis of their content, and therefore 
little commentary on the divergent political interests involved. Therefore, this chapter 
sets out to fill this gap by foregrounding the specific case of Seko, where a plethora of 
actors are engaged in negotiations about the nature and legitimacy of adat claims. 
With constructivist and instrumentalist debates in mind, the perceptions and positions 
of all key protagonists are examined, including village leaders, NGO activists, third- 
party mediators, and government officials. This concludes with an assessment of the 
real political consequences of adat regulations in highly contested areas. 
Background: Seko 
Very little has been written about the history, politics, customs, and geography of 
Seko. Suwito (2006), having published a short pamphlet about land tenure in Seko, 
provides the most detailed account. In their study of decentralisation and forestry, 
Ngakan et al. (2005) mention Seko in passing. Caldwell (1991) remarked upon the 
importance of a lucrative fifteenth century trade route that ran through the fertile Seko 
valley. Ngelow (2004) refers briefly to the immense suffering of Christians from the 
Rongkong and Seko territories of North Luwu during the Darul Islam rebellion. 
Finally, Zerner (1981) has written about iron forging and smiths in Toraja and Seko, 
focusing on the swords and keris (traditional daggers) of the ancestors. The following 
background section is based primarily on Suwito's (2006) work, and supplemented by 
interview material. 
The customary territories of Seko are located approximately 90 kilometres 
inland from Masamba, the district capital of North Luwu. Still largely forested, the 
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Seko domain measures approximately 211,030 hectares, and is inhabited by some 
12,735 people. 152 Administratively, Seko is divided into three regions, known as Seko 
Lemo, Seko Tengah, and Seko Padang, within which there are nine officially 
recognised customary law territories (wilayah hukum adat). 153 
There are many natural features that define the Seko landscape and capture the 
imagination of its inhabitants. For instance, two rivers flow through this domain, the 
Betue and Uro Rivers, and there are mountain ranges with three visible peaks that 
stand out, which are Kambuno mountain to the southeast, Malimongan mountain to 
the west9 and Kasinturu mountain to the north (Suwito 2006: 14). 
Recent research has uncovered several sites within Seko that are symbolically 
important, all of which contain rock formations that resemble different aspects of 
village life. These include rock formations that resemble water buffalo in the Turong 
territory, three human shapes in Hoyane territory, and a mortar (for pounding rice) 
along with a hearth (for cooking) in Hono territory (Suwito 2006: 15). 
According to local legend, a ritual called Sallombengan was to be performed 
annually by the Seko communities in order to ensure peace and safety (Suwito 
2006: 14). During the ritual there are expressions of gratitude to God, community 
deliberations, as well as art and cultural performances. The term Sallombengan 
roughly means a string of beads consisting of a variety of shapes and sizes, signifying 
ethnic variation,, social status and economic conditions throughout the nine distinct 
adat territories of Seko (Suwito 2006: 14). 
While there is no written evidence, local infon-nants suggest that a system of 
governance called the lipu is indigenous to Seko, though it only became operational 
following colonial restructuring in the early 1900s (Suwito 2006: 14). The hierarchical 
desa model from Java is structured vertically while the lipu delegates power 
horizontally, with an elected leader and a cabinet responsible for all aspects of village 
152 According to membership data obtained at the National Secretariat of AMAN in Jakarta on 23 
November 2005. 
153 The nine customary territories of Seko, are: Singkalong, Turong, Lodang, Hono, Ambalong, 
Hoyane, Pohoneang, Kariango, and Beropa. 
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governance. 154T is includes areas such as law, security, agriculture, forestry, health, 
communications, property, and religion. The leadership structure has historically been 
decentralised, with one leader in each territory known by one of the following titles: 
To Bara', To Key, or To Mokaka. 155 Local decision-making is based on the principles 
of musyawarah (deliberation) and mufakat (consensus), as well as consultative 
processes that encourage popular participation and rule by consensus. 
While some of these historical features may persist, it must be recognised that 
a series of intrusions have largely undermined the traditional systems of governance 
throughout Luwu. These include the colonial legacy that brought forced cultivation 
and missionary activity, the Darul Islam rebellions that displaced so many in 
Sulawesi, and New Order era standardisation policies such as Village Law Number 
5/1979. 
In accordance with the ratification of Law Number 21/1950, Sulawesi joined 
the unitary Republic of Indonesia, and each of the ma or kingdoms (Luwu, Gowa, and 
Bone) became diminutive districts, standardised administrative units in a newly- 
united Republic. In the same year, Emergency Statute Number 1/1950 was issued in 
order to unify the structures of governance and the powers of the civil courts, leading 
to the abolishment of most of Indonesia's adat courts (Bourchier 2007: 118). Sulawesi 
was then reorganised into four separate provinces based on Law Number 47/1960. 
Gradually, Javanese desa-style systems of village governance were imposed, 
contributing to the overall decline of adat leadership and the severance of the chains 
of oral history throughout Sulawesi. 
Recent efforts to revitalise the traditional systems of governance in the Seko 
domain have been hindered by this legacy. Local disagreement and divergent 
interpretations of adat are the result of this severed chain as mentioned above. There 
are very few ketua adat (tribal elders) and pemangku adat (customary leaders) with a 
complete knowledge of traditional systems, making it hard to reach consensus. 
154 Interview with Sahbuddin Umar, executive director of YBS Palopo, on 27 February 2006. 
155 According to the Draft Regional Regulation about 'Recognition of the Seko Customary Community 
and their Rights over Natural Resources, ' obtained at YBS Palopo on 
27 February 2006. 
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In an effort to overcome these obstacles, a collaborative effort has been 
undertaken by a network of donors and activists determined to engage in a thoroughly 
modem political struggle for the rights of Seko communities. As a result,, the revival 
of adat has been linked with a variety of political campaigns, ranging from forestry 
preservation and resource management to poverty reduction and good governance. 
Intervention in Seko 
North Luwu is the largest district in South Sulawesi, covered mainly by tropical 
rainforest consisting of several high-value commercial timber species (Ngakan et al. 
2005: 5). As well as wet tropical forests, the district contains swamp-forest 
ecosystems which also "provide valuable ecological and financial services to local 
communities,, including water source preservation, non-timber forest product 
collection, timber production, eco-tourism, etc. " (Ngakan et al. 2005: 5). 156 
Rainforests cover some 72.86 per cent of district land, which is the equivalent 
of 1,045,273 hectares; 55 per cent of these forests are hutan lindung (protected), 
fifteen per cent are designated as cagar alarn (nature reserves), and the remaining 30 
per cent is open to hutan produksi terbatas (limited production), according to 2001 
figures (Ngakan et al. 2005: 7). 157 Focusing on the limited production zone of North 
Luwu, there have been several examples raised by local activists of concession rights 
granted to companies that threaten livelihoods in the Seko territories. 158 
There has been a history of mineral exploration in Seko, the latest being an 
Australian company called PT North Mining searching for gold and copper deposits 
in 1997.159 It is certain that prospective investors are aware of the potential in North 
156 The research team working in North Luwu and led by Ngakan et al. (2005) was sponsored by the 
Centre for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), Hasanuddin University (UNHAS) Makassar, the 
Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research (ACIAR), and the Department for 
International Development (DflD). 
157 Suwito (2003: 16), citing figures from 2003, suggests that 63 per cent of forest land in North Luwu 
is protected, 36 per cent is productive, leaving a mere one per cent of forest land for conservation 
purposes. On balance, however, the study by Ngakan et al. (2005) seems to have more reliable figures. 
158 Interview with Mahir Takaka from AMAN-SS on 17 February 2006. There are allegedly eight 
concession permits (HGU) that have been granted in North Luwu, though none are currently 
operational. 
159 Interview with Mahir Takaka, head of AMAN South Sulawesi, on 17 February 2006. 
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Luwu's rainforests. However, in contrast to the protracted land disputes examined in 
Soroako (chapter six) and Kajang (chapter seven) involving entrenched corporate 
interests, adat revivalism in Seko has not faced the same level of resistance, 
manipulation, or provocation. 
Beginning in 1985, concession rights for 25,000 hectares of land were 
reportedly obtained by PT Seko Fajar, a tea plantation company, without the 
knowledge or consent of local communities. This was said to have disrupted the local 
food system as rice fields were converted into tea plantations. 160 However, it has been 
reported that extractive activities from this company have ceased. 161 According to 
data published by the district Agency for Forestry and Plantations in North Luwu in 
2001, the business licence application of PT Seko Fajar was re-categorised as a 
Limited Production Forest (HPT) concession, measuring only 975 hectares (Ngakan 
et al. 2005: 38). 
Another example was the granting of significant concessions to PT Kendari 
Tunggal in 1994, allegedly covering some 105,000 hectares of forest land in North 
Luwu. 162 This productive venture has been met with accusations of environmental 
mismanagement (leading to floods), local conflicts, and incidents of sexual abuse. 
163 
It was reported that, in 2001, local communities from Seko brought their grievances 
directly to PT Kendari Tunggal, requesting that logging operations cease because of 
the environmental impact (Ngakan et al. 2005: 9). 
Forests serve to prevent flooding and soil erosion; therefore, widespread 
logging in and around Seko was determined to be the cause of severe downstream 
flooding that destroyed community plantations. It has been reported that a total of five 
160 Interview with Sahbuddin Umar of YBS Palopo on 27 February 2006. 
161 Interview with Mahir Takaka from AMAN-SS on 17 February 2006. The granting of such 
concession rights are also reported by Suwito (2006), as well as members of 
YBS in Palopo, however 
the latter gave a figure of 50,000 hectares. As mentioned in chapter three, Daud Pakondongan 
Tangidau. from To Tana Lalong in Palopo confronted the owner Haj Musa and was accused of 
witchcraft following his death in 1997. 
162 Members of YBS Palopo suggested that the infamous 'Tommy' Suharto, son of 
former president 
Suharto, owns PT Kendari Tunggal. 
163 interview with Mahir Takaka from AMAN-SS on 17 February 2006. 
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sub-districts in North Luwu were affected by these floods, and that one family died 
after drinking water with high mercury content. 164 
Since 2002, all forestry concession holders are said to have ceased operations 
(Ngakan et al. 2005: 7). Prior to this, there were records of seven large-scale 
concessionaries based in North Luwu district, with joint control over approximately 
354,525 hectares of land. The cessation of productive operations in North Luwu is 
explained by the following facts: logging activities were not generating sufficient 
profits; concession holders were faced with increasing pressure from local 
communities (land contestations); and the district government introduced additional 
taxes and levies as well as using its newly devolved authority to impose greater 
accountability and restrictions on the productive and extractive sectors (Ngakan et al. 
2005: 7-8). 
Arriving at a time when productive activities were minimal, domestic NGOs 
began courting international donors in 1999 with the aim of fon-nulating a strategy for 
Seko and raising sufficient funds to implement this strategy. A new organisation 
called the Alliance of Customary Leaders of Sallombengan Seko (Persekutuan Dewan 
Pemangku Adat Sallombengan Seko or DPASS) was established to bolster local 
representation as well as to create a focal point for village activism. 165 Having an 
organisation with recognisable objectives and structures also presents international 
donors with a capable partner in the field. 
The first formal meeting held by DPASS and associates in Seko reportedly 
took place on 21 May 1999, in the village of Padang Balua, followed by a seminar in 
Bengke village on 18 January 2000.166 From this moment onwards, the revival of adat 
in Seko has been driven largely by organisations such as AMAN South Sulawesi, 
YBS Palopo, the Legal Aid Institute (LBH) Makassar branch, the organisation for 
Legal Revitalisation based on Social and Ecological Reform (HuMa) Jakarta, and 
164 Interview with Sahbuddin Umar of YBS Palopo on 27 February 2006. 
165 According to membership data obtained at the National Secretariat of AMAN in Jakarta on 23 
November 2005. The head of DPASS, Mr Jafar M., is also a member of YBS Palopo. 
166 According to the Draft Regional Regulation about 'Recognition of the Seko Customary Community 
and their Rights over Natural Resources, ' obtained at YBS Palopo on 
27 February 2006. 
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Bantaya Palu. 167 Mahir Takaka, the head of AMAN-SS, hails from Seko and makes 
frequent trips to his village of origin. The aim of these organisations is to secure 
official recognition of the existence of adat communities, providing a legitimate, 
legible platform from which to launch specific campaigns for land rights, resource 
entitlements,, and the return to antedated systems of customary government. 
Internationally, the UK government's Department for International 
Development (DflD) deployed a cadre of trustees from the Multi-stakeholder Forestry 
Programme (MFP) to work in Seko; the Ford Foundation has supported local partners 
such as HuMa; and the Support Office for Eastern Indonesia (SOMI), a multi-donor 
organisation funded mainly by the World Bank, has formed partnerships with 
indigenous rights activists from AMAN and YBS. 
Buoyed by the political transition of May 1998, the international donor 
community has been seeking out recipients for their well-endowed programmes in 
support of democratisation, human rights, community-based development, and 
sustainable environmental management in Indonesia. The Seko territories presented a 
clear opportunity for the convergence of all these campaigns under the umbrella of 
adat revivalism. 
International donors were therefore able to align their causes and channel 
resources towards an emerging political movement, one arising organically from the 
village to be spurred on (and reconfigured) in partnership with local, provincial and 
national NGOs. Representations are frequently made on behalf of vulnerable or 
aggrieved adat communities, those thought to be in need of protection from the 
encroachments of predatory state and business interests. 
Since 1998 there has been an "unprecedented ease of global 
communications, 119 allowing campaigners to "interact directly with their intended 
beneficiaries" (Henley and Davidson 2007: 6). Often the political ideals and struggles 
of such intended beneficiaries are shaped by their interactions with other actors, as 
167 Bantaya, (meaning roughly 'a place to meet' in Kaill) is an environmental and indigenous rights 
NGO from Palu, Central Sulawesi. Interview with Marce from Bantaya on 23 February 2006. 
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they are drawn to the "economic resources and media attention which it provides" 
(Henley and Davidson 2007: 6). 
Interaction with the global indigenous movement has been characterised as 
(coxymoronic" in the sense that adat communities such as those in Seko are being 
embraced under the umbrella of "cosmopolitan nativism" (Henley and Davidson 
2007: 6). Put another way, the practice of indigenous revival is "determined less by 
ancestry, culture, or marginality" than by "familiarity with international discourse and 
the politics of indigenous rights" (Henley and Davidson 2007: 6). Therefore, the 
ongoing construction of adat discourses, the selective accentuation of ethnicity, the 
patterns of political representation, and the prevalence of clientelism all challenge the 
authenticity of adat revivalism and related demands for recognition and rights. 
Observers have long challenged notions of exemplary communities "eternally 
fixed in some essentialised past" and constantly equated with "fixity and tradition" 
(Elmhirst 2001: 290). It is important, rather, to recognise the ways in which the local 
is "actively constructed, imagined and struggled over" (Li 2000: 152). Forms of 
political representation and particular local circumstances may determine the degree 
to which adat is perceived as genuine, superficial, ephemeral, popular, or politicised. 
While this is not a perfect science, the search for greater accuracy requires some 
acknowledgment that notions of antiquity, of golden ages, genealogies, kinships, 
ancestral bestowals, cultivation patterns, and vibrant oral traditions have some 
popular resonance. Not all customs and traditions in Seko are wholly invented, nor 
are all local communities simply imagined. Degrees of popular resonance are evident 
in Seko, although there are deliberate processes underway to capture and contain the 
politics of adat. 
From the outset,, therefore, the challenge has been to examine the ways in 
which discourses of adat are being framed and constructed over time in order to 
mobilise or domesticate local communities. In the context of decentralisation, 
discerning the patterns of political representation, atavism, clientelism, public 
participation, and the deployment of institutional power are all key to understanding 
the process of adat revivalism in Seko. One of the MFP benchmarks for success in 
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Seko was to ensure that their initiatives (political refon-n and ecological management) 
did not necessitate the erosion of the "unique character" of the adat communities, nor 
undermine their solidarity. 
Going Global: DflD and the Multi-stakeholder Forestry Programme 
In 2000 a bilateral agreement was signed between Indonesia and the United Kingdom 
allowing for the MFP to begin planning operations. The MFP was a UK government 
DfID initiative designated for a five-year period (2001-2006) in Indonesia with a 
budget of approximately f24 million. 168 The Indonesian archipelago covers some 193 
million hectares of land, of which approximately 60 per cent is under the nominal 
administrative control of the Ministry of Forestry (MFP 2006a: 2). Therefore from the 
outset MFP planners sought to ensure that their objectives were compatible with those 
of the Ministry (combating illegal logging, revitalising forest-based industries, 
conserving the natural habitat). 
In the Sulawesi regional branch, MFP headquarters was located in Kendari, 
the capital of Southeast Sulawesi province. It is estimated that between 1985 and 
1997 some 29 per cent (3,242,050 hectares) of forestland in Sulawesi was destroyed 
(MFP 2006b: 2). The devolution of authority to district-level government created an 
opportunity for local stakeholders to cooperate in slowing or even reversing this 
unsustainable trend. In procedural terms, the authority of a newly empowered, 
autonomous district covers the following: district government agencies, harbours, 
airfields9 residential zones, industrial zones, mining zones, plantation zones, forestry 
zones, tourist sites, highways, and related areas within a specific jurisdiction. 169 
District authorities are meant to exercise control over mining, plantations, 
fisheries and forests that fall within their administrative boundaries, which suggests 
that, in theory, they are to manage all concessions, contracts and licenses for the 
extraction of natural resources within their designated borders. However problems 
168 Interview with Anas Nikoia, regional facilitator of MFP-Sulawesi, on II March 2006. 
169 Government of Indonesia, Undang-Undang Nomor 2211999 tentang Pemerintahan Daerah. As 
stipulated in Article 119[ 11. 
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arise when district governments attempt to exercise real authority over resources and 
lands within their jurisdiction. 
Central ministries responsible for mining, fisheries and forestry, for instance, 
continue to operate under conditions where central planning is paramount and their 
jurisdiction extends throughout the archipelago. Decentralisation is therefore loosely 
interpreted as a process whereby district actors must only be notified of concessions, 
contracts and licenses issued from the centre and carried out in the periphery. 170 
Moreover, the granting of concession rights often transcends district boundaries, 
involving multiple district authorities in protracted negotiations. Mayors often rely on 
the advice or intervention of provincial authorities or even central ministries in order 
to resolve such disputes. 
District authorities continue to be wary of the central Ministry of Forestry, 
which has regained significant power and influence after years of extreme 
decentralisation. 171 Since the implementation of decentralisation, district authorities 
have attempted to exercise control over the issuance of small-scale concessions and 
commercial permits. 172 By contrast, all policies with a major impact on forestry 
development continue to be controlled by the central ministry; these include forest 
area designation, zoning, forestland conversion, and the granting of permits for large 
commercial concessions (Ngakan et al. 2005: 37). 
In some ways, any progress made in Seko is a welcome departure from the 
rigid centralisation of the past, when planning directives filtered down from Jakarta 
and forest-dependant communities were constantly excluded from deliberations over 
land use policy. 173 Conversely, policy advisors from CIFOR (Moeliono and Godwin 
2004) and the MFP have reservations about decentralisation, suggesting that the rate 
170 Interview with Anas Nikoia of MFP-Sulawesi on II March 2006. 
171 Interview with Anas Nikoia. As part of the devolution process, district government has been granted 
the authority to issue or revoke small-scale concessions. 
172 According to Ngakan et al. (2005: 37) small-scale concessions and commercial permits that are 
within the sphere of control of the district include Timber Utilisation Permits for Privately-Owned 
Land (IPKTM), Timer Utilisation Permits for Community Forests (IPKR), and Permits for Harvesting 
Non-Timber Forest Products (NTFPs). 
173 Interview with Anas Nikoia of MFP-Sulawesi on II March 2006. 
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of deforestation will only increase, reaching critical levels in the near future, if 
regional policy is not brought under control. 174 
The vices of irresponsible forest management, along with new fiscal and 
budgetary pressures faced by inexperienced district governments, are said to have 
precipitated the uncontrolled exploitation of forest resources (MFP 2006b: 2). The 
district Forestry Agency in North Luwu, for its part, has also expressed concerns 
about land use and management, suggesting that forest preservation cannot be 
handled by the government alone, but rather requires an integrated effort involving all 
stakeholders, from international donors to local communities. ' 75 
Initial efforts to promote broad political reforms in North Luwu, such as good 
governance and sustainable forest management, were not intended to delve into the 
complex realm of indigenous rights; however it quickly became apparent that these 
issues were inseparable. 176 MFP facilitators thus endorsed the revival of adat in Seko, 
focusing on the convergence of two key issues: sustainable forest management and 
indigenous rights, both of which required effective governance at the district level. It 
was determined that programmes could be instituted most effectively by working 
with the existing customary authorities. In villages where these authorities were found 
to have been "neutered" (Erb 2007: 263), particular emphasis was placed upon 
revitalising adat structures and institutions. Thus the finely tuned and selective 
deployment of history was encouraged in order to build working partnerships at the 
village level. 
In terms of building partnerships, prior to the arrival of the MFP local NGOs 
had little experience in formulating proposals or running programmes; rather, they 
often took directives from larger trustee NGOs in Jakarta and then fortned local 
committees to carry out these directives. 177 In order to reduce local dependency, MFP 
facilitators undertook a strategy of "cultivating" a new generation of independent 
174 Interview with Abdul Madjid Sallatu, Director of the Institute for Local Social Development, 
University of Hasanuddin, Makassar, on 14 February 2006. 
175 Interview with Sam Sumastomo, head of the Forestry Department, North Luwu district, on 22 April 
2006. 
176 Interview with Anas Nikoia on II March 2006. 
177 Interview with Anas Nikoia of MFP-Sulawesi on II March 2006. 
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activists capable of drafting their own project proposals, developing their own 
political concepts, and finding their own sources of funding. 178 
One way this transpires is through the imposition of models of economic 
rationality, making farmers out of peasants and cultivating a new generation of 
activists, which threatens to upend familial ties and divide the community. This is not 
the same as a repressive state apparatus implementing agrarian policies that 
disenfranchise rural communities; rather, it is more subtle and diffuse, and less 
coercive. Control in this sense is institutional, manifested through agenda setting 
(controlling actions, limiting choice, constraining behaviour, perpetuating power 
differentials). 
Here we are reminded of the analysis set out in chapter one, where 
institutional control depends on degrees of "patterned regularity" (Biersteker 
1992: 104) and "routinised behaviour" (Rosenau 1992: 7), achieved through national 
laws,, district regulations and local ordinances. International development agencies 
and donors such as the UK government's DflD play a key role in the categorising of 
actions and the shaping of subjectivities, for instance by intervening locally in order 
to dictate the framework and minutia of the development agenda. 
MTP facilitators not only encountered manipulation and misrepresentation at 
the village level, but also divergent and incompatible interpretations of land use. For 
instance, MFP's rationalising principles such as efficient forest management and 
conservation were often rejected by local adat communities. One solution was to 
undertake an exhaustive process of community consultation in Seko in order to satisfy 
detractors of the inclusiveness of local dialogue and the empowering potential of 
community-based forestry. 
Given that consensus within and between villages is rarely reached, the MFP's 
modernising language was often adopted by default, setting local agendas and 
forming the content of proposed regulations to be sent to district parliament for 
review. This was then endorsed by MFP's carefully selected local partners from YBS, 
AMAN-SS and DPASS, who form another level of trustees working to domesticate 
178 Interview with Anas Nikoia on II March 2006. 
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their village constituencies. Despite the best laid plans, however, the process of 
cultivating activists and shaping subjectivities (constructivism) in highly charged 
political settings is never guaranteed. This is particularly salient in cases such as 
Seko, where villagers are encouraged to mobilise around primordial notions of 
customary land rights and entitlements (pioneering cultivation, ancestral bestowal, 
bequeathed lands). 
According to members of AMAN Jakarta, following the passing of the 
framework decentralisation laws in 1999 local authorities responded to the changing 
political climate by encouraging association, participation, press freedoms, and multi- 
party negotiation. 179 This was particularly relevant in relation to the issuance of land 
concessions. However, it is important to question the extent to which these reforms 
were part of the asymmetric agenda setting and institutional control mentioned above. 
From the perspective of AMAN, the positive spin put on these reforms did not 
alleviate concerns about the impartiality of environmental impact assessments 
(AMDAL), or the reluctance of government to hold concessionaries to account for the 
adverse effects felt by forest-dependent communities. 180 
It is widely felt in AMAN that members of district government agencies, 
working in tandem with business interests (their supposed natural allies), were able to 
effectively ignore community concerns while maintaining the appearance of an 
inclusive, participatory process. 181 One method was to gather, cajole, or pay for 
signatures from villagers claiming to represent adat communities in contested areas. 
All such claims are difficult to verify, raising deeper questions about political 
representation. AMAN has established criteria for membership which are quite 
specific. Members of adat communities must live in accordance with the lifeways and 
traditions of their ancestors, located within an autonomous, customary law territory, 
179 Interview with Yuyun Indradi from the National Secretariat of AMAN in Jakarta on 23 November 
2005. 
180 Interview with Yuyun Indradi of AMAN on 23 November 2005. 
181 Interview with Emil Kleden, director of the National Secretariat of AMAN, on 23 November 2005. 
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exercising control over land, natural resources, governance, and social functions. 182 
However, these criteria are subject to constant renegotiation in the field. 
In order to "prove" that there was local support for their initiatives, whether 
proposed development projects, compensation packages, or the granting of forestry 
concessions, power brokers have reconstructed notions of indigenous identity and 
boundaries. Authorities responsible for approving proposals for the productive use of 
forests were thus able to bypass the actual communities that would be affected, and 
which were likely to raise objections. This has all the trappings of clientelism, where 
powerful patrons galvanise relatively weak or poor communities and forin factions 
which fight to gain privileged access to resources, contracts, and lucrative lands 
(Szeftel 2000: 430). 
Research has shown that the adat communities of North Luwu have a 
tendency to confuse official designations of land, in particular those concerning 
customary forests (Ngakan et al. 2005: 53). Where an "adat system" is recognised and 
adhered to, customary land ownership derives from the principle of first cultivation, 
passed on through a system of inheritance to each new generation, to be bought, sold 
or allocated accordingly. Customary land claims throughout Indonesia tend to be 
based on similar criteria, such as histories of forest utilisation, delineation of 
territorial borders, and evidence of ancestral links to the forest, usually in the form of 
customary regulations, lontard, ancient burial sites, plantations, and landmarks. 
However, these criteria for delineating territory and enforcing customary 
tenure are not recognised under state law. They are incompatible with Forestry Law 
Number 41/1999, for instance, which stipulates that customary forests are state lands 
that may be managed by the customary community, but this must not deviate from the 
official designation of the lands. 183 Therefore, if the forests had already been 
182 As defined on the AMAN National Secretariat membership form. 
183 Government of Indonesia, Undang- Undang Nomor 4111999 tentang Kehutanan. Chapter I Article 
1[6] defined 'customary forests' as state forests located in zones of customary jurisdiction; Chapter 2 
Article 5[2] states that 'customary forests' may be designated as such so long as they exist in reality 
and this existence is recognized. 
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designated as a conservation zone, then customary communities that have been 
granted managerial rights would be prohibited from selling or cultivating the land. 
It has been recommended by the joint research team led by CIFOR that, rather 
than struggle for the recognition of customary land ownership, which is legally 
ambiguous, the villagers of North Luwu should strive to have their forests "officially 
acknowledged as individually or collectively owned (hutan hak milik); this would 
allow them to manage the forests for either subsistence or commercial purposes" 
(Ngakan et al. 2005: 54). This recommendation was not received well in the sample 
villages surveyed in North Luwu. 184 
The following points of contention were raised: firstly, it was considered 
unfair that adat community members should be bound by formal property rights laws, 
the likes of which they had never been informed of or consulted over; secondly, forest 
boundaries were imposed by the state without village consultation, and were not 
clearly mapped; and finally, there is no fon-nal law that provides a reliable framework 
for allocating property rights to the poor (Ngakan et al. 2005: 54). 
One of the conclusions reached by researchers in North Luwu was the "urgent 
need to facilitate both parties (government and local communities) to promote more 
active consultation and collaboration on setting up a property rights regime for the 
future" (Ngakan et al. 2005: 54). With these critical challenges in mind, the main 
objectives behind all local MFP initiatives were to empower community actors, 
promote responsible forest cultivation the forests, combat poverty, and facilitate 
multi-party negotiations. 185 
It was determined from the outset that all stakeholders should engage in 
negotiations over the status of the customary territories of Seko, and that the most 
effective way to recognise these unique territories was through the formal regulatory 
process. This process was to be facilitated by Df[D through the MFP, and driven 
by 
the district government in collaboration with NGOs, focusing on participatory 
184 Collaborative research was conducted by CIFOR, UNHAS, ACIAR and DfID about customary 
land 
claims in Sepakat village and Sassa village, North 
Luwu district (Ngakan et al. 2005). 
185 Interview with Anas Nikola, regional facilitator for MFP-Sulawesi, on 
II March 2006. 
122 
community mapping, legal drafting, public forums, comprehensive community 
consultation, and timely dissemination. 
Cultivating Exemplars: The Seko Experience 
As stated in the MFP core objectives for the Seko initiative, all proposals must 
originate from the village and the forest-dependent communities of Seko must be the 
primary actors responsible for forest cultivation and management. 186 As the previous 
section indicated, these objectives are combined with efforts to cultivate new 
generations of local activists willing to subscribe to international discourses of forest 
management and rational entrepreneurialism. In order to bolster their reformist 
credentials and offset potential criticisms, MFP operators delegated the task of 
gauging local opinion through intensive consultation processes to YBS and DPASS. 
An initial workshop was held from 15-17 June 2001 in Padang Balua Village, 
Seko, with the aim of developing a strategy for customary resource management. 187 A 
comparative study was then arranged whereby volunteers from Seko travelled to the 
district of Lampung, South Sumatra, to visit communities already involved in drafting 
regulations concerning the recognition of adat. 188 
By the end of 2003 the MFP programme was well established, and citizens' 
forams, public dissemination workshops, seminars, and village consultations had 
become regular parts of daily life in Seko. Experts were often invited to consult H. A. 
Lutfi Mutty, the mayor of North Luwu, about the prospects for a regional regulation 
acknowledging adat law and land rights in the Seko domain. 
189 Consultation papers 
produced by AMAN-SS, YBS and DPASS were also delivered to the mayor's office 
detailing community expectations and anxieties, which had evolved significantly 
since NGOs started campaigning in Seko in 1999. 
186 Interview with Anas Nikoia of MFP-Sulawesi on II March 2006. 
187 According to the opening considerations of the Draft Regional Regulation entitled 'Recognition of 
the Seko Customary Domain and Rights over Natural Resources' provided by YBS Palopo on 27 
February 2006. 
188 Interview with Mahir Takaka from AMAN-SS on 17 February 2006. For more on the revival of 
adat in Lampung, South Sumatra, see Elmhirst (2001). 
189 Interview with Anas Nikoia of MFP-Sulawesi on II March 2006. 
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These consultation papers were based on years of fieldwork and thus reflect 
the emerging aspirations of the common villagers and peasants of Seko. 190 However, 
the political language used by NGOs to represent their intended beneficiaries is 
thoroughly modem, which suggests that testimony recorded in each village was 
collated and refined prior to being sent to the office of the mayor. It has been found 
that,, in similar cases from Central Sulawesi, NGOs often practiced a form of elitism 
by "monopolising public relations, publicity, and lobbying in relation to particular 
communities under their guidance, " practices which threaten to relegate their clients 
to a position of permanent dependency (Sangaji 2007: 330). 
Between 2001 and 2003 activists and researchers visited all twelve villages in 
Seko in order to avoid any accusation of exclusionary practise or elitism. 191 During 
these visitations, meetings were organised so that local adat leaders could participate 
in the drafting of proposals, the development of key concepts, the clarification (and 
construction) of community perceptions, and ultimately to approve of a draft version 
of the regulation to be presented to the district government. 192 
Despite these efforts, the time constraints and shortages of personnel meant 
that it would not have been possible to verify that the adat leaders participating in 
these meetings were genuinely representative of the wider community. Based on a 
degree of nominal consensus, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed 
by the mayor of North Luwu in 2003, confirming that the district parliament would 
begin negotiations towards the establishment of a regulation in recognition of adat. ' 93 
Official recognition of the customary domain of Seko, however, required more data 
and information about the different territories within Seko (geographic, political). In 
response, the associated members of YBS, DPASS, and AMAN-SS initiated three 
interrelated programmes in Seko: the first involved participatory mapping of the 
territories; the second provided legal training at the village level; and the third 
'90 Interview with Anas Nikoia of MFP-Sulawesi on II March 2006. 
191 Interview with Sahbuddin Umar of YBS Palopo on 27 February 2006. 
192 Interview with Anas Nikoia of MFP-Sulawesi on II March 2006. 
193 This would have been possible given the amount of time spent by YBS and AMAN-SS in Seko. 
Moreover, one member of AMAN-SS actually halls from Seko, and thus has intimate knowledge of 
the lands, customs, traditions, and the inhabitants of this customary domain. 
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facilitated the historical documentation of customs and traditions throughout the 
domain. 194 
Having worked towards the establishment of appropriate representative 
structures for each village in Seko, the next challenge was the training of community 
representatives for the participatory mapping of the Seko territories. This was a 
technique increasingly deployed by indigenous rights activists in the Philippines and 
Indonesia, and has become an integral part of AMAN-SS's regional strategy. 195 The 
aim is to clearly demarcate the customary boundaries of specific indigenous groups, 
within which they demand rights over land, resource entitlements, and the freedom to 
be governed in accordance with antedated systems true to their authentic heritage. 
Such training took place in Seko between March 2003 and March 2004.1 96 
Some villagers are now able to use the technical equipment necessary for 
participatory mapping, such as Global Positioning Systems (GPS), compasses, and 
meters. With limited resources and difficult terrain, the mapping of the nine adat 
territories of Seko required a collective effort. As a result, maps have been produced 
which can be used as negotiating tools, communities are now aware of the dimensions 
of their territories, and they have already started preserving their historical and 
cultural sites. 197 
As mentioned, these maps serve to bolster legal claims on a spatial basis, 
documenting the "presence of human agency, " and advancing the adat claim that 
"investments of labour confer enduring rights" (Li 2007: 339). However, it is argued 
that 6'any group can make adat maps of land and natural resources used by its 
members past and present, " though these are of little help to government agencies 
194 According to the document 'Final Program Report Program for Promoting Sustainable Resource 
Management by Adat Communities in the Seko Ecosystem' dated 20 December 2005, obtained at 
MFP Head Office in Kendari on 14 June 2006. 
195 For instance, delegates from Indonesia and the Philippines presented papers about land claims and 
resource entitlement in the 'ancestral domain' at the Regional Community Mapping Network 
Workshop held in Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines from 8-10 November 2004. 
196 According to the opening considerations of the Draft Regional Regulation entitled 'Recognition of 
Seko Customary Domain [ ... ]'provided 
by YBS Palopo on 27 February 2006. 
197 According to the document 'Final Program Report dated 20 December 2005, obtained at MFP 
Head Office in Kendari on 14 June 2006. 
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attempting to identify "which communities qualify for special adat rights protected by 
national law" (Li 2007: 340). 
The destructive legacy of the Darul Islam rebellion makes it difficult for 
activists and local communities to point out sites where their ancestors' homes once 
stood, and most of the remnants of ancestral villages in North LuwU have long since 
been overlain by secondary forest (Ngakan et al. 2005: 55). Moreover, where GPS 
technology has been correctly deployed, the findings may not support the claims 
being made by village leaders. In Masapi (next to Seko), for instance, adat claims for 
500 hectares, based mainly on local recollections of "natural borders" (rivers and 
mountains), were reduced to only 232 hectares after participatory community 
mapping efforts, and were found to be located within a larger zone designated as a 
non-forestry utilisation area according to pre-existing government maps (Ngakan et 
al. 2005: 56). 
To fulfil the MoU conditions, a phase of paralegal training was also 
undertaken at the village level. 198 MFP reports suggest that approximately 30 
community members benefited from this training, which bolstered their 
understanding of law and legislation, legal and administrative hierarchy, and policies 
that relate to the community-based forestry management. Specifically, there was said 
to be at least one contact person in each village that possessed some understanding of 
legal procedure. 199 
In order to consolidate local understandings of the legislative process, 
AMAN-SS, YBS,, and DPASS extended their training program to include legal 
drafting. 200 Members of the adat community were expected to be able to draft their 
own regulations reflecting the diverse interests of the community in a systematic way. 
The training was specialised, focused on regulations concerning natural resource 
management, land ownership and customary governance. 
Adat communities from neighbouring Rampi, the district of Mamuju in West 
Sulawesi province, and from Central Sulawesi province were invited to participate, 
198 According to the MFP document 'Final Program Report [ dated 20 December 2005. 
199 According to the MFP document 'Final Program Report [ dated 20 December 2005. 
200 According to the MFP document 'Final Program Report [ dated 20 December 2005. 
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and panels of experts with experience in the Philippines gave consultations on the 
drafting of regional regulations. 201 Once the community had been equipped with the 
necessary tools for negotiation, all stakeholders were gathered together to ensure that 
the drafting of regulations had a legitimate basis in local customary law. 
From 2003 onwards, there was a shift towards activities and initiatives that 
focused on the drafting of a specific regional regulation for the recognition of adat in 
the Seko domain. Through the broad political campaign for recognition, activists 
were hoping to ensure that local adat communities gained control over the lands and 
resources contained within their designated territories, while simultaneously working 
towards the reassertion of traditional systems of governance. 
From 2003-2004 advocacy networks engaged in lobbying and negotiations 
with the district goverm-nent in Masamba, managing to gain an audience with the 
mayor of North Luwu, H. A. Lutfi Mutty, who proved willing to negotiate. Mr. Mutty 
has gained a reputation as a reformer, positively embracing decentralisation and 
governing North Luwu district with competence. 202 As a testament to his popularity, 
he was re-elected for a second terin as mayor on 27 June 2005, gaining 47.2 per cent 
of the overall vote. 203 
Final consultations were held in 2004 in order to bring local communities 
towards consensus on the wording of a final draft regulation. Those working to 
facilitate each round of meetings did encounter some obstacles. For instance, not all 
of the communities in Seko were able to attend the meetings because of the difficult 
terram. and the lack of accessible roads,, meaning that communications were delayed 
204 and the recommendations were not reaching all concerned parties . 
Certainly there were also villagers that did not subscribe to this process and 
therefore refused to attend the consultations. Still, the communal fissures and fault 
lines emerging in Seko were not as damaging as those in Soroako (chapter six) or 
201 Interview with Mahir Takaka of AMAN-SS on 17 February 2006. 
202 Interview with Ryaas Rashid in Bandung on 25 January 2006. Mr Rashid was one of the framers of 
the original decentralisation laws in Indonesia, working as a minister under the Habibie administration 
in 1999. 
203 Data published by the General Elections Committee, South Sulawesi Province, on 29 July 2005. 
204 According to the MFP document 'Final Program Report [ ... ]' 
dated 20 December 2005. 
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Kajang (chapter seven), where major extractive companies operate. There were some 
troubling signs from the district government, as many officials on the MFP guest list 
did not attend the crucial rounds of community deliberations and thus were not 
willing to be subjected to questioning from local adat leaders. 205 Fortunately, the 
mayor of North Luwu was said to be accessible as well as receptive to the suggestions 
of the adat communities and their supporters. 206 
On 8 March 2004 a collective agreement was signed in Masamba by the head 
of DPASS (B. Usman), the Head of the District Assembly (Dr. H. A. Hasan) and the 
Mayor (Drs. H. A. Lutfi MUtty). 207 This agreement was intended to hold all parties to 
their commitments towards the drafting of a regional regulation about the 
'Recognition of the Rights of Seko Adat Communities over their Natural Resources'. 
Later in 2004, however, the mayor released an official statement to the effect that a 
regional regulation in recognition of Seko was inappropriate, for Seko was but one of 
the customary domains in North Luwu, existing alongside Rampi, Masapi and 
Rongkong. 208 
Prior to this,, officials from the National Land Agency in North Luwu had 
proposed a different policy for addressing customary land claims. According to 
reports, adat leaders from Masapi were informed that they could obtain official 
recognition of land ownership if they could "provide proof, or show the natural 
borders of the claimed areas" (Ngakan et al. 2005: 54). However, after sustained 
deliberation and debate, it was deemed highly inefficient for the district government 
to undertake separate legislative processes for each customary domain, let alone 
separate villages. Therefore, the mayor indicated that it was best to formulate one 
framework regulation for the whole of North Luwu, and then issue specific decrees in 
recognition of each customary domain in turn. 
209 
205 According to the MFP document 'Final Program Report [ ... ]' 
dated 20 December 2005. 
206 Interview with Mahir Takaka from AMAN-SS on 04 May 2006. Members of 
YBS and MFP also 
considered the mayor to be relatively professional and affable. 
207 According to a document titled 'Policy Dialogue with Seko Adat Communities 
in Masamba' 
provided by YBS Palopo on 27 February 2006. 
208 Interview with Mahir Takaka from AMAN-SS on 04 May 2006. 
209 Interview with Mahir Takaka from AMAN-SS on 04 May 2006. 
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After years of negotiation, Regulation Number 12/2004 about 'Empowering, 
Preserving and Developing Customs, Traditions and Customary Institutions' was 
promulgated by the mayor of North Luwu on 19 August 2004. This was followed by 
Mayoral Decree (Surat Keputusan Bupati) North Luwu Number 300/2004 about 
'Recognition of the Seko Customary Domain' in December 2004. The following 
section examines these regulations and the strategies for implementation proposed by 
NGOs with the support of the MFP. 
The Politics of Recognition 
Based on evidence from Central Sulawesi, Li (2007: 365) found that the process of 
recognising adat through district regulations, as stipulated in the autonomy 
legislation, captures "the contradictory conundrum of adat in contemporary 
Indonesia". Activists venture into remote districts in search of exemplars, natural and 
authentic systems of customary governance, yet they find adat in need of 
revitalisation so it can be aligned with contemporary political struggles (Li 2007: 365). 
In Seko, MFP facilitators intermingled with local activists M order to conduct 
a sustained campaign for the forestry management and the revival of adat through 
regulatory processes. Notions of adat were both revived in the primordial sense and 
reconstructed in the modernist sense. Members of AMAN-SS, YBS and DPASS, 
while concerned with preservation and continuity in Seko, have simultaneously 
engaged in a thoroughly modem political campaign. For instance, by undertaking the 
task of community mapping and the documentation of adat, it was expected that 
greater control over land and resources would be granted to villagers dependent on 
the forests for their livelihoods and identity. 
While the regulations in North Luwu reflected local realities without any 
reference to romantic authenticity, they fell short of the demands being made by the 
Seko communities and their support networks. As Table 4.1 below indicates, there are 
significant differences between the final draft proposal submitted by YBS on behalf 
of the Seko communities and the official regulations promulgated by the district 
government of North Luwu- 
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Table 4.1: Regulatory Comparison 
Proposed Regulation District Regulation Mayoral Decree 
[Draftl Number 12/2004 Number 300/2004 
'Recognition of the Seko 'Empowering, Preserving and 'Recognition of the Seko 
Customary Community and Developing Customs, Traditions Customary Domain' 
their Rights over Natural and Customary Institutions' 
Resources" 
Opening Considerations: Opening Considerations: Opening Considerations: 
(a) that the Seko customary (b) that in the lands of Luwu there (b) that in the lands of Seko 
community owns the territory exist customs, traditions and there are customs, traditions 
that is rich with natural customary institutions that, when and customary institutions 
resources, which is a blessing recognised by the community, can that, when recognised by the 
from God; grow and develop; Seko community, possess the 
ability to grow and develop in 
(f) that the district (c) that the district government a hereditary manner; 
government of North Luwu must establish a regulation for 
must recognise the Seko empowering, preserving and 
Customary Community and developing customs, traditions 
its rights over natural and customary institutions; 
resources; 
Chapter I Article 1[81 Omitted Chapter 1 Article 1[91 
The rights of the Seko No equivalent section or article The unwritten customary law 
customary community over of Seko is inherited and valid 
natural resources are in every customary territory 
hereditary rights for of Seko, and functions to 
authorising and managing regulate, bind, sanction, 
these resources both honour and defend the values 
communally and individually; of Seko; 
Chapter 2 Article 2 Chapter 4 Article 6[11 Chapter 2 Article 2 
The district government Customary communities [in North The district government 
recognises the Seko Luwu] have the right to inaugurate recognises the Seko 
customary community as a customary leaders [pemangku customary community as a 
community that possesses a adat], to establish customary community that possesses a 
customary legal system, regulations that do not contradict system of values, a system of 
customary institutions, and higher regulations, and to resolve customary law, and 
customary rights over natural customary disputes through customary institutions; 
resources; deliberation [musyawarah] 
Chapter 3 Article 10 Chapter 5 Article 9[41 Chapter 3 Article 10[a] 
Permission for the use of Regarding the granting of The granting of permission 
natural resources in the Seko permission by the government for for the use of, and benefit 
customary domain cannot be the management and use of state from, natural resources in the 
granted without the land and natural resources in the territory of Seko must 
have 
agreement of the Seko customary territories, local the agreement of the 
Seko 
customary community; customary organisations must be customary community; 
informed; 
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Table 4.1 indicates the key areas of divergence. The main difference is the 
removal of any indication that adat communities can claim ownership over the 
resources contained within their territories. Consistent reference is made in the final 
draft regulation approved of by Seko communities to the rights and ownership of 
lands and resources within their designated territories. However, in the official 
regulations all such references are omitted. Mayoral Decree Number 300/2004 
dealing specifically with Seko stipulates that the communities are entitled to govern 
in accordance with customary law; however, when it comes to land ownership and 
resource extraction,, the language contained in the decree is ambiguous. 
For critics of community forestry programmes such as the Seko initiative, 
these final regulations merely point to the futility of such endeavours, which allow 
activists to entertain the illusion that communities have regained control over their 
customary lands. It is held that programmes such as the MFP "do not address the 
basic issues of tenure, "' and communal stewardship or managerial rights granted 
through district regulations do not constitute "clear legal rights to own houses on state 
forestland, or cultivate crops, or even to exploit forest products" (Fitzpatrick 
2007: 141). Rather, the communities at the heart of such programmes "retain their 
status as (at best) revocable licence-holders, mere occupiers who rights depend on 
administrative discretion rather than clear legal definitions (Fitzpatrick 2007: 141). 
While these are legitimate criticisms, they are raised with the national context 
in mind, where legal ambiguity persists and central ministries resist change; however 
there is no mention of local forestry programmes with the level of commitment 
shown by the MFP, nor any cases cited where specific communities have been 
recognised in local ordinances. In Seko, local activists were not satisfied with their 
achievements, but rather took the promulgation of the two pieces of legislation as a 
platform for further rights-based struggles. 
Even if the Seko programme fails to find a solution to the highly complex 
dilemma over tenure and resource entitlement, it has introduced the progressive 
language of sustainable forest management, political participation, and ethnic 
tolerance into the remote villages of North Luwu. Moreover, it reflects many of the 
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principles of democratic decentralisation, such as participation, representation and 
empowerment. 
In the preamble to the draft regional regulation submitted by YBS, it is 
indicated that MFP objectives are considered to be compatible with the rediscovered 
customs of Seko. Perhaps the most significant aspect of the preamble is the guarantee 
that "non-members of the Seko community" will be "treated fairly, without 
discrimination or differentiation". This is important given the legacy of 
transmigration in the area, which began in the 1960s. There are many examples of 
strained, even violent relations between "indigenous" populations and transmigrant 
communities throughout eastern Indonesia, making this a highly contentious issue. 
Indeed, there are very few ethnically homogeneous regions of Indonesia. This 
is due to instances of spontaneous migration, as well as "social engineering projects" 
(transmigration, resettlement) carried out by the Indonesian state (Acciaioli 2001: 96). 
Observers have expressed concerns about adat revivalism becoming a "vehicle for 
mobilising people [that] sharpens distinctions between cultural insiders and outsiders, 
increasing the potential for horizontal conflict and violence" (Bourchier 2007: 124). 210 
Research in the Lindu Plain of Central Sulawesi has found that efforts to 
revitalise the customary order (concerning governance and land use) has elicited a 
hostile response Erorn the Bugis settlers (Acciaioli 200 1: 100). Observers from Lindu 
note with a "degree of terror" the similarities between their situation and that of Poso, 
where violent conflict erupted between long-settled Christians and recent Muslim 
migrants (Acciaioli 200 1: 100). 
In North Luwu district the population is approximately 467,191 (2003 
figures), some thirteen per cent of which are listed as transmigrants. 21 1 There is a 
significant presence of Javanese, Balinese and Buginese in North Luwu, and these 
communities tend to have more advanced farming techniques (drainage and pest 
"0 See, for instance, Avonius (2003) on tensions in Lombok; Davidson (2007) on Kalimantan; Duncan 
(2007) on Maluku; Elmhirst (2001) on Sumatra; and Erb (2007) on Flores. 
21 1 There are 59,650 transmigrants in North Luwu (thirteen per cent) based on population figures 
published by the Provincial Government of South Sulawesi, available at: 
http: //www. sulsel. go. id/wilayah/luwu-utara/ 
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control) allowing for better crop yields (Ngakan et al. 2005: 5). By contrast, it is 
reported that the indigenous people of North Luwu tend to reside in close proximity 
to the forests and gather forest produce (rattan or timber) to support their livelihoods, 
as well as managing fruit plantations for additional income during harvest season 
(Ngakan et al. 2005: 5). 
The pressures felt in Seko are similar to those in Lindu, where the adat 
communities have been working with NGOs in order to represent an environmentalist 
position that "interprets local custom as a community resource management system" 
(Acciaioli 2001: 99). In contrast to this positive framing, the Bugis migrants tend to 
interpret adat revivalism and discourses of local wisdom as cynical manoeuvres to 
offset their own comparative advantage in agrarian technique, and their pioneering 
entrepreneurialism through the imposition of restrictions on land use and ownership 
(Acciaioli 2001: 99). Given these inherent tensions and competing representations, it 
is important that efforts to improve communal relations in Seko continue. 
Beyond promoting pluralism within Seko, there were other key issues 
addressed by the MFP network as plans were established for the implementation of 
regulation 12/2004 and decree 300/2004. These issues included the revival of 
customary laws, regulations, and modes of governance; the enhancement of 
communications and public awareness campaigns; and finally, the consolidation of 
poverty reduction strategies. The following section provides an overview of the final 
recommendations made by all parties during MFP workshops, followed by an 
examination of the key issues and challenges. 
Implementation: Prospects and Challenges 
In 2005, the final year of the MFP, emphasis was placed on implementing the 
regulations in recognition of adat and continuing dialogue and negotiation between all 
local parties. YBS and DPASS began by organising a 'Planning Workshop for the 
Implementation of Adat Regulations, ' held in Masamba (the capital of North Luwu 
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212 district) in March 2005 
. All concerned parties were in attendance, including 
representatives from the Seko community, NGOs, the district government, and 
universities. This was followed by a final round of village deliberations held in Seko 
from 17-18 December 2005, in a programme called 'Promoting Sustainable Natural 
213 Resource Management by Adat Communities in the Seko Ecosystem' . 
During the Planning Workshop in March 2005, the district government was 
asked to provide a funding schedule for Seko (in support of capacity building and 
institutional development), as well as to verify that the concession rights of PT Seko 
214 Fajar and PT Kendari Tunggal had been terininated . All parties were expected to 
publish and circulate supplementary adat regulations that had been agreed upon in the 
villages, particularly those concerning the prohibition of hunting with firearms within 
the Seko territories, the clear-cutting of trees, slash and bum agriculture, and finally, 
unlicensed trade in village produce and rattan crafts 
Another demand was that access to the rainforests of Seko was to be 
prohibited without permission from the adat institutions. The procedural legitimacy of 
these village regulations derives from the newly promulgated district regulation and 
mayoral decree, and the underlying principle behind all of these proposals is that adat 
law takes precedence within the territorial borders of Seko. Substantively, however, it 
is doubtful whether implementation will have any real consequences. This strategy 
remains contingent on the ability of all parties to improve communications, work 
towards a collective agreement about natural resource management, devise a strategy 
to entice donors to the region, and finally clarify specific aspects of adat law and 
governance that were unique to each territory. 215 
Beyond the revival of adat law, there was much emphasis placed on poverty 
reduction in Seko, particularly through the sustainable management of profitable 
216 
primary products (mainly rattan) . It 
has been reported that (as of 2005) Sulawesi 
212 According to the MFP document 'Final Program Report [ ... ]' 
dated 20 December 2005. 
213 According to the document 'Narration Report: Process of Village Deliberations in Seko' dated 25 
December 2005, obtained at MFP Head Office in Kendari on 14 June 2006. 
214 According to the MFP document 'Final Program Report [ ... ]' 
dated 20 December 2005. 
215 According to the MFP document 'Narration Report [ ... ]' 
dated 25 December 2005. 
216 According to the MFP document 'Final Program Report [ ... ]' 
dated 20 December 2005. 
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supplied approximately 89 per cent of all rattan produced in Indonesia (Ngakan et al. 
2005: 41). Therefore, while the enhanced production of rattan crafts was expected to 
generate profits for local producers, deficient infrastructure complicated efforts to 
market their products outside of the Seko territories. Production was also limited as 
designs and product models lacked variation; the assistance provided by YBS and 
DPASS in the management and marketing of local produce (coffee, cocoa, rice) was 
equally inadequate. 
There have been some substantive developments such as the building of a 
library in Seko and the establishment of a community radio station called 
Sallombengan Seko Station. 217 While library resources are still limited (mainly 
covering agriculture), the building hosts the radio studio where the Voice of Seko 
program is broadcasted, and also serves as the secretariat of DPAS S. 218 The Voice of 
Seko helps inform audiences about the customary domain, particularly news about 
current campaigns, activities and agricultural products; however the broadcasting 
range is still very limited. Overall, it has been estimated that 90 per cent of the budget 
for all Seko initiatives was provided by the MFP. 219 
After years of intervention in Seko it was expected that, in the absence of 
external supporters, adat communities would be able to govern their territories in 
accordance with their own customs and traditions, enforcing prohibitions, imposing 
sanctions, and holding prospective investors to account. 220 According to reports, 
however, there was cause to doubt whether these expectations could be met. NGO 
advocates and activists allege that the district government still maintains its grip on 
power and officials arrogantly wield their influence in Seko. Moreover, the security 
apparatus has yet to respect adat law or community demands for autonomy and 
control over local affairs, as evidenced by their continued hunting with firearms in the 
Seko territories. 221 
217 Interview with Mahir Takaka and members of AMAN-SS on 17 February 2006. 
21 8 According to the document 'Final Program Report dated 20 December 2005, obtained at MFP 
Head Office in Kendari on 14 June 2006. 
219 Interview with Anas Nikoia of MFP-Sulawesi on II March 2006. 
220 According to the MFP document 'Final Program Report [ ... ]' 
dated 20 December 2005. 
221 Interview with Sahbuddin Umar and members of YBS Palopo on 27 February 2006. 
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Research has found that New Order efforts to standardise village 
administration seriously marginalised customary rule in North Luwu (Ngakan et al. 
2005: 55). As a policy of containment, the Suharto regime often granted official 
recognition to particular adat councils and leaders deemed trustworthy or non- 
threatening. Through the Ministry of Religion and the Ministry of Home Affairs, the 
regime also incorporated animist and syncretic religions into one of the state 
sanctioned monotheistic religions. Examples from South Sulawesi include the 
Council of Customary Leaders in Tana Toraja recognised in 1969 (Bigalke 
2005: 292), and the mystical Mukhdi Akbar movement of Selayar recognised as 
Hindu in the mid-1970s (Lucas and de Jong 2000: 587). In the 1980s the Department 
of Education and Culture promoted the architectural traditions of Kajang Dalam, 
Bulukumba district, whose adat communities are often held to be exemplars of pre- 
Islamic and pre-colonial Sulawesi (Robinson 1997: 8 1). 
Consistent with these offilcialising strategies, the role of adat leaders in North 
Luwu were limited to "overseeing social ceremonies" such as traditional marriages 
and religious occasions, and they "no longer had the authority to regulate the use of 
the forests in this area" (Ngakan et al. 2005: 55). While external intrusions certainly 
contributed to the cooptation and erosion of customary leadership structures and 
community lifeways, the impact of internal crises should not be downplayed. Based 
on reports and testimony from Seko there appears to be a crisis of identity within 
communities, leading to the abandonment of customary forest management practices, 
decline in collective land use and ownership with detrimental impacts on local 
livelihoods, and the desertion of customary laws and regulations. 
Despite the efforts of all MFP partners to reverse the legacy of the New Order 
in Seko, many of their initiatives and programmes have fallen short, for they have yet 
to generated consensus within the communities. 222 MFP reports show that some 
community representatives and participants in the final meetings and workshops of 
2005 were not committed to the decisions reached, thus obstructing the 
222 According to the MFP document 'Final Program Report [ ... ]' 
dated 20 December 2005. 
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implementation of pilot projects for a return to customary governance and the 
rationalisation of resource management. 
Conclusion 
All of the regulations concerning adat that have been passed in South Sulawesi since 
2000 include general statements about the need to 'empower, preserve and develop 
customs and traditions' at the district level. Using Gowa, Majene and Palopo as 
examples in chapter three, it was found that little or no public input went into the 
drafting of these regulations. Research in Central Sulawesi also came to the 
conclusion that such regulations failed to take into account local political realities (Li 
2007: 364). 
By contrast, the intemationally-driven processes in Seko broke with this trend 
by ensuring that members and representatives of adat communities were able to 
participate in negotiations and were consulted throughout. Having reviewed the 
relevant documentation on Seko and interviewed key informants, however, notions of 
representation, participation, stakeholders, and comprehensive village consultation 
appear somewhat facile and distorted. 
To ensure the actual customs and traditions being rediscovered in Seko were 
compatible with wider political campaigns for human rights and environmental 
preservation, support networks, facilitators and trustees in Seko were selective in their 
representations of adat. The target constituencies (local villagers) were often found to 
be indecisive, indifferent,, or sceptical; therefore, the donor-driven process of 
constructing exemplary adat communities, able and willing to manage the forestry 
sector, has been overstated. MFP regional facilitator (Anas Nikoian) admitted as 
much when he asserted that the programme should have been extended for another 
five years. 223 
223 Interview with Anas Nikoia of MFP-Sulawesi on II March 2006. Beyond this self-endorsement, 
Mahir Takaka from AMAN-SS, staff from MFP headquarters in Kendari, and Agung Wiyono from the 
NGO Lepmil in Kendari all agreed that the MFP should be extended. These actors are funded by MFP 
so it is natural that they would feel this way, although they also approved of the community initiatives, 
educational programmes, capacity-building forums, and village developmental schemes. Interviews 
were conducted in Kendari during the month of June 2006. 
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While local communities were encouraged to draw on the past in search of 
meaning and identity, the representation of adat and its articulation is contingent and 
constantly changing. Thus the protagonists involved in foregrounding and 
constructing local aspirations (cultivating a new generation in Seko) have drawn on 
primordial signifiers to support modem, reconfigured village units. This is a variant 
of Smith's (2004: 204) proposition that the accentuation of ethnicity (or adat 
revivalism) is not meant to "recreate the past in the present, " but rather to serve as an 
"inspiration and means for renewing decayed or fragmented societies, so as to make 
them viable and confident in the face of the pressures of modernity". 
Whereas local political realities were completely ignored in Donggala and 
Poso districts of Central Sulawesi (Li 2007: 364), they were actively recreated in Seko 
by MFP facilitators and their local partners. Reports and transcripts show only a small 
number of detractors vocally opposed to the reification of their cherished customs. 
For the most part, ordinary villagers tacitly accepted this process, silently rejected it, 
or made indifferent appearances during village consultations in order to sign 
attendance forms, endorse proposals, socialise, and enjoy a complementary meal. 
In North Luwu as well as Palopo (chapter three) the mayors have embraced 
narrow views of cultural revivalism, attempting to instrumentalise local rituals and 
bureaucratise adat governance. Stipulations regarding the ownership of customary 
lands and resources have been omitted Erom the official regulations, even if North 
Luwu went somewhat further than Palopo, Gowa and Majene. In some ways the 
mayor of Palopo's outright rejection of "adat as politics" is preferable to the half- 
truths being bandied about in North Luwu's legislature, where customary territories 
are recognised as autonomous but without any substantive rights enforceable by law. 
This brings the argument back to Li's (2007: 365) characterisation of the 
recognition process as a "contradictory conundrum". Activists venture into remote 
districts in search of exemplars, an oasis of harmonious, authentic systems of 
customary governance, yet they find adat in need of protection and revitalisation so it 
can be aligned with contemporary political struggles (Li 2007: 365). Having 
established a clear set of objectives that were compatible with those from the Ministry 
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of Forestry, MFP facilitators and their domestic partners (AMAN-SS and YBS) 
arrived in Seko with a predetermined social and political context within which their 
local clients could find areas of compatibility. Local adat identities and boundaries in 
Seko were thus subject to sustained periods of negotiation and reconstruction. 
Through the MFP, the UK government's Df[D played a key role in 
representing local communities,, perpetuating institutional control, categorising 
actions and shaping subjectivities. This was achieved by negotiated access, 
intervening in Seko with a legitimate (government approved) mandate for reform and 
a viable operating budget in order to "cultivate" a new class of local activists, those 
capable of instituting rational frameworks for development and optimal forest 
management. 
The Seko initiatives seem to have tempered and domesticated adat revivalism 
through the quaint, gradual, donor-friendly processes of deliberation and negotiation. 
Instead of focusing on the practicalities of customary rights or devising new strategies 
in order to rupture the web of governance, activists and local communities have fallen 
back into the shackles of "elegant policy" (Lev 1985: 64) as witnessed through the 
promulgation of several redundant district regulations in recognition of an elusive, 
intangible, apolitical adat. 
While the seemingly benevolent agents of change and their benefactors in 
Seko negotiate and compromise over the status of adat, millions of rural citizens 
continue to face restrictions in their use of the forests, and concession rights continue 
to be granted "without any legal requirement to compensate or consult with affected 
local communities" (Fitzpatrick 2007: 138). The granting of semi-formal land use 
rights by district officials in North Luwu does not constitute an adequate solution to 
the wider problems of community dispossession in eastern Indonesia,, particularly the 
"right of control" principle that favours the state in national law and forestry 
department policy (Fitzpatrick 2007: 138). 
As in the cases of Gowa, Majene and Palopo, the process of adat revivalism in 
Seko was largely captured by bureaucrats and channelled into the patterned regularity 
of the state. Many local MFP partners were found to have willingly subscribed to this 
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officialising surrogacy, just as many local activists and villagers did so unwittingly. 
However, if the intermingling of an international donor project with Seko's 
indigenous awakening forges a lasting and effective partnership, helping to preserve 
and manage North Luwu's vulnerable ecosystem and improve livelihoods, then for 
many this would be a legitimate and justified outcome regardless of the 
misrepresentations and distortions along the way. 
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Chapter Five: Lembang Governance in Tana Toraja 
Along with a surge in violent incidents of land reclaiming, the passing of Indonesia's 
framework decentralisation laws in 1999 led to struggles for recognition and a desire 
to return to antedated systems of customary governance throughout the archipelago. 
These systems are distinguished by, among other things, nuanced adat procedures and 
criteria for electing leaders, reverence for nature, emphasis on the guiding role of 
local wisdom in decision-making, as well as stipulations about communal relations, 
land distribution, and the conduct of villagers within a specific customary domain. 
Building on the politics of recognition analysed previously, this chapter 
examines adat revivalism in Tana Toraja district, with particular emphasis on the 
return to the lembang. The term lembang denotes the antedated (pre-modem, pre- 
colonial) political units originating in the south of Tana Toraja, which now apply to 
all of the customary territories within the modem administrative grid (Rombelayuk 
nd). Tana Toraja district, covering some 3,000 square kilometres, has a population of 
about 400,000 and borders Luwu (Roth 2005: 489). It is known for some of 
Sulawesi's most dramatic landscapes and extensive rice terraces, along with elaborate 
funeral processions, sweet tuak (palm wines), ornate tongkonan (customary long- 
houses), and antiquated, hierarchical caste systems (Adams 2003; Bigalke 2005; 
Waterson 1986). 
In contrast with the elaborate Buginese and Makassarese kingdoms, the Toraja 
"never formed a single centralised political unit" (Adams 1998: 330). In 1906, Dutch 
officials recognised 32 distinct customary lembang territories, within which there 
were hundreds village units (also known as lembang), and these administrative 
arrangements were maintained throughout several periods of transition and intrusion 
(Bigalke 2005: 12). It is commonly held amongst scholars from Hasanuddin 
University Makassar that the number of lembang territories (32) was an arbitrary 
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deten-nination made by Dutch colonial officials more concerned with legibility and 
control than with authenticity. 224 
As in Seko (chapter four), the establishment of a Mayoral Decree (number 
222/IV2005 dated 5 February 2005) in Tana Toraja constitutes an advancement, a 
progression beyond the replicated regulations that fail to reflect local political 
realities throughout Sulawesi. Since 2005,, the existence of 32 adat territories in Tana 
Toraja has been officially recognised, within which there are approximately 984 
225 Lembang (villages) 
. The most obvious contradiction is that these apparently innate, 
fluid political units were first frozen by Dutch administrators in the search for 
regularity and rationalised governance, and they continue to conforin to Dutch 
colonial designs. 
As stated in chapter one, coercive deployments of state power to eradicate the 
threat posed by autochthonous societies are less effective than diffuse, institutional 
methods of incorporation and domestication. This is particularly true in the reform era 
(post 1998) of democratisation and regional autonomy. Therefore, this chapter re- 
examines the constitutive political order and the ways in which adat revivalism is 
domesticated and contained through subtle institutional processes, regulatory 
procedures, and village deliberation. 
When considering the "returning to the lembang" in Tana Toraja, one must 
critically engage with the view that these are innate units of political and social order, 
within which primordial attachments and indigenous sensitivities are exemplified. 
Indeed, one must consider the strong instrumentalist tendencies associated with adat 
revivalism in general, and the interests and perceptions of local Torajan actors in 
particular. 
During the New Order era (1966-1998) the official strategy was to 
"inventorise, '" 44categorise, " and "classify" local customs and traditions in Sulawesi 
and other eastern islands (Robinson 1997: 72). In 2001, members of the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) converged 
224 Interview with Dias Pradadimara at UNHAS in Makassar on 03 February 2006. 
225 District Government of Tana Toraj a, Keputusan Bupati Tana Toraja Nomor 22211112005 tentang 
Pengakuan Keberaddan Masyarakat Adat Toraya, Article 4. 
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upon Tana Toraja district in South Sulawesi to determine whether its idyllic villages 
qualified as a World Heritage Site (Adams 2003: 92). UNESCO attendees were 
strongly oriented towards preservation, warning of the assault upon Toraja's 
traditions by modernising, global influences (Adams 2003: 92). 
In periods of rapid social and political change, some aspects of tradition 
disappear, while other aspects are accentuated and selectively recombined with new 
and powerful meanings (Schefold 1998: 261). The recent campaign for a return to the 
lembang therefore involves the accentuation of Torajan identity, along with 
politicised representations and reconstructions, and the redefining of cultural features, 
group attachments, and the demarcation of political boundaries. As the case of Seko 
(chapter four) demonstrated, this process is fraught with dilemmas and contestations. 
Adams (2003: 93) provides valuable insights into the "politics of heritage" in 
Tana Toraja, where living cultural landscapes become politically charged arenas. 
Writing in the context of UNECSO and world heritage, Adams (2003: 93) 
encapsulates the politicisation of Torajan culture, a process which is held to be 
(Traught with calculation and collusion, conflict, collaboration, and co-optation". 
Similarly, Schefold (1998: 276) contrasts between patronising strategies for the 
promotion of moralistic, pious, politically correct, aesthetic and tourist-friendly 
versions of adat on the one hand, and atavistic, oppositional, rights-based 
deployments of adat on the other. 
The folkloric domestication of adat has been labelled a "rapprochement" in 
the sense that the showcasing of public rituals has been encouraged while the 
"decisive questions of public life have been removed Erom ethnic responsibility" and 
have been "entrusted to the state" (Schefold 1998: 277). With these challenges in 
mind, this chapter serves to examine recent efforts in Tana Toraja to reclaim political 
responsibility in the name of adat, again focusing on the struggle for recognition and 
rights. The conservationist, domesticating tendencies of state agencies, heritage 
foundations, and the tourism industry will be contrasted with the seemingly 
innovative roles of donors, NGOs, and adat leaders collaborating in the formulation 
of an oppositional political agenda. 
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Origins of Adat Revivalism 
Toraja, a name derived from the Bugis to (people) and ri-aja (from above), was first 
applied to the inhabitants of the Sa'dan highlands by Makassarese invaders in the 
226 seventeenth century (Bigalke 2005: 6) . Throughout the nineteenth century 
intermarriage and the solidification of military, trade (coffee, arms) and slaving 
alliances greatly increased the contact between the Luwu Kingdom and their 
tributaries in the Sa'dan highlands (Roth 2005: 491). Emulation was most apparent 
amongst the ruling elites of Sa'dan, who strove to learn the Bugis language and 
develop certain aspects of Luwu's political culture (Bigalke 2005: 34). 
Given the tendency of contemporary adat revivalists to use term Toraja as a 
"badge of ethnic identity, " it is important to provide some historical context (Bigalke 
2005: 7). No highland group actually called themselves Toraja before the twentieth 
century, and it was the proselytising of two Dutch missionaries (Kruyt and Adriani) 
from 1892 onwards that popularised the term Toraja. 
In 1905 Luwu was incorporated into the colonial empire "as a division of the 
Government of Celebes and Dependencies under a Dutch assistant-resident" (Roth 
2005: 491). Subsequent colonial policies of territorial delineation and the redrawing of 
boundaries in an effort to consolidate political control were "quite alien to either 
Luwu or Torajan views of their worlds" (Bigalke 2005: 66). While the indigenous 
structures of governance in Toraja are said to be "informed by genealogy, " Dutch 
organisation was territorial in conception, seeking to control the people by controlling 
the land (Bigalke 2005: 67). 
Cultural and geographical surveys conducted from 1907-1910 led to the 
creation of administrative borders within Toraja; for the first time there were efforts 
to disaggregate what colonial officials viewed as an "undifferentiated mass" of 
highland communities (Bigalke 2005: 66). Despite evidence to the contrary, the Dutch 
assumed Sa'dan highland submission to Luwu, and subsequently incorporated the 
highlands into Luwu- By doing so, it is held that the Dutch had "frozen dynamic and 
226 See Bigalke (2005) for a comprehensive account of history and society in Tana Toraja. 
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shifting political relations into fixed territoriality based administrative units" (Roth 
2005: 492). 
Colonial expansion (rounding out the empire) required direct administration 
and taxation, enhanced productivity through wet-rice cultivation, rationalisation of 
policing and governance, social engineering and the penetration of missionaries, and 
finally, road construction and the consolidation of villages into larger political units 
(Bigalke 2005: 68). From 1910 onwards Calvinist missionaries were engaged in 
proselytising activities (Adams 1998: 330). Throughout this expansionary period, a 
"pre-emptive strategy of Christianisation" was undertaken in the Sa'dan highlands as 
missionaries were entrusted with the task of creating a "buffer against Islam" (Roth 
2005: 493). At the forefront of this movement was the Association of Dutch Reformed 
Mission (GZB), which sought to Christianise the highlands in systematic ways, yet 
found it difficult to subdue Torajan customs and traditions (Ngelow 2004: 5). 227 
From the 1940s onwards, relations between Luwu and Tana Toraja had 
become increasingly strained as a result of Torajan migratory expansion into lowland 
Luwu, religious differences, power differentials, and the Toraja Raya (Greater Toraja) 
movement (Roth 2005: 511). By 1959 Luwu and Tana Toraja had been divided into 
two autonomous districts (Roth 2005: 502). 228 
Prior to the arrest of Indonesia's first president, Sukarno, in 1965, the 
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) was rapidly gaining popularity throughout the 
archipelago. It is alleged that in lembang Madandan (village), some 80 per cent of the 
population were nominal "communists" prior to 1965.229 It was not the ideology that 
attracted such support, but rather notions of redistribution and communal agrarianism. 
Local discontent was fuelled by government reforestation programmes that were used 
"' See Bigalke (1984) for a detailed account of missionaries in Tana Toraja. 
228 Roth (2005: 502) refers to unpublished sources found in the National Archives of Makassar. Based 
on these sources Tana Toraj a was separated from Luwu in accordance with Emergency Act 
Number 
3/1957. This Act was later replaced by Law 29/1959 which established Luwu and Tana Tora a as two 
distinct, autonomous districts. 
229 Interview with Lasso Sombolinggi, head of WALDA, in Lembang Madandan, Tana Toraja, on 
04 
March 2006. 
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as an official justification for continual land seizures causing displacement and 
undermining local livelihoods. 230 
The political transition of 1965-1966 involved a phase of "communist purges" 
that claimed as many as 500,000 lives across the archipelago (Collins 2002: 598). The 
village head of Madandan at the time (Lasso Sombolinggi) reacted quickly to avoid a 
local catastrophe by couching their political struggles in indigenous agrarian terms 
and dropping the communist affiliations. 231 While these manoeuvres may have 
prevented the communist purges from claiming any lives in Tana Toraja, a constant 
military presence was maintained in the district. 232 
The fall of communism allowed for the revival of the aristocratic Torajan 
elite, who embarked upon a modernist campaign for the return to the Aluk Todolo by 
"creating a new organisational vehicle which was powered by patronage and 
recognition from Jakarta" (Bigalke 2005: 292). In league with powerful members of 
Golkar, as well as the Ministry of Religion and the Ministry of Home Affairs, well- 
educated Torajan elites and ritual specialists formed the Customary Council of 
Leaders (Dewan Pimpinan Parandangan Ada' or DPPA). By 1969 the Indonesian 
government had recognised the animist Torajan Aluk Todolo as an official religion 
(Adams 1993: 56). 233 
In the aftermath of the Darul Islam rebellions (1953-1965) and the communist 
purges (1965-1966), a period of relative stability beginning in the 1970s brought a 
new wave of tourism to the highlands of Tana Toraja. Seizing the opportunity to 
"reinvigorate" local heritage, Torajan leaders impressed a delegation from the Pacific 
Asia Travel Association (PATA), which promoted the region as a "pristine and 
fascinating destination" (Adams 2003: 97). 
230 Interview with Lasso Sombolinggi in Lembang Madandan on 04 March 2006. 
231 Interview with Lasso Sombolinggi on 04 March 2006. See Taslim (2007) for more information. 
232 Interview with Lasso Sombolinggi on 04 March 2006. According to Bigalke (2005: 268) it is hard to 
imagine that no spontaneous killings broke out in Tana Toraja during the communist purges, however 
his informants were unanimous in their claims that people were beaten and arrested, but not executed. 
233 Bigalke (2005: 292) recounts that the New Order regime legitimised the DPAA by classifying Aluk 
Todolo as a sect of Hinduism, one of the world religions recognised by the state. 
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From the 1980s onwards the official promotion, listing, and codification of 
adat in Sulawesi was led by the Department of Education and Culture, which 
established "authorised versions of what constitutes authentic cultural traditions" 
(Robinson 1997: 72). By 1991, officially branded as "Visit Indonesia Year, " there 
were reportedly 215,000 tourists converging upon Tana Toraja, 40,000 of which were 
foreign tourists (Yamashita 1994: 78). 
UNESCO representatives, cultural tourists, architects, anthropologists and 
historians alike are drawn to the rich tapestry of customs and traditions that shape the 
lives of those residing in the Torajan highlands. Elaborate funeral ceremonies are still 
a major feature of Tana Toraja, as are the rituals surrounding harvests, the building of 
homes, and weddings. Visitors continue to be awed by "cliffside graves replete with 
haunting effigies of the dead, " which display "ancestral skulls, weathered wooden 
effigies [ ... 
], carved sarcophagi, and more recently erected ornate cement tombs" 
(Adams 2003: 94). 234 
While authorised and domesticated versions of adat were being sought after 
by central government officials, tourist agencies (PATA), and heritage foundations 
(UNESCO), activists led by Lasso Sombolinggi and Den Upa Rombelayuk from 
Madandan began to quietly reconstruct and accentuate political concepts such as 
kombongan. The kombongan has traditionally been relied upon as a community 
decision-making mechanism, though it can also serve political interests and 
agendas. 235 By implication, the gradual transition towards an oppositional, politicised 
agenda based on indigenous discourses began in lembang Madandan. 
In contrast to the conservative, elitist revival led by the DPPA and supported 
by Golkar officials and ministers, a new movement was launched in the 1970s in the 
Madandan territory of Tana Toraja called Gerakan Tallu Lolona (meaning the three 
elements-humans,, animals, and crops), focusing on the local ecosystem and natural 
234 For a rich account of Toraj an burials and rituals, see Waterson (1995); 
for kinship, see Waterson 
(1986). 
235 Sandarupa (2000: 40) defined kombongan as "public meetings" involving elders and adat chiefs that 
had traditionally been used to resolve ritualistic matters. 
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resource management. 236 The early leaders of grassroots adat revivalism in Tana 
Toraja were attempting to reconcile the traditional and the modem, articulating 
political themes that were relevant locally and also resonated with international donor 
agendas. Thus the thinly veneered "folklorist faqade" of aesthetically pleasing, non- 
threatening, "showcased" versions of indigenism were being challenged by politically 
sophisticated actors in Madandan from an early stage (Erb 2007; Schefold 1998). 
By 1986, a new organisation called Wahana Lestari Persada (WALDA) was 
established in order to consolidate the struggle for community land rights and the 
promotion of local awareness. 237 New Order policies were in their advanced stages 
and land seizures had become a frequent occurrence, justified in official terms as a 
crucial component of government "reforestation programmes". 238 Local opposition 
and resistance arose as a result of the failure of the government to inform the 
communities of their intentions prior to the initiation of such programmes, which 
were meant to conceal the seizure and conversion of productive, arable lands into 
profitable plantations (Arabica coffee being the most lucrative cash crop). 
Bolstered by the support of the Canadian International Development Agency 
(CIDA), WALDA was able to bring a series of land claims to the district courts in the 
early 1980s. These collaborative legal efforts reportedly secured 114 land certificates 
for local families based on their adat rights. 239 Beyond struggles for land ownership 
and legal title, there was an urgent need to address issues of land usage and 
cultivation techniques. In order to devise a long-term strategy, members of WALDA 
sought to expand their support network beyond CIDA by involving the Indonesian 
Research and Education Institute (Lembaga Ilmu Penelitian Indonesia or LIPI) in 
their local affairs. 240 
236 Interview with Lasso Sombolinggi in Lembang Madandan on 04 March 2006. 
237 Interview with Den Upa Rombelayuk in Madandan on 23 February 2006. 
238 Interview with Den Upa Rombelayuk in Madandan on 23 February 2006. 
239 Interview with Lasso Sombolinggi on 04 March 2006. CIDA provided the legal 
fees for these cases, 
which only amounted to some five million rupiah; however most of the 
CIDA development budget 
was used for irrigation and water purification in Tana Toraj a. 
240 Interview with Lasso Sombolinggi on 04 March 2006. 
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The vision for Tana Toraja that emerged in the late 1980s revolved around 
five progressive principles: support for isolated groups; reduction of community 
dependency; autonomy; ecology; and finally, the promotion of culture and 
241 traditions . Beyond these localised projects, Tana Toraja was rapidly swept up in the 
national awakenings led by indigenous leaders in the 1990s. As mentioned 
previously, Madandan became the site for covert meetings between regional leaders 
from throughout the archipelago, documented by Moniaga (2007) and SangaJi (2007). 
As a precursor to the first Congress of Indigenous Peoples of the Archipelago 
(KMAN 1) in 1999, the formation of the JAPHAMA network provided a foundation 
for adat revivalism based on an amalgam of interests and interpretations. As Schefold 
(1998: 261) noted, when political interests are involved, customs and traditions tend to 
be selectively accentuated to serve particular goals. As such, pristine authenticity 
merges with modem constructivism to form a national platfon-n for the revival of 
adat. 
It is held that "essentialist images of 'the Toraja' as a 'tribal minority' in a 
distinct geographical space with clearly demarcated boundaries" are inappropriate; 
rather, the more accurate approaches "focus on conceptions of identity as socially 
constructed" (Roth 2005: 511). The structures of lembang governance and boundaries 
of lembang territories are largely colonial constructions, influenced first by the close 
proximity to the Kingdom of Luwu, and then by the imposition of Dutch 
administrative reforms after 1906. Historical challenges to the authenticity and 
legitimacy of the lembang are mirrored in the contemporary challenges facing district 
authorities in Tana Toraja, particularly the need to avert local conflicts that may arise 
within multi-ethnic communities that do not share the same adat. 
Observers have with increasing proclivity questioned the wisdom of trying to 
recreate antedated structures for governance, with much speculation directed towards 
the social implications this may have (Acciaioli 2001: 88). It is easy, for instance, to 
bemoan the revival of adat when it leads to rigidly hierarchical social structures, 
241 Interview with Lasso Sombolinggi on 04 March 2006. 
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chauvinistic attitudes, and exclusionary tendencies. 242 Long-standing patterns of 
social hierarchy tend to characterise relations in Tana Toraja's lembang, which are 
based on "age, descent, occupation, and wealth" (Adams 1993: 56). Torajan society is 
divided by a tiered class system, within which there are distinct social categories 
based on status and function, from the nobility downwards to the dependent (or slave) 
class. 243 
By contrast, there is a slightly less cynical view that links the revival of adat to 
matters of local pride, identity, symbolism, and community renewal; however this is 
tempered by assertions that the lembang system of government, exemplified and 
essentialised in Tana Toraja, is in fact very similar to the desa. 244 Some local scholars 
feel that an authentic version of the lembang can never be revitalised (Nomba et al. 
2002). For instance, it is argued that there is no singular version of a customary 
system of governance in Tana Toraja; rather, the old dominant systems of belief 
based on Aluk Todolo (animism) have been eroded by centuries of external 
interventions (warring kingdoms, colonial administration, missionary work, regional 
245 rebellion,, transmigration) . Others consider the return to the 
lembang to be a matter 
of symbol rather than substance, differing from the Javanese desa system only in 
name, and serving mainly to preserve the traditional authority of the noble class. 246 
Therefore, while there has been no overt public opposition to the return to the 
lembang, there is a wide array of divergence when it comes to the features of the 
lembang system, and the issue of the status of ethnic minorities has yet to be clarified. 
According to the deputy mayor of Tana Toraja, the only solution in diverse localities 
such as the tourist destination of Rantepao, which is host to large numbers of Bugis 
242 See Bigalke (2005: 8-10) for a rich account of society and class in Tana Toraj a, including the 
"ascriptive bloodline criteria" used to determine status as well as the "spiritual appreciation" of wealth. 
See Morrell (2001: 440) for more on the contemporary "manipulation of ritual and belief' and the 
challenges to dominant power structures in Tana Toraja, including tourism and out-migration. 
243 Interview with Paulus Tangke, deputy head of the People's Legislative Assembly, on 28 February 
2006. While slavery has long been abolished in Tana Toraja, the title (or social category) remains. 
244 Interview with Dias Pradadimara, historian at the University of Hassanudin, in Makassar on 03 
February 2006. 
245 Interview the head of the Village Governance Agency in Makale on 03 March 2006. 
246 Interview with Emil Kleden from the national secretariat of AMAN on 03 January 2006. 
Individuals hailing from nobility tend to have the title Andi. 
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and Makassarese transmigrants, is to use generics title such as kampung or kelurahan. 
rather than the Torajan-specific lembang. 247 With these challenges in mind, the 
following section sketches the processes of adat revivalism, particularly the return to 
the lembang. 
Regulation 2/2001 on Lembang Governance 
In March 1999 KMAN I was held in Jakarta, followed by a Congress of the 
Indigenous People's Alliance of Toraj a (Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Toraya or AMAT) 
in Makale in April 1999, and finally the establishment of the decentralisation laws in 
May 1999. The euphoria of political transition was clearly at its peak, prompting local 
activists to organise periodic "dissemination workshops" in Tana Toraja with the aim 
of improving local awareness about the major initiatives and reforms taking place 
throughout Indonesia. 248 
These preliminary workshops were held between April and July 1999 at the 
Gedung Wanita building in Makale, the district capital of Tana Toraja, often attended 
by as many as 300 representatives from all 32 lembang territories. In an effort to 
consolidate their positions, a temporary coordinator was appointed to engage in multi- 
party negotiations, as well as gather community input about the revival of antedated 
249 systems of government (the return to the lembang) . 
By the end of 2000 there had also been a series of workshops organised by the 
mayor and the district representative council, with the aim of drafting a regulation 
regarding village participation and the return to the lembang. 250 The prospect of a 
regional regulation allowing for a return to the lembang prompted local activists to 
extend their support networks and build partnerships in order to enhance the legal 
drafting process. 
247 Interview with Palino Popang, the deputy mayor of Tana Toraja, on 22 February 2006. 
248 Based on transcripts from the 'Workshop for Comparative Study of the Regulatory Process' held in 
Lembang Madandan, Tana Toraj a, from 21-23 February 2006. 
249 Based on transcripts from the 'Workshop for Comparative Study of the Regulatory Process, ' 21-23 
February 2006. 
250 According to the document 'Forum for Lembang Autonomy' provided by the head of the 
Indigenous People's Alliance of Toraja (AMAT) in Makale on 28 February 2006. 
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Starting in February 2001 a partnership was forged between the Consortium 
for Agrarian Reform (KPA)-a network of Indonesian NGOs promoting agrarian and 
natural resource rights-and WALDA Tana Toraja (Fauzi and Zakaria 2002: 9). The 
primary objective was to establish capacity-building programmes throughout 
Indonesia, as well as facilitate training initiatives in support of good governance and 
community-driven development. Beyond this, there were specific programmes 
undertaken in each of the districts selected by the Consortium; in Tana Toraja, three 
core activities were undertaken, including social forestry, sustainable agriculture, and 
cultural revival (Fauzi and Zakaria 2002: 10). 
In relation to cultural revival, the KPA sought to facilitate district negotiations 
between all relevant stakeholders, as well as sponsor training sessions to build 
administrative and legislative capacity at the district level (Fauzi and Zakaria 
2002: 19). KPA reports suggest that "there was an enthusiastic response to the 
possibility of restoring traditional forms and roles of local government" (Fauzi and 
Zakaria 2002: 13). Moreover, there was potential for a restoration of grassroots, 
community-driven democracy and development; however, in order for this to be 
realised, "new regional regulations were required" (Fauzi and Zakaria 2002: 13). 
It has been reported that the results of the Makale workshops of 1999, the 
mayor 9s workshops of 2000, and the joint KPA-WALHI initiatives of 2001 led to 
specific proposals for the regulation concerning lembang governance. 251 These 
proposals were not unanimously approved of, though by 11 April 2001 the mayor had 
endorsed the promulgation of District Regulation Number 2/2001 about Lembang 
Governance. District authorities in Tana Toraja thus became the first in South 
Sulawesi to respond to the decentralisation laws, promulgating a regulation in 
recognition of an antedated system of customary governance. 
Regulation 2/2001 allowing for the return to the lembang has come under 
significant criticism because certain stipulations were found to be in derogation of 
25 1 According to the AMAT document 'Forum for Lembang Autonomy' obtained on 28 February 
2006. 
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higher laws. 252 Moreover,, it is held that the community was not properly consulted 
during the deliberative process, and that the conduct of members of the district 
representative council was dismissive and hasty, failing to heed the warnings of 
several adat leaders that the legal drafting and dissemination process was 
incomplete. 253 This was confirmed by one of the members of the Special Committee 
appointed for the oversight of all district regulations in Tana Toraj a. 254 
In 2001 there were thirteen regulations being reviewed by the Special 
Committee,, including the regulation concerning lembang governance. In a series of 
4'confessions,, )" one Committee member admitted that the work of the representative 
council was not of a high enough standard. 255 Furthermore, it was held that 
community input was minimal and that Regulation 2/2001 was rushed through the 
legislative to avoid lengthy periods of consultation in remote territories of Tana 
Toraj a that were difficult to reach. 
As a party to the process, this informant recounted that deliberation and 
debate amongst representative council members were not taken seriously, and that 
many members were busy reading newspapers and generally ignoring proceedings. 256 
Indeed, in this "confession" the Committee member suggested that only two out of 
the twelve members took their jobs seriously, which is why the regulation 
subsequently encountered so much resistance. 
Such revelations challenge claims about the significance of the recognition of 
adat in terms of the "unleashing" of regional innovation, the "encoding" of 
community aspirations into the structures of customary governance, and the 
"celebration" of genuine village initiative (Acciaioli 2001; Antl6v 2003a). Moreover, 
252 Interview with Paulus Tangke, deputy-head of the People's Legislative Assembly, Tana Toraja 
District, on 28 February 2006. For instance, the stipulations regarding size and composition of each 
Lembang were found to contradict higher laws. 
253 Interview with Paulus Tangke, deputy-head of the People's Legislative Assembly, on 28 February 
2006. 
254 Based on contributions from Samin, member of the Special Committee for Regulatory 
Oversight, 
during the 'Workshop for Comparative Study of the Regulatory Process, ' 21-23 February 2006. 
255 Based on contributions from Samin, member of the Special Committee, 
during the 'Workshop for 
Comparative Study of the Regulatory Process, ' 21-23 February 2006. 
256 Based on personal records from the 'Workshop for Comparative 
Study of the Regulatory Process' 
held in Lembang Madandan, Tana Toraja, from 21-23 February 2006. 
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as in the districts of Majene, Jeneponto, and Gowa, the initial regulation passed in 
Tana Toraja involved a minimum of community input and was found in need of 
revision. The bureaucratisation and normalisation of adat tends to steer the process of 
revivalism away from substantive politics, away from the pioneering ecologism of 
Madandan's activists. 
As in Seko, the recognition of adat in Tana Toraja was not a simple 
reproduction of the standard regulatory notations ('empowerment, preservation, and 
development'). Rather, Regulation 2/2001 provided a detailed, procedural account of 
local governance at the lembang level, prompted by new stipulations in the 
decentralisation laws calling for district governments to show initiative in the use of 
their newly devolved responsibilities. Regulation 2/2001 therefore blueprints the 
structure, organisation and responsibility of the lembang government. 
In the opening considerations of Regulation 2/200 1, it states that a framework 
was needed for the implementation of lembang governance to ensure that it was 
relevant and succesSfUl. 257 Further, it was stated that the term desa as imposed during 
the New Order through Village Law Number 5/1979 was "no longer appropriate 
given the characteristics and the socio-cultural conditions of the Tana Toraja 
communities,, therefore it needs to be revised and made appropriate through the use of 
the name lembang". 258 
Regulation 2/2001 also stipulates that the revival of the lembang must be 
based upon "the initiative of local communities with consideration given to the 
origins of the lembang and the socio-cultural condition of local communities". 259 
However, it quickly became clear that "local initiative" had little bearing on the 
process, prompting NGOs and activists to begin a series of village meetings and 
workshops to determine whether a revised regulation was needed. 
In principle the autonomous authority of the lembang derives from the 
indigenous hak ulayat (right of origin) as well as formal devolution, which are to be 
257 District Government of Tana Toraja, Peraturan Daerah Nomor 2 Tahun 2001 tentang 
Pemerintahan Lembang. 
258 Peraturan Daerah Nomor 2 Tahun 2001 tentang Pemerintahan Lembang. 
259 Peraturan Daerah Nomor 2 Tahun 2001 tentang Pemerintahan Lembang. Article 4 [1]. 
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stipulated in local ordinances. 260 These authorities include dispute resolution, the 
enforcement of adat law and imposition of adat sanction upon the inhabitants of each 
lembang, and the selection of the government apparatus (Head of Lembang and 
Lembang Representative Council). 26 1 As this section illustrates, the technical contents 
of Regulation 2/2001 suggest that lembang governance is essentially modem, 
conforming with the decentralisation legislation without much of a departure from the 
desa system it was meant to supplant. This becomes apparent when one reviews the 
stipulations regarding the election of Lembang Head (executive) as well as members 
of the Lembang Council (legislative). 
Eligible Council (BPL) members must satisfy a list of criteria, which includes 
being a well-known member of the community, residing in the relevant Lembang, and 
being willing to participate in the wider functions of the BPL (see Table 5.1 for 
complete list). These functions include upholding customs and traditions, drafting 
lembang regulations, formulating budgets, determining and accommodating 
community aspirations, monitoring the implementation of lembang governance, and 
holding the Lembang Head (Kepala Lembang) accountable . 
262 BPL decision-making 
procedures require that a minimum of two-thirds of members are present and that all 
decisions are achieved through the deliberative process, known generally as 
musyawarah in Indonesia and specifically as kombongan in Tana Toraja. 
263 
260 Peraturan Daerah Nomor 2 Tahun 2001 tentang Pemerintahan Lembang. Article 9[l]. 
261 Peraturan Daerah Nomor 2 Tahun 2001 tentang Pemerintahan Lembang. Articles 12 & 13. 
262 District Government of Tana Toraja, Peraturan Daerah Nomor 2 Tahun 2001 tentang 
Pemerintahan Lembang. Article I U] - 
263 Peraturan Daerah Nomor 2 Tahun 2001 tentang Pemerintahan Lembang. Article 30. 
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Table 5.1: Candidacy Criteria 
Lembang Representative Council (BPL) Lembang Head Criteria6' 
Membership Criteria Z64 
Devotion to God Devotion to God 
Faithful to Pancasila and the Constitution of Faithful to Pancasila and the Constitution of 
1945 1945 
No involvement (direct or indirect) with any No involvement (direct or indirect) with any 
movement that betrays the Pancasila and the movement that betrays the Pancasila and the 
Constitution of 1945, such as the G. 30 S/PKI Constitution of 1945, such as the G. 30 S/PKI 
[alleged communist plot] [alleged communist plot] 
Note: All mention of Communist Party association was removed from revised Regulation 5/2004 
Minimal level education: Junior High School or Minimal level education: Junior High School or 
equivalent level of education equivalent level of education 
Minimum age: 25 years or older Between the age of 25 and 60 
Good health: physical and mental, certified by a Good health: physical and mental, certified by a 
doctor doctor 
No psychological illness Registered as a citizen and living in the relevant 
Lembang for a minimum two consecutive years, 
with the exception of 'Indigenous' peoples [no 
such restrictions apply] 
Positive attributes, including honesty and Positive attributes, including honesty, 
fairness intelligence, charisma, and the ability to conduct 
all of the tasks associated with Lembang Head 
No criminal record Has never been imprisoned 
The right to vote has never been withdrawn in The right to vote has never been withdrawn in 
accordance with a court order accordance with a court order 
Is known by community members in the relevant Is familiar with the territory and is known by the 
Lembang community 
Proposal to become a BPL member was based Candidacy for Lembang Head was based on free 
on free will will 
Has never been found in breach of adat Has never been found in breach of adat 
regulations or faced adat sanctions regulations or faced adat sanctions 
264 District Government of Tana Toraja, Peraturan Daerah Nomor 2 Tahun 2001 tentang 
Pemerintahan Lembang. Article 22. 
265 Peraturan Daerah Nomor 2 Tahun 2001 tentang Pemerintahan Lembang. Article 36. 
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In strictly procedural terms, the BPL is supposed to be represented in all 
district affairs, including the establishment of regulations. However, it is widely felt 
that members of the BPL have yet to participate fully in district affairs, and when they 
do participate they routinely fail to consult the adat communities within their 
jurisdiction. 266 Therefore while it is the right of each adat community member to 
participate in district politics, their input is often ignored. This was but one of the 
shortcomings of Regulation 2/2001, and it quickly became clear to all parties that 
revisions were needed. 
Regulation 5/2004: Revising the Lembang 
As district authorities prepared to implement Regulation 2/2001 it emerged that there 
was significant local opposition to the content of the regulation and process through 
which it was drafted. In 2001 it was reported that three meetings were organised by 
AMAT, after which it was decided to reject the regulation. 267 As will be discussed 
below, it was felt that the regulations concerning lembang governance were more 
concerned with procedural reform than substantive autonomy, that mention of the 
inherent "rights of origin" and land entitlements had been excluded, and that village 
participatory and consultative mechanisms had broken down. 
In August 2002 an agreement was reached between an associated 
organisation, the Institute for Rural and Agrarian Reform (Lingkar untuk Pembaruan 
Desa dan Agraria or KARSA) and the mayor of Tana Toraja to revise Regulation 
2/2001, allowing KARSA and AMAT time to hold community consultations and 
make recommendations. 268 On aggregate, these efforts produced few significant 
recommendations and failed to steer the revision process towards a genuinely 
participative, democratic endeavour. 
266 Based on personal observations from the 'Workshop for Comparative Study of the Regulatory 
Process' held in Madandan, 21-23 February 2006. 
267 Contribution firom Yando Zakaria from KARSA, contained in the document 'Forum for Lembang 
Autonomy' provided by the head of AMAT in Makale on 28 February 2006. 
268 Contribution from Yando Zakaria from KARSA during the 'Forum for Lembang Autonomy'. 
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With limited community input and insufficient NGO participation, the district 
government repeated its early mistake by unilaterally amending the initial regulation 
regarding lembang governance. On 18 June 2004 Regulation Number 5/2004 entitled 
'The First Revision of District Regulation Tana Toraja Number 2/2001 about 
Lembang Governance' was established. According to the opening considerations, this 
revision was prompted by alterations made to higher laws, specifically Government 
Regulation Number 76/2001.269 As stated consistently throughout all regional 
regulations, if they are found to contradict higher laws or regulations they must be 
revised and brought into conformity. As a secondary consideration, it was also stated 
that the revised regulation must be "made appropriate with the aspirations of the 
270 community" . 
All of the revisions contained in Regulation 5/2004 were of a technical nature, 
concerning such issues as establishing, abolishing or merging lembang, defining the 
duties and functions of BPL members, or listing the criteria for candidates for 
Lembang Head. In a sequence that appears counter-intuitive, on the same day that 
Regulation 5/2004 was promulgated (18 June 2004) the mayor of Tana Toraj a 
(Johanis A. Situru) sent a letter to Yusuf Biringkanae requesting that local adat 
organisations and NGOs draft a collective document entitled 'Academic Document 
for the Revision of Regional Regulation 2/200 1'. 271 
Technically speaking, the mayor had yet to enter Regulation 5/2004 into the 
District Gazette, allowing time for local NGOs to provide critical input. 272 In practical 
terms, however, it is difficult to discern the logic of pushing through regulatory 
amendments without community or NGO input, and then requesting a comprehensive 
'academic document' which would take a considerable amount of time to produce. 
269 District Government of Tana Toraja, Peraturan Daerah Nomor 5 Tahun 2004 tentang Perubahan 
Pertama Peraturan Daerah Kabupaten Tana Toraja Nomor 2 Tahun 2001 tentang Pemerintahan 
Lembang. 
270 Peraturan Daerah Nomor 5 Tahun 2004 tentang Perubahan Pertama Peraturan Daerah 
Kabupaten Tana Toraja Nomor 2 Tahun 2001 tentang Pemerintahan Lembang. 
271 Interview with Yusuf Biringkanae on 28 February 2006. Biringkanae is both the director of AMAT 
and the district head of the Environmental Impact Management Agency (Badan 
Pengendalian Dampak 
Lingkunan Daerah or Bapedalda); some local informants feel this dualism to be a conflict of interests. 
272 According to transcripts of the 'Forum for Lembang Autonomy' held on 8 July 2004. 
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Two possible explanations are bureaucratic incompetence or political malevolence; it 
was either an error in judgment that compounded earlier mistakes (with Regulation 
2/2001) or an intentional act meant to avoid lengthy deliberations and consultations. 
Either way, the mayor's request prompted a surge of political activism in Tana 
Toraj a. 
On 8 July 2004 Yusuf Biringkanae from AMAT hosted 26 prominent figures 
from throughout Indonesia, who participated in a meeting called 'Forum for Lembang 
Autonomy' held in Hotel Sangalla, Tana Toraja. The guest list included 
representatives from thirteen adat territories within the district, as well as four local 
NGOs, members of Jakarta Heritage, activists from Yogyakarta in Central Java and 
from Papua, and finally district officials from Biringkanae's Environmental Impact 
Management Agency. 273 Based on the transcripts of this meeting, there seems to have 
been a degree of animosity amongst the activists of Tana Toraja, who had been 
neglected throughout the drafting and negotiation process for Regulation 5/2004. 
According to Lasso Sombolinggi of WALDA Madandan, dissemination 
programmes had been held in fifteen of the adat territories, revealing popular support 
274 for the rejection of Regulation 5/2004 . It was estimated that 
80 per cent of the 
lembang chiefs had rejected the revisions found in Regulation 5/2004, which were 
contrary to the spirit of local autonomy, kearifan lokal (local ecological wisdom), and 
did not acknowledge adat rights such as hak ulayat or customary tenure. 
275 
While Lasso Sombolinggi felt it important to respond to the mayor's request 
by engaging in critical discourse, this would have to involve all of the communities of 
Tana Toraja likely to be affected by the return to the lembang. Therefore it was 
recommended that each of the participants at the Forum for Lembang Autonomy 
spend time gauging and documenting local aspirations, undertaking a grassroots 
approach called kombongan in order to better understand what people expect from the 
revival of lembang governance. 
276 
273 According to the 'Introductory Remarks' made during the 'Forum for Lembang Autonomy'. 
274 Contribution from Lasso Sombolinggi during the 'Forum for Lembang Autonomy'. 
275 Contribution from Lasso Sombolinggi during the 'Forum for Lembang Autonomy'. 
276 Contribution from Lasso Sombolinggi during the 'Forum for Lembang Autonomy'. 
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In response, Yusuf Biringkanae remarked upon his personal meeting with the 
mayor of Tana Toraja. When news first broke about Regulation 5/2004, Biringkanae 
supposedly told the mayor that district officials no longer control the people's 
,, 277 sovereignty, but rather "are in the service of the people's sovereignty . After 
lengthy discussion he was ordered as head of the Environinental Impact Management 
Agency to cooperate with AMAT and other organisations to arrange an academic 
document. If this academic document only served to validate Regulation 5/2004 then 
Biringkanae vowed to reject the mayor's request. This was meant to be a struggle and 
a learning process for the government, the district representative council, NGOs, and 
local communities in collaborative policy making. 278 Forum participants agreed that 
Regulation 5/2004 should not be rejected outright, but rather its implementation 
should be postponed until the kombongan could be completed. 
There were several other points of contention raised during the Forum, 
confmning the views expressed by Biringkanae that this was indeed a learning 
process with many inherent flaws. KARSA members likened the disjointed debate 
that ensued to a traditional dance driven by the erratic beat of the "gendang drum". 279 
Representatives from Lembang Nanggala Sangpiak Salu, for instance, remarked on 
earlier meetings with the mayor and members of the representative council, during 
which they articulated their views and concerns about regulations concerning 
280 lembang governance but were ultimately ignored . 
Similarly, representatives from the Sa'dan highlands felt that the lembang 
chiefs had been "fooled by the mayor and the representative council, " and that the 
essence of the lembang was not found in the articles and stipulations of either 
regulation (2/2001 or 5/2004). 281 Participants from KARSA added that, were there an 
outside party observing the meeting, they would be consumed with laughter, and 
277 Contribution from Yusuf Biringkanae during the 'Forum for Lembang Autonomy'. 
278 Contribution from Yusuf Biringkanae during the 'Forum for Lembang Autonomy'. 
279 Contribution from Yando Zakaria from KARSA during the 'Forum for Lembang Autonomy'. 
280 Contribution from Matius Mangando, chief of Lembang Nanggala Sangpiak Salu, during the 
'Forum for Lembang Autonomy'. 
281 Contribution from Songa Ponglamba, chief of Lembang Sa'dan Malimbong, during the 'Forum for 
Lembang Autonomy'. 
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therefore everyone should ask: "why do we accept the systematic deception that the 
chiefs of lembang and AMAT experience, which is not consistent with the 
community's inner self? The community has been disappointed and cheated, and we 
just do nothing about it"' . 
282 
The core of the gendang drum debate was eventually captured by one 
participant at the meeting, who suggested that the regulations concerning lembang 
governance were more concerned with administrative refon'n than local autonomy, 
and that mention of customary rights and entitlements had been excluded. 283 
Reference was made to a recent case from the nearby island of Maluku. District 
authorities had yet to establish regulations concerning adat governance, prompting 
villagers to reassert their own systems based on customary law and tenure, which they 
claimed was the realisation of genuine autonoMy. 284 By implication, the regulatory 
process in Tana Toraja was a betrayal of the principle of political autonomy and an 
affront to the protagonists of adat revivalism. 
Continuing on the theme of autonomy, Den Upa Rombelayuk argued that the 
key issue was re-establishing the authority of lembang chiefs, who should not rely on 
directives from the district government but rather govern by mufakat (consensus) and 
kombongan (community consultation and deliberation). 285 Reference was made to 
another case from Lombok where villagers established their own autonomous 
regulations concerning livestock without consulting district authorities. Rombelayuk 
demanded that authority be returned to the lembang chiefs of Tana Toraja, who 
maintain close links to the community and possess knowledge of antedated systems 
of governance, ancestral property, patterns of inheritance, and cultivation. 286 
In response, Biringkanae (host of the Forum) posed a series of questions: how 
are we to create transparent government? What form of government accountability do 
282 Contribution from Mita Iswari from KARSA during the 'Forum for Lembang Autonomy'. 
283 Contribution from Yando Zakaria from KARSA during the 'Forum for Lembang Autonomy'. 
284 Contribution from Yando Zakaria from KARSA during the 'Forum for Lembang Autonomy'. 
285 Contribution from Den Upa Rombelayuk, former chief of Lembang Nanggala, during the 'Forum 
for Lembang Autonomy'. 
286 Contribution from Rombelayuk, former chief of Lembang Nanggala, during the 'Forum for 
Lembang Autonomy'. However, one should be wary of 'essentialising the local' and 'romanticising 
adat'. 
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we need? Do the lembang have the capacity to face higher levels of government? 
Finally, what is the meaning of real autonomy for the lembang? 287 While these 
questions were merely intended to provide a guideline for the consultants working on 
the academic document, they did lead to admissions that the revised regulation 
(5/2004) had no sections that addressed these matters, nor did it cover issues of 
lembang development or regulatory capacity, meaning that it ultimately failed to 
reflect community aspirations. 
Biringkanae concluded by challenging Forum participants to overcome the 
legacy of deception and the maladministration that plagued the district by forming a 
network of researchers and activists that could seriously influence the policymaking 
288 
process . In order to 
influence policy while remaining committed to community 
aspirations, it was suggested that members of the various organisations involved in 
the struggle for lembang autonomy in Tana Toraja begin by consulting community 
leaders and village representatives from every Lembang, fulfilling the kombongan. 289 
It was estimated that a thorough process of village consultation, conducted by 
a team of nine activists working in tandem with all of the lembang chiefs, would take 
up to one year to complete, after which all parties would be prepared to publish the 
academic document as per the mayor's initial request on 18 June 2004 . 
290 The district 
government was also expected to participate, particularly officials from the Law 
Bureau and the District People's Representative Council, and the mayor would be 
responsible for the release of funds from the district budget in support of these efforts. 
Participants would start by establishing a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) with the mayor endorsing the kombongan process. 
29 1 This was to involve a 
government committee (consisting of the mayor, the district representative council, 
and the lembang councils); a technical team (comprised of nine activists, all of the 
lembang chiefs, the lembang council, and the district Law Bureau); and finally, an 
287 Contribution from Yusuf Biringkanae during the 'Forum for Lembang Autonomy'. 
288 Contribution from Yusuf Biringkanae during the 'Forum for Lembang Autonomy'. 
289 Contribution from Mita Iswari from KARSA during the 'Forum for Lembang Autonomy'. 
290 Contribution from Yando Zakaria from KARSA during the 'Forum for Lembang Autonomy'. 
291 According to transcripts of the 'Forum for Lembang Autonomy'. 
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association of public consultants (members from KARSA, HuMa, AMAN, and 
AMAT). 292 
With a timeframe of six to twelve months and sufficient funds released from 
the district budget, it was expected that a comprehensive academic document could 
be completed, adhering to the principle of kombongan. 293 This document would then 
become the basis for a fundamental revision of Regulation 5/2004, or conversely, it 
could form the basis for a new mayoral decree. 
One of the primary organisations entrusted to complete the community 
consultation process was the Alliance of Customary Communities of Tana Toraja 
(AMAT) headed by Biringkanae. This independent organisation has members from 
each of the 32 adat territories of Tana Toraja claiming to live in accordance with a set 
of hereditary customs and traditions. 294 Within these territories the inhabitants claim 
to exercise sovereign rights over land and natural resources, and that social, cultural 
and political life is governed by customary law. The function of AMAT, therefore, is 
to coordinate the struggle for the revival of these sovereign rights, as well as the 
promotion of indigenous concepts of environmental preservation and sustainable 
resource management. 295 
Organisations from Central Sulawesi such as Bantaya have also joined the 
consultation process in Tana Toraja, participating in a comparative workshop 
regarding the revival of customary governance and the achievement of official 
recognition. The name Bantaya is said to derive from the Kaili language, meaning "a 
place to meet". 296 This organisation was formed in 1995 and presently has twelve 
297 
staff focusing on agricultural issues and adat rights . Members of 
Bantaya have 
participated in comparative forestry workshops in Japan, and frequently travel to 
Jakarta to lobby for changes to Forestry Law 41/1999 at the Ministry of Forestry. 
292 According to transcripts of the 'Forum for Lembang Autonomy'. HuMa is an organisation for 
'Legal Revitalisation based on Social and Ecological Reform'. 
293 According to transcripts from the 'Forum for Lembang Autonomy'. 
294 According to the document 'Existence of the Customary Communities of Tana Toraj a' provided by 
Yusuf Biringkanae on 28 February 2006. 
295 According to the document 'Existence of the Customary Communities of Tana Toraja'. 
296 Interview with Marce from Bantaya on 23 February 2006. 
297 Interview with members of Bantaya in Palu, Central Sulawesi, on 21 June 2006. 
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According to the timeframe set out by Forum participants, the academic 
document was to be completed by July 2005 at the latest. However based on the 
findings of a workshop held in Lembang Madandan from 21-23 February 2006, there 
were still fundamental issues left unresolved and community consultation remained 
incomplete. 298 
Reviving the Kombongan and Tongkonan 
The comparative workshops held in Lembang Madandan from 21-23 February 2006 
drew members of the district government, NGO activists, and several lembang heads. 
Members of Bantaya were joined by representatives from four separate districts in 
Central Sulawesi, including Donggala and Poso, where regulations regarding adat 
have already been promulgated. 
Concerns raised by Li (2007: 364) about legislative replication and legal 
redundancy have been echoed by researchers from the Consortium on Agrarian 
Reform (KPA). It is held that most district regulations are little more than "direct 
adaptations" of higher laws, "replicating the language of the national laws almost to 
the word" (Fauzi and Zakaria 2002: 15). By implication, regulations are drafted, 
debated, and implemented without adequate public consultation, thus failing to reflect 
local initiatives and conditions. 
Confirming these findings (Li 2007; Fauzi and Zakaria 2002), representatives 
from Donggala and Poso remarked upon the limitations of the regulations passed in 
their respective districts, particularly the failure of the government to engage in a 
process of revitalising and recognising the lipu. 299 The fact that the district 
government of Tana Toraja allowed for the return to the Lembang (in name and 
symbol, at least) has attracted the attention of a wide base of activists involved in adat 
revivalism. The activists from Central Sulawesi, however, quickly came to realise that 
298 Personal observations from the 'Workshop for a Comparative Study of the Regulatory Process, ' 2 1- 
23 February 2006. 
299 Personal observations from the 'Workshop for Comparative Study of the Regulatory Process, ' 21- 
23 February 2006. As in Seko, lipu is used in reference to antedated systems of governance, 
indigenous to some regions of Central Sulawesi. 
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the Lembang model in Tana Toraja was also problematic and left many issues 
unresolved. 300 
During the Madandan workshops, members of Bantaya along with 
representatives from Central Sulawesi asked their counterparts from Toraja to 
describe the lembang. 301 It quickly became apparent that there remained a divergence 
of opinion amongst adat leaders about the nature and structure of the lembang system. 
Moreover, owing to a lack of capacity and resources, there was a dearth of policy 
research about the revised regulation on lembang government (5/2004), suggesting 
that earlier commitments to the kombongan (consultation, deliberation) had not been 
fulfilled. 302 Thus the protagonists of adat revivalism falteringly debated the nature of 
their own antedated and indigenous past. While the same dilemma occurred in Seko 
(chapter four), sustained levels of facilitation and funding provided by the MFP 
allowed for coherent and legible reconstructions of adat which the district 
goverm-nent could easily endorse. 
While the Madandan workshops failed to impress, one local activist, Den Upa 
Rombelayuk, projected a clear image of the lembang and the unique features of 
Torajan identity. While women continue to be underrepresented in Tana Toraja (only 
five women are reported to have been elected as head of Lembang since 2002), they 
play a significant role in Torajan civil society, involved in all of the activist alliances 
and NGO network operating in the area. 303 Arguably the most prominent female 
activist in Tana Toraja is Den Upa Rombelayuk. In the struggle for indigenous rights 
and self-governance, Rombelayuk has addressed international audiences, for instance 
participating in the Second Session of the Asia Development Bank's Conference in 
2001 titled 'Indigenous Peoples/Ethnic Minorities and Poverty Reduction' (ADB 
2001: 16). 
She is featured in the newsletters of the Philippine-based Asian Indigenous 
Women's Network (AlVv'N), where she has argued that "history has proven that many 
300 Personal observations from the 'Madandan Workshops, ' 21-23 February 
2006. 
301 Personal observations from the 'Madandan Workshops, ' 21-23 February 
2006. 
302 Personal observations from the 'Madandan Workshops, ' 21-23 February 
2006. 
303 interview with Saba Sombolinggi, head of Lembang Madandan, 
in Rantepao on 20 February 2006. 
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Torajan women can take on leadership roles in the community. For example, several 
women were elected as District Head during the Dutch government period" (AINNN et 
al. 2007: 2). Rombelayuk was also invited to speak on spirituality and mainstream 
religions by the Asia Indigenous Peoples Pact (AIPP) Foundation during their 
'Second ID Conference' held in Tana Toraja in September 2006 (AIPP 2006: 2). 
To conclude this vignette, from 17-20 March 2007 the Third Congress of 
Indigenous Peoples of the Archipelago (KMAN 111) was held in West Kalimantan. A 
total of eleven workshops were held during the Congress, one of which was entitled 
the 'Indigenous Women's Workshop' (Anggraini 2007). Rombelayuk was selected to 
present on 'The Role of Indigenous Women in Decision-Making at the Community 
Level' to approximately 70 participants in the workshop (Anggraini 2007). 
In an effort to enhance the compatibility of the lembang project with the new 
democratic imperatives of the reform era, Den Upa Rombelayuk and Lasso 
Sombolinggi have been reconstructing the traditional concepts of tongkonan 
(ancestral houses) and kombongan (village deliberations). The tongkonan or family 
house of origin is "both a material structure, the house, and a group of people, those 
who trace descent from its founding ancestors" (Waterson 1986: 96). Each household 
in Tana Toraja has a traceable genealogical connection to a mother tongkonan, a 
kinship centre originally constructed to carry out "whole cycles of propitiation 
rituals" (Bigalke 2005: 11). Moreover, the tongkonan is held to be "at once the 
centrifugal and the centripetal element of Torajan social organisation"; every three to 
five generations a new tongkonan is built, however all descendants are bound to the 
original tongkonan, meaning that a gradual solidification of culture and custom 
occurs which distinguishes different territories within Tana Toraj a (Bigalke 2005: 11). 
Crucially, Bigalke (2005: 11) asserts that "it is primarily along tongkonan lines 
that the first higher forms of political organisation begin to emerge" in Tana Toraj a. It 
is held that "the status of the tongkonan is determined by the functions it performs" 
(Sandarupa 2000: 64). From this perspective, there are three distinct types of 
tongkonan: the first, called tongkonan layuk, belongs to the highest order of adat 
authorities and "was the centre of the government 
in ancient times"; the second, 
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called tongkonan pekamberan, belongs to the adat functionaries; and finally, the third, 
called tongkonan batu a'riri, is available to the commoners that have no adat function 
(Sandarupa 2000: 64). 
Prior to Dutch occupation in 1906 the tongkonan. were central to inter-group 
relations and the strengthening of ties "through an elaborate system of ritual 
exchanges" (Adams 2003: 94). Dutch missionaries struggled to deal with strong 
customary traditions such as the clan-house kinship (tongkonan) and its ritual for the 
deceased; by 1942 it is reported that "less than thirty per cent of the population had 
been baptised" (Ngelow 2004: 5). One Torajan theologian, Theo Kobong, is said to 
have dedicated his life's work to resolving this impasse, attempting to place Christ 
(the new Patriarch) at the centre of the tongkonan and thus at the core of Torajan 
culture, rituals, and beliefs (Ngelow 2004: 6). 304 The problem with Dr. Kobong's 
"contextual ecclesiology" and Christocentric approach to the Torajan tongkonan, 
however, was that is was an imposition that failed to provide a "proper place" for the 
family kinship values inherent in Torajan culture (Ngelow 2004: 8). 
Despite systematic colonial efforts to Christianise the Torajan highlanders, 
regional rebellions seeking to Islamise Sulawesi entire, and New Order policies meant 
to standardise village governance throughout Indonesia, the tongkonan legacy 
continues today. In contemporary times, witnesses to various tongkonan-centred 
rituals in Tana Toraja will discover that the histories of the "founding ancestors and 
their descendants are carefully recounted, " during which all those connected to the 
"mother" tongkonan being feted are expected to make financial and material 
contributions, which are closely monitored by adat leaders (Adams 2003: 96). 
Tongkonan are also the symbolic centres where the decisions reached through 
kombongan deliberations are disseminated to the public. 
As mentioned previously, adat leaders and activists that participated during 
the Forum for Lembang Autonomy in July 2004 had agreed to engage in 
comprehensive community consultation, which was couched in terms of reviving the 
304 Ngelow (2004: 6) quoting Kobong (1989). Evangelium und Tongkonan. Eine Untersuhung über die 
Begegnung zwischen chrislicher Botschaft und der Kultur der Toraja. Hamburg: Verlag and der 
Lottbek. 
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kombongan. 305 In February 2005 the district government seemed to endorse this 
revival, officially recognising the kombongan through Mayoral Decree 222/IF2005. 
This Decree also acknowledged 32 distinct, autonomous customary territories in Tana 
Toraja, each said to possess a valid system of oral customary law inherited from 
generations past, as well as the principles of kearifan lokal (local wisdom), which are 
reflected in the governance system, regulations, and sanctions. 306 
Den Upa Rombelayuk has written a comprehensive account of village 
governance and kombongan in Tana Toraja. Ideas, habits and rules governing 
community life in the lembang have traditionally been agreed upon through the 
kombongan, which is then formalised in the tongkonan (Rombelayuk nd). The 
kombongan and tongkonan have been characterised as "pillars of indigenous 
democracy, " popularised through the Torajan slogan Kada Rapa dan Kada Situru 
meaning agreements and treaties (Rombelayuk nd). 
Furthermore,, the kombongan is meant to represent the "highest village-level 
decision making space, " and decisions rendered "cannot legally be made without the 
presence of all community groups, including women and youth groups" (AIW-N et al. 
2007: 2). Following her electoral victory in Lembang Nanggala in 1992, Rombelayuk 
set about reviving the kombongan, which had been abolished by Village Law 5/1979. 
Owing to the complexities involved, however, this did not come to fruition until the 
reform era, when activists from Toraja forged a new political strategy in conjunction 
with the decentralisation laws. 
According to Rombelayuk, there are at least four distinct forins of the 
kombongan. The highest form is known as "kombongan kalua sang lepongan bulan, " 
meaning a supreme meeting. This is said to apply to all of the territories of Tana 
Toraja, which are expected to send a delegation when such a meeting is called. 
Therefore, observers feel this satisfies the democratic principle of representative 
governance (Rombelayuk nd). 
30' District Government of Tana Toraj a, Keputusan Bupati Tana Toraja Nomor 22211112005 tentang 
Pengakuan Keberadaan Masyarakat Adat Toraya, Article 9. 
306 District Government of Tana Toraj a, Keputusan Bupati Tana Toraja Nomor 22211112005 tentang 
Pengakuan Keberadaan Masyarakat Adat Toraya, Article 1. 
168 
Below this supreme meeting there is the "kombongan kalua sang lembangan, " 
which refers to the highest level of deliberative meeting within a Lembang territory 
(Rombelayuk nd). This was traditionally held on an annual basis, involving mainly 
adat leaders and some representatives from villages and local communities, affording 
each participant the opportunity to voice their opinions on internal matters. 
Kombongan decisions are to be reached in accordance with deliberation and 
consensus in an open forum; as such, it is said to satisfy the democratic criteria of 
transparency, participation and fairness (Rombelayuk nd). 
The third form is known as "kombongan karopi, " which takes place at the 
administrative equivalent of the sub-district. Open deliberations and consultations 
revolve around local issues that often provoke bitter disagreements amongst the 
participants (Rombelayuk nd). This level of kombongan tends to focus on the 
rejection, revision, and implementation of adat regulations, which upholds the 
accountability of local leaders and those entrusted with customary sanction and law. 
Finally, the lowest level is called "kombongan saroan, " which is held in the 
equivalent of a village hamlet and involves small community groups, families, and 
village cooperatives (Rombelayuk nd). During these proceedings, issues such as 
community assistance, land and forest usage, and ownership tend to arise. All 
decisions at this level are adjudicated by authorities from higher kombongan. Taken 
together, these four levels of deliberations and consultations are said to reflect the 
core principles (or pillars) of democratic decentralisation, including participation, 
representation, accountability, and transparency. 
However,, there are still aspects of the kombongan that deviate from 
mainstream decentralisation narratives. For instance, each annual event is brought to 
a close with a final reading of all the decisions reached, accompanied by a ceremonial 
feast during which all participants eat a traditional pork dish cooked in bamboo 
(Rombelayuk nd). If there are any participants that secretly reject the decisions being 
read, they will choke on pork bones, the lesson being that everyone must work 
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towards consensus and form an oath (called besse in Torajan) prior to this final public 
reading. 307 
Features of the indigenous lembang system of government have thus emerged 
from the continuous play of history, and the contemporary revival is largely the 
product of a complex interplay between the local, the national, and the global. Despite 
recent setbacks, there is still potential in Tana Toraja for meaningful change as 
activists strive to reclaim their own movement. For instance, the revival of the 
tongkonan and kombongan offers a uniquely Torajan solution to the democratic 
deficits associated with customary governance. Similarly, the assertion of "people's 
sovereignty" from the head of AMAT during his address to the Forum for Lembang 
Autonomy was a potential rallying point. 308 
Of course, the term sovereignty is highly problematic when applied to the 
diverse archipelagic adat communities of Indonesia. Conventional Westphalian 
notions of sovereignty apply to the international system of independent nation-states, 
exercising power within a fixed territory and providing security against external 
threats. Therefore,, struggles for the sovereignty of adat communities could easily be 
misinterpreted as separatism, and while the actual threat to the unity of the Republic 
is minimaL, it could be exaggerated and used to discredit the adat revival. 
In contrast to conventional notions of state sovereignty involving ultimate and 
exclusive authority within a fixed territory, the assertion of indigenous people's 
sovereignty seems to "present a complimentary, rather than exclusive node of 
allegiance for communities still oriented to the practice of local custom" (Acciaioli 
2007: 305). Having examined closely the proclamations made at both KMAN (I and 
11), Acciaioli (2007: 306) found that indigenous sovereignty may engender a sense of 
communal rights, building local capacity to cope with contemporary challenges. 
Furthermore, the revitalisation of customary governance holds the potential to 
empower local communities as they encounter a variety of external incursions, for 
instance from concessionaries, transmigrants, or predatory elites (Acciaioli 
307 For an account of "magical poisoning" in Tana Toraj a, see Hollan (1994). 
308 Contribution from Yusuf Biringkanae during the 'Forum for Lembang Autonomy'. 
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2007: 306). This seems to require a synthesis between the "exercise of sovereignty 
and the local operation of customary law" within specific customary territories 
(Acciaioli 2007: 299). No such synthesis has yet to be achieved in Tana Toraja; 
however, the political strategies emanating from Madandan, Rantepao and Makale 
hold promise for the future. 
Conclusion 
Based on the empirical materials examined in this chapter, it is possible to argue that 
the decentralisation laws were intentionally designed to insulate and protect the state 
from oppositional challenges. Despite the best laid plans, however, all of the 
contingencies have not been accounted for, and the human inclination to resist 
continues to manifest in new and innovative ways. 
Many of the emergent struggles over land and resources in eastern Indonesia 
have been driven by political activists (becoming, in a sense, surrogates for local 
communities). Indeed, throughout Sulawesi there have been deliberate campaigns led 
by NGOs tactfully stretching the legal definitions of adat as set out in the 
decentralisation laws. Subtle, ambiguous clauses about the need to protect and 
develop customs and traditions can be seized upon and redeployed for a variety of 
targeted rights-based struggles. Local customary communities may then identify 
several sources of threat (real or perceived) from which they require protection. 
According to the modernist perspective, this process could be viewed 
depreciatingly, as a form of patronising and divisive "ethnic arithmetic" (Azarya 
2003: 14). Conversely, primordialists would celebrate this as an opportunity for the 
emancipation of indigenous communities; through the virtues of their place-based 
attachments and the strength of their communal bonds, these communities could rise 
above efforts to manipulate and control them. If indeed adat revivalism is not the 
ephemeral phenomenon that critics such as Kaldor (2004) insist upon, then it may yet 
hold the potential for community renewal and prove that the convergence of 
decentralisation and adat is politically durable and potentially emancipatory. 
171 
For pragmatists, if adat revivalism is to achieve any substantive gains there 
must be a sustained challenge the constitutive political order. However, challenging 
the dominant structures and institutions of power does not necessarily mean 
transcending them. An adat community, or specific households within an adat 
community, may secure their rights through ad hoc tribunals, negotiated settlements, 
mediation, or the judicial system, which constitutes a victory, though not necessarily 
one that can be widely replicated. 
Having reviewed the conservationist, domesticating tendencies of state 
agencies, heritage foundations, and the tourism industry, all of which promote a 
protectionist agenda, this chapter proceeded to examine the innovative roles of 
donors, NGOs. and adat leaders in the formulation of an oppositional political 
agenda. Den Upa Rombelayuk and Lasso Sombolinggi have led the struggle for a 
return to the kombongan and tongkonan for decades. 
However, the increasing tendency of local partners (WALDA, AMAT) and 
national trustees (KARSA, WALHI, KPA, AMAN) to fall back on regulatory 
processes has stunted their activism. The failings of Regulation 2/2001 (on lembang 
governance) were reproduced in Regulation 5/2004, and compounded after an 
association of activists converged on Tana Toraja to participate in superfluous forums 
and workshops. Through the promulgation of successive regulations, district 
authorities (wittingly or unwittingly) channelled local aspirations for an adat revival 
and the oppositional forces that supported it into a non-threatening process of legal 
drafting and technical review. 
Within these autonomous territories the unwritten customary law inherited 
from generations past is to apply, as well as the principles of kearifan lokal, which are 
reflected in the governance system, customary regulations, and sanctions. 
309 
Furthermore,, the community consultation process of kombongan was officially 
recognised, to be relied upon before any major changes occur within the Lembang. 
310 
309 District Government of Tana Toraja, Keputusan Bupati Tana Toraja Nomor 22211112005 tentang 
Pengakuan Keberadaan Masyarakat Adat Toraya, Article 1. 
3 10 Keputusan Bupati Tana Toraja Nomor 22211112005 tentang Pengakuan Keberadaan Masyarakat 
Adat Toraya, Article 9. 
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Finally, as in the Seko territories, it is stipulated that "the customary communities of 
Tana Toraja must be informed of every permit issued for natural resource use within 
the customary territory". 311 
As in the Seko territories, where similar fon-ns of recognition have been 
granted, it is too early to pass judgments on substantive impacts. Customary 
communities in both Seko and Tana Toraja have recourse to specific Mayoral 
Decrees containing stipulations about their right to be informed prior to the granting 
of land use or concessions within their acknowledged territories. There are as yet no 
real test cases from which to draw conclusions about the efficacy of these 
stipulations. 
From the testimony of Yando Zakaria and Mita Iswari of KARSA, Yusuf 
Biringkanae of AMAT, Lasso Sombolinggi and Den Upa Rombelayuk from 
Madandan,, and several other participants in workshops and forums on lembang 
governance, a common grievance is discernible. There is a sense that adat revivalism 
has been captured by the discourses, notations, and prerogatives of the state, and that 
the regulatory process has been flawed from the outset. 
The "ubiquitous political mantras" of mufakat (consensus) and musyawarah 
(deliberation) so often associated with modem adat campaigns are evidence of the 
distillation of diverse customs and traditions into "simple formulas" which are easily 
instrumentalised by authorities (Bourchier 1997: 158). These mantras feature 
consistently in the discourses and narratives of adat revivalists in South Sulawesi. 
However, as the case of Tana Toraja demonstrated, activists such as Den Upa 
Rombelayuk and Lasso Sombolinggi have tirelessly worked towards the convergence 
of indigenous mantras (tongkonan, kombongan) with modem, democratic 
imperatives. 
For adat revivalists, the existence of historical antecedents must be established 
empirically in order to bolster campaigns for land rights and political recognition. The 
protagonists behind such campaigns, therefore, must attempt to strike a balance 
31 1 Keputusan Bupati Tana Toraja Nomor 22211112005 tentang Pengakuan Keberadaan Masyarakat 
Adat Toraya, Article II [a] - 
173 
between the primordialist position (searching for antiquity and exemplars) and the 
modernist project (emancipatory political innovation). 
Distinctions between festive showcasing and political resistance are largely 
the product of choices (consciously or unconsciously) made by local communities 
and their supporters. However, once adat has been deployed, claims have been 
articulated, and actors made clear their positions, a multitude of possible scenarios 
arise that are often beyond the control of the target constituencies. 
Support networks and sympathisers may seek recognition for adat claims 
(land, resources), not as part of official government structures but rather as "parallel 
forms of sovereignty whose adherents' rights need to be guaranteed" (Acclaioll 
2007: 303). However, these same protagonists may unwittingly promote a sanitised 
version of adat that, while appearing democratic and environmentally friendly, 
ultimately fails to constitute a genuine challenge to dominant power structures or 
constitutive political conditions. 
In a functioning customary system, true to its antecedents, villagers and their 
leaders would debate the various responses (rejection, alteration, approval) to the 
pressures of modernity and develop an appropriate strategy. If the choice was to adapt 
to the changing conditions, then contingencies would need to be established in order 
to maintain the character and essence of the unique customs and traditions of a 
particular domain. The fractiousness that has resulted from most of these encounters 
between tradition and modernity suggest that the village kombongan has broken 
down. A degree of dependency on NGO surrogates determined to oversee the rebirth 
of the Indonesian village might be the short-term compromise needed to ensure the 
renewal of customary lembang institutions, those capable of adapting to changing 
political conditions, mitigating conflicts over land, and reconciling local 
heterogeneity. 
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Chapter Six: The Nickel Project in East Luwu 
This chapter investigates the origins and development of customary land claims in the 
district of East Luwu, South Sulawesi province. Unlike the politics of adat revivalism 
in previous chapters, these struggles have progressed beyond the search for official 
recognition and regulatory approval. In the small mining town of Soroako on the 
shores of Lake Matano, contemporary land disputes are traceable back to the 
beginnings of nickel exploration in 1909. By 1968 International Nickel of Canada 
(hereafter PT InCO)312 was granted a Contract of Work for nickel production, marking 
the origins of systematic land appropriation and community alienation. 
As PT Inco reached full production in 1978, mining concessions were held 
over an area measuring some 118,3 87 hectares. According to local indigenous groups, 
the loss of customary lands to the mining concessionary was a blatant derogation of 
their adat rights. While PT Inco's successful bid brought the prospect of windfall 
profits and favourable relations with the Suharto regime, it also landed the company 
in a protracted dispute with two indigenous communities, the Soroakans and the 
Karongsi'e Dongi. 
This chapter charts the various historical intrusions that have shaped local 
politics and traditions in the Matano domain, some of which having seriously 
disrupted the agrarian patterns of village life. Neither authentic nor wholly invented, 
customary land claims in the mining zone of East Luwu are the product of selective 
historical reconstructions, shared memories of suffering, external intervention, and 
violent confrontation. In order to better understand local conflicts, van Klinken 
(2007b: 2) contrasts "grievance-based" approaches with "mobilisational" approaches, 
favouring the latter for its concrete political analysis of resource mobilisations as 
opposed to the "timeless hurt" of grievances, which "tend to fester until an organiser 
comes along". 
312 Perusahan Terbatas (or PT) stands for Corporation Limited. 
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Developmental imperatives and national unity remain the cornerstones of 
modem Indonesian politics; however since 1998, more emphasis has been placed 
upon respect for human rights, citizen empowerment, and the growth of civil society. 
This shift has been driven by external agents, producing significant (though not 
entirely favourable) impacts on the dispute resolution process. Disputes over 
productive lands in Indonesia raise complex questions about land classification, 
entitlement,, and legitimate criteria for assessing customary claims, bringing to the 
fore tensions between the interests of the state and the interests of local communities. 
PT Inco, holder of a valid Contract of Work,, employer of thousands, and 
significant revenue generator, has the force of national law and political patronage on 
its side. Determined to confront this pollution-generating mining giant, one profiting 
at the expense of eco-friendly noble savages while colluding with rabidly plundering 
politicians and members of a vitriolic security apparatus, adat communities have 
allies in a variety of international movements. 
Beyond the narrow, grievance-based, binary analysis of victims and 
perpetrators, there are several factors which complicate the mobilisational approach 
mentioned by van Klinken (2007b). These include the heterogeneity of most 
Indonesian communities, differential interests and perceptions, subterranean 
interventions by a melange of trustees, patrons and allies, deliberate 
misrepresentations in the name of adat, governinent officials espousing populist 
rhetoric while practicing an exclusionary form of gentle compulsion, uncertainty in 
the decentralised legal framework, and strategically sophisticated corporate public 
relations and mediation teams. 
Within an optimal Indonesian framework for decentralisation, expectations 
are that a local government with newly devolved responsibilities, facing direct 
elections for the first time, will be more fiscally responsible, constituency-oriented, 
downwardly accountable, and broadly representative. Similarly, reducing the 
constraints on local communities will enhance citizen participation and political 
awareness, leading to a proliferation of contestations and struggles aided 
by 
benevolent NGOs and burgeoning activist networks. 
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The corporation, though somewhat insulated from these changes as a result of 
its legally-binding contract and obligation to maximise profits, may voluntarily adopt 
the notations of corporate social responsibility. In addition, corporate managers will 
highlight their increasing contributions to community development programmes, and 
appease critics with their newly-found commitment to transparency, consistent with 
the democratic imperatives of the reform era. 
Such mainstream narratives will be critically examined throughout this 
chapter, which draws on firsthand field research from the contested areas around 
Soroako, the principal site of PT Inco's expansive nickel mining and smelter project. 
Specifically, this chapter examines the extent to which local autonomy enables adat 
communities to challenge the constitutive political conditions that have, for so many 
decades, served to disenEranchise and dominant them. The surrogacy of NGO allies 
and activist associations largely drives these political challenges, reconfiguring adat 
so as to serve as a rallying point for aggrieved villagers, those disillusioned by the 
legacies of legal uncertainty and political disenfranchisement. 
In order for the complex and highly politicised process of adat revivalism to 
resonate with an international audience, there have been innovative efforts by local 
communities and their supporters to align notions of adat with environmentalism and 
the harmony ideologies of indigenous rights campaigners. These constructed 
discourses often translate into substantive political struggles on the ground, though by 
no means does this guarantee unanimity, improvements in local livelihoods, or 
resolution of long-standing disputes. Indeed, the political strategies designed, funded 
and coordinated by external supporters have the potential to empower or marginalise 
local client communities, exemplify or misrepresent the intended beneficiaries, and 
alleviate or exacerbate violent land disputes. 
Framing these complexities within the permissible discourses of 
decentralisation, it is important to assess the ways in which enhanced participation, 
representation, and accountability provide adat communities with new opportunities 
and arenas for struggles over land. Specifically, the extent to which third-party 
intervention fosters a growing dependency on outside representation, shapes local 
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perceptions, and marginalises ordinary villagers in the dispute resolution process shall 
be assessed. By foregrounding the struggles of indigenous Soroakans and Karongsi'e 
Dongi, the degree to which adat revivalism has produced tangible results in the 
context of decentralisation shall be also examined, along with the willingness of all 
protagonists to collaborate in search of a comprehensive solution to local land 
disputes. 
The Nickel Project in Matano 
With the exception of Robinson (1986), no history of the Lake Matano region has 
been published, nor has it figured prominently in the historical records of either the 
Kingdom of Luwu or of the Dutch occupiers. Robinson (1986: 59) used missionaries' 
and explorers' reports, as well as documents from the Indonesian National Archives, 
to help "throw light on events in the region around Lake Matano, fleshing them out 
with the oral history of the people themselves". It has been established that Soroakan 
and Karongsi'e Dongi villages were located on the shores of Lake Matano in the 
nineteenth century, and so fell within a political domain that straddled the periphery 
of the Kingdom of Luwu. 
The incorporation of Matano into the Bugis Kingdom of Luwu in the late 
nineteenth century was fon-nalised through intennarriage and the payment of tributes. 
One consequence was that local customs and traditions gradually became 
synonymous with Bugis CUStOMS. 313 Therefore, while "asserting an autonomous 
identity as the indigenous people of Soroako, they were simultaneously taking on 
Bugis cultural practices as part of the reassertion of that identity" (Robinson 
1986: 92). The Buginisation of the Matano domain was just one of a series of 
intrusions upon the customs and traditions of local indigenous communities. 
In 1905, for instance, the Kingdom of Luwu was incorporated into the Dutch 
colonial empire, and troops were deployed in order to "subjugate the natives" (Roth 
2005: 491). While the Karongsi'e Dongi still resided in the highlands, it is likely they 
313 The indigenous peoples of Matano were also culturally and linguistically related to the Mori of 
Central Sulawesi (Robinson 1986: 1). 
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were caught up in colonial "buffer politics" meant to create a boundary between the 
highlands and lowlands, thus preventing the spread of Islam (Roth 2005: 493). 
Christian missionary activity, driven primarily by the Association of Dutch Reforined 
Mission (or GZB), was establishing strong roots in the highlands of Luwu and 
neighbouring Tana Toraja (Ngelow 2004: 5). 
Beyond religious containment, colonial rule in Sulawesi (after 1910) was 
becoming much more direct and policy shifts much more purposeful. Administrative 
control was sought, which required control of the population and therefore 
resettlement was encouraged: "villages and homesteads were moved from locations 
high in the mountains to sites closer to new roads" (Robinson 1986: 73). Taxation and 
forced labour followed, and regulations were imposed in order to end the 'slash and 
bum' swidden cultivation that characterised agrarian practice in Matano prior to rice 
paddy field cultivation. This change introduced permanent cultivation, and crucially, 
brought the concept of private land ownership into the region. 
When the Darul Islam rebellion reached the shores of Matano, the Soroakans,, 
who were for the most part nominal Muslims, fled to neighbouring towns such as 
Nuha and Malili, the capital of what is now East Luwu district. By contrast, the 
Karongsi'e Dongi community faced a stark choice; they could either renounce 
314 Christianity, flee, or be killed . Very 
few voluntarily converted to Islam, meaning 
that the majority fled to other parts of the island, some going as far as Poso in Central 
Sulawesi, Routa-Towuti in Southeast Sulawesi, and Manado in North Sulawesi. 
By the time the rebellion was defeated (1965), PT Inco was amongst a host of 
multinational corporations bidding for control of the vacant land in and around 
Matano. With the onset of the New Order (1966) came repressive campaigns to 
standardise village affairs and promote uniformity throughout Indonesia. Land 
alienation was a common feature of this era, paving the way for most of the ongoing 
disputes in Sulawesi involving customary communities. 
Building on earlier explorations, the Celebes Mining Company (Mijnbouw 
Maatschappij Celebes) began operations in 1941, though this productive period was 
314 Interview with Karongsi'e Dongi activists (names withheld), in Soroako on 16 April 
2006. 
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short lived (Robinson 1986: 79). War, occupation and rebellion had reached the shores 
of Lake Matano, and investment was not forthcoming until the corporatist New Order 
regime brought stability and a commitment to modem development in Indonesia. 
From 1966 onwards, President Suharto guided Indonesia towards a new era of 
modernisation and industrialisation, focusing heavily on the attraction of foreign 
investment. 
As global competition for dominance in resource extraction intensified in the 
1960s, it was found that some 80 per cent of the world's nickel reserves were 
contained "in the tropical zones in the laterite ores" (Bradbury 1985: 137). Vast 
lateritic nickel reserves have been discovered in Nicaragua, Guatemala, the 
Dominican Republic, and Indonesia. In 1968 tenders were invited to bid for contracts 
to explore and develop the nickel ores of Sulawesi, believed to be potentially the 
richest in Indonesia (Robinson 1986: 99). 
On 27 July 1968 International Nickel of Canada (Inco) was awarded a 
Contract of Work from the Indonesian Ministry of Energy and Mining. This was a 
thirty-year contract, to commence once exploration was completed and a stage of full 
production was reached. In 1973 the company announced the first phase development 
"in conjunction with PT International Nickel of Indonesia, a majority-owned 
subsidiary of Inco" (Bradbury 1985: 140). 
When PT Inco finally entered into a phase of full production in December 
1978, at a cost of some US$820 million, it was decided that the nickel-producing 
plant would be permanently located in the village of Soroako (Robinson 1986: 
101). 
The Soroako complex was designed to employ 4,000 persons at full production, with 
annual production expected to top 45,360 tons of nickel (Bradbury 1985: 
140). 
Local indigenous communities have since been embroiled in a protracted land 
dispute with the District Government of Luwu as well as PT Inco. 
Adverse 
environmental impact, land alienation, and threats to the traditional patterns of 
life 
were some of the principal points of contention. Soroakan and 
Karongsi'e Dongi 
grievances were channelled into political campaigns for compensation. 
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PT Inco's original Contract of Work (1968-1996) stipulated that the company 
should strive to maximise the benefits of the nickel project for regional development. 
The company also issued a mandate to hire locally, and to compensate indigenous 
inhabitants dependent on land and waterways for fruit fanning and drinking water 
that had been forced to resettle because of operational imperatives (Hilson 2002: 71). 
It was found that "the company would be obliged to pay reasonable compensation for 
dwellings, cultivated land, or any other [ ... ] lands that were damaged or taken over by 
the company" (Robinson 1986: 10 1). Such obligations constitute the social element of 
the company's responsibilities, alongside obligations to pay royalties, rents and taxes 
to the state. 
As a basis for determining eligibility for compensation, the principle of forced 
resettlement is contentious. Soroakan and Karongsi'e Dongi families had been 
displaced by the rebellion, and upon their gradual return to Matano discovered that 
their residential and agricultural lands had been auctioned off to corporate bidders by 
the New Order regime. Technically, PT Inco followed procedures and their mining 
and exploration bid was legitimised under state law. The opportunistic Suharto 
government seized upon the "vacant" lands around Matano, pre-empting the return of 
the Karongsi'e Dongi and Soroakan diasporas. 
The early returnees, already traumatised by Westerling's pacification 
campaign and the voracity of the Darul Islam rebellions, faced a new reality: 
industrialisation. For those willing to confront the PT Inco nickel project, forged from 
the collusion of ravenous govenunent officials and predatory investors, there was 
little political or legal representation available, and very few points of leverage from 
which to engage in negotiations over matters of compensation. 
Having fled far and wide, Karongsi'e Dongi families were slower to return, 
but when they did trickle back to their homeland, they found their village, located two 
kilometres from Soroako, to have been overlain by a corporate golf course. From 
1972 onwards, former Karongsi'e Dongi lands were being converted into housing 
units and amenities for PT Inco employees with greater rapidity. In order to 
build a 
case for compensation, these families needed to present genealogical evidence, 
181 
drawing on their residential and cultivation patterns. This was complicated by the fact 
that no coherent "system" of inheritance really existed; rather, the rice-paddy fields 
first encouraged by Dutch controlleurs had only been maintained for two or three 
generations (Robinson 1986: 119). 
For adat communities, custom, ritual and survival revolved around access to 
arable land rather than rationalised, systematised notions of private ownership. Where 
there was legible documentation and legal certification, the majority was either lost or 
destroyed during the crises; the wrath of rebellion left little more than burnt-out 
remnants of houses, cemeteries, rice fields and plantations. 315 
Consistent with the era of developmental authoritarianism, investment and 
secunty were paramount, and disparate customary claims were generally seen as 
antithetical to the national interest. PT Inco's contractual obligations to compensate 
the victims of "forced resettlement" derive only from their mining operations, not the 
legacy of rebellion or the maladministration of the Indonesian government. Despite 
mounting local protests, the company maintained its uneven hiring policy (only 140 
locals hired), refused to accept the blame for receding waters levels in Lake Matano, 
and failed to commission studies about the envirom-nental effects of gaseous mine 
pollutants (Hilson 2002: 71). 
Throughout the 1970s the district government of Luwu was certainly inept, 
but not entirely idle, for there were initiatives and committees established to 
investigate land claims and community grievances. 316 Lands were surveyed, market 
prices were scrutinised, transactions were monitored, and an attempt to determine the 
precise number of households eligible for recompense was made. 
315 Interview with Karongsi'e Dongi activists (names withheld), in Soroako on 16 April 2006. 
316 In 1975, for instance, the Mayor of Luwu, at the behest of the Governor of South Sulawesi, 
established a Compensation Committee (through ordinance number 15/1975) in order to compile an 
inventory of land sales and to collect data about land ownership and development in Soroako and the 
surrounding areas. This information is contained in the document 'Chronology of Dispute 
Resolution 
over Land Compensation in Soroako from the Operational Activities of PT Inco, ' obtained 
from PT 
Inco's Department of External Relations, Soroako, on 16 April 2006. 
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At one juncture, it seemed that compensation in the form of land allocations 
and cash contributions would reach the aggrieved communities. 317 However,, hopes 
faded as venal politicians began to issue contradictory statements, compensation 
funds vanished, relocation settlements were disputed, villagers were confronted by 
the violence and intimidation of security forces, excluded from negotiations, and 
ultimately prevented from obtaining vital information with respect to their cases. 318 
Based on PT Inco's own chronology of events, the Mayor of Luwu issued a 
decree on 29 May 1974, offering cash settlements totalling 42,413,793 rupiah. 319 
Once PT Inco accepted this figure, the district government of Luwu was entrusted 
with the task of allocating these funds to eligible claimants. From the outset, however, 
the amount offered was considered far too low, heightening people's suspicions about 
a negotiation process fraught with irregularities. As a result, only ten per cent of 
eligible landholders accepted the money by the end of 1975; and by 1978, just 25 per 
cent had bowed to governmental and military pressure, accepting a revised financial 
settlement (Robinson 1986: 182). 
Acting on the advice of two indigenous Soroakans who had risen to 
prominence as civil servants of rank in Jakarta and Makassar, a lawyer was authorised 
to represent the community in all further negotiations over land compensation 
(Robinson 1986: 182). It has been argued that the Soroakans "were fortunate in having 
connections with more sophisticated people in the city" (Robinson 1986: 187). 
According to PT Inco's records, a lawyer named Mustamin Dg. Matutu S. H. 
assumed authority over the case, enlisted by Soroakans to represent them in the 
protracted legal dispute with PT Inco and the district government. 320 A compromise 
was eventually reached whereby PT Inco agreed to pay out additional compensation, 
317 In 1974 the negotiating parties determined that 137 Soroakan households qualified for 
compensation (Robinson 1986: 119). 
318 See Robinson (1986) for a detailed and rich account of these early compensation disputes. 
319 Mayoral Decree Number 29/11/KDL/74 and all compensation figures are listed in the 'Chronology 
of Dispute Resolution [ ... ]' 
document obtained from PT Inco on 16 April 2006. 
320 According to PT Inco's 'Chronology of Dispute Resolution [ ... ]' 
document, the appointment of 
Mustamin Dg. Matutu S. H. as the community's lawyer was recorded by the District Court of Palopo, 
and formalised through Letter of Authority Number 352/S/1975, dated 28 February 1975. 
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but would avoid losing face by labelling these payments as charitable contributions in 
the amount of 33,363,000 rupiah. 321 
On 9 August 1978 the Indonesian Ministry of Energy and Mining decreed that 
the process of land compensation for the operational activities of PT Inco in Soroako 
had been rectified and finalised. PT Inco was to ensure that all legal documentation 
for the land release would be issued, and all compensation paid, after which the 
company would no longer have any legal obligation to deal with further accusations 
or complaints regarding concession lands (Robinson 1986: 183). 
Despite this attempted compromise, the catalogue of errors continued as 
clerical mistakes were identified,, leading to misallocations, mistaken identities, and 
even cases where non-claimants received compensation (Robinson 1986: 184). Legal 
procedures had stalled because of the volume of unverifiable claims being made, as 
well as the refusal by recognised claimants to accept any money before the matter 
was legitimately resolved. This provides the first indication of disunity within the 
community. 
When there was nothing but a shared sense of grief in the community (from 
1968-1974), this could be channelled towards a broad-based oppositional campaign 
against the perpetrators-PT Inco and the government. With the prospect of cash in 
hand and land, however, fissures emerged as some households were naturally tempted 
to accept any offer to alleviate their sufferings, which was interpreted by other 
households as a betrayal of community solidarity and the principles of their struggle. 
Differences were also amplified between local PT Inco employees, the 
beneficiaries of sub-contracting jobs that arose periodically, those attempting to 
revive notions of adat rights, members of transmigrant communities, and those 
without any affiliations, rendered anonymous by the forces of industrialisation and 
modernisation. In their efforts to represent Soroakan claimants, members of the 
officially sanctioned Compensation Committee grew increasingly bold, seeking to 
expose the corrupt practices of government officials. For their efforts, many were 
321 Figures from PT Inco's 'Chronology of Dispute Resolution [ ... ]'. Combining the two 
instalments, 
the total figure to be paid out was: 42,413,793 + 33,363,000 = 75,776,793 rupiah. 
184 
detained and some even labelled as communist provocateurs. 322 In such a climate of 
political uncertainty, people began to reassert their adat rights over lands. 
By 1979 a significant proportion of villagers were selectively 'reviving' 
notions of customary tenure to support direct appeals for official recognition. These 
appeals were often based on romantic portrayals of the village, within which land 
tenure was consistent with traditional patterns of life, ancestral inheritance, and the 
principle of first cultivation (traceable back to the pioneering settlers who first cleared 
and cultivated lands in Matano). The first official response to claims for adat rights 
over village land was denial; the relevant authorities refused to sign documents that 
local people needed in order to "transfon-n their customary rights in land into rights 
under the modem law" (Robinson 1986: 196). 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, profitable mining operations continued to 
expand in Soroako, without serious political challenges. In 1996 a new contract was 
concluded with the Suharto regime running until 2025, with PT Inco committed to a 
C$1.5 billion investment meant to increase laterite nickel output by 50 per cent 
(Moody 1999). The following sections concentrate heavily on the contemporary 
struggles over compensation, focusing on the ways in which notions of adat are 
reconfigured and redeployed to bolster claims over land. 
Reform Era 
Negotiation over compensation for indigenous households displaced by mining 
operations was incremental until 1989, when a social organisation called the 
Indigenous Soroakan Organisation (Kerukunan Wawainia Ash Soroako or KWAS) 
was established. At that time community relations with PT Inco and the government 
were strained, the military apparatus of the New Order regime continued to prevent 
community activists from wielding any political influence, and protests were firmly 
suppressed. 323 
322 Interview with Andi Baso, one of the founders of KWAS, in Soroako on 13 April 
2006. 
323 Interview with Andi Baso of KWAS on 13 April 2006. 
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The history modem developmental NGOs in Indonesia (LBH, WALHI, CD 
Bethesda, WALDA Tana Toraja) suggests that it takes time and perseverance to 
establish a broad base of support from within the community. Likewise, any 
community-based or social organisation established in a conflict zone will need time 
and experience in order to formulate a clear, effective political strategy. 
Preliminary efforts to reassert indigenous rights involved violent 
confrontation, bold public demonstrations, blockades, and forcible land reclaiming. 324 
These disparate strategies proved costly in terrns of security, investor confidence and 
district revenue, and failed to produce a sustainable political solution. Between 1998 
and 2000, however, there were indications that NGOs, trustees and activists were 
becoming more professional, changing the balance of representation at the local level 
by strengthening the formal bargaining position of local communities. 
As a consequence of decentralisation, government officials from East Luwu 
district no longer work in the shadow of provincial authorities or central ministries 
325 
responsible for forestry or mining. PT Inco, for its part, has been more willing to 
address community grievances and is responsive to political pressure from activists 
and their support networks. From the community perspective, Soroakan villagers in 
the 1970s felt blessed to have support and council from metropolitan lawyers and 
civil servants, whereas their plight has now captured the attention of a well-endowed 
and highly sympathetic international audience. Finally, the Karongsi'e Dongi rose 
from obscurity to become the focal point of a sweeping campaign to denounce PT 
Inco's human rights and environmental record. Ironically, as this campaign 
progressed, the plight of actual indigenous victims became of secondary concern and 
was instrumentalised. 
Mobilising around new discourses of local empowennent and emancipation, 
community-based organisations such as KWAS managed to secure a variety of 
324 Lucas and Warren (2003) uncovered similar patterns throughout Java and Sumatra. 
325 Autonomy from central ministries and their directives does not mean that district political 
imperatives are any different, though it does remove some of the insulation from public scrutiny and 
hostility. 
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concessions from PT Inco. 326 These include improvements in hiring policy, job 
security, a focus on the development of skilled workers from within the indigenous 
community, and the provision of electricity (250 watts) to each household in Soroako. 
There are plans to build a free health clinic in Soroako adhering to the same standards 
that PT Inco's own health centres operate under, as well as to improve water quality. 
In addition, KWAS and PT Inco's Department of External Relations have established 
a service whereby the descendants of the original inhabitants of Soroako can register 
and receive a special health card entitling them to free medicine and health care. 327 
Finally, extra funding has been made available to Soroakan families planning to make 
the pilgrimage to Mecca. 328 
By 2006 the administrative capacity of KWAS had evolved significantly, and 
the organisation was able to establish a direct link to PT Inco's External Relations. As 
a result, KWAS was able to better represent the Soroakan community in negotiations 
with PT Inco over the provision of facilities and community development projects. 
See Table 6.1 below for the most recent community development proposals forged by 
KWAS in cooperation with PT Inco advisors. 
326 Interview with Andi Baso of KWAS in Soroako on 13 April 2006. 
327 Interview with Jaharuddin Tosalili, foriner head of KWAS, in Soroako on 
15 April 2006. 
328 Interview with Andi Baso of KWAS on 13 April 2006. 
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Table 6.1: KWAS Community Development Proposals 
Tj fra eI ý: ýý Program ,ý I; guy/ 2006-2007 Building drug To improve community To be managed 
stores access to medicine by KWAS 
cooperative 
April-May Developing To create a centre for water To be managed 2006 Tapulemo Pier transportation, employment by KWAS 
facilities opportunities, and to beautify cooperative 
the coast 
April-June Development of a To encourage trade in farm To be managed 
2006 traditional market produce, to stimulate local by KWAS 
business and create cooperative 
employment 
August- Building of a To preserve cultural and 
September monument historical values, as a symbol 
2006 of harmony between the 
corporation and indigenous 
Soroakans 
June 2006 Supplying To preserve the art and 
equipment for culture of indigenous 
bamboo music and Soroakans 
other art forins 
May- Skills training To improve skills in 
September management, craftsmanship, 
2006 marine first aid, fishing, 
education, and languages 
2006-2007 Water Sanitation Community can be self- 
sufficient in management of 
water sanitation 
2006-2007 Cultural Revive, preserve and spread 
performance the arts and culture of 
indigenous Soroakans 
throughout Matano 
May-June Establish a To preserve the fish 
2006 protected fishing population of Lake Matano 
zone_ 
Source: KWAS Letter Number 01 6/Kwas/SK/IV/2006, obtained II April 2006 
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When set against annual profit margins the costs of such concessions are 
miniscule, and the objectives do not pose a significant political challenge to existing 
conditions. The community development proposals do not even go beyond the basic 
safeguards originally established in PT Inco's first Contract of Work, such as the 
obligation to compensate households for loss or damage to their dwellings, 
agricultural lands, and any other lands affected by mining operations. By branding 
their community development programmes as innovative, democratic reforms, 
therefore, the company has sought to win a public relations victory. 
Local infonnants are wise to these tactics, asserting that their representatives 
from the village government are not forthcoming about matters of importance such as 
district funding, clean-water programmes, or infrastructure projects. 329 Moreover, 
despite the rhetoric of community consultation, those genuinely affected by local 
policy and negotiations are rarely represented and remain largely anonymous. In 
order to appease some critics and appear socially responsible, PT Inco has endorsed 
aspects of the KWAS proposals that commit to preserving and promoting the customs 
and traditions of Soroako. 
In order to showcase passive and harmonious forms of adat, PT Inco is active 
in the documentation of oral traditions, publishing (non-political) books of folklore 
and legends from Matano, such as Mahendra's (2005) Tales of the People and Culture 
of East Luwu. 330 The company also sponsors annual adat celebrations and spectacles. 
For instance, on 22 April 2006 1 attended an event called 'A Night in the Land of 
Bugis' held in appreciation of Buginese art and culture. The district government of 
East Luwu and PT Inco co-sponsored the event, and the Chairwoman of the 
Organising Committee was the mayor's wife. The event organisers felt that "we 
ought to appreciate and preserve the original culture" of the Bugis, a culture which 
has been "passed down from generation to generation, seen through the way of life in 
the language as well as in the arts and the traditions". 
329 Interview with a neighbourhood head (Pak Rukun Tetangga) from Nikkel Village, Old 
Soroako, on 
14 April 2006. 
330 Interview with Edi Suherdi, Manager of PT Inco's External Relations, in Soroako on 
20 April 2006. 
189 
Among the main features that evening was a performance called "Andi-Andi 
Wesabbe Dance" which originates from Soppeng, followed by "Kecapi Music" from 
Wajo which is performed with a traditional string instrument called Pinisi. There was 
also a theatrical performance called "Kondo Buleng" which has been developed in 
Makassar but derives from an original play by the Bajo ethnic group (the people of 
the sea). Finally, a folk dance called "Pepe'-Pepe'Ka Ri Makkah" which means "a 
game from Mecca" was performed; this dance was first introduced when Islam 
entered the Kingdom of Gowa in 1605. 
Bugis sub-groups from throughout South Sulawesi were thus represented in 
their most stylish, colourful, and romantic traditions. As the following section reveals, 
this event was a significant departure and distraction from the oppositional strategies 
developing in Soroako, particularly those revolving around the Karongsi'e Dongi. No 
longer the passive, ideal sub ects of development, different factions from within the 
Karongsi'e Dongi community have been working with external supporters to forge 
innovative political strategies in search of compensation, recognition of land 
entitlements, and protection from future incursions. 
While the support of benevolent allies and expert trustees provides unique 
opportunities for emancipation, it also raises agonisingly complex questions about 
misrepresentation and donor dependency. PT Inco, for its part, promotes a narrow 
cultural view of adat that is devoid of political implications, while the district 
government seems at once ambitious, ambivalent, and cautious on the question of the 
legitimacy of customary land claims. Finally, local communities are divided in their 
perceptions, strategies, and allegiances, mobilising around various interpretations and 
reconstructions of adat, and endorsing an array of disparate, exclusivist agendas. 
Therefore, further analysis of the evolving roles of each protagonist in Matano is 
needed in order to assess the prospects for peaceful resolution of seemingly 
intractable land disputes. 
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Autonomy and District Governance 
Since the implementation of decentralisation there has been an Indonesia-wide trend 
towards administrative blossoming, with the number of districts more than doubling 
between 2001 and 2004 (Duncan 2007: 726). This blossoming involves the scaling 
down of administrative units based on strategic considerations such as control over 
resources,, exclusive access to lakes and rivers, as well as entitlement to annual 
transfer funds (DAU and DAK). 
Consistent with this trend,, Luwu was partitioned into four separate districts- 
Palopo, Luwu, North Luwu and East Luwu. 331 Much to the chagrin of North Luwu's 
politicians, PT Inco's South Sulawesi concession zone now falls exclusively within 
the administrative borders of East Luwu, forging a direct and lucrative link between 
the company and the district capital of Malili. In 2003 PT Inco, though taxes, levies, 
rents,, and royalties, contributed 221 billion rupiah to the district revenue of East 
Luwu, which is significantly higher than the 76 billion rupiah allocated from the 
332 
central government in 2004 as part of the General Allocation Fund (DAU). 
Struggling to escape from the "Dutch disease" (Davis 1995) and the "resource curse" 
(Rosser 2007), East Luwu remains heavily dependent on PT Inco's contributions, 
which causes political distortions and hinders the dispute resolution process. 
The transfer of power from Mamasa (capital of North Luwu) to Malili (capital 
of East Luwu) began as a muddled process of delegation and deconcentration; 
however, a legitimate mandate was needed and officials made preparations for the 
genuine devolution of authority. This culminated in the holding of direct mayoral 
elections in 2005, bringing East Luwu into compliance with revised Decentralisation 
Law 32/2004. As a result,, Haj Andi Hatta Marakarma and his deputy became the 
first-ever directly elected officials in East Luwu District, securing 45.7 per cent of the 
popular vote on 27 June 2005.333 In order to distance themselves from the venality 
331 East Luwu was established as a separate district in 2003, based on Law Number 7/2003. 
332 Data provided by PT Inco External Relations on 14 January 2006. Contributions to district revenue 
and domestic income are based on the 32 per cent figure which is allocated to the principal district (the 
location of the mining contract or plantation concession). 
333 Data from the General Election Commission, South Sulawesi Province, Makassar, published 29 
July 2005. 
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and weakness of past governments, officials have taken a proactive approach to the 
mediation process between indigenous claimants and corporate perpetrators without 
deferring to the authority of PT Inco executives or upper levels of government. 
The newly elected mayor, aware of the importance of resolving local land 
disputes, has attempted to facilitate negotiations between all parties in a relatively 
transparent way. During the New Order all of the government officials were said to 
have acted "as if they knew everything and had all of the control". 334 In the era of 
decentralisation, the government supposedly functions "like a servant" to the 
community, providing essential services, behaving responsibly, and accommodating 
the aspirations of the community in their policies. Fear of district mayors has been 
replaced with respect. 335 
Statements made by subordinate politicians seem to affi-rm the opinions of the 
mayor. For instance, without any signs of trembling, the sub-district head of Nuha 
lauded this new "era of transparency, " where "at all administrative levels there is 
336 [political] access and everyone has the mobile phone number of the mayor". Given 
that Soroako is a heterogeneous town, mainly as a result of transmigration, pioneering 
agriculturists, and foreign recruitment by PT Inco, the role of the sub-district head is 
to "work on improving relations between diverse ethnic groups and religions [ ... 
] for 
example by creating inter-faith cooperation through open forums and community 
empowerment". 337 
Having spent time in the district government complex in Malili, it is evident 
that relations between the district government and PT Inco are productive and 
channels of communication are always open. There are, however politically 
motivated accusations coming from the office of the mayor that the company is "still 
centralistic in its outlook and behaviour". 338 For instance, it is alleged that while the 
district government sacrifices its popularity in order to support PT Inco by managing 
334 Interview with Haj Andi Hatta Marakarma, the Mayor of East Luwu, on 18 April 2006. 
335 Interview with Haj Andi Hatta Marakarma, the Mayor of East Luwu, on 18 April 2006. 
336 Interview with Ade Chandra, the Sub-district Head of Nuha, on 19 April 2006. 
337 Interview with Ade Chandra, the Sub-district Head of Nuha, on 19 April 2006. Ethnic diversity 
in 
Soroako is largely the result of Javanese, Balinese, Torajan and Bugis transmigration. 
338 Interview with Haj Andi Hatta Marakarma, the Mayor of East Luwu, on 18 April 2006. 
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local conflicts and assuaging malcontents, the "corporation does not show any 
appreciation [and] the priority is still the central government" . 
339 Despite these 
concerns,, relations between corporate managers and district officials have improved, 
especially where PT Inco's Department of External Relations is concerned. 
In the ongoing dispute over compensation, land, and customary rights, 
therefore, PT Inco and the government could be viewed as natural allies, 
collaborating in the struggle against villagers and their various external 
representatives. This is an extension of the binary logic discussed in chapter one, 
whereby the powerful impose their will upon the vulnerable. In light of recent 
reforms, however, this logic fails to capture the complexity of local politics in 
Soroako. 
Senior members of the district government have allegedly threatened to 
provoke mass demonstrations against PT Inco if the company failed to provide 
sufficient facilities (bribes) and discretionary allowances. 340 Moreover, local activists 
with international connections appear to have manipulated common villagers in order 
to fulfil their trustee role, bolster land claims, or inflate the rates of compensation 
offered by PT Inco. 34 1 Therefore, simplistic portrayals of natural alliances in the 
struggle over land and resources gloss over the fault lines that divide communities 
internally, rupture the collusive relations between power brokers, and engender a 
sense of suspicious hostility amongst politicians, beneficiaries, NGOs, constituencies, 
and company managers. 
Set against the violent decades of the 1970s and 1980s, however, there have 
been some progressive indicators. PT Inco's endorsement of social responsibility, 
community development, and environmental preservation, for instance, is a marked 
improvement. Specifically, the Department of External Relations, responsible for 
negotiations with the government and the community, has undergone some notable 
changes. 
339 Interview with Haj Andi Hatta Marakarma (the Mayor) on 18 April 2006. 
340 Anonymous source from PT Inco interviewed in Soroako, April 2006. 
341 Personal observations in Soroako, April 2006. 
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Recent personnel changes include the appointment of a new superintendent 
from Sulawesi, Sawedi Muhammad, to help oversee negotiations over land rights and 
compensation. The department also recruited a champion of corporate transparency 
from Jakarta, Again Fatchurrochman, who has been working to harmonise PT Inco 
standards with international standards such as the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI), Sustainability Reporting Guidelines (SGR), Audit and Assurance 
Standards, and International Accounting Standards (Fatchurrochman 2006: 31). 
Through the Global Mining Initiative there are also new standards for sustainable 
development, environmental impact, and mine closure legislation (Cesare and 
Maxwell 2003: 42). 
It is obvious that, while some of the most progressive ideas have recently 
come from the Department of External Relations, corporate policies and practices are 
determined from the offices of upper management and chief executives. Moreover, 
the primary purpose behind the establishment of External Relations is to employ a 
cadre of well trained,, well educated, affable public relations officials to offset the 
negative and sometimes sensationalised press that frequently denounces PT Inco's 
environmental and human rights record. 
As a concession to its newest (reform oriented) members, External Relations 
has also been given a mandate to shape and expand community development 
programmes, building local partnerships with credible actors and responsible 
members of the press. Aware that community development programmes have 
historically been manipulated by local elites, sub-contractors, and members of the 
district parliament for personal gain, External Relations staff attempted to "draw up a 
new system in which the community would be the owners of development. , 
342 There 
is a firm belief that "change has to result from design, not random acts. Therefore 
people in need such as farmers and fishermen should be empowered and should 
, 343 determine where the [community development] funds are allocated' . 
342 Interview with superintendent Sawedi Muhammad, External Relations, on 17 April 2006 
343 Interview with superintendent Sawedi Muhammad on 17 April 2006. This was the logic behind the 
reforms introduced by KWAS, leading to the proposals listed in Table 6.1; however, such reforms 
have 
yet to pay dividends in the Karongsi'e Dongi dispute. 
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It is worth locating such reforms in the wider political context. District 
officials from Gowa,, Palopo, Majene, Seko, and Tana Toraja sought to capture local 
opposition and redirect activists' energies towards non-threatening processes such as 
regulatory deliberation. In East Luwu, authorities encouraged lengthy debates over 
community development to deflect attention away from more fundamental issues 
surrounding land disputes, legal rights, eligibility for compensation, and the right of 
return for the Karongsi'e Dongi diaspora. As the following section demonstrates, 
district power brokers have not entirely succeeded in their efforts to deflect attention 
away from the underlying political dilemmas surrounding land claims in Soroako. 
Constructing an Oppositional Agenda: Case of the Karongsi'e Dongi 
As envisioned by the framers of the decentralisation laws, there are now fon-nal 
mechanisms in East Luwu for villagers to make requests directly to the local 
government or to PT Inco. This occurs through the village head, who is elected by the 
community to represent their interests, acting with the approval of the village 
assembly. However, according to the following account from a PT Inco employee, 
there are still conflicts of interest: 
Local politics are much more complex [challenging mainstream 
decentralisation]. There are many different ethnic groups and 
factions living in the same villages and sub-districts [of East 
Luwu]. What is needed is more thought towards participatory 
mechanisms. There is resistance from the district capital Malili, 
for instance in the parliament, towards these changes. No one 
wants to be overlooked or made redundant in the process, and no 
one wants to lose the benefits that they enjoy from manipulation 
of community development funds or from assistance given by 
PT Inco. 344 
This echoes Kaldor's (2004: 164) critique of political strategies that 
foreground ethnicity and indigeneity, which are held to be divisive and antagonistic. 
What might have been in the best interests of the village or sub-district is now defined 
344 Interview (name withheld), Department of External Relations, on 17 April 2006. 
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in exclusivist terms, foregrounding the grievances of particular groups rather than an 
inclusive whole. The statement also indicates the pervasiveness of corruption and 
entrenched interests in the district. 
Chapter two already cast doubt on general assumptions that the benevolent 
influence of civil society would be positive, embodying a "natural affinity" with 
democracy, local empowerment and participatory democracy (Sch6nwdlder 1997; 
Hadiz and Robison 2005). This section poses specific challenges to such assumptions, 
focusing on the networks that have coalesced around the Karongsi'e Dongi, 
introducing a variety of disparate political strategies into the area, some of which 
have backfired. 
In contrast to the relative isolation of the 1970s and 1980s, the Karongsi'e 
Dongi community now has a network of supporters extending from the provincial 
capital Makassar to Jakarta and beyond. Moreover, they now have an officially 
recognised village representative committee that is not readily excluded from 
negotiations, enjoying frequent access to PT Inco's External Relations Department as 
well as relevant district government agencies. 
Since 1999 activists have encouraged a political strategy that places greater 
emphasis upon adat, building a campaign around the imagery of victimisation and 
exploitation of innocent indigenous peoples. At the fore of such strategies are 
domestic organisations such as WALHI, AMAN-SS, and Yayasan Tanah Merdeka 
(YTM) from Palu, each committed to the preservation and empowerment of the 
ecologically friendly occupants of Soroako's "tribal slot" (Li 2000). Beyond the 
garnering of international support, it was expected adat revivalism would help forge a 
common position within the community, which could then be used to rally support 
behind the campaign for financial compensation from PT Inco and the return of stolen 
lands by the district government. 
The South Sulawesi branch of AMAN, for instance, is committed to 
advocacy, participatory community mapping, and historical documentation in support 
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of Karongsi'e Dongi claims. 345 Moreover, they are active in reporting on current 
events, and provide a link to the English website of the Mining Advocacy Network 
(Jaringan Advokasi Tambang or JATAM) as well as the pressure group Down to 
Earth (DTE). 
From AMAN's national database, membership applications for six adat 
346 communities from (what is now) East Luwu were received on 10 May 2001. A 
common grievance found on these membership forms was land alienation resulting 
from the activities of PT Inco. In support of its regional branch, AMAN Jakarta is 
involved in lobbying and public awareness, and a former member runs a newsletter 
called Down to Earth, an English-Indonesian publication that often reports on events 
involving adat communities in Soroako. 347 
Similarly, members of the Indonesian Forum for the Environment (WALHI) 
South Sulawesi branch actively target large productive estates in an attempt to hold 
them accountable for envirorunental mismanagement as well as rights abuses. 
WALHI's researchers conduct fieldwork, environmental impact assessments, and 
public awareness campaigns; their activists engage in public demonstrations and, in 
some instances, attempt to disrupt mining operations or plantation estates. 348 
Specifically, this organisation attempts to scrutinise Environmental Impact 
Analysis reports (Analisis Dampak Lingkungan or AMDAL) which are carried out by 
the govenunent prior to the issuance of any licenses for extractive activities. 
Unsurprisingly, many of these AMDAL do not adhere to standards of impartiality and 
become politicised. Furthermore, some of its members believe in direct action and are 
committed to the disruption of productive activities in order to pressure companies to 
address community grievances. Some of their activities in relation to PT Inco's 
mining operations have been provocative, and their reporting is often sensationalised. 
345 Interview with staff from AMAN South Sulawesi in Makassar on 02 February 2006. 
346 All membership records for South Sulawesi province were provided by AMAN Jakarta staff on 23 
November 2005. 
347 See, for instance, 'Mass Protests Challenge Inco'. Down to Earth No 67- November 2005, available 
at: htti): //dte. gn. gpc. org/67mi4. htm 
348 Interview with members of WALHI South Sulawesi on 15 March 2006. 
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Representations on behalf of the Karongsi'e Dongi community are also being 
made by local community-based organisations (CBOs) such as the Indigenous 
Karongsi'e Dongi Organisation (Kerukunan Petawawo Ash Karongsi'e Dongi or 
KRAPASKAD), along with priests (pendeta) and members of the LuwU nobility 
(kedatuan Luwu). With so many claiming to speak on behalf of the Karongsi'e Dongi 
community, it inevitably becomes difficult for the district government and PT Inco to 
ascertain who to negotiate with, and for NGO's, who to represent. 349 
According to Arianto Sangaji, a prominent activist working out of YTM Palu, 
Central Sulawesi, this loose coalition lacks a coherent vision for Soroako, as well as 
the commitment necessary to see the process of dispute resolution through to a 
conclusive end . 
350 The resolution of resource conflicts therefore requires "permanent 
organisational forms with institutionalised and democratic leadership, rather than 
informally led, personalistic, ad hoc coalitions which disband when (some of) their 
short-term demands are met" (Sangaji 2007: 330). For very different reasons, PT 
Inco's negotiators agree, giving the following account of the proliferation of NGO 
activity in Soroako: 
In 2000 activism and efforts to support local communities began. 
Many NGOs came to the area [Soroako] and tried to mobilise 
the communities, to give them encouragement to stand up for 
their rights and so on. This was done in an irresponsible way, 
and the NGOs did not spend the necessary amount of time to 
help these communities become self-sufficient and able to 
organise their own affairs. Therefore it was an unfinished job, 
only provoking the community and not building the foundations 
for lasting change or struggle. 351 
In order to stand above this disarray, PT Inco, through the Department of 
External Relations, has attempted to define and set the parameters of the debate. The 
first manoeuvre was to publicly acknowledge that the historical claims of the 
Karongsi'e Dongi have been overlooked (ISRR 2004: 67). This acknowledgment is 
349 Interview with Sawedi Muhammad on 17 April 2006. 
350 Interview with Arianto Sangaji in Palu, Central Sulawesi, on 21 June 
2006. 
351 Interview with Sawedi Muhammad, External Relations, on 17 April 
2006. 
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part of their new-found commitment to corporate social responsibility, and goes some 
way towards satisfying the stipulations in their legally-binding Contract of Work. 
When pressed, however, PT Inco's executive still maintains that all land 
compensation matters arising from nickel production in East Luwu were finalised in 
accordance with the Ministry of Energy and Mining Decree of 1978, contradicting 
statements coming from External Relations. 
PT Inco's public admission constitutes a half-hearted acknowledgment that 
early negotiations and settlements focused primarily on the indigenous Soroakan 
victims of the mining operations and government maladministration, to the detriment 
of Karongsi'e Dongi. There are, however, some records, recollections, and accounts 
of compensation being paid out to Karongsi'e Dongi community leaders, those best 
positioned to consult with local constituents and arrange for the distribution of 
funds. 352 
Rather than systematically allocating compensatory funds to each eligible 
household, these community leaders were thought to have kept the money or sent 
remittances to families which had fled the region. Negotiators from PT Inco as well 
as local third-party informants verified that payments had been made, although this 
was difficult to crosscheck because the recipients were village elders and many 
passed away soon after receiving the funds. There are accounts of receipts being 
issued for all of the funds outlaid to households, witnessed by the mayor in the 1970s, 
though the evidence has either been withheld or lost. 353 The degree of political 
uncertainty surrounding compensation has left many families guarded, and officials 
have not exactly been forthcoming about cash transactions. 
Whatever the circumstances, most observers agree that PT Inco released 
compensation funds in the 1970s, some of which were to be allocated to the 
Karongsi'e Dongi, but that "the district government failed to distribute these funds to 
352 Interview with Andi Yayat Pangeran, third-party to the dispute resolution process, in Malili on 
20 
April 2006. 
353 Interview with Andi Yayat Pangeran on 20 April 2006. 
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the community" in any systernatised way. 354 As allegations of corruption become 
more widespread, attracting the attention of international mining watchdogs, 
ecologists, and human rights campaigners, PT Inco has expressed its willingness to 
reopen the matter of compensation, with specific reference to the social and historical 
355 upheaval that the Karongsi'e Dongi endured in decades past . This is the first 
indication that PT Inco has responded to changing political dynamics at all levels, 
even if the company refuses to acknowledge any land claims that are made in the 
name of adat. 
The criteria used to judge the legitimacy of adat claims can be divided into 
moralistic and legalistic categories. The moralistic approach seems to carry little 
weight, and is often dealt with through patronising community development projects 
and socially responsible goodwill payments. For customary rights to be legally 
binding and enforceable, by contrast, proof of the existence of the adat community 
must first be established. Evidence of an uninterrupted presence within a clearly 
demarcated territory is then required, with the proviso that the forcible removal of the 
community (for instance as a result of conflict) does not nullify the land claim in 
question. In principle, only the voluntary transfer of land (sales and transactions), 
wilful abandom-nent,, or undue neglect can be cause for nullification. 
During the Darul Islam rebellion that preceded the granting of PT Inco's first 
Contract of Work,, the mainly Christian members of the Karongsi'e Dongi community 
were forced to flee under threat of death, after which their vacant lands were 
converted for mining purposes. Compounding these extreme incidents of ethnic 
cleansing and upheaval, the lands around Lake Matano were rapidly auctioned off to 
international investors. The plight of indigenous peoples has since been exacerbated 
by PT Inco's relentlessly expanding mining operations. 356 
The building of a corporate golf course and airstrip has led to the loss of 
agricultural lands, while the construction of a housing estate for employees on the site 
354 Interview with Naomi Werima, Karongsi'e Dongi activist from sub-district Wasuponda, on 21 
April 
2006. 
355 Document titled 'Chronology of Dispute Resolution obtained from PT Inco on 16 April 2006. 
356 Interview with Mahir Takaka, of AMAN-SS, on 17 February 2006. 
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of a Karongsi'e Dongi cemetery has demoralised the community. The inclusion of 
customary forests (which are often considered sacred) in PT Inco's concession zone is 
a grievous offence to those whose ancestors were among the pioneering settlers who 
first cleared and cultivated the lands. Finally, and most visibly, the fact that many 
Karongsi'e Dongi families were forced to reside in neighbouring areas such as 
Wasuponda, paying rents and struggling to re-establish sustainable livelihoods, is 
cause for revisiting the question of compensation and entitlement. 357 
The patterns of customary tenure in Indonesia, from which a degree of 
regularity emerges, dictate that whenever virgin forests and uncultivated lands are 
cleared and then put to use, rights are transferred to those who first engage in these 
productive activities (the pioneers). However, modernising reforms such as the 
introduction of private land ownership and the rationalisation of agriculture are often 
blamed for the gradual erosion of traditional agrarian systems and lifeways. 
Impugning the hallmarks of modernity (industry, technocracy, developmental 
imperatives, and rationalisation) is a selective endeavour, ignoring many of the 
positive, enabling features that support adat revivalism (democratic decentralisation, 
open forums for political discussion, uncensored press, and ecological protectionism). 
It also diverts attention away from the fact that most adat communities have been 
unable to achieve the renewal that Smith (2004: 204) predicted, indicating that the 
capacity to reinvent the past is limited and the intervention of external supporters is 
not a panacea. 
Those whose interests are served by rejecting customary land claims seem to 
mimic their adversaries, the adat revivalists, by falling back on history and selectively 
deploying the most fitting interpretations of events. For instance, without denying the 
rich cultural heritage of Luwu, PT Inco executives or predatory govenu-nent officials 
seek to undermine customary claims by citing the moment in 1957 when the last datu 
(or ruler) of Luwu agreed to join the Republic of Indonesia. 
358 
357 Interview with Mahir Takaka on 17 February 2006. 
358 Although traditional Bugis authorities consented in 1957 to the "abolition of the noble-dominated 
kingdoms, " there remains a notable preoccupation with "ascriptive rank, " hierarchy, patronage and 
clientelism (Millar 1983: 478; Pelras 2000: 18-19). 
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From 1957 onwards, all lands within the fon-ner kingdom of Luw-u 
automatically became state lands. 359 New terms of reference were promptly 
introduced. Hak ulayat (the customary right of avail) was relegated, and vast tracts of 
land were reclassified as productive or protected, thus altering the concept and 
practice of ownership and challenging the founding principles of adat such as 
pioneering cultivation, bestowal, and inheritance. 
Members of Indigenous Karongsi'e Dongi Organisation (KRAPASKAD), 
though still committed to the promotion of customary rights, made the following 
sober assessment: 
The problem is that the adat tenure system is unwritten, with no 
documentation, and therefore one cannot trace back to deten-nine 
who first cultivated the land. All of the infon-nation has been lost 
since the [Darul Islam] rebellion, the displacement of the 
population, and the increasing extent of inter-marriage. 360 
Members of PT Inco,, for their part, rarely shirk an opportunity to contribute to the 
uncertainty surrounding customary land claims. Seeking to dispel overly romanticised 
views of history and tradition in Matano, it has been suggested that since the division 
of Luwu into four separate districts (2001 onwards), intra-elite and familial conflict 
has been endemic. 361 Specifically, local elites are said to rely on specific 
representations of adat in order to capture political office, control the allocation of 
sub-contracting jobs, and determine the particulars of community development 
strategies. 
There is indeed a long legacy of elite capture in Soroako, some of which may 
be blamed on local leaders acting in the name of adat. For the Karongsi'e Dongi 
community, therefore, discourses of adat create opportunities for the resolution of 
land disputes while simultaneously posing threats to the unity and efficacy of their 
bargaining position. 
"9 Interview with Haj Andi Hatta Marakan-na, the Mayor of East Luwu, on 18 April 2006. 
360 Interview with Pak Yusri from KRAPASKAD, Soroako, on 14 April 2006. 
361 Interview with Sawedi Muhammad, External Relations, on 17 April 2006. 
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Proponents of adat revivalism are facing a myriad of unresolved issues related 
to the Karongsi'e Dongi land dispute. Opportunistic governinent officials try to 
remain non-committal, though for the most part there is a reluctance to acknowledge 
customary rights. There have also been accusations that local security forces still use 
repressive tactics in order to dissuade Karongsi'e Dongi activists from engaging in 
politically-charged endeavours such as the reclaiming of ancestral lands. 362 Efforts to 
compensate local victims are complicated by the sheer volume of claims, some of 
which are dubious. Those advocating on behalf of the Karongsi'e Dongi community 
are not united in their approach, and the presence of external NGOs and activists has, 
at times, caused further schisms within the small community (Tyson 2007: 33). 
Towards Reconciliation 
The first direct calls for recognition of customary lands were made on 28 June 2002 
following a meeting of the whole Karongsi'e Dongi community (some 300 
households) in Wasuponda. 363 Despite differences of opinion, the most vocal 
representatives of the Karongsi'e Dongi community managed to elevate their 
demands for the recognition of customary lands to the top of the political agenda, 
honing in on the historically relevant Kopatea area. 364 The agenda, which was by no 
means unanimously sanctioned, determined that recognition of adat lands should 
fulfil both the residential and agrarian needs of the community, endorse the socio- 
cultural revitalisation of the Karongsi'e Dongi people, and include the construction of 
a rumah adat (traditional longhouse) used for rituals, ceremonies and deliberation. 
Finally, it was decreed that any compensation scheme involving resettlement should 
be opposed, for it threatened to divorce people from their ancestral lands. 365 
Evidently, "the non-state-legitimising ideologies of adat" have a way of 
capturing the sense of collective grievance within the Karongsl'e Dongi community, 
362 Interview with Naomi Werima, Karongsi'e Dongi activist, on 21 April 2006. 
363 Based on Letter Number 590/121/KN-VII/2002 issued on 5 July 2002 by the Sub-district 
Government of Nuha. 
364 Kopatea is site of the former Karongsi'e Dongi village that was converted into a corporate golf 
course. 
365 Letter Number 590/12 1 /KN-VII/2002, Sub-district Government of Nuha. 
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drawing on the symbolism of an ecologically- sound people victimised and oppressed 
by the vices of capital and the greed of politics (Fitzpatrick 2007: 138). Here the 
formative traumatic events of the Darul Islam rebellion and the mining project are 
signifiers of unity within the community, from which a sense of "political mission" 
emerges (Asari et al. 2008: 3). Articulate, skilful activists have long sought to 
redeploy adat as a rallying point for the many disenfranchised citizens, appealing to 
their sense of identity and their historic ties to place in the Lake Matano domain. 
Buoyed by the political momentum surrounding adat revivalism, community 
activists began to make their demands more explicit. For instance, during village 
meetings held in 2002 and 2003, local activists argued that all of the 300 Karongsi'e 
Dongi households residing throughout East Luwu should be eligible for a 
renegotiated compensation package. 366 By extension, this implies that all of the 
Karongsi'e Dongi should be recognised as victims of the land alienation that began in 
the 1970s. 
All parties to the dispute were therefore forced to consider claims regarding 
the inherent rights of one specific group to govern or control land "by virtue of its 
historic attachment to place" (Li 2007: 338). In order to avoid violent incidents of land 
reclaiming (as witnessed in Bulukumba--chapter seven), the district government, PT 
Inco negotiators, and community representatives attempted to reconcile their 
positions and reach an accommodation. The first manoeuvre by the government was 
to urge the Karongsi'e Dongi community to elect an inclusive, representative village 
compensation committee. As a result, five representatives were chosen to work on the 
behalf of the community, entrusted to engage in all future negotiations with PT Inco 
and the district government. 
By March 2004 these five individuals were formally recognised as bargaining 
partners by the Mayor of East Luwu, and were given the title of Team Five Dongi or 
367 'Tim Lima Dongi' . Unlike the original village compensation committee established 
by the Soroakans in 1974, Team Five Dongi (hereafter T5D) is not comprised solely 
366 Interview with Anwar Hafid, Head of Governance Division, on 18 April 2006. 
367 Interview with Anwar Hafid, Head of Governance Division, on 18 April 2006. 
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of local elites. However, as will be discussed further, there have been concerns raised 
about the selection process, and not all villagers approve of their representatives. 
Since its inception the T5D has served two functions. First and foremost, it 
has been entrusted the internal task of representing the interests of the community, 
which requires transparency and effective communication. As further examination 
will show, a lack of cohesion within T5D, coupled with miscommunication, human 
error, and political manipulation, has served to undermine the dispute resolution 
process. 
The second function of T5D was to engage in negotiations with government 
officials and PT Inco managers. Following the issuance of Mayoral Decree Number 
112. A/2004 on 4 June 2004, the T5D was incorporated into a larger Dispute 
Resolution Committee or 'Tim Terpadu'. At the behest of the Mayor of East Luwu, 
this committee was granted a specific mandate for resolving the increasingly 
labyrinthine land conflict. 
Table 6.2 below reveals that the Dispute Resolution Committee consists of all 
relevant stakeholders, including the T5D and other NGOs, indicating a procedural 
commitment to representation. 
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Table 6.2: Structure of the Dispute Resolution Committee 
Positions Particulars 
Directors 1. Mayor of East LuNvu 
2. Regional Secretary, East Luwu District 
3. PT Inco Management 
Head Governance Sector Assistant, East Luwu District 
Deputy Head Administrative Sector Assistant, East Luwu 
District 
Secretary Director of Law and Order, East Luwu District 
Additional Members 1. Head of the Regional Development Planning 
Board, East Luwu District 
2. District Agency of Mining, Energy and the 
Environment 
3. District Agency of Manpower and 
Transmigration 
4. Head of the National Land Agency, North 
Luwu District 
5. District Bureau of Community Empowerment 
and National Unity 
6. District Bureau of Law and Organisation 
7. Sub-District Head of Nuha 
8. District Bureau of Public Administration 
9. Sawedi Muhammad-Department of External 
Relations, PT Inco 
10. A. M. Yayat Pangerang-NGO NCC 
11. The Village Head of Magani 
12. The Village Head of Ledu-Ledu 
13. H. Andi Baso, founder of KWAS 
------------------------------------------------- 
[Members of Team Five Dongil 
14. Yadin Wololl 
15. Ramli Laduri 
16. Agusmail. D 
17. Steven Siape 
18. Werima Mananta 
Infori-nation contained in Mayoral Decree Number 112. A/2UU4, tast Luwu vistriCL 
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The inauguration of this Resolution Committee marked the beginning of 
formal efforts to reach a comprehensive, localised solution to protracted land dispute. 
What needs to be examined further is the composition of this Teamq in particular the 
political agendas of the community representatives from T5D. This will be followed 
by an investigation of the contested political issues surrounding customary land 
claims: who from the Karongsi'e Dongi community should be compensated, and what 
should they receive? The outcomes are highly dependent on the constructed 
perceptions and real consequences of adat revivalism. 
Beginning with composition,, Ramli Laduri of the T5D comes from a humble 
farming background and wants desperately to reach an agreement that will improve 
local livelihoods. 368 His confrontation with PT Inco began in 1999 when he objected 
to the damage done to a Karongsi'e Dongi cemetery during the development of a 
housing complex for company employees. 369 In 2003 police allegedly threatened to 
incarcerate him or even shoot him if he did not abandon his campaign. It was not the 
threats but rather the long years of prostration and deadlock that drove Laduri to 
endorse the pragmatism of political compromise and reconciliation, marking a 
definitive shift away from the idealism of a Karongsi'e Dongi awakening. 
Another T51) member, Erik Stephen Siape, is a local sub-contractor who has 
business dealings with PT Inco. This association with the business side of the 
company casts doubt upon Siape's neutrality, though his performance during a 
370 
meeting with PT Inco negotiators was professional . While 
he seems ambivalent in 
his approach to the concept of customary lands, he does recognise the importance of 
understanding and overcoming the ethnic divisions in the Matano area. 
371 
A third member, Werima Mananta, has devoted much of her time to the 
forging of global links and support networks in order to consolidate a local strategy 
368 Interview with Ramli Laduri, member of T51), in sub-district Wasuponda on 21 April 2006. 
369 In Soroako there are two staff dormitories-Old Camp and Housing Block F- for labourers, while in 
the 'suburbs' of Pontada and Salonsa some 250 upper-level managers and supervisors have taken up 
residency. 
370 Personal observations during a meeting between the negotiating parties in Soroako on 26 
April 
2006. 
371 Interview with Erik Stephen Slape, member of T513, in Soroako on 26 April 2006. 
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for the recognition and bestowal of customary land rights. During my field research in 
East Luwu Werima Mananta was in Jakarta advocating, lobbying and recruiting for 
the collective cause of disenfranchised Soroakan villagers. She represents a faction 
unwilling to compromising when it comes to the principles of adat, such as the 
honour of the Karongsi'e Dongi community and their rightful claims over lands 
bequeathed to them by their beloved ancestors. As these brief vignettes demonstrate, 
there is a clear divergence in the approaches favoured by each of these three members 
of T5D. 372 
Werima Mananta seems to be the most politically active of the T5D members. 
On 13 November 2006, for instance, she was a participant at the 'Roundtable on 
Corporate Social Responsibility and the Extractive Sector in Developing Countries' 
held in MontreaL Canada. This roundtable was hosted by an organisation called 
Mining Watch Canada. 373 Werima Mananta (2006a) used this forum to highlight the 
plight of the Karongsi'e Dongi community in Soroako, focusing on land alienation 
and the ongoing struggle for compensation. 
The Mining Advocacy Network (JATAM), in partnership with AMAN, has 
also provided support for Karongsi'e Dongi activists. 374 Through these international 
forums, Werima Mananta has been able to further her public awareness campaign, for 
instance reporting on hunger strikes by indigenous Karongsi'e Dongi. She has also 
been lobbying the Indonesian and Canadian governments over matters such as the 
upholding of basic human rights, and environmental issues such as banning open pit 
mining in protected forest areas. While this strategy may enhance the notoriety of her 
constituency, attracting an international audience, it has yet to translate into 
substantive change on the ground. The most intractable dilemmas are local in origin 
and may require a local solution. 
372 1 was only able to personally interview two members of T5D, Ramli Laduri and Erik Stephen Siape. 
The other three members-Werima Mananta, Yadin Wololy and Agusmail Wangdah-were not in East 
Luwu at the time of my fieldwork. 
373 Mining Watch Canada also paid for Andi Baso to travel to Sudbury Ontario to address PT Inco 
shareholders in 2000. 
374 The Mining Advocacy Network (http: //wwwjatam. org/) publishes reports by activists such as 
Werima Mananta (2006b), spreading domestic and local awareness about events such as the Montreal 
Roundtable. 
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Werima Mananta's sister, Naomi Mananta, a Protestant priest, is also actively 
going global, using her oratory and literary skills to appeal to the international 
community. For instance, Naomi Mananta (2002) attended the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development in Bali, held from 25 May to 7 June 2002. At this summit 
she delivered a paper entitled 'The Existence of the Karongsi'e Dongi Adat 
Community, ' introducing a wider audience to the perils of community displacement 
and the vices of PT Inco's mining operations. Both Mananta sisters are thus pursuing 
a similar global agenda, though there appears to be a divergence in their approach 
when it comes to local, grassroots strategy. Indeed, as will be discussed further, 
Naomi Mananta is at times highly critical of the T51), the compensation committee to 
which her sister belongs. 375 
Ramli Laduri is the only negotiator to have expressed a willingness to die for 
his community. Without detracting from his commitment to the emancipation of the 
Karongsi'e Dongi, Laduri's skills appear better suited to agrarian matters. At the 
negotiating table he seems awkward and inarticulate. 376 Erik Stephen Siape is 
entrepreneurial, competent, and better suited to roundtable negotiations, though his 
focus seemed to be parochial. The Mananta sisters are, by contrast, attempting to 
develop a path-breaking strategy, one hinged on the primordial view that insists links 
are maintained with an authentic past, while simultaneously seeking to map out new 
political terrain, selectively appropriating historical meanings and symbols in order to 
legitimise their actions. 
The Politics of Compensation 
In a new round of negotiations sanctioned by the mayor of East Luwu through a 
variety of decrees and directives, both PT Inco and the district government have 
exercised caution in the selection of bargaining partners, and have been more 
transparent in the determination of eligible claimants from the Karongsi'e Dongi 
community. Early attempts in 2003 to facilitate deliberations between all 
300 
375 Interview with Naomi Mananta, activist from Wasuponda, on 21 April 
2006. 
376 Personal observations during a meeting between the stakeholders 
in Soroako on 26 April 2006. 
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Karongsi'e Dongi households failed to reach consensus on who is eligible for 
compensation and on what basis land claims should be made. 
To minimise the risk of a backlash, a genealogical survey was undertaken in 
sub-district Wasuponda, where the ma ority of Karongsi'e Dongi now reside. T5D 
members endorsed this process. According to participants, the tracing of lineage 
required door-to-door surveying, supervised by three Karongsi'e Dongi elders with 
knowledge of local history. 377 The method for validating claims was based on three 
principles: the claims must be genuine, inclusive, and proportional. 378 However, even 
the strictest of methods cannot avoid the fact that historical reconstructions are 
selective and political, particularly when the results will be used to support lucrative 
compensation claims. Ultimately, 57 households were deemed to have qualified for 
compensation (cash and resettlement). 
Recommendations were passed on to the Office of the Mayor of East Luwu, 
who swiftly promulgated Mayoral Decree Number 166/2004 in recognition of the 57 
Karongsi'e Dongi households, listing each by family name. By endorsing this 
process, PT Inco and the district government have in fact conceded that Karongsi'e 
Dongi claims derive from their primordial, ancestral links to the disputed lands. 
Limiting the number of eligible households to 57, however, was bound to provoke a 
hostile response from some quarters. One informant suggested that the rapidity of the 
mayor's response was a manoeuvre to avoid counter-claims and pre-empt any 
negative reactions from the community. 
379 
Historical reconstructions are open-ended and easily manipulated. Naomi 
Mananta, for instance, openly contests the recommendations put forth in Mayoral 
Decree 166/2004, recounting that prior to the Karongsi'e Dongi exodus in the 1950s, 
there were at least 70 households inhabiting and cultivating the 
lands that were 
consumed by PT Inco's mining operations. 
380 If so inclined, one could trace this 
377 Interview with Andi Yayat Pangeran, third-party negotiator, on 
20 April 2006. 
378 Interview with Anwar Hafid, Head of Governance Division, on 
18 April 2006. 
379 Interview with Andi Yayat Pangeran, third-party negotiator, on 
20 April 2006. 
380 Interview with Naomi Mananta. in Wasuponda on 21 April 
2006. 
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dispute back to the turn of the twentieth century, when the first generation of 
Karongsi'e Dongi abandoned the highlands and resettled near Lake Matano. 
The process has caused resentment among those excluded from the 
compensation list and exacerbated conflicts amongst the eligible households. It is not 
surprising that a household deemed eligible based on residential and cultivation 
patterns from the 1950s has since expanded significantly. With each new generation 
the number of claimants mushrooms. All but two of the 57 family heads listed in the 
district government gazette are deceased, placing the burden upon their executors and 
relatives to decide whether to accept this resolution and reach a compromise. 
Beyond disagreements about the outcome of the genealogical study, there 
have also been objections regarding the process. Following the appointment of the 
T5D,, for instance,, Naomi Mananta worked with the community in Wasuponda to 
establish an accountability mechanism. Without seeking an official mandate, 
concerned citizens set up a kerukunan (or management board) to monitor their 
representatives. 381 Members of this kerukunan allege that they were not consulted by 
T5D prior to the submission of their final recommendations to the Mayor of East 
Luwu: 
T5D is under the management [kerukunan] of the Karongsi'e 
Dongi people, but this Team does not represent all the needs of 
the community. When the Mayoral Decree [Number 166/2004] 
about the 57 households was passed the kerukunan did not know 
about this. Why did T5D not discuss the issues with the 
community first? They are not all honest, and some are too young. 
T5D does not have a good form of communication and the 
community is never informed about the plans made by the Team, 
the district government, or PT Inco. Also, members of the Team 
must have received "something" for their efforts and therefore 
neglected the community interests. 
382 
381 Interview with Naomi Mananta. in Wasuponda on 21 April 2006. 
382 Interview with Naomi Mananta. on 21 April 2006. 
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Allegations of bribery, the withholding of information, and collusion, long the 
preserve of plundering politicians and callous corporate executives, have now been 
extended to community representatives and appointees. 
Frustrated by the nature of external intervention in the land conflict, one 
informant close to all parties to the negotiation process laments the lack of progress 
made thus far. 383 The Karongsi'e Dongi community is said to lack proper 
representation and is suffering from breakdowns in communication. Hanging 
questions remain with regards to the legitimacy of historical claims to land 
(particularly Bumi Perkemahan), the popular mandate of appointed bargaining 
partners, divisions within and between local communities, and the impact of external 
intervention. 
This testimony is indicative of the many political challenges facing 
negotiators in East Luwu. However, assuming that the eligible claimants would 
eventually reconcile their internal differences or forfeit their struggles, the 
government proceeded with implementation planning. After having considered four 
separate locations in East Luwu, it was decided that an area called Pontawaa in Ledu- 
Ledu village, Wasuponda, was the most appropriate choice for resettlement. 
Pontawaa measures 6.8 hectares and is located approximately thirteen 
kilometres from Soroako in a conservation area designated as protected state lands. 384 
According to External Relations, if all stakeholders approve of this location, it will be 
developed in accordance with the needs of the Karongsi'e Dongi community, 
including provisions of public infrastructure (roads, water, and electricity), annual 
community development projects and training programmes, a school, a church, and a 
rumah adat (customary longhouse). 385 
For each of the 57 eligible households, a plot of land measuring 20 x 30 M2 
would be allocated,, upon which the family could build a new house. Certificates of 
hak milik (land ownership) would be issued for each household once the new village 
383 Interview with Andi Yayat Pangeran, third-party negotiator, on 20 April 
2006. 
384 Figures obtained from a map of the proposed location for the Karongsi'e 
Dongi community 
produced in 2005 by the Agency of Mining, Energy and the Environment, 
East Luwu District. 
385 Interview with superintendent Sawedi Muhammad, External Relations, on 
28 April 2006. 
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was established and the relevant surveys conducted. 386 Reportedly, a standby budget 
has already been approved by PT Inco executives for the project. 387 
PT Inco's commitment to Pontawaa is based on the fact that it does not 
interfere with active mining projects and does not breach any aspect of their Contract 
of Work, which expires in 2025. The government's commitment is based on the fact 
that there is no local opposition to the construction of a new settlement (which, 
incidentally, it true). Still, this is a highly contentious issue as resettlement would 
necessitate the abandonment of Karongsi'e Dongi ancestral lands. Members of 
AMAN South Sulawesi, for instance, wilfully support the fiction that ethnic mapping 
should inform land claims and resource entitlements. 388 At one antiquated stage in 
history the mountainous regions of Luwu were divided according to tribal affiliations 
and ethnicity, though these borders have long since been reshaped by insurrection, 
and overlain by the modem administrative grids envisioned by the Dutch, enforced by 
the Japanese, and consolidated by the Suharto regime. 
This legacy neither eradicated indigenous identity nor nullified all customary 
land claims. It has5 however, restricted the range of permissible political actions, 
providing a foundation for power brokers to consolidate their positions and relegate 
adat to the legal and political margins. Specifically, East Luwu became a legally- 
sanctioned administrative district in 2003, within which there are lower tiers of 
government and pigeon-holed constituencies, creating a degree of pattered regularity 
and rationalised governance. 
Adat revivalists nostalgically refer to the past,, to a time when the primordial 
boundaries of Luwu were divided in accordance with the historic terrains of various 
ethnic and sub-ethnic groups. They lament the fact that modem administrative grids 
overlay the colourful domains of the three Karongsi'e sub-groups tied to Matano, 
which are the Sinongko, the Pae Pae, and the Dongi. However, this selective portrait 
386 All of the features of the proposed compensation settlement have been verbally verified by 
representatives of the District Government of East Luwu, PT Inco's Department of External Relations, 
and T51). As of yet, however, no written agreement has been signed, and voices of dissention still 
exist. 
387 Interview with Sawedi Muhammad on 28 April 2006 
388 Interview with Mahir Takaka of AMAN-SS on 04 May 2006. 
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of rich, pre-modem cultural landscapes ignores the darker legacies of slavery, warfare 
and disease that tainted the colourful tapestries of indigenous life. 
Romanticism aside, the proponents of adat revivalism in Matano are facing 
powerful constraints and structural obstacles that derive from contractual law, 
obligations to shareholders, and overstretched government coffers. PT Inco's 
investments are well defended, and there are concerted efforts to discourage activists 
from reclaiming village land in contested areas, which are located within the mining 
zone. For instance, PT Inco issues periodic warnings about health hazards, citing 
geological surveys determining that high levels of iron make the land unsuitable for 
habitation, and that nickel content is high enough to justify the continued expansions 
of the mining concession zone. 389 Villagers (mainly from Bumi Perkemahan) and 
NGOs (AMAN-SS, WALHI, KRAPASKAD) report that there are also more sinister 
deterrents involving preman (hired thugs) and unscrupulous Intel officers. 
Despite such obstacles, proposals for resettlement will always be challenged. 
In 1979 the Soroakans resisted government orders to relocate to a new village, even 
though it was only a few hundred metres away from what they considered their 
village of origin (Robinson 1986: 272). This was seen a form of exile by the families 
being resettled, creating a social distance between them and their kinsmen. Resistance 
emanating from some members of the Karongsi'e Dongi community mirrors this 
situation, as does their adat-driven response to PT Inco's nickel project. 
In order to maintain a sense of social proximity and avoid the "exile" of 
resettlement, some of the Karongsi'e Dongi proclaimed their unwillingness to leave 
the site of their foriner village. Indeed, clusters of inhabitants can presently be found 
in the contested Bumi Perkemahan area, which technically falls within PT Inco 
concession zone. In April 2006 1 observed twelve households in this area; four in 
clear view of the main road, and eight located deeper into the mining zone. 
390 
Restrictions have been imposed on their activities; for instance, prohibiting signposts 
389 Interview with Anwar Hafid, Head of Governance Division, on 18 April 2006. 
390 Personal observations, April 2006. 
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have been erected which indicate that no cultivation is allowed, and the land cannot 
be put to any productive use. 
During a meeting arranged by Pak Yusri of KRAPASKAD with eight 
391 Karongsi'e Dongi activists, yet another historical reconstruction was offered. 
Activists spoke of the original Karongsi'e Dongi territory as spanning from Buton 
Mountain (Luwu highlands) to the shores of Lake Matano. At present, only 30 
households are said to have remained in what they call Desa Dongi (the original 
Karongsi'e Dongi Village). They were adamant in their demands, which included 
formal recognition and protection of their status as a community with unique 
customs,, traditions and culture,, followed by the rebuilding of their village on its 
original site so that the whole Karongsi'e Dongi community could reunite. 
While each activist present at the meeting was encouraged to participate, only 
three mustered the courage to do so. For the most part they deferred to their NGO 
representative, Pak Yusri, who frequently spoke on their behalf without hesitation, 
even when questions were directed specifically to the activists themselves. Despite 
this tendency, it became apparent that adat revivalism was based on the fact that their 
ancestors originally cultivated and inhabited these lands (Bumi Perkemahan). 
However, they claimed to be deterred by intimidation, accusations that they are 
stealing land, and suffocating restrictions on their activities. 392 Unwilling to 
compromise, they seem trapped in a legal void, unable to secure customary tenure, 
and residing on hazardous PT Inco mining concession lands. As the meeting drew to 
a close, it became apparent that the eight activists unanimously rejected the proposed 
compensation package for resettlement. 393 
Beyond rejectionism, a proactive strategy was needed in order to secure 
various points of leverage for the community. In anticipation of a new round of 
391 This meeting was held on 16 April 2006 in an austere home in the contested Bumi Perkemahan 
area. 
392 Claims made by the Karongsi'e Dongi activists during the meeting in Bumi Perkemahan, 
Soroako 
on 16 April 2006. 
393 Meeting in Bumi Perkemanah, Soroako on 16 April 2006. Some of those present were in fact 
recognised as eligible claimants from the second generation Karongsi'e Dongi, though 
they still 
rejected all proposals to relocate to Pontawaa resulting from Mayoral 
Decree 166/2004 and the 
conclusions drawn from the Dispute Resolution Team. 
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negotiations with PT Inco, eight Karongsi'e Dongi families were encouraged by 
activists (names withheld) to leave Wasuponda in 2000, returning to Bumi 
394 Perkemahan, the supposed lands of their ancestors . By maintaining a presence in 
this area, activists could enter negotiations with at least one political vantage point 
from which to oppose resettlement plans. 
Against the odds, a small cluster of Karongsi'e Dongi families now reside in a 
low-lying valley near the foot of Buton Mountain, in what are effectively 
underdeveloped, mildly hazardous mining concession lands. Upon this reddened 
landscape a small Karongsi'e Dongi church has been built, surrounded by denuded 
hills and a pond of industrial pollutants. 
While the location of these eight families is politically symbolic, the actual 
inhabitants of this isolated community were not highly politicised. Indeed, when 
faced with questions about land disputes, compensation packages and adat rights, 
they were eager to defer to their representatives in Soroako and Wasuponda. 395 These 
people, along with their heritage, are being instrumentalised, caught up in a political 
quandary, and used to help bolster customary claims in a dispute that has seemingly 
evolved beyond their comprehension. 396 
Despite the persistence of those opposed to the resettlement plan, several 
mformants were of the opinion that most of the eligible Karongsi'e Dongi households 
are prepared to accept the Dispute Resolution Committee's compensation proposal. 
Anwar Hafid, Head of the Governance Division in Malili, puts the approval rating at 
70 per cent; Andi Yayat Pangeran, third-party to the dispute, cites the same rate of 
approval (70 per cent). Ramli Laduri from T5D estimated an 85 per cent approval, 
while Irawan Ali, the District Head of Wasuponda, claimed that 90 per cent of 
claimants were prepared to accept compensation proposals. 397 By contrast, some 
394 Personal observations, April 2006. 
395 This line of questioning was withheld until a degree of trust had been established with the 
inhabitants. It had to be made clear that this was impartial research, not part of a government or 
corporate project. 
396 Personal observations, April 2006. 
397 Interview with Irawan Ali, the District Head of Wasuponda, on 25 April 2006. 
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activists with the capacity to disrupt the resolution process reject these favourable 
ratings. 
Despite the lack of consensus surrounding the Pontawaa resettlement project, 
the district government was determined to move ahead with plans to legitimise the 
land acquisition and entitlement rights for eligible households. In 2005 the District 
Agency for Mining, Energy and the Environment produced a comprehensive map of 
the planned relocation site. Representatives from T5D, fully aware that firm steps 
were being taken to implement a resettlement plan, continued to indulge local 
activists by pressing the adat issue. 
On 16 June 2005 T5D issued a formal letter to PT Inco's Department of 
External Relations, with a copy forwarded to the district government, reiterating their 
commitment to customary adat lands in Matano. This public letter bore the signatures 
of all five Karongsi'e Dongi representatives, even though some of these members 
were privately pulling in very different directions. 
As the following section indicates, factions within the small Karongsi'e Dongi 
community have failed to reconcile their positions, and this lack of unity reflects 
poorly on their representatives, who are struggling to move forward in their 
negotiations with PT Inco and the district government. 
Final Deliberations 
In early April 2006, T5D in consultation with the wider community requested 
detailed information from PT Inco about the contested Bumi Perkemahan area, such 
as the results from health studies, environmental assessments, arability, plantation 
rights, and security. 398 In response, PT Inco wrote on 11 April 2006 that lands 
claimed as adat "are in the territory of PT Inco's Contract of Work. From the data 
collection from drilling [ ... 
] the nickel content in that area is sufficient, so it is proper 
for PT Inco to conduct mining activities in that area. We suggest the Karongsi'e 
198 Letter from T51) to the Head of the Dispute Resolution Committee in Malili and forwarded to PT 
Inco, dated 24 March 2006. 
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Dongi community finds another location that can become a permanent place of 
residence". 399 
It was clear from these communiques that influential factions within the 
community rejected the Pontawaa settlement and PT Inco rejected the Bumi 
Perkemahan compromise. It was also evident that the divisions within the Karongsi'e 
Dongi community remain deeply entrenched, and that the negotiating parties do not 
fully trust one another. Perhaps this explains why several years have passed since the 
promulgation of Mayoral Decree 166/2004 and very rudimentary issues remain 
unresolved. 
In an attempt to reconcile these positions, a meeting was held at the 
Department of External Relations in Soroako on 26 April 2006 . 
400 Alarmingly, only 
two of the five members of the T5D negotiating team attended the meeting, to be met 
with an equal number of representatives from PT Inco's Department of External 
Relations. At the first instance T513 circulated a letter requesting a map of the mining 
concession zone that overlays the Karongsi'e Dongi homeland . 
40 1 Data was also 
requested about the drilling and nickel content in this zone. Assuming that there was a 
high (profitable) nickel content in the area, T5D asked their counterparts: "what 
contributions will be provided to the Karongsi'e Dongi community"? Lastly, the letter 
indicated that the Karongsi'e Dongi community demands that these matters be 
resolved prior to any talks about the Pontawaa resettlement project. The particulars of 
this letter were pre-determined in consultation with the Karongsi'e Dongi community 
(though from experience, this does not ensure that it was participatory in any 
meaningful sense). 
Predictably, PT Inco's negotiators began by reminding their counterparts that 
Kopatea and Bumi Perkemahan (the disputed ancestral lands) are located in the 
mining concession zone, as stipulated in the legal Contract of Work. They agreed to 
399 Letter of response from PT Inco to T5D and forwarded to the district government, 
dated II April 
2006. 
400 1 was given permission to attend this meeting and record all of the proceedings. 
The tapes have been 
transcribed and translated verbatim into English. 
40' Letter of Reply Number EXR/138-IV/2006 from T5D to PT Inco and 
forwarded to the district 
government, dated 25 April 2006. This was a response to PT Inco's 
letter issued on II April 2006. 
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provide the drilling data requested, though sidestepped questions about further 
contributions, noting that they remain committed only to community development 
programmes. 
Both parties acknowledged that when PT Inco's contract expires in 2025, the 
lands may be returned to the Karongsi'e Dongi, at the discretion of the district 
government. In the meantime, PT Inco's negotiators encouraged their counterparts to 
consolidate their bargaining position; incremental progress is beneficial to the 
company but detrimental to the community, particularly the 57 households hanging in 
the balance since 2004. 
As is standard corporate practice, PT Inco maintains that the present 
negotiations are a matter of community development, and that any compensation 
offered is tantamount to a goodwill donation. This distinction is made to avoid any 
reference to legalities and to sidestep the debate over the validity of customary land 
402 
claims . This was the same strategy applied in the 1970s when further compensation 
was granted to claimants from the Soroakan community. 
Drawing on the transcripts of the meeting, the following exchange of ideas 
took place, starting with PT Inco's negotiators: 
Now that both sides want to resolve [this dispute] in a harmonious 
way, we do not want to engage in a legal process, but if there are 
differences it will take a long time and will not be resolved, so it 
will have to be dealt with through the law. Now, we have already 
started with the process of communication, and there is already 
some understanding [between us], so the next issue is to find the 
location [for resettlement]. How can PT Inco make any 
commitments if the location itself has not been agrred upon? [ ... ] 
I think that what you gentlemen are doing now will influence the 
future or the next generation [of Karongsi'e Dongi]. So in my 
opinion the next step is to socialise [the approved Pontawaal 
location to the community so this process will not take too long. It 
has already been six years of negotiations. 
403 
In response, the T5D representatives made the following points: 
402 Personal observations from the meeting in Soroako on 26 April 2006. 
403 Excerpt from Pak Arfah, PT Inco negotiator, during the meeting held in Soroako on 26 April 2006. 
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Generally, the Karongsl'e Dongi community lives in a very 
difficult way. Some 60 per cent of the community still wants to 
keep or defend their land, and the rest want to move. Why does 
the 60 per cent want to defend their place? Because generally the 
community wants the name of Karongsi'e Dongi to live on, while 
the other 40 per cent are divided, and they only want this [dispute] 
to be over soon. But now the problem is these 57 households will 
not enjoy [compensation] because now it is only the heirs and 
executors left. This is now up to the second and third generation. 
Only two of the original claimants are still alive. From the 
community the point is to defend their identity and land because 
we also want to make demands but we are not convinced that 
404 [these demands] will be fulfilled . 
The PT Inco representatives did acknowledge the importance of the survival 
of the Karongsi'e Dongi identity during the meeting, and responded to complaints 
about the lack of progress by promising "action, not just words". They proceeded to 
draft an impromptu "plan of action" spanning from 1 May 2006 through to 4 August 
2006, involving details about resettlement, infrastructure, amenities, provisions, and 
implementing procedures. The plan remained contingent on whether the Karongsi'e 
Dongi could reached an agreement on a new location (outside of the mining zone), 
after which PT Inco, working in tandem with the sub-district heads of Nuha and 
Wasuponda respectively, would put their commitments in writing. 
Crucially, from the perspective of PT Inco, the land transfer to eligible 
Karongsi'e Dongi households would be transparent and legal, with the guarantee of 
land certificates issued by the district branch of the National Land Agency (Badan 
Pertanahan Nasional or BPN). They suggest that this certificate is "more important 
than the physical land" because of the potential for false claims being made by 
"outsiders". 405 In such circumstances, legitimate Karongsi'e Dongi claimants would 
be protected by the government, whose role it is to "neutralise" such outside 
influences. 
404 Excerpt from Erik Stephen Siape, member of T5D, during the meeting held on 26 April 2006. 
405 Excerpt from Pak Rahim, PT Inco negotiator, during the meeting held in Soroako on 26 April 2006. 
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There was, however, little progress on the question of how to compensate or 
accommodate the new generation of Karongsi'e Dongi, the heirs of the 57 original 
claimants. Moreover, it remains far from clear how the parties planned to convince 
local activists to subscribe to a relocation plan that would involve abandoning 
customary adat lands. T5D representatives hinted at the potential for internal disputes 
within the local community and between different sub-ethnic groups. The resolution 
process, it seemed, could easily be derailed if proper attention was not paid to 
divergent community interests. The following scenario was presented by the T5D: 
It seems PT Inco and the government have already determined 
their strategy [bilaterally]. With the selection of Pontawaa in Ledu 
Ledu village, it seems that you already have a cohesive position. 
But [this is not the case] with the community [ ... ] because on that land [Pontawaa] there are people who said that it does not belong 
to them, but they feel that they will also receive land. So it is PT 
Inco that will have problems later. It could be from within the 
community itself, who will fight each other to get the land. 
The future promises to be stormy again gentlemen. 406 
In slightly dejected tones, the PT Inco representatives queried: "what is the 
meaning of this stormy future"? Both sides discussed the possibility of communal 
infighting and agreed that it was ultimately the concern of the government, and that 
the government had the capacity as a mediator to deal with such matters. 
Nevertheless,, the T5D felt obligated to issue further warnings to their counterparts 
regarding the land problem. The Karongsi'e are said to consist of three ethnic sub- 
groupings: the Dongi, Pae Pae and Sinongko. Recognising, compensating and 
relocating 57 Dongi households will raise expectations and mobilise hundreds more 
to claim their own entitlements. 407 Accentuating ethnic difference in a case like this 
presents the danger of local rivalry and potential outbreaks of violent land reclaiming. 
Representatives from all three Karongsi'e sub-groups were reportedly holding 
meetings in Makassar, where plans were in motion to "declare their ethnicity" and 
406 Excerpt from Erik Stephen Siape of T5D on 26 April 2006. 
407 Excerpt from Erik Stephen Slape, 26 April 2006. 
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rally behind a broad campaign for the revival of adat. 408 On hearing this, PT Inco's 
negotiators conceded that there is "no secure option in this world" and that "problems 
between siblings are not even secure, " acknowledging the potential for communal 
conflict as well as conflicts between sub-ethnic groups of Karongsi'e. 409 
Consistent with corporate strategy, PT Inco's negotiators were sympathetic to 
the plight of indigenous peoples, willing to support local cultural events and publish 
books of folklore, but remained adamant in their rejection of customary land rights. 
They preferred not to refer to the Karongsi'e Dongi as the holders of adat rights and 
ancestral land titles, avoiding exclusive discourses of adat, and thus minimising the 
potential for misrepresentation. 410 PT Inco negotiators thus sought to mitigate the 
damaging impact of political opportunists, spoilers and ethnic entrepreneurs, all those 
intervening in the Matano area with divergent legal interpretations and incompatible 
political strategies. 
Based on recorded testimony, senior managers from External Relations 
preferred to frame the debate over political reform in civic, inclusive terrns such as 
gender equality, inter-religious dialogue, the preservation of traditional society, the 
promotion of good governance, and respect for nature, all of which were favoured 
over the politicisation of ethnicity. 411 The uneven process of decentralisation and the 
ambiguities of laws and regulations are blamed for the revival of adat, which has been 
likened to the feudalism of the former kingdom of Luwu. Old values from old eras are 
"being romanticised, " and this is incompatible with the modem democratic values 
and imperatives of the reformasi era. 412 
Despite the eclectic nature of adat in the Matano region, customary leaders as 
well as NGOs are attempting to mobilise people around a shared sense of history and 
socio-cultural identity. It is possible that the deployment of tradition in the 
contemporary context involves political innovations, bringing new opportunities for 
408 Excerpt from Erik Stephen Siape, 26 April 2006. 
409 Excerpt from Pak Arfah, PT Inco negotiator, 26 April 2006. 
41 0 Excerpt from Pak Rahim, PT Inco negotiator, 26 April 2006. 
411 Interview with manager Edi Suherdi, External Relations, on 20 April 2006. 
412 Interview with manager Edi Suherdi, External Relations, on 20 April 2006. 
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rights-based struggles as well as the realisation of the basic tenants of democratic 
decentralisation (such as participation and representation). However, the deployment 
of adat for political ends often highlights difference rather than functioning as a 
symbol behind which local communities can rally support for their cause. In Soroako 
this strategy has been politically divisive, with land claims being subjected to 
manipulation and reconstituted by local power brokers. 
Conclusion 
In the mining town of Soroako, where very real cases of land alienation are evident5 
the district government captured the local agenda for reform in 2003 by framing the 
terms of the negotiations for compensation. The normalisation of political struggles 
which threatened to escalate and grow violent required that some concessions be 
made, though still firmly within the constitutive political order. This relates to the 
political constellation envisioned by Muppidi (2005: 283), whereby citizens and their 
supporters are "locked in to various forms of institutional and structural power". 
Sustained efforts have been made by Werima and Naomi Manata to globalise 
their local struggle, join domestic associations, and recruit influential allies from 
Jakarta,, Makassar, and Palu. And yet, the concerns raised by Sch6nwdlder (1997) 
about internal divisions, by Bourchier (2007) about crises of representation, and by 
Erb et al. (2005) about community consultation continue to haunt the victimised 
Karongsi'e Dongi. 
By recognising only 57 Karongsi'e Dongi households in 2004, the district 
government greatly increased the probability that internal disputes would resurface, 
undermining the solidarity of the aggrieved community without making any real 
concessions. Though still bound by a shared sense of history, the selective and 
incomplete alleviation of community suffering detracts from the unifying impact of 
what Asari et al. (2008: 3) call the "formative traumatic event". 
In the collective bargaining process, the government empowered a symbolic 
compensation team (T5D) to engage in negotiations with PT Inco, culminating 
in an 
endless cycle of negotiations. Discourses of customary tenure are discouraged though 
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not eradicated, and a degree of dissent is permitted, giving hope to adat revivalists. 
According to reports coming out of Soroako in 2007, fresh protests and 
demonstrations against PT Inco took place, with some 1,500 demonstrators gathering 
outside of the PT Inco office. 413 This suggests that the plan of action determined by 
both parties on 26 April 2006 has broken down. The number of Karongsi'e Dongi 
claimants has blossomed in conjunction with the public announcement that a new 
compensation settlement was being negotiated. 
Opportunists, political entrepreneurs and distant diasporas can easily sabotage 
this process, invoking or inventing their status as disenfranchised adat claimants with 
indigenous ties to the Lake Matano area. Filtering out unauthentic claims is an 
unpopular and complicated task, particularly as the criteria for eligibility are still 
under review. Any semblance of legal certainty has given way to political jostling and 
manoeuvring. A variant of the lustration policy is a very difficult and reviled 
alternative,, and would further undermine the sense of communal solidarity and 
possibly even provoke violent reactions. 414 
As Erb (2007: 268) found in Flores, "conflict can be lucrative. " In such a 
context, the district government and PT Inco do not make natural allies, as the former 
is in a position to bribe and blackmail the latter. The reform era in Indonesia has 
indeed ushered in some significant changes, the most visible of which are a robust 
media and an empowered public sphere. Brown envelope over-the-counter corruption 
is rarely to be found. 
However, there are some innovations worth mentioning. PT Inco, for all its 
power and resources, is still vulnerable. The district government has the capacity to 
disrupt mining operations, sabotage the company's public image, and provoke mass 
demonstrations if so inclined. These are unlikely scenarios, but not unthinkable. 
Corruption has become subterranean, hidden to those without a clear vantage point 
from which to observe it. 
413 Based on a report from AMAN South Sulawesi that was translated 
by JATAM and posted on their 
website, http: //www. iatam. org/englisli/index. php 
414 Lustration comes from the Latin for ritual purification. 
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The suspicion and vulnerability of PT Inco is evident in the initial reception 
one receives in Soroako. Records and profiles of all foreigners checking into local 
hotels are kept, a mandatory questionnaire is issued, and a police file is drafted and 
forwarded to the relevant authorities immediately. Moreover, by asking probing 
questions about local land claims and visiting contested areas such as Bumi 
415 Perkemahan and Kopatea, one may find Intel officers on their trail . 
One prominent local informant gave some indication as to the innovative 
means by which PT Inco may bribe officials and spread around some of the 
discretionary allowances designated for community development. 416 Every company 
has overhead costs. These costs can be converted into patronage and goodwill funds. 
If the governinent passes new safety regulations which call for new signposts in 
potentially hazardous areas, for example, PT Inco may decide to allocate an inflated 
budget of 87 million rupiah to sub-contractors to complete the menial job. Moreover, 
if property is needed for guesthouses or other non-mining purposes, rents can be 
artificially inflated, selectively enriching landowners. A well-fed, loyal, and passive 
constituency is thus created. 
For activists, the challenge has always been to craft a political strategy that 
could "rupture the web of governmentality" (Lipschutz 2005: 245), thus taking on the 
mantle of emancipation for traditional fanning households. For PT Inco, the 
endorsement of the government plan to compensate only a fraction of the Karongsi'e 
Dongi community serves as a counter-rupture, eroding the common sense of 
victimisation in East Luwu. As mentioned, a community bound by forinative 
suffering has a natural affinity and sense of political purpose; a community tempted 
by the alleviation of suffering and cash settlements, by contrast, may succumb to 
political pressure and greed. 
415 Following an informal conversation with a local politician over dinner at the 
Hotel Lusiana in 
Soroako on 19 April 2006, undercover Intel officers began to take an 
interest in my case. A 
surveillance operation was conducted from 19 April-23 April 2006, until 
it became clear that I was not 
a threat. Up until the 22 nd of April they had me fooled. 
416 Anonymous source, East Luwu, April 2006. 
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Therefore, relating this analysis back to the research questions posed in the 
introduction, the dispute resolution process in the Matano domain has stymied the 
political revival of adat, reimposing the shackles of "elegant policy" so effectively 
deployed by colonial officials in centuries past (Lev 1985: 64). Moreover, the 
intervention by third-parties and associations from the public sphere has had a 
fractious impact upon their intended beneficiaries. Consistent with the trappings of 
clientelism, powerful patrons and trustees manage to galvanise relatively weak 
communities and form factions which struggle for privileged or exclusive access to 
resources, contracts, and lucrative lands (Szeftel 2000: 430). 
Perceptions about adat have become distorted as a result of internal dissent 
and external intervention. Ethnicity has become a political instrument finely tuned to 
the societies in question. As a consequence, specific actors operating 'in the name of 
adat' have captured or misdirected the benefits that accrue from policy realignments 
in the context of decentralisation. In an era where the calculus of indigenism 
undermines the unity of local communities, the ideals of peaceful collaboration and 
reconciliation are still far from being realised. 
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Chapter Seven: Rubber Production in Bulukumba 
Since the implementation of decentralisation, the district government of Bulukumba 
has used the policy of autonomy to express its diversity. For instance, several 
regulations containing elements of sharia law were promulgated between 2002 and 
2003.417 There are also revivalist movements based in the customary territories of 
Kajang Dalam. (or the inner circle of Kajang), where adat law is practiced by the 
"spirit cult" of the Amma Toa (Gibson 2000). 
The coastal town of Bira is also being recast as a tourist zone, where alcohol is 
readily available and promiscuity is commonplace. Thus within the administrative 
boundaries of Bulukumba district, there is a strong Islamic presence, an active 
customary law community recognised de facto by the government, and a seaside 
resort area catering to the tastes of European visitors. 418 
Beyond these features, Bulukumba has long been known for its lucrative trade 
in rubber. The company PT London Sumatra (hereafter PT Lonsum) currently 
operates two major plantation estates in the district, Palangisang and Balombissie, 
covering some 5,784.46 hectares. These estates have been at the centre of incessant 
land disputes since the 1980s, involving two seemingly irreconcilable interpretations 
of land ownership and entitlement. 
One interpretation used (selectively) by the fan-ning communities of Kajang is 
that all land is adat land, with ownership deriving from pioneering settlement, 
inheritance, and sustained cultivation. By contrast, PT Lonsum reminds critics of its 
plantation concession rights, granted by the state and legitimised under national law 
through the signing of a formal contract of work. 
Approximately 65 per cent of Indonesia's landmass is state-owned forestland, 
constituting the "greatest source of dispossession in modem Indonesia" (Fitzpatrick 
417 District Government of Bulukumba, Regulation Number 3/2002 about 'Prohibiting, Monitoring, 
Controlling, Distributing and Selling Alcoholic Beverages'; Regulation Number 2/2003 about 'Tithe, 
Infaq and Alms [Islamic forms of charity]'; Regulation Number 5/2003 about 'How to Dress as a 
Muslim'; and Regulation Number 6/2003 about 'Fluency in the Reading of the Quran'. 
418 Signs welcoming tourists to Bira are written in 4 languages: English, French, Dutch and 
German. 
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2007: 138). Many millions of rural citizens are restricted in their use of the forests, 
and concession rights are often granted "without any legal requirement to compensate 
or consult with affected local communities" (Fitzpatrick 2007: 138). Without recourse 
to state institutions, aggrieved local communities tend to "fall back on non-state- 
legitimising ideologies of 'adat"' (Fitzpatrick 2007: 138). 
In Bulukumba,, it is more a case of communities being led to embrace variants 
of these non-state ideologies (as opposed to simply falling back on them), raising 
further concerns about the nature of political representation and public participation. 
It is evident that the innate, primordial traits of local villages have been subjected to 
historical upheaval and contemporary renewal as actors compete over finite resources 
and lucrative lands. While accentuating the "authentic" features of adat to legitimise 
land claims, some of those involved in the current revival are striving to transcend 
local customs and traditions by realigning them to fit more comfortably into legible 
platforms for political struggle. Other actors mimic the chameleon by constantly 
adapting to new political environments in order to capture negotiation processes and 
the dividends they pay. 
Despite the sustained efforts of external actors and intervening parties in 
Bulukurnba, the political preferences and beliefs of local communities have failed to 
cohere around an essentialist, latent form of adat. Instead, politics and identities 
remain contingent and contextual, subject to constant change as a result of complex 
interactions amongst individuals and between local groups. The forging of activist 
networks in support of rural victims against the vices of capital, therefore, brings both 
opportunities and threats, engendering a sense of empowerment for intended 
beneficiaries as well as despair for perpetually marginalised client communities. 
Given the highly contextual and contingent nature of these rapidly evolving 
political dynamics, there is need for further research and analysis as the scholarship 
on adat and decentralisation in Indonesia remains patchy and 
incomplete. 
Correspondingly, this chapter examines both the constructed perceptions and real 
consequences of adat revivalism by foregrounding the specific experiences and 
struggles of local communities and activists as they confront 
PT Lonsum's managers 
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and security forces. Here, as in Soroako, there are no natural allies in the struggle 
over land and resource entitlement. Therefore consideration must be given to the ad 
hoc alliances that have arisen in response to intensified conflicts in Bulukumba. 
In particular, the propensity of local elites (entrenched and emergent) to 
capture democratic processes by manipulating and dividing local communities must 
be examined. Moreover, the use of gentle compulsion by ambivalent government 
officials must be considered, along with the benevolent nature of external mediation 
teams, the deliberate strategising of PT Lonsurn managers, and the ambiguity of civil 
society actors converging on Bulukumba, all of which have introduced multifarious 
political strategies into the district. 
Background 
Constructions of local cultures are built on, among other things, the many layers of 
contested histories, external intrusions, and myths of an elusive golden era that have 
been passed down (selectively) from generation to generation. Between 1540 and 
1623 Bulukumba was invaded and subdued four times by the rulers of the kingdom of 
Gowa, giving rise to forms of local resistance as well as emulation (Cummings 
2001: 425). Other key periods were the spread of Islam (1605 onwards), the colonial 
legacy, and Kahar Muzakkar's Darul Islam rebellion (1953-1965). 
Committed to the suppression of feudalism, spirit cults, and customary 
leaders, the Daral Islam guerrillas had gained control of Bulukumba by 1953. 
However, in 1954 an "anti-Islamic millenarian movement" was forined in Kajang to 
defend the cult of the Amma Toa (Gibson 2000: 67). 
419 In 1955 members of this 
movement (known as the Dompe Army) "swept down from Kajang all the way to 
Bira" executing supporters of the Darul Islam and attacked mosques, causing so much 
disruption that Kahar Muzakkar personally attended to the matter (Gibson 2000: 67). 
The Dompe Army, armed only with "swords, spears, and magic, " was then 
annihilated in a "single climactic battle" in 1955, after which Darul Islam 
forces 
419 This Konjo-speaking territory is under the customary authority of the Amma Toa, thought to 
be the 
reincarnation of "legendary beings descended from heaven in mythical times to 
found the first 
Bugis and Makassarese states" (Gibson 2000: 67). 
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imposed severe religious and social reforms, banning spirit cults, ceremonies and 
sacred visitations-all hallmarks of feudalism as listed above (Gibson 2000: 67). Apart 
from this dramatic defeat, the customary order in Kajang Dalam remained largely 
insulated from the major transitional eras such as the conquest of Gowa, the spread of 
Islam, colonial occupation, and the gradual capitulation of the indigenous nobility in 
South Sulawesi. 
During the New Order era, "official state doctrine emphasised sanitised and 
authorised versions of cultural difference subservient to national goals" (Robinson 
1997: 7 1). In the 1980s the Department of Education and Culture began promoting the 
architectural traditions of South Sulawesi, particularly Kajang, whose adat 
communities are often held to be exemplars of pre-modem Sulawesi; that is, an 
authentic representation of pre-Islamic and pre-colonial society (Robinson 1997: 81). 
Rendered non-threatening and deemed non-expansionary, the territories of the Amma 
Toa continued to be governed in accordance with customary law. 
Currently, the sub-district of Kajang is divided into two sections; Kajang Luar 
(the outer circle) with fifteen villages, and Kajang Dalam (the inner circle), where 
there are four villages recognised as customary adat lands. The territory of Kajang 
Dalam is unique in that the authority of the Amma Toa is considered absolute, just as 
it has been for centuries past. 
The principal village of Kajang Dalam is called Tana Toa, within which the 
Amma Toa resides; the second is Bonto Baji, followed by Malleleng and Pattiroang. 
An estimated 3,000 people reside in this customary domain. 
420 From personal 
observations, it is clear that most of Kajang Dalam is underdeveloped. Agrarian 
activities are limited to serve the subsistence needs of the community. In terms of 
land usage, the forests are roughly divided as follows: 98 hectares are allocated 
for 
collective cultivation; 144 hectares serve a social function, meaning that any trees that 
are cut must be replanted; and a final 317 hectares are considered sacred and thus 
protected, used only for rituals and ceremonies (Nainggolan 2005). 
420 Interview with members of the Farmer's Union of Kajang (names withheld) 
from 6-7 February 
2006. 
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Careful negotiation is required before any outsider is granted permission to 
enter this territory. To this end, members of AMAN South Sulawesi and the Farmer's 
Union of Kajang (Serikat Petani Kajang or SPK) were able to help negotiate access. 
In the event that one does receive permission, strict protocol must be adhered to when 
entering this customary domain. Visitors must remove their shoes and socks, and 
either wear the traditional clothing of the Kajang villagers or wear all black . 
42 1 
Kajang Dalam is believed to represent the "last genuine patuntung, " a term 
used in reference to Makassarese adat communities still committed to the lifeways 
and oral traditions of their ancestors (R6ssler 1990: 293). Village life Kajang Dalarn is 
characterised by a variety of antecedents, including the pasang ri' Kajang (oral 
tradition), the striving for modesty, belief in guardian spirits, and reverence for land. 
The first written account of the patuntung of Kajang Dalam was offered by Dutch 
linguist A. A. Cense (193 1: 1), who argued that this community should be exemplified 
and distinguished from other Makassarese communities. R6ssler (1990: 290) concurs, 
suggesting that Kajang Dalarn represents a unique "kind of cultural enclave" with 
many "archaic" features of their religion and social organisation still preserved. 
Visitors to this enclave are still met with the insistence on bare feet (it is offensive to 
tread on the land with artificial footwear), and will encounter many of the same 
features that R6ssler (1990) and Sutton (1995) encountered, including the sense of 
communal egalitarianism and the architectural style that is meant to compliment the 
natural landscape in all of the villages of Kajang Dalam. 
Customary, unwritten laws governing community life are taught through the 
pasang ri' Kajang, a continuous method of learning that requires the passing on of 
experiences and principles that are believed to reach back to the origins of life on 
422 
earth . So 
long as the chain of oral history remains unbroken, each successive 
generation will learn about adat law; it is their rightful inheritance, passed down 
orally through legends and tales. 
421 1 wore the traditional black sarong and Pasapu headwear. Sutton (1995) reported 
having the same 
experience (negotiated access, clothing). It is rumoured that even former President Suharto, the most 
powerful man in Indonesia at the time, complied with these adat protocol when visiting 
Kajang Dalam. 
422 Interview with members of the Farmer's Union of Kajang from 6-7 February 2006. 
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In terms of governance, the highest position in the community is held by the 
Amma Toa, responsible for moral and spiritual leadership. Under the Amma Toa's 
guidance are a number of karaeng tallua (political functionaries) dealing with matters 
ranging from law, agriculture, land tenure, and social affairs. The ada' limaya oversee 
marriage and initiation rituals, while the sanro are appointed as religious 
authorities. 
423 
Women play a role in the selection ceremony for all pemangku adat; however 
they do not run as candidates. All decision making and problem solving in Kajang 
424 Dalarn requires musyawarah (deliberation) and mufakat (consultation) . The current 
Arnma Toa's reign began in 2003; he is the keeper of the pasang ri' Kajang, the 
primary source of all knowledge and understanding that is conveyed orally through 
legend and tale. 425 Advice, prayers and blessings are offered to any who visit him at 
his residence. 
All foreigners permitted to enter Tana Toa village are asked to sign a log 
book. In 2005 approximately 100 visitors from countries as diverse as Australia, 
Japan, Canada, and Venezuela were granted permission. 426 From the perspective of 
the mayor of Makassar, the authenticity of this exemplary community should be 
427 capitalised upon by the tourism board . There is already evidence of a "creeping 
modernity" with the younger generations; some women are taking regular excursions 
into the cities to shop and sample cosmetics, while men compete for the latest cellular 
phone technology. 
In order to preserve their integrity, Kajang Dalam's leaders are encouraged to 
follow the Tana Toraja example, where a public version of adat is presented as a 
marketable object of tourism, while another private manifestation of adat retains its 
socio-cultural relevance to the daily practices of the community. 428 While provincial, 
423 For more on the history, customs, rituals and symbols of Kajang Dalam, see Andang (2006), 
Cummings (2001), DTE (2002), Nainggolan (2005), R6ssler (1990), and Usop (1978). 
424 Interview with Andi Sudin-nan Mangkona, head of sub-district Kajang, on 23 May 2006. 
425 Interview with members of the Farmer's Union of Kajang from 6-7 February 2006. 
426 Personal observation, Tana Toa village, Kajang Dalam, 6-7 February 2006. 
427 Interview with H. Ilham. Arief Sirajuddin, mayor of Makassar, on 16 February 2007. 
428 Interview with H. Ilham Arief Sirajuddin, mayor of Makassar, on 16 February 2007. 
232 
district, and village government officials will continue to respect the Kajang 
customary domain, there are suggestions that isolationism is not the best way to 
preserve their lifeways (modesty, egalitarianism, reverence for nature). 
What is conspicuously absent from these officialising strategies is any 
mention of the political implications of adat revivalism. To the bureaucrats in the 
Tourism Board, for instance, the showcasing of exemplary cultures is perfectly 
rational, profit generating, and non -threatening. For those entangled in protracted land 
disputes with PT Lonsum and local branches of government, there is much more 
adversity to contend with. To the extent that the peoples of Ka ang Dalam still 
possess an authentic cultural heritage, I found that this increases the likelihood that 
political opportunists and spoilers will seize upon this "exceptional case" in order to 
enhance their particularistic political interests and exclusive agendas. 429 
The following section maps the origin and development of the land dispute 
between PT Lonsurn and the fanning communities of Kajang, beginning with rubber 
production in Bulukumba district. This provides the necessary context from which to 
engage with the contemporary politics of adat revivalism, foregrounding the specific 
manifestations and deployment of adat in a highly contested conflict where the 
natural alliances between actors are tested and challenged. 
Rubber Production in Bulukumba 
Harrisons & Crosfield, a British-based multinational, was founded in 1844 as a 
partnership engaged in tea trading, with operations mainly in India and China for the 
first 50 years (Jones and Wale 1999: 70). In 1906 Arthur Lampard, a partner of 
Harrisons & Crosfield,, landed on the east coast of Sumatra and began to acquire 
rubber plantation estates (FOE 2004: 2). Investments soon spread to the densely 
forested islands of Kalimantan and Sulawesi. 
In Bulukumba district, forestry concessions were first granted to NV Celebes 
Lanbouw Maaschappijh, a subsidiary of Harrisons & Crosfield specialising in rubber 
429 Patabai Pa Bokori, former mayor of Bulukumba, echoed these concerns during an interview on 17 
February 2006. 
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production, in 1919.430 By order of the Governor General of the Netherlands East 
Indies, this company was awarded erfacht (concession) rights to lands measuring 
some 7,092.8 hectares. 431 
Harrisons & Crosfield's organisational structure produced a complex network 
of companies "linked through a wide variety of cross-shareholding as well as non- 
equity arrangements" (Jones and Wale 1999: 95). In 1909 the Rubber Plantations 
Investment Trust was established, through which Harrisons & Crosfield's held 
strategic stakes in other companies. After it was realised that this network structure 
left the company vulnerable, a period of consolidation was initiated, beginning with 
the merger of many small plantation companies into larger units such as London 
Sumatra in Indonesia in 1960, followed by the Harrisons Malaysian Estates in 1976 
(Jones and Wale 1999: 95). 
In 1961 NV Celebes Lanbouw Maaschappijh based in Bulukumba was 
incorporated into the larger PT London Sumatra, with additional plantation estates in 
Java, West Sumatra and Kalimantan (FOE 2004: 2). That same year PT Lonsum's 
Sulawesi holdings, previously designated as erfacht rights, were converted into Land 
Cultivation Rights (Hak Guna Usaha or HGU). In accordance with the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs Decision Number 39/HGU/DAJ76, these plantation concessions were 
extended and a contract of work granted Erom 13 May 1968 until 31 December 
1998.432 
PT Lonsum's concession zone (HGU) traverses the administrative boundaries 
of four separate sub-districts in Bulukumba, namely Kajang, Herlan, Ujung Loe, and 
Bulukumpa. As production expanded (after 1981), rubber exports were reaching the 
markets of Singapore, Japan and America. From all of PT Lonsum's Indonesian 
430 The granting of land rights was based on Dutch Governor General Decision 
Number 43, dated 10 
July 1919, and Decision Number 44, dated 18 May 192 1. This information Is 
from a legal report titled 
'Case of the Forcible Occupation of Adat Land in Kajang' published 
by National Solidarityfor 
Bulukumba, obtained in Makassar on 15 March 2006. 
43 ' Based on a report titled 'Chronology of HGU Acreage Reduction of the 
PT London Sumatra 
Indonesia-Sulawesi Estate, ' provided by PT Lonsurn managers from Palangisang 
Estate, Kajang, on 
09 February 2006. 
432 From the report 'Case of the Forcible Occupation of Adat Land 
in Kajang' published by National 
Solidarityfor Bulukumba. 
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holdings, which produce coconut palm oil, coffee, cocoa, tea and rubber, 75 per cent 
of produce is exported (SOMO 2004: 76). 
The security of PT Lonsum's investments would come to be challenged on 
two fronts: the domestic challenge was political and the international challenge was 
financial (although both are interconnected). On the international front, HSBC was 
among the major global banks involved in propping up the palm oil industry. 
Specifically, HSBC was reported to have helped secure more than US$550 million in 
loans for PT Lonsum in 1994 (FOE 2004: 2). HSBC also participated in the listing of 
PT Lonsum on the Jakarta Stock Exchange (under the acronym LSIP) in 1996, 
helping raise an additional US$76 million (FOE 2004: 2-3; SOMO 2004: 76). 
In 1997 the Asian Financial Crisis plunged PT Lonsum into severe debt, 
forcing the company to enter into a restructuring process under the auspices of the 
433 Jakarta Initiative Task Force (SOMO 2004: 77) . Citibank 
has also been involved in 
PT Lonsum's debt restructuring, acting as the company's "cashier" by paying their 
outstanding financial obligations to third parties (nearly US$ 100 million), to be repaid 
once PT Lonsum's operations were stable and profitable (SOMO 2004: 77). 
Domestically, rubber production on the Bulukumba estates has been 
interrupted by violent incidents of land seizures from the 1970s onwards, leading to 
protracted legal disputes and political uncertainty. The most heavily contested lands 
are located primarily within Kajang; however they also cross into sub-district 
Bulukumpa. With the onset of Kahar Muzakkar's Darul Islam rebellion (1953 
onwards), PT Lonsum was prevented from consolidating its control over plantation 
estates in Bulukumba, and was unable to operate at full production, leaving 
large 
tracts of vacant land. As in Soroako (chapter six), residents were displaced and some 
forced to flee (Mahmud 2007: 105). 434 With the resumption of peace, discussions were 
held between local community leaders and PT Lonsum managers. An informal 
433 The Task Force involved a partnership between the Government of Indonesia and the 
World Bank, 
IMF, and USAID. 
434 See Gibson (2000) for more on rebellion and resistance in Bulukumba. 
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agreement was reached in the 1960s whereby villagers could utilise plantation lands 
until the company was prepared to expand production. 435 
At that juncture a clear schism was created between those claiming historic 
ties to the land (most villagers in Kajang) and those only willing to recognise 
squatters rights (estate managers). The dominant corporate interpretation is that 
Kajang farming communities were presented with a favourable opportunity to retain 
their place of residence and continue to cultivate lands contained within the legal 
boundaries of the plantation concession zone. The oppositional community (and 
activist) position is that these are adat lands, unjustly auctioned off by a corporatist 
state utilising colonial designations such as "vacant lands" to unden-nine traditional 
concepts such hak ulayat (right of avail). 
After the lost decades (1950s and 1960s), normal residential and agrarian 
activities resumed in Kajang with very little government oversight. Many households 
planted long term crops, including corn, cocoa, coconut, banana and pepper on their 
lands, a portion of which was given to PT Lonsum as a form of taxation. 436 However, 
what began as a practical arrangement between village leaders and estate managers 
gradually degenerated into violent conflict. 
By the 1970s many of the original village leaders who had negotiated with PT 
Lonsum had passed away. As is customary, the lands were automatically inhented by 
their siblings. This second generation of squatters felt a natural sense of entitlement, 
437 
in accordance with customary tenure and the right of avail . Indeed, they 
had 
inherited lands that had been developed and cultivated by their honoured ancestors, 
an inheritance that would not easily be abandoned. 
Gibson (2000: 44-45) found that political characteristics tend to be attached to 
physical features of the natural environment such as rivers and mountains, providing 
a mnemonic device for villagers. In the case of the Kajang 
farmers, they had 
435 Interview with Ir. Sugito, manager of Palangisang Estate, on 9 February 
2006. Besides the 
rebellion, early production was hindered by a lack of investment 
in equipment, resources and 
technology. 
436 Interview with Ir. Sugito, manager of Palangisang Estate, on 9 February 
2006. 
437 Interview with Ir. Sugito, manager of Palangisang Estate, on 9 
February 2006. 
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developed a sense of identity in relation to the natural borders that surrounded them, 
such as the Galoggo River to the north and Balang Lohe River to the south. 
Starting in the 1970s, PT Lonsurn began releasing some of the concession 
lands that they controlled. The first instance was in 1973, when the company 
complied with a request from Mayor of Bulukumba for the release of 500 hectares (to 
be used for a military base). 438 Then in five separate episodes recorded between 1975 
and 1995, a total of 808.21 hectares were returned to local communities throughout 
Bulukumba,, mainly in response to incidents of forceful land reclaiming. 439 While this 
does not satisfy the criteria set out by Lucas and Warren (2003: 92) regarding the 
achievement of legal resolution, the issuance of legal title, or the securing of land 
certificatesl local farmers were able to cultivate and inhabit the lands, upon which 
their livelihoods depended. 
As PT Lonsum began to expand rubber production in the 1980s, the company 
demanded that all lands be returned in accordance with the informal agreement 
reached decades earlier. Many of the squatters did not comply, prompting the 
company to forcibly remove them. This was met with formidable opposition from the 
Kajang community, culminating in a protracted land dispute that grabbed the 
attention of a wider domestic and international audience. 
What sets the Kajang conflict apart from all other cases in Sulawesi is the fact 
that it was taken up by the courts at all levels-district, provincial and supreme. 
440 
Beginning with a series of protests in 1982, the Kajang dispute quickly evolved 
beyond the rally politics of mass demonstrations, taking nearly a decade of trials and 
legal appeals in order to clarify matters of land entitlement and ownership. These 
processes shall be examined in further detail in the following section. 
438 Based on Letter Number 92/DBNIII issued by the Mayor of Bulukumba on 22 June 
1973, 
contained in the document 'Chronology of HGU Acreage Reduction of PT London 
Sumatra 
Indonesia-Sulawesi Estate' provided by PT Lonsum managers from Palangisang Estate. 
439 Figures listed in PT Lonsum's 'Chronology of HGU Acreage Reduction [ ... ]'. 
440 Pengadilan Negri stands for District Court (of first instance), Pengadilan Tinggi 
for Provincial 
Court, and Mahkamah Agung for Supreme Court. 
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Legal Proceedings 
As PT Lonsum began to expand rubber production in the 1980s the previously 
sanguine relations with local squatters rapidly degenerated into confrontation and 
coercion. Previously dormant issues of state versus adat lands, as well as principles of 
community right of avail versus corporate concessionaries, re-emerged with a rapidity 
that took a complacent district government by surprise. 
PT Lonsum's interpretation was that all "sleeping lands" within their 
concession zone had to be reclaimed in order to meet demands for increased rubber 
production. The community challenged the legitimacy of this claim, interpreting PT 
Lonsum's acts as aggressive land seizures rather than lawful reclamation. As tensions 
intensified,, a community rights advocate named Hamarong from neighbouring 
441 Selayar district came to represent the aggrieved Kajang farmers. With his aid, the 
community was able to secure the legal services of barrister Laica Marzuki. 
On 17 June 1982,253 households from the farming village of Bonto Biraeng 
442 in Kajang Luar took PT Lonsum to trial . Proceedings were first 
brought to the 
District Court of Bulukumba, which registered the case as Number 17. K/1982/Blk. 
Standing accused were PT Lonsum, the sub-district head of Kajang, and the village 
head of Bonto Biraeng. 
The litigants' initial claim was for 350 hectares of land that had been forcibly 
seized by PT Lonsum for rubber production in 1981 (the expansionary period). 
According to customary adat law, inheritance and continual cultivation of lands is a 
legitimate form of ownership, whether written or unwritten. They also based this 
claim around their natural borders such as rivers and mountains, which are easily 
identifiable landmarks but lack precision. According to transcripts from the trial, the 
litigants' testimony went as follows: 
We [the litigants] feel threatened by the efforts that PT Lonsum 
was making to reclaim the lands upon which the community had 
lived and cultivated for 28 years. We claim that PT Lonsum was 
441 Interview with Zainuddin, third-party negotiator, Bulukumba district, 9 February 
2006. 
442 According to PT Lonsum's 'Chronology of HGU Acreage Reduction [ ... I'. 
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trying to remove us by force, and that [the company] had already 
reclaimed 150 hectares in this [forceful] manner. We [the litigants] had already fulfilled all of our obligations under the 
unwritten agreement [with PT Lonsum]. The 350 hectares of land was still unused and had not yet been cultivated [for rubber 
production], so we felt it was neglected land and thus it was ours 
to be taken. 443 
This testimony reveals that the litigants maintain their historic ties to the lands 
of Kajang (which forms the basis for adat rights), though they are willing to accept 
that their legal claim originates in 1954. Thus the trial was premised on a truncated 
version of Kajang history. 
After hearing the testimony of the litigants, the District Court ordered PT 
Lonsum. to cease all expansionary activities, productive or otherwise, involving the 
disputed lands pending a full legal review. Three weeks later, on 5 July 1982, judicial 
responses were issued by each of the accused. PT Lonsum, for its part, gave the 
following statement: 
The legal rulings are incorrect because they contradict the facts. 
We [the accused] have proof in the form of a land certificate 
showing that PT Lonsum is the only party with rights over the 
disputed lands. PT Lonsum has invested in the disputed lands, so 
it is not possible to withdrawal this investment. Such an act 
would cause unemployment. The compensation demanded by 
the litigants has no legal basis and they have no ri ht to a 
certificate [of land ownership] over the disputed lands. 4N 
Having reviewed all the evidence the District Court of Bulukumba reached a 
verdict on 24 March 1983, ruling in favour of the litigants by granting the 
following: 445 
443 Transcript of Case Number 17. K/1982/Blk, from the District Court of Bulukumba. 
444 Judicial Response issued by PT Lonsum on 5 July 1982 in Case Number 17. K/1982/Blk, District 
Court of Bulukumba. 
445 Transcript of Case Number 17. K/1982/Blk, from the District Court of Bulukumba. 
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The disputed lands that can be cultivated and used by the litigants' amounts to 
200 hectares. This is based on the fact that the litigants have lived on and 
cultivated these lands for 28 years; 
* The court requires PT Lonsum to return the land that was forcefully reclaimed, 
amounting to 150 hectares, and return it in its original state; 
That PT Lonsum. is to pay compensation to the community; 
The land certificates held by PT Lonsum are not legally binding. 
By implication, the District Court endorsed the customary rights of 253 
Kajang households from the fanning community of Bonto Biraeng village. Legal 
entitlement was thus granted for 200 hectares of land, 150 of which having been 
forcibly seized by PT Lonsum. Therefore, the simple calculus suggests that PT 
Lonsum must release 150 hectares of land and pay compensation. Only by design 
could this verdict be misinterpreted. 
In May 1983, two months after this verdict was reached, the Provincial Court 
of South Sulawesi agreed to hear an appeal by PT Lonsum, registered as Case 
Number 228/1983/PT/Ptd. The appeal was based on the same legal principles stated 
in PT Lonsum's judicial response on 5 July 1982. Four years later, on 23 May 1987, 
the Provincial Court overturned the decision of the District Court of Bulukumba, 
officially nullifying the claims of the 253 households. 446 
While the appeal process had moved incrementally along (May 1983 to May 
1987) there were political developments on the ground. For instance, in a process of 
local reconciliation PT Lonsum. released 143 hectares of land in 1985, which was 
returned to the villagers of Bonto Biraeng in Kajang sub-distriCt. 
447 This process was 
facilitated by the district government of Bulukumba. Regarding the particulars of land 
release, PT Lonsurn claims the following: 
[The company] had agreed, in a sincere manner, to the transfer 
of land measuring 143 hectares [ ... ] to the 
litigants and the 
446 Transcript of Case Number 228/1983/PT/Ptd, from the Provincial Court of 
South Sulawesi. 
447 Interview with Ir. Sugito, manager of Palangisang Estate, on 22 May 2006. 
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communities living around the contested area. It was distributed in lots, [with space available] for houses and public facilities. All 
of the administration costs for this [land] distribution were guaranteed by PT Lonsum, which considered the problems of this case and the community accusations to be finalised. 448 
By rejecting the legal verdict (calling for the release of 150 hectares) and 
endorsing the political reconciliation process (enforcing the release of 143 hectares), 
PT Lonsurn negotiators sought to appease the aggrieved community without 
acknowledging the legitimacy of their adat claims. Much to the chagrin of PT 
Lonsurn management, however, activists and supporters from Bulukumba, Makassar 
and Jakarta organised an appeal to the Supreme Court of Indonesia. In the words of 
one plantation manager: "without speaking to PT Lonsum, seven community 
members [led by Harnarong] who were not satisfied [with the trial verdict] and did 
not receive the land that was supposed to be returned [to them] went directly to the 
Supreme Court in Jakarta". 449 This fits the typical pattern of land release orders. 
Companies are forced to compensate local victims, upon which the district 
government, tasked with oversight and implementation, fails to ensure that eligible 
claimants actually receive their entitlements. 450 
On 23 May 1987 the Supreme Court of Indonesia reviewed the appeal made 
by the litigants and ruled that there were legal grounds for further consideration by 
the highest court in the country. 451 By 26 June 1990 a final verdict was reached in 
favour of the farmers of Kajang, granting them rights over 200 hectares of the 
disputed lands as well as compensation for their losses during the land seizures of 
1981. Thus the decision of the Provincial Court of South Sulawesi was overturned, 
and the original decision made by the District Court of Buluk-umba in 1983 was 
448 Based PT Lonsum's 'Chronology of HGU Acreage Reduction [ ... ]'. 449 Interview with Ir. Sugito, manager of Palangisang Estate, on 22 May 2006. 
450 The same happened in Soroako, where PT Inco's compensation package was pilfered by the district 
government of Luwu and rarely reached the intended beneficiaries (community victims). 
451 Supreme Court of Indonesia registered this as Case Number 2553/K/Pdt. /1987. 
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reinstated. In order to justify this decision, the following legal considerations were 
cited by the Supreme Court: 452 
The Provincial Court of South Sulawesi did not properly apply the law; 
Section 5 of Basic Agrarian Law Number 5/1960 deals with community land 
rights, which are based on customary (adat) law; 
The Provincial Court of South Sulawesi did not recognise [the concept ofl 
community land rights or cultivated lands that are inherited based on 
customary (adat) law. Rather, the Provincial Court based [its verdict] on the 
legal letter-the land certification held by the Accused [PT Lonsum]; 
* Customary (adat) law was wrongly ignored when faced with the written 
evidence provided by the Accused [PT Lonsum]. Therefore the Supreme 
Court rules that this written evidence does not constitute the only fon-n of 
evidence in this matter. Another form of evidence [to be considered] derives 
from the experiences of those living on the land [for up to 28 years]; 
* The Provincial Court was incorrect in its decision about the authentication of 
the law, ignoring the evidence of the Litigants based on the fact that it was not 
written, unlike the evidence used by the Accused; 
* Not all of the written evidence provided by the Accused was based on original 
documents. For instance, only photocopies of land certificates and concession 
rights were provided, and these had been altered from their original state, with 
sections crossed out. 
In what seems to be an unprecedented case, the Supreme Court of Indonesia 
saw fit to apply the concept of customary adat rights as stipulated in Article 5 of 
Basic Agrarian Law Number 5/1960. Article 5 reads as follows: 
Agrarian law that is valid over land, air and space is the 
customary adat law, so long as it does not contradict national 
452 Transcript of Case Number 2553. K/Pdt/1987 from the Supreme Court of Indonesia. 
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or State interests, based on the unitary state, with Indonesian 
socialism that is contained within the regulations added to this 
law as well as other regulations, with everything being laid 
out in religious law. 
As stipulated (rather awkwardly) in Article 5, agrarian law and adat law are 
considered one and the same, provided that neither contradicts higher interests. As a 
result of this ruling, a group of local Kajang fan-ners (the original litigants) were 
suddenly propelled from their tenuous position based on the vagaries of squatter's 
rights to one of legal recognition at the highest levels. 
Such an unprecedented legal decision raises key questions. For instance, could 
this be the first step towards resolving the dilemma set out by Professor J. de Louter 
in the 1920s? As previously stated, de Louter queried whether or not it was correct to 
judge government policy according to the degree to which it respects native 
institutions and adat law, or conversely, whether a government must enforce the law 
best suited to the needs of modem society (cited in Fasseur 2007: 60). This implies 
that respect for native institutions is incompatible with the needs of a modem society, 
and would only hinder progress, turning Indonesia into an "open-air adat museum". 
In its ruling, however, the Supreme Court has upheld adat law in a thoroughly 
modem dispute over land rights and entitlements. This can be viewed as an 
endorsement of both customary institutions and national law in accordance with the 
needs of modem Indonesian society, thus satisfying both of the criteria set out by de 
Louter. 
Another key question is whether or not this ruling will lead to the achievement 
of concrete results, such as comprehensive agreements, settlements, safeguards 
against violent reprisals, community development funds, the obtainment of land 
certificates, control over arable lands and resources, and unrestricted access to farm 
produce (Lucas and Warren 2003: 92). 
The real challenge, therefore, is to gauge the extent to which the Supreme 
Court legal ruling has been implemented. As will be discussed further, corporate 
delay tactics have hindered implementation, a prostrated district government has 
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responded slowly to mounting pressures, district and provincial mediation teams have 
been toothless, NGO intervention has been unsettling, and local fanning communities 
remain divided. Given these complications, substantive gains have not been 
forthcoming in Bulukumba. 
By linking the land release to notions of adat rights, the courts had 
inadvertently complicated matters, prompting scores of activists and NGOs to 
intervene in Kajang. Despite their ascriptive commonalities, the people of Kajang are 
politically as divided as their lands, which have long been carved up into corporate 
concessionaries,, military command centres, zones of sharia law, and customary law 
domains under the auspices of the Amma Toa. As the following section explains, the 
implementation of the court-ordered land release of 200 hectares has proven highly 
problematic, forestalling the achievement of any concrete gains. 
The Politics of Land Release 
Having achieved victory in the courts, the next challenge for select members of the 
Kajang community was to secure the lands that they were now legally entitled to (200 
hectares). Given that 143 hectares had previously been released (in 1985), it was only 
necessary to secure an additional 57 hectares. From the outset, however, PT 
Lonsum's approach was cautious and obstructive. In order to ensure that these lands 
were clearly marked and divided from the rest of the concession zone, the company 
requested a judicial review of the Supreme Court ruling as well as the postponement 
of its implementation. 453 
In response, the Supreme Court issued a letter on 27 February 1991 
instructing district authorities in Bulukumba to postpone the land transfer until further 
454 
review was conducted . Between 
1991 and 1998 community lawyers as well as the 
Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling from the University of Hasanuddin in Makassar 
453 From the report 'Case of the Forcible Occupation of Adat Land in Kajang' published 
by National 
Solidarityfor Bulukumba. 
454 The postponement was ordered through Letter Number KMA/028/Il/ 199 1, according to the report 
entitled 'Case of the Forcible Occupation of Adat Land in Kajang, ' published by National 
Solidarity 
for Bulukumba. 
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fought for the implementation of the Supreme Court ruling. Their efforts were finally 
rewarded on 16 March 1998 when the judicial review requested by PT Lonsum was 
finalised and the postponement order lifted by the Supreme CoUrt. 455 
In one sense, the delay tactics employed by PT Lonsum were effectiveg 
allowing the company sufficient time to consolidate their land holdings and complete 
a comprehensive survey of the disputed areas. This was important as the Supreme 
Court had questioned the legitimacy of the land permits held by the company, 
prompting local farmers to reclaim lands in contested areas. 
Working in conjunction with the National Land Agency in Bulukumba 
district,, the company concession zone was surveyed and re-measured, and it was 
determined that PT Lonsum's total holdings amounted to 5,784.46 hectares. 456 While 
the postponement order preventing the implementation of the Supreme Court ruling 
had provided the company with ample time to verify their land holdings, it had also 
caused significant hostility within the community. 
By ensuring that the land transfer and compensation payments were delayed 
for seven years the company disenfranchised many farming households in Kajang. As 
will be discussed further,, it also created an environment of uncertainty and legal 
ambiguity, allowing opportunists and political entrepreneurs to exploit the farming 
community by claiming false ownership over contested lands and selling them to 
unsuspecting families. 
As alluded to earlier, the simple calculus used to determine rates of 
compensation for Kajang victims could only be misinterpreted by design. To begin, a 
clerical error during the recording of the Supreme Court verdict gave the impression 
that the land to be returned to the original litigants fell within the natural village 
borders. This error has been cited by some as evidence that all lands in Kajang are 
455 Through Supreme Court Decision Number 29 8-PK/PDT/I 99 1, according to the report entitled 
'Case of the Forcible Occupation of Adat Land in Kajang, ' published by National Solidarityfor 
Bulukumba. 
456 Based on Land Inspection Report Number 03/RPT-B/53/1997, the official land 
holdings of PT 
Lonsum were 3,436.61 hectares in the Palangisang Estate and 2,347.85 hectares in the 
Balombissie 
Estate. Combined, the total concession zone measured 5,784.46 hectares, according to PT Lonsum's 
'Chronology of HGU Acreage Reduction [ ... F. 
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adat lands, giving rise to divergent interpretations which have prolonged the 
conflict. 457 
While the lifting of the postponement order in 1998 was welcome news for 
those who had subscribed to the legal process and considered the verdict a victory, 
there were many advocates and activists opposed to the perceived myopia of their 
counterparts. For instance, the assertion that a select number of Kajang households 
(253) are entitled to an exclusive tract of land (200 hectares) based on their adat rights 
contradicts the expansive, inalienable nature of adat. Therefore, deliberate efforts 
were undertaken in order to cast the net wider, to encourage villagers to reclaim their 
ancestral lands that fall within the natural borders of Kajang (determined in relation to 
physical landmarks such as rivers and mountains), a zone encompassing some 540 
hectares. 
In 1999 the National Land Agency of Bulukumba district was tasked with the 
implementation of the land release, which required field surveys, mapping, and the 
placement of demarcation poles around a 200 hectare perimeter. 458 While this brought 
the district government into compliance with the Supreme Court ruling, the 
implementation of the land release was incremental and lackadaisical. Opponents of 
this process thus had ample time to formulate strategies and garner support. 
Opposition to PT Lonsum comes from a variety of fronts, including 
environmental activists from WALHI Makassar, indigenous rights campaigners from 
AMAN South Sulawesi, the Legal Aid Institute (LBH), members of the National 
Human Rights Commission (Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia or KomnasHam), 
an umbrella group called National Solidarity for Bulukumba (Solidaritas Nasional 
untuk Bulukumba or SNUB), and an array of ad hoc local alliances. 
459 
According to PT Lonsurn management, political opportunists, spoilers, and 
ethnic entrepreneurs from Bulukumba seamlessly drift from one local NGO to 
another, carrying out activities under the banner of one organisation until it faces a 
457 Interview with Patabai Pa Bokori, former mayor of Bulukumba, on 17 February 2006. 
458 According to PT Lonsum's 'Chronology of HGU Acreage Reduction [ ... I' - 
459 SNUB is comprised of 36 organisations, including legal aid groups, media, human rights monitors, 
ecologists, farmers unions, and AMAN. 
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public ban or is blacklisted by the authorities, and then regrouping under a new 
banner to continue their activities. 460 The most visible of Bulukumba's chameleonic 
NGOs are the Fanner's Union of Kajang (SPK), the Community Education 
Foundation (Yayasan Pendidikan Rakyat or YPR), and the Alliance of Kajang 
Communities (Aliansi Masyarakat Kajang or AMK). 
In some ways the scenario in Bulukumba mirrors that in South Sumatra, 
where PT Lonsurn also controls large tracts of productive lands (Collins 2003: 166). 
Both cases involve NGOs deserving of praised for their exposure of violence and 
repression against villagers, as well as their campaigns to educate farmers about their 
rights and opportunities for political participation. However the NGOs involved in 
Bulukumba have expanded the scope of activism by engaging in direct intervention. 
This has led to typical reactionary (but not wholly unfounded) criticisms from 
the government and the company, with frequent accusations that NGOs provoke and 
manipulate the community, spoil and derail negotiations, which culminates in violent 
demonstrations and forcible land occupations. Moreover, the introduction of 
divergent political strategies puts pressure on community groups to align themselves 
with one or more of their trustee and patron organisations, rather than benefit from a 
broad mobilisation based on collective grievances. 
Conditions in Kajang therefore closely mirror the "politics of difference" as 
observed by Li (2001) in Central Sulawesi, as well as the patterns of resource conflict 
identified by Erb (2007) in Flores. Indeed, the parties involved in protracted disputes 
over coffee plantations in Flores came to realise that "conflict was lucrative, " after 
which it became "impossible to put an end to it" (Erb 2007: 268). 
For a minority in Bulukumba, conflict has indeed been lucrative, while for 
many others it has been devastating. From 1999 onwards representations on behalf of 
the wider Kajang community have been made by groups agitating for the release of 
540 hectares of land (constituting the natural adat borders). This strategy would come 
460 Interview with Andi Abdul Malik, coordinator of labour relations and security at 
Palangisang 
Estate, on 22 May 2006. It is worth noting that PT Lonsum has an interest 
in discrediting local 
opposition. 
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to envenom the area as local communities became increasingly fragmented and 
opposition to PT Lonsurn became radicalised. 
Two groupings in particular are under the surveillance of local authorities; the 
Salasa group and the Latif group. 461 Formally, Armin Salasa is associated with the 
Community Education Foundation (YPR), though his role in the wider political 
conflict is much more dubious. In some quarters Salasa is revered as a champion of 
the people, having been arrested several times for his involvement in struggles over 
adat lands. H. Latif is the son of Hamarong, the community advocate from Selayar 
that has developed a reputation as protector of the community. Thus, by association, 
H. Latif is also held in high esteem by Kajang communities. 
Conflict can only be lucrative if an expedient and efficient resolution is 
obstructed. Since land is the principal source of wealth, this must be the focus of any 
campaign to derail the settlement process. As mentioned, this process was postponed 
by court order from 1991 to 1998, during which time it seems that actors such as 
Salasa and Latif began to stake their claim over contested lands. 
As soon as the postponement order was lifted (March 1998), they could begin 
to sell individual plots for cultivation and residential purposes, using their public 
notoriety to convince farming families that these were legitimate transactions. There 
is no physical evidence that these illicit transactions took place; no formal contracts 
were drafted or signed, official terms of designation such as realtor and tenancy were 
not used, and the issuance of receipts rarely applied (the dominant mode of payment 
tends to be livestock rather than currency). However, much of the testimony recorded 
in Bulukumba confirms that land transactions were taking place prior to and during 
the implementation of the court-ordered land release. 
The first in a series of land reclamation operations took place in 1999, as 
Kajang villagers were encouraged to remove the National Land Agency's 
462 
demarcation poles and set them around a new perimeter (540 hectares) . This 
extended perimeter included the lands that were being illicitly bought and sold by 
461 Interview with Andi Abdul Malik, coordinator of labour relations and security at Palangisang 
Estate, on 22 May 2006. 
462 According to PT Lonsum's 'Chronology of HGU Acreage Reduction 
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local brokers. As this was an illegal act and continues to be a highly sensitive political 
issue in Bulukumba, local informants were not particularly forthcoming about the 
identities of the perpetrators, though it was clearly in the interests of some to resist 
efforts to return to the legal boundaries (200 hectares). 
Local authorities were inept and complicit as farming communities from 
Kajang along with activists engaged in land reoccupation and the planting of long- 
term crops such as cocoa, coconut, banana and pepper. Much of the costly and time- 
consuming work carried out by the National Land Agency-including surveying, 
mapping, and consulting-was disrupted as activists removed demarcation poles, 
expanded plantations, and encouraged villagers to reject Agency findings. 
The government was also inclined to proceed with caution as their actions 
threatened to compromise relations with PT Lonsum's management. Rubber tapping 
in Bulukumba employs some 3,000 workers and generates significant tax revenues 
from production, transportation, building, and road use. 463 PT Lonsum operations 
reportedly constitute 60 per cent of total district revenue, making them politically 
indispensable. Goodwill, on the other hand, is fostered through community 
development programmes similar to those established by PT Inco in Soroako, which 
include the provision of basic needs, sporting facilities, public transportation, mosque 
refurbishments, Ramadan safaris, and water procurement. 
It is therefore clear that the company has made positive contributions to the 
district,, and moreover PT Lonsum. managers did not oppose the appointment of third- 
party mediators to lead the resolution process. However, tensions escalated in 2001 as 
people began cutting down rubber trees within PT Lonsum's concession zone in order 
to consolidate control over their naturally defined customary territories. 
464 
Despite the frequent invocation of adat, such actions have little connection to 
the Konjo-speaking adat communities of Kajang Dalam, governed by oral tradition 
under the mystical figure of the Amma Toa. Nevertheless, activists 
from Makassar 
and elsewhere did not seem to hesitate when misusing the traditional name of 
Kajang 
463 Average tax contributions are 1.3 billion rupiah per annum. Data provided 
by PT Lonsum managers 
at Pallangisang Estate on 09 February 2006. 
464 Interview with Ir. Sugito, manager of Palangisang Estate, on 9 
February 2006. 
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Dalam to build a thoroughly modem case around adat rights in order to bolster their 
struggles against PT Lonsurn. 
Rather than confon-ning to latent, unified, essentialist versions of indigeneity, 
the community bargaining position in Kajang has been severely undermined by 
internal divisions, the most obvious of which is the distinction between original 
litigants and non-litigants. For non-litigants, the release of 200 hectares would 
constitute a collective loss given that they had co-inhabited the disputed area without 
obstruction for years. By that measure, 200 hectares would require a withdrawal, a 
trade-off that might not seem appealing even if the 200 hectares were legally 
certified. The ma ority of inhabitants in the contested area simply want to protect their 
landholdings, upon which they depended for daily subsistence needs. 
In order to offset growing resistance from elements within the community, PT 
Lonsum announced that compensation amounting to one million rupiah was to be 
465 
paid to each household for crops lost during the land resettlement . Some 
households reluctant to reconcile with PT Lonsum were offered jobs in the plantation 
estates. The appeasement of opposition was a strategy that further divided the farmers 
of Kajang. 
Based on evidence from PT Lonsum's South Sumatra operations, NGOs 
implicated in land disputes were "often manipulated by the government or 
corporations to legitimate government policies and disenfranchise people" (Collins 
2003: 166). As for their client communities, the actual farmers whose livelihoods 
depend on the disputed lands, they continue to struggle to articulate a coherent set of 
demands, and thus grow increasingly reliant on NGOs for support and representation. 
Many of those in a leadership position are young activists with a dearth of 
experience in dealing with conflict through political negotiation. Some remain 
suspicious of formal negotiation and are wary of cooptation; others argue that 
participation and engagement are the only ways in which to wield any meaningful 
influence. All local parties are vulnerable to the actions of political spoilers. 
In the 
46' According to PT Lonsurn's 'Chronology of HGU Acreage Reduction [ ]'. 
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event that formal negotiations break down, as was the case in South Sumatra, 
villagers and workers may feel that violence is their only option (Collins 2003: 17 1). 
Ultimately, the dilemma in Kajang is the result of miscommunications and a 
crisis of identity within the community, strategic divisions within the support 
networks of NGOs and activists, deliberate company tactics, and government 
ineptitude at the village and district level. While all of these contributing factors are 
important, it may have been the cunning corruption of local elites that really drove 
this illegal land expansion. The illicit sale and distribution of contested lands by local 
elites was achieved through campaigns of misinforination and exploitation in the 
name of adat, culminating in an appalling outbreak of violence in June 2003. 
Crisis in Kajang 
In 2003 incidents of forcible land reclaiming erupted throughout the Indonesian 
archipelago, many of which are documented by Lucas and Warren (2003). In 
Bulukumba tensions came to a head as mass protests were held for ten days outside of 
the district parliament building. From I June 2003-10 June 2003, thousands of rural 
villagers, NGOs and journalists are reported to have camped outside of the 
parliament, demanding a copy of PT Lonsum's concession permit as well as 
documentation acknowledging the land release, which was expected to include all 
lands within the natural customary borders (540 hectares). 466 Local members of the 
SPK and YPR, as well as WALHI Makassar, were in attendance. 
These mass protests led to direct action, land seizures, and violent 
confrontation. The serving mayor at the time claimed that "the NGOs started the 
conflict, " provoking the community by falsely promising that the government would 
distribute one hectare of land to each villager that participated in the occupation of 
company lands. 467 This is a sweeping denunciation of NGOs as well as a gross 
oversimplification of Kajang villagers (the mayor's own constituents). 
466 According to the report entitled 'Resisting the Violence of Financial Capital: Serious 
Human Rights 
Violations in Bulukumba, South Sulawesi' published by National Solidarityfor Bulukumba. 
467 Interview with Patabai Pa Bokori, former mayor of Bulukumba, on 17 February 
2006. 
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As alluded to previously, it is possible to disaggregate NGO as well as 
community interests. Some activists struggling in the name of adat are genuinely 
concerned for the wellbeing of their intended beneficiaries. Others are less concerned 
with individual Kajang households but remain committed, in principle, to opposing 
rapacious corporate managers and plundering politicians. Then there are the 
chameleonic organisations that agitate for reforms by day and serve as covers for 
opportunists by night. 
A combination of political opportunism, rightful resistance, and blind 
emulation led to the gathering of 1,500 people on the outskirts of Bonto Biraeng 
village, Kajang Luar, on the morning of 21 June 2003.468 Some were reportedly in 
possession of chainsaws, as it was their intention to fell more trees within PT Lonsum 
rubber plantation estates. 469 PT Lonsum's Intel apparatus had alerted company 
managers to this danger, and a small security detail (twelve local police) arrived on 
the scene around 13: 00, attempting to disperse the large crowd. 
As tensions escalated it is alleged that the police fired at the villagers, 
prompting a barrage of attacks by the demonstrators armed with spears, knives and 
Molotov cocktails. 470 Having driven the police away the mass of demonstrators 
gathered in PT Lonsum's football field and were divided into two camps. The first 
was responsible for gathering provisions and food stocks (enough for ten days), while 
the second was to build a temporary encampment. 471 
Not surprisingly, the second police deployment arrived swiftly, heavily armed 
and in numbers. 472 PT Lonsum asserts that the authorities fired warning shots and 
used rubber bullets to dissuade protesters, but that this only enraged them further. 
Faced with the threat of villagers running amok, they shot into the crowd, 
injuring 
468 Report entitled 'Record of Violence against Indonesian Farming and 
Adat Communities' published 
by WALHI in 2003. 
469 Report entitled 'Resisting the Violence of Financial Capital published 
by National Solidarity 
for Bulukumba. 
470 According to PT Lonsum's 'Chronology of HGU Acreage Reduction 
471 According to the report entitled 'Resisting the Violence of Financial 
Capital published by 
National Solidarityfor Bulukumba. 
472 243 security personnel were reported to have responded to the crisis, 
deployed from four districts as 
well as the province, according to PT Lonsum's 'Chronology of 
HGU Acreage Reduction [ ... 
]'. 
252 
two and arresting another 21 people. WALHI's reporting of the incident puts the 
numbers as five shot and 36 arrested. SPK's account was that two died from the 
473 
shooting, with 46 injuries and 43 arrests . 
Kompas, a reputable national news 
agency, interviewed members of the National Human Rights Commission about the 
Bulukumba incident, and found that three people eventually died as a result of 
474 injuries sustained during clashes with police. 
The following day (22 June 2003) the police set a five-kilometre radius for 
their search operations, during which houses were raided and hundreds more were 
detained. Members of the Community Education Foundation (YPR) considered 
instrumental in the organisation of the land reclaiming incident were added to the 
provincial daftar pencarian orang (most wanted persons list), along with 26 other 
provocateurs. 475 Allegations of police brutality were equally widespread, prompting 
the National Commission for Human Rights to send an investigative team to 
Bulukumba. 476 
PT Lonsum's managers accuse YPR (particularly Salasa) of exploiting the 
adat communities of Kajang Dalam, famed for their willingness to defend the honour 
477 
of their domain unto death . In order to secure points of 
leverage to bolster 
expansive land claims (540 hectares), Salasa is accused of reaching out to the non- 
litigant community in Kajang, selling some 90 households plots of land within PT 
Lonsum's concession zone. 478 In this scenario, any resolution reached between the 
parties for less than 540 hectares would expose the fraudulence of these transactions 
and likely cause a severe backlash against Salasa and YPR- 
473 Interview with members of the Farmer's Union of Kajang (names withheld) 
from 6-7 February 
2006. 
474 Kompas (2003). 'KomnasHam Temukan Indikasi Awal Pelanggaran Ham Berat d, Bulukumba'. 
Kompas. 20 September 2003. Available online. 
47' According to PT Lonsum's 'Chronology of HGU Acreage Reduction 
476 Report entitled 'Record of Violence against Indonesian Farming and 
Adat Communities' published 
by WALHI in 2003. 
477 Interview with In Sugito, manager of Palangisang Estate, on 22 May 
2006. Refer back to Gibson 
(2000) for more on the indefatigable spirit cults of the Amma Toa. 
478 Interview with Ir. Sugito, manager of Palangisang Estate, on 22 
May 2006. 
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The former head of the provincial court of South Sulawesi was also convinced 
that these expansionary measures were provoked or at least orchestrated by political 
opportunists working behind the scenes: 
The borders were not clear when the [court] ruling was made ' and so the communities just took advantage of the 
ambiguities. There were some who funded and organised the 
cutting of the [rubber trees] in plantation areas, with promises being made [to those who carried it out]. It turns out that there 
were people who funded the expansion of community land, 
helping the community to expand from 200 to 540 hectares. 
They must have been expecting to gain some land out of 
this. 479 
This informant did not explicitly refer to anyone by name, though his testimony does 
reinforce the allegations made by PT Lonsum managers (that some expected to "gain" 
from the attempted land seizure). 
In order to gauge the accuracy of these competing claims, it was necessary to 
visit the actual site of the conflict, located on the fringe of Bonto Biraeng village. The 
conflict remains unresolved, and many of the outstanding issues are politically 
sensitive. As such, the sub-district head of Kajang warned against visiting Bonto 
Biraeng, for it would "give encouragement to villagers" and engender a false sense of 
hope. 480 His main concern was that the presence of researchers in this aggrieved area 
would provoke yet another uprising. 
Without firsthand research, it would not be possible to determine whether any 
lands within the contested zone had indeed been sold to unsuspecting villagers. Upon 
arrival in Bonto Biraeng, the village head was far less tentative that his superior at 
sub-district level. He pointed out the direction in which the land seizures took place, 
and indicated the area in which the contested lands had been sold to local households. 
There is only one main road leading in and out of the village, and it takes very 
little time to reach the contested area. Most households in Bonto Biraeng make their 
479 Interview with H. M. Arsyad Sanusi, head of the Provincial Court of South Sulawesi, on 13 March 
2006. 
480 Interview with Andi Sudirman Mangkona, head of sub-district Kajang. on 23 May 2006. 
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living as rubber-tappers and farmers; when harvest season is over activities tend to be 
concentrated in the village, during which time people are easily approachable. One 
informant agreed to an interview and told his story. 481 He is not one of the original 
litigants in the land dispute, though he does hold an adat title (Tu' Toa Ganta) and 
feels a natural entitlement to all the surrounding lands. 
Crucially, this informant admitted without hesitation that he had been sold 
land by one of the well-known community advocates, H. Latif, son of Hamarong: 
I paid for this land with four cows worth approximately eight 
million rupiah and received 1.25 hectares. There is a receipt 
for the land. Mr. Latif and one other man sold land to around 
700 people. We were all willing to buy the land because we 
really needed it at the time. We do not know about the proper 
procedure for land purchases. No land certificates have been 
given yet. Mr Latif and his partners are working for the 
482 community so we are not worried . 
While it did not seem like a matter for levity, the infon-nant often laughed and smiled 
while giving details of his dubious land purchase. He was adomed in the traditional 
dress of Kajang Dalam (black sarong and Pasapu headwear), swore loyalty to the 
Amma Toa,, and believed all of the lands in Kajang to be customary adat lands. This 
infonnant was not concerned with politics and had no obvious motive to lie or 
mislead. 
For H. Latif and his accomplices, it would have been relatively easy to blur 
the facts by citing the court clerical records that (mistakenly) acknowledged 
community rights over customary lands, defined as natural borders. Perhaps they 
genuinely believed that their campaign would succeed and PT Lonsum would agree 
to the release of all 540 hectares, after which the Kajang community could retain their 
lands and no one would be held accountable for the illicit transactions. 
Reports vary, though it has been alleged that Armin Salasa sold land to some 
90 non-litigant households in Kajang, while H. Latif may have sold 
land to an 
481 Interview with a villager (anonymous) from Bonto Biraeng on 23 May 
2006. 
482 Interview with a villager (anonymous) from Bonto Biraeng on 23 May 
2006. 
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additional 700 non-litigant households. The sub-district head of Kajang did not cite 
specific cases or attempt to vilify any individuals, though he admitted that the number 
of claimants has expanded from the original 243 to as many as 500 households. The 
head of the provincial court in Makassar believes that all those responsible for 
funding and provoking the land reclaiming activities should be held accountable, even 
brought to trial for their alleged involvement in the destruction of company 
property. 483 
After gathering testimony in Bonto Biraeng the village head agreed to an 
interview. He has been village head since 1998, and thus has firsthand knowledge of 
the land dispute. During the mass protests and clashes with police on 21 June 2003 
the village head recounts hearing gun shots from his house, and though he was not an 
eye-witness to these events, he has since been inundated with petitions and appeals 
from his constituents. 
It is alleged that, prior to the outbreak of violence, Bonto Biraeng had been 
neglected by PT Lonsum. and the district government, despite its strategic location 
within the contested area. For instance,, he argued that neighbouring villages have 
been the target of community development programmes such as the building of 
484 
mosques and schools, while his village was excluded . It was only after the violent 
land occupations and subsequent tragedy that the resolution process was conducted in 
a formal, systematic way, with village consultations and the appointment of third- 
parties to mediate between the main protagonists. 
With hindsight, the village head felt that the government (at sub-district and 
district level) and PT Lonsurn were at fault for allowing farmers (litigants and non- 
litigants) to carry on cultivating the contested lands from 1998 onwards, while 
the 
485 dispute was being reviewed . This gave the wrong 
impression to local communities, 
causing further ambiguity and resentment. 
483 Interview with H. M. Arsyad Sanusi, head of the Provincial 
Court of South Sulawesi, on 13 March 
2006. 
484 Interview with head of Bonto Biraeng village, sub-district 
Kajang, on 23 May 2006. 
485 Interview with head of Bonto Biraeng village on 23 May 
2006. 
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Failure to implement the original Supreme Court decision, therefore, 
ultimately lies with the district government, which sat idle for too long while PT 
Lonsurn expanded production and local activists fon-nulated counter- strategies which 
included occupations, blockades, and destruction of company assets. After years of 
negligent passivity, however, local authorities were subjected to intense media 
scrutiny and pressure from human rights campaigners following the violence on 21 
June 2003 
. 
486 The following section provides a detailed account of the fon-nal 
response by local, district and provincial authorities to the mounting crisis in Kajang. 
Towards Reconciliation 
Reports of the fatal clashes in Bulukumba were widely circulated throughout 
Indonesia. In response, the National Commission for Human Rights sent a task force 
to the district to investigate, accompanied by a surge in journalistic activity as well as 
NGO intervention. Press reports were highly critical concerning the conduct of the 
triumvirate of security forces, district government officials, and corporate managers, 
concluding that the crisis was caused by ongoing violations of adat rights within the 
rubber concession zone. 487 
While this response marks a significant departure from the censorship and 
repression of the recent past, the reawakening of Indonesia's public sphere is not yet 
complete. Overly simplistic grievance-based analysis which pits innocents against 
perpetrators does not bring the parties any closer to reconciliation; rather, it overlays 
local complexities and fails to engage with communal divisions. 
Facing accusations of maladministration and complicity, the district 
government took a more proactive approach to the dispute following the crisis 
in 
Kajang. On 18 July 2003, for instance, Patabai Pa Bokori (the mayor of Bulukumba 
from 1995-2005), began to report on multi-party meetings held in Kajang. The 
486 Pressure came locally from Tribune Timor, and nationally from Kompas and 
Tempo Group, two 
major media conglomerates in Indonesia, as well as interventon 
from AMAN-SS, WALHI, and Down 
to Earth through its English language website. 
487 'Komnas HAM Temukan Indikasi Awal Pelanggaran HAM Berat di Bulukumba'. 
Kompas. 20 
September 2003. Available at: http: //www. kompas. co. id/utama/news/0309/20/101544. 
htm 
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official government position was articulated as follows: "It has been explained that 
the community has the right to 200 hectares of land, and the rest [of the contested 
area] is the plantation concession area owned by PT Lonsum'q . 
488 
Beyond stating the obvious and reinforcing the decision of the Supreme Court, 
the mayor was aware that a comprehensive solution would require a sustained effort. 
A Tim Terpadu (or Dispute Resolution Committee) was thus established on 27 
August 2003 to handle the land dispute and investigate cases of illegal occupancy 
within PT Lonsurn's concession zone. 489 All proceedings were to be facilitated by the 
mayor and his deputy, along with the district parliament, the police and security 
apparatus. The resolution effort also required the involvement of relevant sub-district 
and village heads, along with one NGO representative, four community leaders, and 
PT Lonsurn managers. 490 
To begin, the mandate of the Committee as set out in Mayoral Decree 
KPTS. 642NIIV2003 was to re-measure the 200 hectares of disputed lands in order to 
produce an accurate survey of the area while recording all data for verification. This 
was necessary in order to replace the demarcation poles first set out by the National 
Land Agency in 1998. An inventory was also to be drafted containing all of the 
names of the community members claiming ownership or entitlement to lands in the 
disputed area. These systematic procedures suggest that the mayor was aware of the 
entrenched divisions within Kajang. Moreover, calls for a security detail to oversee 
the completion of surveys, manifests, and inventories indicate that all parties were 
aware of the dangers of local opposition. 
According to reports, on two separate occasions between II September 2003 
and 23 October 2003 the Committee set about disseminating their findings regarding 
the borders of the disputed lands and the eligible claimants. 
491 Villagers in Bonto 
488 Transcript of meeting number 005/1456/Pem. Um issued by the mayor of Bulukumba on 18 July 
2003. 
489 Consolidation Team was established by order of the mayor of Bulukumba, formalised by Mayoral 
Decree Number KPTS. 642NIII/2003. 
490 Membership of the Dispute Resolution Team as set out in Mayoral Decree Number 
KPTS. 642NIII/2003. 
491 According to PT Lonsum's 'Chronology of HGU Acreage Reduction 
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Biraeng, Bonto Manggiring, and neighbouring villages in sub-district of Bulukumpa 
were informed of the illegality of the continued occupation of 540 hectares within the 
plantation concession zone. 
On 15 December 2003 the mayor attempted to bring all the parties together to 
review the findings and reach consensus, though the fissures that had developed and 
deepened since the 1980s brought negotiations to an impasse. Questions of political 
representation again came to the fore. Those representing the wider Kajang 
community (a mix of litigants and non-litigants) would not compromise over their 
principled claim to 540 hectares, a fact that overshadowed the legal entitlements of 
243 households still awaiting compensation. 
Given the sensitivities involved in such negotiations, all parties to the conflict 
paid close attention to procedures and formalities while glossing over some of the 
more intractable political issues which had developed on the ground. For Armin 
Salasa, H. Latif and their followers, this was a matter of principle; no compromise 
could be made in the name of adat, and all villagers loyal to the Amma Toa should 
thus be given equal status under the law. 
In practice, discourses of adat are frequently distorted in order to insulate 
those behind the lucrative, illicit land deals in Kajang. Through the selective 
deployment of adat, patterns of clientelism are reinforced and reconfigured. 
Meanwhile, for the original litigants, those deemed by the Supreme Court of 
Indonesia to be legitimate bearers of customary adat tenure, such distortions ensure 
that they remain marginalised and overshadowed throughout the negotiation process. 
Such complex and protracted disputes provide substantive tests of legitimacy 
and competence for newly empowered, autonomous district governments throughout 
Indonesia. Indicative of deficiencies (lack of capacity, lack of political will) at 
district 
level, the mayor of Bulukumba turned to provincial authorities for assistance 
in 
February 2004, just six months after the establishment of an inclusive 
Dispute 
Resolution Committee. 492 Preliminary efforts to bring all parties to the bargaining 
table thus proved more complex than originally anticipated, 
highlighting the 
492 According to PT Lonsurn's 'Chronology of HGU Acreage Reduction [ I' - 
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entrenchment of vested interests within and between the communities of Kajang and 
their supporters. 
From research on resource conflicts involving PT Lonsum in South Sumatra, 
Collins (2003: 172) found the same "lack of initiative" from newly elected local 
legislators, and thus questioned the capacity (if not the willingness) of local 
government to resolve land disputes. Disputes involving profitable extractive 
companies tend to be "referred up the chain of command, " eventually reaching the 
governor's office (Collins 2003: 172). Provincial policy in South Sumatra as well as 
South Sulawesi has been to deal with disputes on a case-by-case basis, which can be 
agonisingly slow. 
Acting on the advice issued by the provincial parliament after reviewing the 
case, the governor of South Sulawesi, H. M. Amin Syam, decided to intervene in 
Bulukumba by appointing a Tim Mediasi (Mediation Team) on 18 February 2004. 
Interestingly, prior to the endorsement of the governor's intervention in the conflict, 
the provincial Parliament had taken into consideration the testimony of two local 
NGOs purporting to represent the adat communities of Kajang: the Alliance of 
Kajang Communities (AMK) and the Fan-ner's Union of Kajang (SPK). 493 
Government mediators either determined that these NGOs were legitimate, 
representative bargaining partners, or simply recorded their testimony out of 
indifference. 
Given the diversity of Kajang and the politicisation of local communities, no 
single NGO can claim to represent all of Kajang's constituents. Within the domain of 
the Amma Toa there is a functioning, exemplary community that follows without 
reserve their mystical leader and his karaeng tallua. Activists agitating for political 
refonris and control over plantation lands (all outside of Kajang Dalam) 
do not 
represent this constituency. Moreover, within the ranks of the NGO and 
donor 
community, there are a number of disparate strategies being promoted and 
493 According to the 'opening considerations' contained in the Decision of the 
Governor of South 
Sulawesi Number 93/11/2003 for the 'Establishment of a Mediation Team to Resolve the 
Land Dispute 
between the Kajang Community and PT Lonsum' dated 18 February 2004. 
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implemented, leading to a degree of hesitancy and suspicion among their intended 
beneficiaries,, rather than unity and solidarity. 
The question of representation is further complicated by the following facts: 
many disgruntled families have been given menial jobs by PT Lonsum 
(appeasement); politically articulate villagers are encouraged to become bureaucrats 
or are recruited into security and Intel apparatuses (cooptation); and finally, 
distinctions between original litigants and non-litigants are continuously highlighted 
(fragmentation). As such, the testimony recorded by provincial parliamentarians came 
from two local NGOs with limited constituencies in a politically divisive 
envirom-nent. 
From the outset, therefore, the establishment of a new provincial Mediation 
Team to replace the previous Dispute Resolution Committee from Bulukumba was 
problematic. The provincial Mediation Team was fon-nally established in accordance 
with the Decision of the Governor of South Sulawesi Number 93/IP2004, dated 18 
February 2004. The complete structure of the Mediation Team is set out in Table 7.1 
below. 
261 
Table 7.1: Structure of the Provincial Mediation Team 
Positions Particulars 
Directors 1. Governor of South Sulawesi 
2. Head of Provincial Parliament, South Sulawesi 
3. Chief of Police for South Sulawesi 
Legal Responsibility 1. Deputy Governor of South Sulawesi 
2. Mayor of Bulukumba 
Organisation and 1. H. Moch. Roem, SH., MSi 
Implementation 2. Head of National Unity office, South Sulawesi 
province 
3. Deputy Mayor of Bulukumba 
4. Head of District Parliament, Bulukumba 
Secretariat 1. Head of the Bureau of Deconcentration 
2. Head of the Bureau of Law and Organisation 
Field Coordinator 1. Head of the National Land Agency, South 
Sulawesi province 
2. District Secretary of Bulukumba 
3. Head of National Unity office, Bulukumba district 
4. Director of the National Land Agency, Bulukumba 
district 
Field Organiser 1. Head of the National Land Agency, South 
Sulawesi province 
2. Director of the National Land Agency, Bulukumba 
district 
3. Head of the District Court of Buluk-umba 
4. Head of sub-district Kajang 
5. Head of sub-district Bulukumpa 
Pacification 1. Chief of Police, Bulukumba district 
2. Commander of Military Unit, Bulukumba district 
3. Commander of Police Unit, Bulukumba district 
Additional Members 1. Seven district and provincial bureaucrats 
2. One lawyer and four managers from PT Lonsum 
3. Three community representatives from sub-district 
Kajang; 
4. Two community representatives from sub-district 
Buluk-umpa; 
5. Two community lawyers 
A 
Based on Govemor of South Sulawesi Decision Numoer 
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In the preamble to this decision establishing the Mediation Team, it was stated 
that the emphasis must be placed on two key principles: precision and proportionality. 
Indeed, judging from the proceedings overseen by district authorities in relation to the 
execution of the court-ordered land release between 1998 and 2003, the principles of 
precision and proportionality were largely absent. To achieve a comprehensive 
solution to the dispute, H. M. Amin Syarn (the provincial governor) set out the 
following tasks for the Mediation Team: 494 
e Facilitating and supporting the resolution of the land dispute between PT 
Lonsurn and the fanners of Kajang in Bulukumba district proportionally and 
in accordance with valid legislative regulations; 
e Carrying out direct field observations to clarify the location of the disputed 
lands, allowing for the possibility of a return to the fonner borders of the PT 
Lonsurn concession zone; 
* In carrying out these tasks, the Mediation Team is to coordinate with the 
district government of Bulukumba and the technical apparatus in the field; 
e Reporting to the Governor of South Sulawesi on the results of the tasks as 
they are implemented. 
H. Mohammad Roem from Makassar was appointed to lead this Mediation 
Team, which consists of representatives from all relevant stakeholders (as indicated in 
Table 7.1). Listed as the representative for Bonto Biraeng village was the infamous 
Salasa, while Sampe was recorded as the representative for Tana Toa village, the 
residence of the Amma Toa of Kajang Dalam. H. Latif does not appear on the 
register, nor does Juma, the representative of the original litigants who are still 
awaiting closure. While the presence of Salasa is controversial, the appearance of 
Sampe on the list of representatives is erroneous, for Tana Toa village 
is located 
outside of PT Lonsum's concession zone as well as the disputed area. 
494 As stated in Governor of South Sulawesi Decision Number 
93/11/2004. 
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The Politics of Compensation 
After one month of mediation activities the provincial government organised a 
general meeting in Makassar (on 17 March 2004), providing a forum for all parties to 
report on progress in the field. With a reinvigorated mediation process, PT Lonsum 
negotiators were facing immense scrutiny from hostile reporters and human rights 
advocates. As a conciliatory gesture, W. Giriputra, the managing director from PT 
Lonsum head office in Medan, North Sumatra, sent a memo to Palangisang estate in 
Bulukumba sanctioning the conditional release of an additional 271 hectares of 
land 
. 
495 Considering the previous land release in 1985 (for 143 hectares), the new 
offer would effectively transfer legal rights over 414 hectares to claimants from 
496 Kajang at a cost of some 67,736,000 rupiah . 
The following conditions were attached to this offer: first, that the 
communities in the disputed location will not issue any further complaints regarding 
the acreage that is managed and owned by PT Lonsum; second, that the district 
government of Bulukumba guarantees that there will be no further demands over the 
acreage controlled by PT Lonsum. in other locations throughout the Bulukumba. 497 it 
was expected that this compromise would be the final push that brought peace and 
stability to Bulukumba. 
In a show of defiance, however, representatives for the Kajang community 
(particularly Salasa and Sampe) boycotted several meetings sponsored by the 
provincial government and dominated proceedings at village level. The ever-cautious 
provincial Mediation Team made consistent reference to the need to support a 
64 comprehensive solution" to the land dispute by directly involving all relevant 
parties, including "independent actors and elements of the local adat communities". 
498 
495 Memo Number II 02/GAD/G/43NIII/2004 from PT Lonsum Head Office in Medan dated 4 August 
2004. 
496 Particulars of the land release, including sequencing, budgeting, and oversight, are contained in 
Letter Number 593.7/10/6/Set signed by the Deputy Governor of South Sulawesi, H. Syahrul Yasin 
Limpo, on 16 March 2005. 
497 According to the Mediation Team Report on the 'Progress of the PT Lonsum Case' dated August 
2004. 
498 According to the Official Report of the Mediation Team dated 17 March 2004 and signed 
by all 
parties. 
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There was no official acknowledgment of the incompatible political views and 
divisive strategies undertaken by several of the village representatives. Furthermore, 
the so-called comprehensive solution called for a dualistic approach; that is, the 
combination of "legal scrutiny and sociological understanding". 
H. Mohammad Roem's call for greater "sociological understanding" was to be 
achieved through comprehensive village consultation and deliberation. From August 
2004 onwards PT Lonsum's final offer for the legal release of 414 hectares was 
announced to villagers throughout the contested area, including Bonto Biraeng where 
Salasa's influence remains strong. 
Anticipating resistance from certain quarters, Roem stressed that all parties 
had exerted the maximum effort to ensure a proportional and comprehensive 
resolution to the land dispute. Furthen-nore, assurances were given to the effect that 
the release of an additional 271 hectares was "sufficient" and the "best middle-way 
solution we can achieve". 499 If "wisdom and sincerity were allowed to prevail, " then 
legal certainty and human rights would be well within the grasp of all parties 
concerned. 
Despite repeated calls for precision and proportionality from the Governor of 
South Sulawesi, and appeals for wisdom and sincerity from the head of the Mediation 
Team, the negotiation process had failed to reconcile the damaging divisions within 
Kajang. Despite their divisive political platforms and possible criminal associations, 
the Salasa group (associated with YPR and Bonto Biraeng village), the Latif group 
(connected to Hamarong from Selayar), and now the Sampe group (affiliated with the 
SPK and Tana Toa village) have featured prominently in mediation team procedures, 
activities, reporting, and village deliberations. By contrast, the Juma group advocating 
on behalf of the original litigants (253 households) were largely excluded and 
marginal. 
This all changed however as the Juma group found its voice again and began 
to appeal directly to the mediators. In an open letter to the Governor of South 
499 According to Letter Number 27/MC. SSNIII/2004 issued by the Mediatlon Team and sIgned 
by H. 
Mohammad Roern on 26 August 2004. 
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Sulawesi bearing the signatures and fingerprints of 33 original litigants from Kajang, 
the following statements were made: 
With respect to the land dispute in Bonto Biraeng village, 
many efforts have been made to promote our [land] rights as 
the original litigants, although we have not yet achieved the 
solution that was expected. Resulting from a series of 
interventions from outsiders with no stake [in the conflict], the 
resolution of this dispute has been complicated and there are 
groups of non-litigants that have received land and cultivated 
it without legal justification. As a result, we [ ... 
] request that 
you carry out land redistribution or land sharing for each of 
the respective original litigants, and we demand that those 
farmers cultivating the land which are not original litigants 
500 vacate the land . 
Continuing in this assertive tone, the original litigants issued a second letter 
(dated 15 September 2004) to the Governor of South Sulawesi, this time bearing 65 
signatures and including very specific demands. To begin, the Mediation Team was 
asked to revisit the location within two weeks in order to mark the borders of the 
contested lands (200 hectares granted to the original litigants in accordance with the 
Supreme Court ruling). 501 It was suggested that a failure to comply could be met with 
unpredictable results. All relevant parties, especially the security apparatus, were 
expected to provide support because of the possibility of clashes with the non- 
litigants, those farmers cultivating the land without any legal basis, "those who 
continue to control and cultivate our lands". 502 
Perhaps the most revealing component of these letters was the request for 
assistance from the (notoriously repressive) security apparatus, which was meant to 
offset the potential for clashes between different factions within the farming 
communities of Kajang. The Mediation Team's response was immediate. By 
7 
500 Excerpt from an 'Action Statement' sent to the Governor of South 
Sulawesi, signed by 33 original 
litigants. There is no date on the letter. 
'0' Excerpt from a 'Statement of Intent' sent to the Governor of South 
Sulawesi, signed by 65 original 
litigants, dated 15 September 2004. 
502 Excerpt from a 'Statement of Intent' sent to the Governor of 
South Sulawesi, signed by 65 original 
litigants, dated 15 September 2004. 
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October 2004 they had organised a meeting in Bonto Biraeng village, attended by the 
village head along with some 150 people from fourteen different villages. 
Unfortunately, judging from the report published by the Mediation Team following 
this meeting, it would have done little to appease Juma and the original litigants, who 
seem to have been outmanoeuvred yet again by other factions (Salasa, H. Latif) 
within the Kajang area. 503 
According to the report of the meeting in Bonto Biraeng village, statements 
from four infon-nants were delivered to the Mediation Team, the details of which 
contradict the position articulated by the original litigants in their two letters to the 
Governor of South Sulawesi. H. Latif, still implicated in the illicit sale of concession 
lands to unsuspecting households from the farming village of Bonto Biraeng, was 
given a legitimising platform from which to solidify his position. 504 Salasa, having 
been arrested several times for his involvement in land occupations and destruction of 
company property, was given similar legitimising treatment (a seat at the negotiating 
table). 
These chameleonic actors issued a veiled threat about the resurgence of 
internal conflict if PT Lonsum could not be convinced to release all 540 hectares of 
land, in accordance with the natural adat borders that overlay the concession zone. 
505 
Any comprehensive settlement for less than 540 hectares would force people to begin 
to share lands, which would "cause difficulties" and reignite reclamation activities 
and forcible land seizures. 506 
It appears as though analysts such as Bourchier (2007: 124) were correct to 
point out that land disputes frequently arise among the "putative representatives" of 
adat communities. It is therefore important to be wary of homogenising tendencies; 
an "idealised local community" masks very real differences 
in terms of social, 
economic and political power (Sch6nwdlder 1997: 761). Furthermore, as noted 
in 
503 Mediation Team Report for the month of October 2004. 
504 According to PT Lonsum's 'Chronology of HGU Acreage Reduction 
F 
505 According to PT Lonsum's 'Chronology of HGU Acreage Reduction 
[ ]'. 
506 Excerpts of testimony from community representatives as recorded 
by the Mediation Team during 
their field visitation on 7 October 2004 in Bonto Biraeng village. 
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chapter two, it is imperative not to overlook the "conflictive relations" that often arise 
between the members of popular movements and their various allies (Sch6nwdlder 
1997: 765). 
Sch6nwdlder (1997: 765) was also correct to point out that, in their efforts to 
seize new opportunities for political participation (in mediation processes, for 
instance), villagers and their supporters tend to face "blockage, instrumentalisation, 
cooptation, or the loss of autonomy". The Juma group representing the original 
litigants has been subjected to an assortment of blockages and instrumentalist efforts. 
In Bulukumba, therefore, by bringing politics closer to the people in accordance with 
mainstream decentralisation narratives, the enhancement of popular participation and 
the empowerment of civil society have not brought the parties any closer to a 
comprehensive solution to the land dispute. 
In search of a compromise, the Mediation Team glossed over these political 
dilemmas and, with the approval of the provincial parliament, pushed through their 
final recommendations. A multi-pronged agenda was set out, and it was requested 
that PT Lonsum commit in writing to the release of an additional 271 hectares of land 
(414 hectares in total). On 3 February 2005, PT Lonsum. Head Office in Medan 
publicly agreed "in principle" to the release of an additional 271 hectares, providing 
the following conditions were met: 
Firstly, that the execution of the land release is carefully 
monitored so as to ensure that no further land claims are 
made. Secondly, that the resolution is conducted with clarity, 
honesty, and transparency. Thirdly, that all parties-the 
Mediation Team,, the district government of Bulukumba, and 
the claimants-produce a statement to the effect that, following 
the release of [an additional] 271 hectares of land, there would 
be no further claims to land in PT Lonsum's concession zone, 
no anarchic or violent actions against PT Lonsum, and 
[unanimous] declaration that the land dispute has been 
resolved. Fourthly, the territorial boundaries of the land [to 
be 
released] must be made clear to ensure that people know 
[the 
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limits of these] boundaries. Lastly, that PT Lonsum is informed of the whole agenda for the land release. 507 
Judging from the wording of this letter, it was clearly anticipated by PT Lonsum 
Head Office in Medan that the land release would not satisfy all of the community 
representatives, but that a signed declaration by all negotiating parties would help 
discredit any future attempts to reengage in land reclaiming activities. 
As predicted, some local factions reacted to the agenda proposed by the 
Mediation Team by engaging in sustained demonstrations in front of the district 
parliament building (held in February and March 2005), calling for the release of 540 
hectares of concession land. This was countered by a group of some 70 original 
litigants who felt that their rights were being violated by these demonstrations. 
Allegedly, they were received by the Head of Governance Affairs in Bulukumba, and 
a statement was released to the effect that all third-parties intervening in the conflict 
508 (those without legal recognition) should be penalised . 
This was not enough to deter the opponents of the proposed settlement (now 
414 hectares), who once again managed to prevent district authorities from carrying 
out conclusive field surveys scheduled for 27 April 2005 . 
509 Finally, on 30 April 
20055 the surveying and measurements were completed, although this required the 
presence of fifteen security personnel to stave off the threat posed by groups of 
protestors attempting to encircle members of the National Land Agency working in 
the field. 
All parties were urged to proceed quickly as the district government of 
Bulukumba was preparing to hold its first ever direct mayoral elections, scheduled for 
27 June 2005. It was noted in a Mediation Report (dated 8 March 2005) that a timely 
resolution of the land dispute would "eliminate a source of insecurity" in the run-up 
to the elections. Acting on the advice of the Chief of Police in Bulukumba, PT 
Lonsum employed public relations personnel in June 2005 to dispel any myths 
507 According to Letter Number 033/GSD/E/39/Il/2005 issued by PT Lonsum General Service 
Department Medan on 3 February 2005. 
508 According to PT Lonsum's 'Chronology of HGU Acreage Reduction 
509 According to PT Lonsum's 'Chronology of HGU Acreage Reduction [ 
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surrounding land ownership and entitlement by holding consultations with 
communities in and around the contested area. 510 
District elections held on 27 June 2005 led to victory for the candidate pairing 
of A. M. Syukri A. Sappewali (mayor) and Drs. H. Paddasi (deputy) with 29 per cent 
of the popular vote. 511 As is customary in district elections5 'Vision and Mission' 
statements were distributed by each of the five candidate pairings in the run-up to the 
election. 512 There was no direct reference made to the adat communities of Kajang in 
any of these statements; however, villagers from Kajang Dalam did participate in 
local elections,, and campaign organisers did schedule visits to the customary domain 
in search of votes (with limited success). 513 
The victors, Sappewali and Paddasi, inherited the PT Lonsum conflict, one 
that was first considered by the district court in 1982, and which had grown 
exponentially more complex with the passing of time. Still fresh in office, the newly 
elected pair received an urgent notice from the Governor of South Sulawesi, H. M. 
Amin Syam, calling for "concrete and systematic steps" towards a "fair and humane" 
resolution to the dispute. 514 Some three weeks later, on 10 January 2006, a formal 
agreement (or Peace Treaty) was signed by representatives from all parties involved 
in the land conflict. 515 
Article 2[3] of the Peace Treaty stipulated that PT Lonsum was formally 
committed to the release of 271 hectares of land. Coupled with the 143 hectares 
released in 1985, this brings the total land release to 414 hectares. To reciprocate, 
some community representatives stated their willingness to vacate concession lands 
that they control located outside of the 414 hectares (Article 4[l]). In closing, it was 
"0 According to PT Lonsum's 'Chronology of HGU Acreage Reduction [ ... 
], - 
511 Data published by the General Elections Commission, South Sulawesi Province, on 29 July 
2005. 
512 Obtained at the General Elections Commission district office in Bulukumba on 24 May 2006. 
See 
Appendix I for an example of a Vision and Mission (Visi dan Misi) statement. 
513 Interview with members of the Farmer's Union of Kajang (names withheld) in Tana 
Toa village 
from 6-7 February 2006. 
514 According to letter number 593.7/6376/Set issued by the Governor of South Sulawesi on 
16 
December 2005. 
515 Document titled 'Peace Treaty, Agreement and Transfer of a Portion of the Concession Lands 
(HGU) of PT London Sumatra Indonesia' dated 10 January 2006. 
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ruled that this agreement was to constitute a legal guide and tool for all parties to the 
conflict in the event that further land claims should arise (Article 8[l]). 
H. M. Amin Syam. (the govemor) gave a jovial speech at the Sahid Hotel in 
Makassar on 26 January 2006 celebrating the land release. While the tone of the 
speech remained affable throughout, there was a deliberate sequence used to convey 
politically sensitive messages to all parties involved in the conflict. While no timeline 
was set out, the governor called for urgency in the implementation of the land release, 
as well as transparency in order to minimise the expected backlash by some elements 
of the community. 516 Implicit in this measured statement was the past failure of the 
district government to fulfil its role as mediator in a transparent way, as well as the 
damaging impact of its lethargic response to the mounting crisis. 
Similarly, an appeal was made to PT Lonsum management to continue to pay 
attention to the social conditions of the community, especially those living in the 
concession zone. Additional goodwill funds were requested for infrastructure 
projects, roads, clean water, electricity, religious activities, and the promotion of 
517 education for future generations through scholarships. Implicit in this polite 
message was the need to atone for a long history disenfranchisement and land 
alienation. 
Lastly, in a veiled reference to persistent divisions within the community, the 
governor called for a peaceful and measured response from the original litigants 
during the land transfer. All parties were asked to be wary of perceived disadvantages 
which may incite further communal violence, and to guard against intervention from 
third-parties that are not eligible to make land claims. 518 As a form of deterrent, the 
governor followed his appeal to the community with praise for the security apparatus, 
which was expected to provide security for the district government during the 
implementation of the land transfer. 
516 Transcript of the speech delivered by the Governor of South Sulawesi at Sabld Hotel in Makassar 
on 26 January 2006. 
517 Transcript of the speech delivered by the Governor of South Sulawesi at Sahid Hotel in Makassar 
on 26 January 2006. 
518 Transcript of the speech delivered by the Governor of South Sulawesi at Sahid Hotel in 
Makassar 
on 26 January 2006. 
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The cumulative efforts of lawyers and judges, mayors and governors, 
members of the security apparatus, mediation teams, human rights commissioners, 
and NGOs at all administrative levels (district, provincial and national) secured the 
release of 414 hectares of land, to be sequentially returned to villagers by the district 
government of Bulukumba. However, the "politics of difference" (Li 2001) has 
become a permanent feature of the socio-cultural landscape of Kajang, and the 
probability of renewed hostilities has most politicians monitoring developments 
closely. 519 Even if a majority of villagers approve of the immediate transfer of land, 
the power and influence of a minority of voices in Kajang would be enough to derail 
the process. 520 
Conclusion 
This chapter served to examine the propensity of local actors, support networks, and 
power brokers to shape democratic processes associated with decentralisation by 
manipulating and dividing local communities, particularly when set in the context of 
disputes over productive lands. NGO intervention on behalf of local communities in 
conflict zones tends to foster a growing dependency on external guidance and 
strategic representation. However, there is evidence of a form of innovative traditions 
being deployed by local communities to redress historical grievances associated with 
land alienation and disenfranchisement. 
Each stage in the negotiation process carried different possibilities for 
promoting, co-opting, or tempering the political impulses of adat communities. While 
the primordial traits of adat communities were largely contrived and redeployed in 
order to bolster claims over land and resources, there remained a degree of popular 
resonance as local communities responded to and mobilised around perceptions of 
authentic customs and traditions. Therefore, this chapter demonstrated that it is 
possible to reconcile the tensions between primordial and instrumental aspects of adat 
in newly autonomous districts such as Bulukumba, where land disputes have 
become 
'19 Interview with Andi Sudirman Mangkona, head of sub-district Kajang, on 
23 May 2006. 
520 Interview with Andi Sudirman Mangkona, head of sub-district Kajang, on 
23 May 2006. 
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endemic. Hundreds of fanning households in Bulukumba managed to secure legal 
title over their adat lands though formal judicial proceedings (not customary courts or 
indigenous tribunals), and hundreds more aspire to emulate them. For most, this is an 
acceptable tradeoff 
In what may be an unprecedented legal ruling, the Supreme Court of 
Indonesia granted 200 hectares of land to 253 farming households from Kajang based 
on their adat rights. This was contrary to the findings of Collins (2003) in South 
Sumatra, where the courts were not relied upon in the dispute resolution process. It 
also went against the trend established by Lucas and Warren (2003) whereby local 
communities involved in land disputes rarely achieved legal resolution. 
From the testimony and documentation already reviewed, it is clear that early 
village responses to the unleashing of regional innovation (post 1998) were often 
guided or provoked by external actors intervening in Bulukumba. There were 
examples of well-intentioned NGOs and activists intervening in order to align adat 
revivalism with modem political campaigns for land rights and environmental 
preservation. However, as in Soroako, the communities of Kajang were divided, 
domesticated, and at times disempowered as a result of their participation in discreet 
mediation processes, routinised and patterned modes of governance, and diffuse 
regulatory deliberations. 
When set against the strategies of predatory elites and power brokers in 
Buluk-umba, efforts to mobilise communities, facilitate village empowerment, and 
achieve meaningful participation in negotiation processes were superseded. Indeed, 
the achievement of "micro-level successes" such as the court-ordered land release in 
Kajang does not transcend the systems and structures that determine power and 
resource allocations (Mohan and Stokke 2000: 254). In this sense, while the adat 
revival is couched in terms of resistance and opposition, it may be little more than a 
permissible form of alternative politics encapsulated within persistent, dominant 
structures of power. Of course, this does not negate the fact that some 
livelihoods 
may improve, or that some freedoms have been gained, though it does cast 
doubt on 
whether these successes can be replicated elsewhere. 
273 
Ultimately, the revival of adat in Bulukumba has been hijacked by intervening 
parties, preventing the emergence of an inclusive concept of customary tenure, and 
fomenting divisions within local communities. Intimidated by corporate tacticians, 
threatened by the security apparatus, deceived by predatory elites, misled by 
inexperienced activists, and disenfranchised by politicians, the fanning communities 
of Kajang appeared well out of their depth. Neither political consciousness, nor 
strategic understanding, nor even a proclivity for attracting networks of support 
prevented the continued victimisation of the original litigants from Kajang. This 
despite the fact that they were attempting to seize the opportunities created by 
decentralisation, which has been celebrated as an era of genuine village initiative, 
substantive autonomy, and unbounded indigenous creativity. 
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Chapter Eight: Becoming Indigenous 
It was identified from the outset of this thesis that the convergent processes of adat 
revivalism and decentralisation continue to evolve with a rapidity that scholars find 
elusive and difficult to keep pace with. A number of Indonesianists have expertly 
integrated the politics of adat into their own fields, offering innovative insights, 
conceptual clarity, and a wealth of empirical material. That said, the overarching 
phenomenon of adat revivalism remains fluid and transient, and spontaneous political 
dilemmas and conflicts continue to arise throughout the diverse archipelago. 
The decentralisation laws (numbers 22 and 25 of 1999) provided the basic 
legal underpinnings for Indonesia's experiment in local autonomy and the affirmation 
of village antecedents. Efforts to reform the heavily centralised military-bureaucratic 
state apparatus involved the transfer of authority, responsibilities, and resources to the 
district and village administrative levels. These reforins were driven by both domestic 
and international imperatives, and produced mixed results as many central authorities 
resisted devolution while many local authorities abused their new positions and 
overstepped their prerogatives. 
As indicated in chapter two, several formative studies have dealt with the 
dilemmas of indigenism, drawing on ample evidence regarding the vitiating effects of 
"ethnogenesis" in the era of decentralisation (von Benda-Beckmann et al. 2001: 8). A 
simple proposition suffusing the debate is that the potentially divisive, chauvinistic, 
and exclusionary discourses of adat should be replaced with civic discourses, those 
emphasising democratic inclusiveness and the unalienable rights and entitlements that 
derive from national citizenship (as opposed to group affiliations or tribal loyalties). 
The unavoidable fact, however, is that adat revivalism in all of its manifestations 
has 
been gaining momentum throughout Indonesia since 1998, and thus 
demands further 
scholarly attention regardless of one's proclivity for civic forms of nationalism. 
It is well acknowledged that political influences on adat revivalism and 
district policy-making consist of various constellations of mayors, senior 
parliamentarians, corporate estate managers, academics, 
NGO activists, third-party 
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mediators, and international donors. However, the specific political interests and 
associations of these groups have not been fully explored. In the enabling context of 
decentralisation, this thesis analysed the processes and outcomes of "becoming 
indigenous, " and contributed to understandings of the subtle ways in which new 
constellations of actors have shaped and captured the politics of tradition in Sulawesi, 
Indonesia. 
Consistent with Azarya's (2003: 2) path-breaking findings in Africa, there 
seems to be no contradiction in Indonesia between primordial and instrumental 
aspects of indigenism. Indeed, they often reinforce each other, moving the debate 
beyond Li's (2007: 365) "contradictory conundrum". By framing the debate around 
the processes and preliminary outcomes of becoming indigenous, therefore, this thesis 
highlighted the instrumental roles played by all parties actively intervening in 
localised settings "in the name of adat" (Henley and Davidson 2007: 1). 
In response to the devolution of authority from Jakarta to the peripheries, the 
contours of conflict mediation and dispute resolution have been reconfigured, and the 
roles of all protagonists have evolved (or regressed) accordingly. While this is a 
highly uneven, subaltern process, efforts have been made throughout this thesis to 
map the fragmentary relations between local protagonists and to discern their myriad 
interests and contingent positions. 
On the surface, discourses of decentralisation emphasising the virtues of 
enhanced political participation, emboldened public spheres, and the empowerment of 
local constituencies have some resonance in Indonesia's outlying districts and 
villages. Upon further scrutiny, however, these discourses often appear shallow, 
quaint, and ineffectual. Notions of popular participation often come to be subsumed 
within and dominated by ancillary NGOs, agencies and facilitators, all of which 
introduce disparate political strategies and agendas into their target constituencies. 
Rather than bearing the mark of progress, innovation, modernity, and civility, the 
intervention of external support networks often becomes a form of surrogacy, 
during 
which the client communities are once again bereft of initiative and 
lack a sense of 
ownership. 
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Bearing these dilemmas in mind, this concluding chapter revisits the primary 
themes raised throughout this thesis: the search for recognition; the revival of 
antedated systems of governance; the containment of oppositional forms of adat 
through subtle institutional processes; and the impact of NGO and donor intervention 
upon their intended beneficiaries and dependents at the village level. By 
foregrounding specific local struggles from the resource-rich island of Sulawesi, this 
thesis contributes to the aggregative understanding of the politics of adat revivalism. 
Specific research questions were posed in accordance with the most salient aspects of 
local adat struggles, as defined by the communities themselves in consultation with 
domestic activists and their myriad supporters. 
Searching for Recognition 
It was found that the most common manifestation of "becoming indigenous" has been 
the ongoing search for recognition. Thus the first research question (Q I) was intended 
to determine the extent to which district regulations have become tools of 
emancipation for local communities or, conversely, whether they represent a 
continuation of colonial-style "elegant policy" (Lev 1985: 64) and the manacles of 
"gentle compulsion" (Vandenbosh 1943: 499). 
Recognition as a primary right begins with the "givens" (Geertz 1973: 259; 
Geertz 1994: 3 1) and signifiers of communities, and then branches out to remedial 
rights, matters of territoriality, customs and lifeways, cultivation patterns, and myriad 
political aspirations. In accordance with the decentralisation laws, the existence of 
unique adat communities capable of self-governance and the utilisation of traditional 
wisdom in areas such as forest management must be proven. Assuming that links to 
the past have been established and existence can be proven, it is within the 
discretionary authority of the district mayor and parliament to grant official 
recognition. 
Since this remains a discretionary matter, local communities are faced with 
the task of making a compelling case for recognition; simply "being 
indigenous" 
(Alfred and Corntassel 2005: 597) is not enough. In order to make a compelling 
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official case (as opposed to resorting to direct action such as violent land reclaiming 
or destruction of corporate property), external assistance tends to be sought out by 
community leaders. Becoming indigenous therefore invites external assistance, which 
often leads to a form of direct intervention and surrogacy, during which perceptions 
are altered, meanings are inflected, and political aspirations are domesticated 
(Schefold 1998). 
While this fits the broad conceptual patterns already mapped by some scholars 
(Li 2007; McWilliarn 2006; Warren 2005; Weiner and Glaskin 2006), no one 
assumes that the minutia of each struggle for recognition will follow the same 
trajectory. Indeed, it was only after primary recognition had been achieved in the 
cases of Gowa, Majene, Palopo, Seko (North Luwu), Soroako (East Luwu), and Tana 
Toraja, that the finer points about remedial land claims, resource entitlements, and 
antedated systems of governance could even start to be negotiated. Thus the political 
consequences of recognition remain contingent and contextual, with specific actors 
collaborating in different settings, serving a host of particularistic interests and 
disparate objectives. 
In the new political constellation, local adat communities tend to be bound by 
the same fori-native traumas (conquest, alienation, expulsion). They operate in similar 
(decentralised) political arenas, where they are encouraged by local activists and 
mobilised by supporters to become indigenous and reclaim political authority. This 
frequently involves the targeted articulation of mainstream goals and aspirations such 
as sustainable environmental management, indigenous rights, pluralism, and tolerance 
in order to attract a well endowed international audience. Moreover, local 
communities are confronting equivalent obstacles, including entrenched structures of 
power, constitutive political conditions, supremacy of state law and regulatory 
notations, and institutionalised patterns of (non-threatening) primary recognition. 
However, even with these political variables in place, there is no consistency 
in 
outcome and no predictability of consequence. 
Chapters three through five critically examined the specific ways in which 
struggles for recognition have been domesticated and captured though subtle 
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institutional processes and the patterned regularity of district regulations. The case 
studies range from the coastal villages of Majene, where political activists remain 
isolated, to the Seko highlands of North Luwu, where adat revivalism has become 
intermingled with international donor projects such as the Multi-stakeholder Forestry 
Programme (MFP). The protagonists behind such campaigns have endeavoured to 
reconcile primordial imperatives (the search for antiquity and exemplars) with 
modernising projects, ranging from the institution of patterned regularity to 
emancipatory political innovations. 
All of the district regulations concerning adat that have been passed in South 
Sulawesi since 2000 include calculated statements about the need to 'empower, 
preserve and develop customs and traditions'. Using Gowa, Majene and Palopo as 
examples in chapter three, it was found that little or no public input went into the 
drafting of these regulations. By contrast, the internationally- driven processes in Seko 
broke with this trend by ensuring that adat communities were able to participate in 
negotiations, and were consulted throughout. Thus efforts have been made to 
mobilise communities to reclaim political responsibility in the name of adat. 
As indicated in the second research question (Q2), most visible in this new 
political constellation is the enhanced role of intervening parties, the driving forces 
behind the so-called indigenous awakening. Just as the early Leiden law scholars and 
Orientalists inadvertently relegated adat to the status of folklore by divorcing it from 
its political and economic base, contemporary preservationists and revivalists 
unwittingly contribute to the circumvention of adat's potential as an oppositional 
force for change. Just as Dutch intervention in Sulawesi (1905 onwards) set in motion 
direct and deliberate processes of reconstructing adat in politically non-threatening 
terms, the banality of contemporary NGO and donor-driven interventions tend to 
shape local perceptions, encapsulate local initiatives, and temper the political 
consequences of adat revivalism. 
Calculated efforts to reclassify and index adat communities, 
for the sake of 
administrative and bureaucratic coherence in the era of decentralisation, mirror 
the 
early Dutch efforts to map adat communities and draw up administrative 
frameworks. 
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In both eras, these efforts have been couched in predictable terms such as protecting 
and preserving unique, vulnerable communities, or emancipation in modemising, 
rationalist terms. Moreover, colonial mapping efforts and legibility campaigns served 
pragmatic ends such as improving the scope and reach of the colonial apparatus, 
including the ability to penetrate distant regions, expand resource extraction, and limit 
or co-opt potential sources of resistance. Teams of legal experts were deployed in 
order to consult village chiefs and document oral traditions, establishing borders and 
mapping remote terrains, and engaging in activities that "assumed as well as sought to 
engineer" native populations (Li 2000: 159). 
Once again, this is echoed in the present as third-parties venture into remote 
locales in search of exemplars, attempting to accentuate indigenous signifiers and 
('ethno-symbolism" (Smith 1986) in order to present compelling, legitimating 
evidence as to the existence of their client communities. Recognition of the existence 
of the adat community paves the way for particularistic, remedial political claims 
such as land ownership, eligibility for compensation, resource entitlement, and the 
right to return to antedated systems of governance. 
As in colonial times, official responses to adat revivalism can be characterised 
by the volksverheffing principle, which, as stated previously, refers to the 
emancipation of the native population without threatening to undermine colonial 
power (Weber et al. 2003: 407-409). This was a key component of the strategy to 
ensure the continued existence of the colonial state, one based largely on the loyalty 
of a new class of educated native elite. In its most recent manifestation, 
volksverheffing ensures that no substantive targets regarding improvements 
in 
livelihoods, land tenure security, or ecological preservation were to be set. Rather, 
power brokers equate emancipation with harmony, and view reform 
in the narrow 
sense, such as improving consciousness, extending aid, promoting education, and 
other variants of social engineering. Both past and present, the 
intention was that no 
connection be drawn between emancipation and civic disobedience, or social uplifting 
and rightful resistance, thus leaving the constitutive political conditions undisturbed. 
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Ultimately, this thesis sought to uncover the ways in which third-parties, 
mediators, governors, corporate executives, and other power brokers managed to 
capture and shape the politics of tradition in particular local settings. Moreover, the 
case studies were intended to glean community responses to these endeavours, which 
ranged from resistance to emulation, rejection to mimicry. Finally, given that these 
contextual dynamics are subject to, and highly contingent upon, constant 
reconfiguration. and renegotiation between individuals, between and within 
communities, and between all relevant parties, firsthand field research in Sulawesi 
was needed in order to keep pace with and map these changes on the ground. 
Collaboration and Coercion 
In addition to rights and recognition, this thesis sought to investigate the extent to 
which the process of "becoming indigenous" could foster peaceful collaboration 
between local protagonists in conflict zones (research Q3, Q4 and Q5). Contradicting 
the cosmopolitan harmony ideologies used to characterise occupants of Indonesia's 
"tribal slot" (Li 2000), communities frequently resort to violence when the processes 
of mediation,, deliberation, and negotiation are prostrated, instrumentalised, or break 
down altogether. Some coalesce around radical agendas, while others fragment and 
whither. Older generations that honed their skills during the New Order era have 
begun to forge their own strategies, mobilising supporters around carefully cultivated 
images and discourses of adat while establishing points of leverage in the field in 
order to pressure corporate managers and government officials. 
A reprieve from the stifling authoritarianism of the New Order era prompted a 
shift away from coercion and towards more subtle forrns of power. Indeed, the gentle 
compulsion of institutional power has been deployed in novel ways, tempering 
the 
native hue of political resolution through discreet regulatory processes, mechanistic 
dispute resolution procedures, and donor-approved methods of 
deliberation and 
negotiation. In Kajang and Soroako, for instance, domestic alliances and associations 
endeavoured to steer the process of adat revivalism 
in order to redress power 
differentials and overcome legacies of land alienation and 
disenfranchisement. This 
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involves engaging with self-serving and cautious politicians, entrenched elites, 
nepotistic power brokers, predatory bosses, corrupt bureaucrats, vitriolic security 
forces,, cunning corporate managers, unscrupulous entrepreneurs, and elusive, 
subversive networks. 
Challenging the dominant structures and institutions of power, however, does 
not necessarily mean transcending them. An adat community, or specific households 
within an adat community, or any communities accentuating their links to the past, 
may be granted recognition, secure their rights, and achieve their particularistic 
interests through a variety of means, including ad hoc tribunals, negotiated 
settlements,, or formal judicial processes. This constitutes a victory in a narrow, 
contingent, and contextual sense,, typically driven by external agents and third-party 
intervention, and is rarely replicable. 
To maintain the appearance that the actual customs and traditions being 
rediscovered in cases such as Seko, and Kajang were compatible with wider political 
campaigns for human rights and environmental preservation, support networks, 
facilitators and trustees have been selective in their representations of adat. The target 
constituencies (local villagers), for their part, were often found to be indecisive, 
indifferent, or sceptical. Far from the characterisation of exemplary adat communities 
committed to inclusive village deliberation, fluid in their approach to customary law 
and governance, and adaptive in their land use practices, there are numerous incidents 
of reactionary and violent responses to external pressures. 
From the 1970s onwards, rural citizens (whether considered part of traditional 
communities or not) have been confronted with proposals for land reform (in the 
name of ecological preservation or economic development), bids by prospective 
investors (mainly extractive companies), rationalised agrarian systems, shifts towards 
private ownership and property registry, and rising commodity prices. In numerous 
instances this has caused internal ruptures and the decay of traditional leadership 
structures, prompting communal conflict, inter-ethnic strife, forcible resettlement, and 
the manipulation of tradition to serve particularistic, exclusivist political and 
economic interests. 
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In an idealised, essentiallsed, functioning customary system true to (at least 
some of) its antecedents, villagers, their leaders, and their supporters would debate 
the various responses to the pressures of modernity, ranging from rejection to 
alteration to approval, and develop appropriate strategies. If the choice was to adapt 
to modernising conditions, then contingencies must be established in order to 
maintain the character and essence of the adat community. The fractiousness, 
violence, and betrayal that has resulted from many of these encounters between 
tradition and modernity suggest that the musyawarah has broken down, that 
customary institutions have struggled to cope with changing conditions, and that the 
heterogeneity of village life fosters an incompatibility of political interests, values, 
and preferences. Thus enter the surrogates, made up of third-party supporters, 
trustees, coalitions, activist networks, and allies. 
Local communities are frequently encouraged to draw on the past in search of 
meaning and identity, while the representation of adat and its articulation is 
contingent and constantly changing. Thus the protagonists involved in foregrounding 
local aspirations and cultivating new generations in territories such as Seko have 
drawn on primordial signifiers to support modem, reconfigured village units. This is a 
variant of Smith's (2004: 204) proposition that ethnicity (or becoming indigenous) is 
not meant to "recreate the past in the present, " but rather to serve as an "inspiration 
and means for renewing decayed or fragmented societies, so as to make them viable 
and confident in the face of the pressures of modemity". 
Efforts to reinvent Indonesia's adat communities can be traced back to 
colonial times, during which notions of customs and traditions were reconfigured so 
as to fit comfortably into modem administrative systems. Policy during the Dutch 
liberal era (1870-1900) in particular was found to be self-contradictory, seeking at 
once to "promote social change and to retard it-to transform the indigenous social 
order and to preserve it" (Legge 1980: 95). These contradictions have, to an extent, 
been transposed onto the contemporary autonomy agenda, with the intermingling of 
domesticating agendas and innovative schemes such as participative community 
mapping, multi-stakeholder initiatives, and democratic local governance. 
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Variants of these programmes have been endorsed by many of the district 
goverm-nents of Sulawesi, especially those eager to stymie potential threats to 
entrenched interests and constitutive conditions. Normalisation achieved through the 
deployment of institutional power is less costly than overt, coercive exertions of 
power. In the context of decentralisation, outbreaks of violence and confrontation 
such as those in Kajang prompt automatic responses from a newly independent and 
highly vocal public sphere, including the press corps, NGO networks, and human 
rights commissions. Thus the diffuse, soft approach of regulatory processes and 
multi-party deliberations may be the most effective means to redirect and subdue the 
otherwise creative potential of adat as an oppositional force for change. 
Third-party intervention also contributes to this process of gentle compulsion. 
Having established a clear set of objectives that were compatible with those from the 
Ministry of Forestry, for instance, MFP facilitators and their domestic "partners" 
(AMAN-SS and YBS) arrived in Seko with a predetermined social and political 
context within which their local clients could find areas of compatibility. 521 This was 
achieved though negotiated access, intervening in Seko with a legitimate (government 
approved) mandate for reform and a viable operating budget in order to cultivate a 
new class of local activists, those capable of instituting rational frameworks for 
development and optimal forest management. Forms of social engineering have been 
deployed in order to make farmers out of peasants and to replace the bullock cart with 
the motor car, as citizens are increasingly subjected to development and modernity. 
The Seko initiatives seem to have tempered and domesticated adat revivalism 
through the quaint, gradual, donor-friendly processes of deliberation and negotiation. 
Instead of focusing on the practicalities of customary rights or devising new strategies 
in order to rupture the web of governance, activists and local communities 
have fallen 
back into Lev's (1985: 64) shackles of "elegant policy" as witnessed through the 
promulgation of several redundant district regulations 
in recognition of an elusive, 
intangible, apolitical adat. 
521 For a concise critique of "partnership" in aid and 
donor discourses, see Crawford (2003). 
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Many local MFP partners were found to have willingly subscribed to this 
officialising surrogacy, just as many local activists and villagers did so unwittingly. 
However, if the intenningling of an international donor project with Seko's 
indigenous awakening forges a lasting and effective partnership, helping to preserve 
and manage North Luwu's vulnerable ecosystem and improve livelihoods, then for 
many this would be a legitimate and justified outcome regardless of the 
misrepresentations and distortions along the way. 
In the event that adat communities and their myriad supporters are able to 
mount a sustained challenge to existing conditions-including flawed tenure systems, 
maladministration of the forestry sector, appropriation of lands and resources, forcible 
removal of populations, and the endangering of livelihoods-govemment officials may 
deploy a variety of counter strategies. For instance, threatening, subversive, or 
desperate actions such as forcible land reclaiming or destruction of corporate property 
can be criminalised, representing a simple exercise of institutional power. They may 
also be violently suppressed, representing coercive power. By contrast, reforming 
actions taken by villagers, such as struggles for primary rights (recognition), may be 
absorbed by government officials, redirected through official channels and converted 
into drawn-out regulatory processes or tenurial negotiations. 
From Gowa to Tana Toraja, mayors and parliamentarians have embraced 
narrow views of cultural revivalism, attempting to instrumentalise local rituals and 
bureaucratise adat governance. Stipulations regarding ownership of customary 
lands 
and resources have been omitted from the official regulations, even 
if North Luwu 
and Tana Toraja went somewhat further than Palopo, Gowa and 
Majene. With few 
exceptions, customary territories continue to be recognised as autonomous, as 
stipulated in the decentralisation legislation, but without the granting of substantive 
rights enforceable by law. Thus the volksverheffing policy continues. 
Conclusion: Becoming Indigenous 
Regarding research Q3, external intervention was 
found to foster dependency within 
communities. Supporters and trustees are 
known for inflecting meanings, shaping 
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perceptions and subjectivities, and articulating local strategies on behalf of their 
intended beneficiaries (Weiner and Glaskin 2006). In the selective process of 
becoming indigenous, local communities consciously or unconsciously succumb to 
efforts to recreate a "distinguished pedigree" for the group, one based on ethnic rather 
than civic virtues (Guibernau 2004: 137). This involves the emphasising of collective 
origins, the exemplification of ancestral deeds, the feeding of subjective beliefs in 
kinship relations, and the animating of memories of "transcendental moments" which 
represent the "cradle" of collective characters (Guibernau 2004: 137). Such analysis 
fits the broad, patronising pattern decried by critics such as Kaldor (2004). However, 
as these conclusions are drawn with greater firequency, they tend to become a type of 
orthodoxy, repeated for years without sufficient consideration as to the potential for 
growth and development at the local level. 
Chapter four revealed that the short-term surrogacy of international donors, 
national trustees, and local NGOs was intended to cultivate a new generation of 
activists in Seko capable of managing their own political struggles. Similarly, chapter 
five signified the ways in which district authorities sought to determine the criteria for 
the revival of Lembang governance, silencing and subduing political opposition along 
the way. This is part of a political process that constantly evolves and proceeds in 
unanticipated ways. Evidence gleaned Erom interviews and document analysis 
demonstrated that many local voices arise in opposition to the sanitised discourses of 
aid and donor agencies, and many reject the gentle compulsion of district power 
brokers. Indeed, despite the best laid plans, there are very few instances where local 
conditions mirror the optimising blueprints set out by steering committees on 
decentralisation or by multilateral donor agencies striving to preserve Indonesia's 
ecosystems while empowering forest-dependent communities. 
Rather than passively falling back on the "non-state-legitimising ideologies of 
adat" (Fitzpatrick 2007: 138), local communities are being driven forward 
by new 
activists alliances and ad hoc associations determined to highlight, accentuate, and 
ultimately recreate adat exemplars. The objective is often collaborative community 
renewal, which draws on both primordial and instrumental aspects of adat 
in order to 
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pressure government officials and corporate managers into renegotiating the terms of 
land settlements and compensation packages. Thus, as Smith (2004: 204) alluded to in 
his broad analysis of nationalism, the deployment of tradition is used to cope with the 
pressures of modernity. 
Throughout Sulawesi, boundaries are constantly being renegotiated and 
customary territories overlain by modem administrative grids, though without 
eradicating all ascriptive ties to the past. Rather, adat has become a finely tuned 
instrument, catering to specific audiences in pursuit of tangible political objectives, 
while retaining some popular resonance amongst autochthonous communities by 
appealing to particular antecedents and signifiers. This applies to many of the Bugis, 
Makassarese, Toraja, and Mandar of Sulawesi, who have long-standing reputations 
for their dedication to historiography, the proud chronicling of historical genealogies, 
and the diligent preservation of indigenous manuscripts (Abidin 1971; Pelras 1993). 
Bourchier (1997: 15 8) lamented the frequent distillation of indigenous mantras 
such as musyawarah (deliberation) and mufakat (consensus) into simplistic, legible 
formulas by conservative governing officials and bureaucrats. However, these same 
mantras feature prominently in the discourses and narratives of adat revivalists and 
their activist supporters throughout Indonesia. In Tana Toraja (chapter five), the 
pemangku adat from Lembang Madandan-particularly Den Upa Rombelayuk and 
Lasso Sombolinggi-have worked tirelessly towards the convergence of indigenous 
mantras such as tongkonan (kinship centre) and kombongan (village deliberation) 
with modem, democratic imperatives. The persistent danger, however, is that in the 
context of local autonomy, these mantras may be subsumed within the notations of 
the state, regulated in order to further penetrate the village. They may serve to 
enhance bureaucratic capacity as in Palopo, to stymie local opposition as in Majene, 
or foment divisions within and between communities. 
Chapters six and seven move beyond the primary search for recognition, 
foregrounding specific, remedial struggles over land involving adat communities, 
communities operating under the banner of adat, government 
functionaries, and 
extractive companies. Here the Indonesian variant of Azarya's 
(2003: 14) "ethnic 
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arithmetic" has been most visible as villagers have been led to embrace exclusivist 
discourses of atavism in order to bolster claims over lucrative lands. Empirical 
findings based on firsthand field research helped gauge the extent to which local 
communities and their supporters managed to reconfigure notions of primordialism in 
pursuit of thoroughly modem political goals. 
Since 2001 it has become clear that, owing to the ambiguous nature of 
decentralisation, a variety of elites (entrenched and emerging), resource gatekeepers, 
and rent-seeking actors have attempted to reposition themselves in order to capitalise 
on and perpetuate instability. In some instances this repositioning was intended to 
hijack local democratising processes, in others to capture the benefits that accrue 
from policy realignments (such as devolving authority over the issuance of land 
permits or concessions). The case of the Kajang farmers in Bulukumba district was 
particularly fraught with ambiguities as a result of chameleonic opportunists, power 
brokers, and "ethnic political entrepreneurs" (Aspinall 2007: 952). 
Critics such as McCarthy (2004) and Hadiz (2004) are to an extent correct to 
argue that the decentralisation laws were intentionally designed to insulate and 
buttress the authority of central state from oppositional challenges. Such propositions 
also demand that one considers whether, despite the best laid plans, all of the 
contingencies have not been accounted for, and the human inclination to resist will 
continue to manifest in new and innovative ways. 
Consequently, most post-reformasi analysis offers (what is now) a 
conventional prospectus for change. This involves the "encoding" and unleashing of 
community aspirations (Acciaioli 2001: 88), the "reinvigoration" of grassroots politics 
(Antl6v 2003b: 76), "simultaneous coalition building" (Schonwdlder 1997: 768) and 
the ("forging [of] alliances between disenfranchised groups" (Ehnhirst 2001: 304) by 
appealing to "universalistic" (civic) rather than "particularistic" (ethnic) 
interests 
(Blair 2000: 26). This conventional prospectus derives from the "political school" of 
decentralisation (Malley 2003), and affirms the early rallying calls made by Dr. 
Paulus Santosa, founder of the developmental NGO CD Bethesda in 1974, 
particularly the need to bring politics back to the village 
(cited in Bunnell 1996: 196). 
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Given the complexities and realities on the ground, however, there is no 
integrated grand strategy for dealing with adat revivalism, and no local consensus (the 
arrival of external experts, trustees and facilitators is met with elation in some 
quarters, trepidation in others). Moreover, there are no special tribunals mandated to 
resolve land tenure disputes, nor are there definitive laws equivalent to the Republic 
of the Philippines Act 8371 (known as 'The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997'). 
Instead, there are only scattered, provisional clauses and overlapping stipulations 
contained in a myriad of laws and ordinances. 
In order for adat communities to reconcile their differences and the diversity 
of their positions, they must articulate a clear position and mobilise according to a 
unified objective. Otherwise, local participation will continue to be prostrated, 
downward accountability will be little more than an exercise in appeasement, and 
representation will be exploited by local groups acting against one another in a 
mutually detrimental scenario. 
The differentiation between rural adat communities in terms of geographical 
location, ethnic composition, and political interests makes it difficult for them and 
their supporters to strike a harmonious cord. The search for widely applicable 
remedies to long-term intractable problems at the local level based on invocations of 
adat is proving immensely difficult. Activists, organisations, and external supporters 
are facing formidable challenges such as recentralisation efforts and blockages by the 
state, legal and political uncertainty, threats of elite capture, and resistance at the 
grassroots level. 
However, these dilemmas are not insurmountable, and may still be offset by 
the independent action taken by domestic interest groups (supported by evolving 
coalitions of activists and NGOs) that recognise the opportunities and new political 
spaces created by loosening of state restrictions. In other words, unforeseen 
developments that counterpoise the mainstream (domesticating) decentralisation 
plans of the state are occurring as local constituencies and their allies take pre- 
emptive action to secure their interests. This relates to Tan's 
(2007: 212) analysis of 
decentralisation in Thailand, where the "best chance" for democracy and the public 
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sphere to emerge out of the "Ideological vacuum of money politics and royal 
patronage" was to be found at local (municipal) levels. 
To conclude with reference to research Q4 and Q5, it is apparent that local 
activism is on the rise in Indonesia, and an emboldened civil society is expanding 
rapidly. The revival of adat is an integral part of this trendý transpiring within a new 
political environment and, for the first time, being exposed to the principles of 
modem democracy without stifling censorship and overt repression. Local indigenous 
communities and their burgeoning advocacy networks are engaged in a collaborative 
process of constructing local identities and cultures in order to increase their political 
leverage and bolster their bargaining position vis-a-vis the state. 
If the revitalisation of adat takes on everyday meanings that resonate with the 
local population and does not degenerate into conflicts over meaning or exclusionary 
practices, it is possible that mobilisations of adat will culminate in substantive gains. 
Local groups may yet articulate their interests in unifying terms based on common 
objectives rather than highlighting antagonisms and differences. It seems that, on 
balance,, the ongoing challenge will be to strike a balance between modem political 
imperatives and commitments to tradition. To maintain a viable political movement 
and exert authority, a degree of adaptation, compatibility and incorporation will be 
necessary for adat communities to flourish in the era of decentralisation. Conversely, 
a degree of preservation of the traditions, practices and meanings associated with the 
customary order will be necessary to represent adat as something more than a 
convenient reinvention of an otherwise forgotten past. 
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Appendix A: List of Interviewees 
1. Abdul Khalik Mone, member of the 2001 Special Committee for Regulatory 
Oversight, People's Representative Council (DPRD), Gowa District 
2. Abdul Madjid Sallatu., Director of the Institute for Local Social Development, 
University of Hasanuddin, Makassar 
3. Ade Chandra, Sub-district Head of Nuha, East Luwu District 
4. Agung Wiyono, Fonner Director of Lepmil, Kendari, Southeast Sulawesi 
5. Anas Nikoian, Regional Facilitator of the Multi-stakeholder Forestry 
Programme (MFP), Kendarl, Southeast Sulawesi 
6. Andi Abdul Malik, coordinator of labour relations and security at Palangisang 
Estate, PT London Sumatra (Lonsum), Bulukumba District 
7. Andi Baso, one of the founders of the Indigenous Soroakan Organisation 
(Kerukunan Wawainia Ash Soroako or KWAS) 
8. Andi Kurnala. Idjo, Adat Chief from Balla Lompoa Palace (and museum), 
Gowa District 
9. Andi Sudinnan Mangkona, Head of Sub-district Kajang, Bulukumba 
10. Andi Yayat Pangeran, third-party to the dispute resolution process in Malili, 
East Luwu District 
11. Anshary, adat expert from Tande, Sub-district Banggae, Majene 
12. Anwar Hafid, Head of Governance Division, East Luwu District 
13. Arfah M., negotiator for PT Inco's Department of External Relations 
14. ATianto Sangaji, prominent activist and scholar from Palu, Central Sulawesi 
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15. Arifin Djunaidi, Deputy Mayor of North Luwu District 
16. Bahrum, Bureau of Regional Autonomy, Provincial Governors Office, 
Makassar 
17. Daud Pakondongan Tandigau, founder of To Tana Lalong Customary 
Deliberative Council, Township of Palopo 
18. Den Upa Rombelayuk, adat leader from Lembang Madandan, Tana Toraja 
19. Dias Pradadimara, Centre of East Indonesia Studies, Hasanuddin University, 
Makassar 
20. Edi Suherdi, Manager of PT Inco's External Relations, Soroako 
2 1. Emil Kleden, National Secretariat of the Indigenous Peoples Alliance of the 
Archipelago (AMAN), Jakarta 
22. Erik Stephen Siape, Member of Team Five Dongi, Soroako, East Luwu 
23. Esther Velthoven, Royal Dutch Institute of War Documentation 
24. Gerry van Klinken, Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and 
Caribbean Studies (KITLV) 
25. Gus MacKay, Programme Administrator, Multi-stakeholder Forestry 
Programme 
26. H. Ilham Arief Sirajuddin, Mayor of Makassar 
27. H. Mallingkai Maknun, Head of the People's Representative Council, Gowa 
District 
28. H. Syafruddin Kaiyurn, District Secretary of Gowa 
29. Haj Andi Hatta Marakarma, Mayor of East Luwu District 
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30. Haj Andi Makmun Bautayang Karaenta Bantolangkasa, Curator at Balla 
Lompoa Palace (and museum), Gowa District 
3 1. Haj Hadidjah Katta, Head of the General Election Commission, District of 
Majene 
32. Haj Hamdana A. Tashan, MS., Mayoral Candidate, District of Majene 
33. Hasan, a prominent community figure from Tande village, District of Majene 
34. Head of Bonto Biraeng village, Sub-district Kajang, Bulukumba 
35. Head of the Forestry Bureau, District Govemment of Majene 
36. Head of the Village Governance Agency, Tana Tora a District j 
37. H. M. Arsyad Sanusi, Head of the Provincial Court of South Sulawesi, 
Makassar 
38. H. M. Yarnin, Bureau of Regional Autonomy, Provincial Governors Office, 
Makassar 
39. H. P. A. Tenriadjeng, Mayor of Palopo 
40. Ikhsan Welly, Director of the NGO Yanmarindo, Majene 
4 1. Irawan Ali,, Head of Sub-district Wasuponda, East Luwu 
42. Ir. Sugito, Manager of PT Lonsum's Palangisang Estate, Bulukumba District 
43. Jaharuddin Tosalili, former head of Kerukunan Wawainia Ash Soroako 
(KWAS) 
44. Jeffrey Ong, Development Programme Officer, Embassy of Canada, Jakarta 
45. Jushar Huduri, Head of the Bureau of Finance, Provincial Governors Office, 
Makassar 
46. Lasso Sombolinggi, Head of WALDA, Tana Toraja District 
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47. Mahmud Malissa, an adat expert from Pallarangan, Majene 
48. Mahir Takaka, Head of AMAN South Sulawesi, Makassar 
49. Marce, activist from NGO Bantaya Palu, Central Sulawesi 
50. Members of the Kajang Fanner's Union (SPK), Buluk-umba (names withheld) 
5 1. Muis Mandra, Head of KAPPMAM, Majene 
52. Naomi Werima, an Activist from the Karongsi'e Dongi Community, Sub- 
district Wasuponda, East Luwu 
53. Neighbourhood head (Rulcun Tetangga), Nikkel Village, Old Soroako (name 
withheld), East Luwu 
54. Norbert Eschbom, Representative to Indonesia and East Limor, Konrad 
Adenaur Stiftung (KAS) 
55. Palino Popang, Deputy-Mayor, Tana Toraja District 
56. Patabai Pa Bokori, former Mayor of Bulukumba (1995-2005) 
57. Paulus Tangke, Deputy-Head of the People's Representative Council, Tana 
Toraj a District 
58. Philips J. Vermonte, Department of International Relations, Centre for 
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Jakarta 
59. Rahim S., negotiator for PT Inco's Department of External Relations 
60. Ramli Laduri, Member of Team Five Dongi, Sub-district Wasuponda, East 
Luwu 
6 1. Richard Manning, Team Leader of the Support Office for Eastern Indonesia 
(SWEI), a multidonor facility administered by the World Bank, 
headquartered in Makassar 
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62. Rosda Masrich, Head of the Bureau of Law and lnstitutionsý Provincial 
Govemors Office, Makassar 
63. Ryaas Rashid, one of the original framers of Decentralisation Laws 22/1999 
and 25/1999 
64. Saba Sombolinggi, Head of Lembang Madandan, Tana Tora a District i 
65. Sahbuddin Urnar, Executive Director of YBS, Palopo 
66. Sam Sumastomo, Head of the Forestry Department, North Luwu District 
67. Samin, Member of the Special Committee for Regulatory Oversight, People's 
Representative Council, Tana Toraja District 
68. Sawedi Muhammad, Superintendent of External Relations, PT Inco, Soroako 
69. Staff from WALHI Makassar (names withheld) 
70. Village informant (name withheld) from contested area in Bonto Biraeng 
village, Sub-district Kajang, Bulukumba 
7 1. Yusri, member of the Indigenous Karongsi'e Dongi Organisation 
(KRAPASKAD), Soroako 
72. Yusuf Biringkanae, Director of the Alliance of Tora an Customary i 
Communities, Tana Toraja District 
73. Yuyun Indradi, National Secretariat of AMAN, Jakarta 
74. Zainuddin, third-party negotiator, Bulukumba district 
